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PREFACE
With this volume, the African Studies Center of Boston University
introduces a modification in the series title. The former Boston
University Papers in African History will now be known as Boston
University Papers on Africa. Subsequent volumes in this series will
deal with political affairs and interdisciplinary subjects as well as
history. This volume, Volume II, consists mostly of papers presented
during the 1963-1964 meetings of the Seminars on African History
held by the African Studies Center. Other volumes are in the course
of preparation. Volume III, edited by Jeffrey Butler and A. A.
Castagno, includes papers given at the Seminars on African Politics
held between 1963 and 1965, and others submitted directly by the
authors; Volume IV is a group of essays on historical and archaeo-
logical subjects, collected and edited by Norman R. Bennett.
Most of the papers in this volume are wholly or partly concerned
with the activities of non-African groups and individuals in the
colonial period, albeit on issues related to some part of Africa.
Enthusiasm among the growing group of African historians is cer-
tainly great, but it is, perhaps, fair to say that there is more talk
than work on the difficult problems of precolonial history. A new
generation of historians is being trained now, hopefully to bombard
editors with papers which their more senior colleagues could not
have written. If so, as an editor, I can only pray, unlike the in-
fantrymen of the twentieth century, for the barrage from the other
side to begin.
The widespread preference for subjects which have a close rela-
tionship with colonial history is probably due to the understandable
reluctance of scholars already trained in departments of history to
master difficult languages and techniques, which may be feared to
be applicable only in a limited number of societies. This may be a
problem that will disappear because of generous grants from founda-
tions and support under the National Defense Education Act. In
the meantime, historians should not fail to exploit the considerable
skills of anthropologists and other social scientists who, in the
course of research already completed, have inevitably gone into
v
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historical questions. The papers from Creighton Gabel (archaeology)
and Ronald Cohen (anthropology) are therefore welcome, and I
hope they will serve as a goad and an example to others. Historians
should encourage their colleagues in other disciplines to produce
papers in African history.
Many people helped me in preparing this volume. W. O. Brown,
Director of the African Studies Center, has, as always, supported
the seminar and series generously, making available both secretarial
help and money for the expenses of contributors. In June 1965,
Professor Brown retired as director: I hope this series will continue
for many years as one of the “voices” of the Center that he founded.
Many scholars gave me confidential opinions on individual papers,
which considerably lightened the burden of judgment as to merit.
Norman Bennett and Dan McCall were consulted on many ques-
tions. Alan Booth, Svend Holsoe, and William Lye took a great deal
of trouble to make sure that errors were eliminated. Alyce Havey
and Jacoba van Schaik were responsible for all those things which
secretaries can do and scholars cannot. I thank all of them and, of
course, must add that the final responsibility for the editing rests
on me.
Jeffrey Butler
Wesleyan University
February 1965
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IPrehistoric Populations of Africa
by
CREIGHTON GABEL
Associate Professor of Anthropology,
Boston University

In reviewing the commentaries of historians, archaeologists, and
some physical anthropologists on the human types which contrib-
uted to various aspects of Africa’s past, one finds a surprising degree
of superficiality in the reconstructions offered. It is not my intention
to set about producing a reclassification of African peoples, past or
present, or even to add my name to the growing list of those at-
tempting new definitions of "race.” I simply would like to make
some observations on the current assessments of physical types and
the prevailing attitudes regarding their respective roles in African
prehistory. One facet of the problem involves relatively simple
anthropological concepts (or, rather, the failure to apply them),
while another, more complex facet has to do with changes in con-
cepts of human biology over the past few years. The latter have
considerable bearing not only on our estimations of existing physi-
cal variations but also on our understanding of earlier populations,
which are the concern of this paper . 1
1. Racial Origins
Race
,
Language
,
and Culture
One notable tendency among Africanist scholars is the deplorable
—and inexcusable
—
predilection for confusing race, language, and
culture. The careful discrimination among these phenomena has
long since been well established elsewhere in the world, in practice
as well as in theory; in Africa, much confusion still prevails. Thus
we find undue emphasis being placed upon “Hamitic” peoples:
because these groups speak similar languages and follow a pastoral
way of life, they somehow belong to the same race, however much
1 Interest in this problem was initiated as the result of fieldwork in Rhodesia
supported by the National Science Foundation, and while writing this study I
have been the recipient of a grant from the Joint African Studies Committee
of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research
Council.
3
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they may differ physically. As Lewis has shown, these people are
further equated, often uncritically, with the dissemination in Africa
of various forms of social and political institutions.2 It does not stop
here, for having once concocted such associations, further conces-
sions are soon forthcoming. The pastoral Fulani, who belong to the
West Atlantic subfamily of Niger-Congo languages, are neatly fitted
into the Hamitic linguistic fold, and the Khoisan-speaking Hotten-
tots, with their physical affinities to the Bushmen, are treated in the
same fashion.3 This attitude is not limited to old-fashioned his-
torians and linguists, since we find the same line defended in
Huntingford’s recent discussion of African peoples: “Greenberg
objects also to a correlation between ‘pastoral’ life and the speaking
of Hamitic languages. His reasons, which have a ‘racialist’ flavour,
are not very convincing, for he has apparently failed to realize the
extent to which the Hamites are pastoral.”4
Among cultural historians, Murdock seems to be one of the few
who regard the “Hamitic” affinities of the Hottentots as nonsense.5
Even in recent texts on physical anthropology, a Hamitic increment
in these people seems to be taken for granted.6 We may also note
that Ashley Montagu has a racial category of “Bantu-speaking
Negroes,” a “convenience” for distinguishing certain Central and
South African populations from other Negroids. 7 He of course
knows better, but this scarcely helps to clarify matters for cultural
and social anthropologists.
2 H. S. Lewis, “Ethnology and African Culture-History,” unpublished MS
(1962), and “Historical Problems in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa,” Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences
,
no. 96 (1962), 504-562.
3
J. Greenberg, “The Languages of Africa,” International Journal of Ameri-
can Linguistics, no. 29 ( 1963 )
.
4 G. W. B. Huntingford, “The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by Its
Modem Inhabitants,” in History of East Africa, ed. R. Oliver and G. Mathew
(London, 1963), 69.
5 G. P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History (New York,
1959), 56-57.
6 M. F. A. Montagu, An Introduction to Physical Anthropology, 3rd ed.
(Springfield, 1960), 430; C. S. Coon, The Origin of Races (New York, 1962),
646.
7 Montagu, Introduction, 424.
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Migration Theories
Another problem, and one not altogether unrelated to that above,
is recognizable as a well-entrenched disposition to explain historical
developments in Africa—especially south of the Sahara—in terms of
migrations which introduced cultural changes in the form of im-
proved technologies, new social systems, or more elaborate political
structures. The migration question itself is largely a cultural-his-
torical one, not biological, though it is often seen to have racial
overtones. As such, it is subject to methodological examination with
respect to cultural form and function, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively, as well as geographical and chronological considerations. 8
Insofar as the “Hamitic theory” is structured in racial terms, it has
been carried back far into prehistoric times. “Proto-Hamites” are
said to have first appeared in the Kenya Upper Capsian at Gamble’s
Cave in deposits at least 7,000-8,000 years old. Leakey believes this
industry ( and, by implication at least, the associated physical type
)
to have come from Palestine via Arabia in Upper Pleistocene times.9
Yet there seems to be little in Arabia that would warrant such an
origin. 10 Comparable physical types have even been recognized by
some workers in southern Africa,11 but these “Proto-Hamites”
(“Caucasoids,” “Europoids,” “Erythriotes” ) are all too frequently
either pulled out of context or loosely interpreted in what might be
termed a “morphological-historical” sense. For example, the Kaka-
mas Hottentots, often cited as historical representatives of such
migrations, are known to have intermarried with Bushmen and
Negroes. 12
Honea, using a good deal of questionable archaeological inter-
8 I. Rouse, “The Inference of Migrations from Anthropological Evidence,” in
“Migrations in New World Culture History,” ed. R. H. Thompson, University
of Arizona Social Science Bulletin, no. 27 (1958), 63-68.
9 L. S. B. Leakey, Adam’s Ancestors (New York, 1960), 130.
10 G. Caton-Thompson, “The Evidence of South Arabian Palaeoliths and
the Question of Pleistocene Land Connection with Africa,” Proceedings of the
Third Pan-African Congress on Prehistory (London, 1957), 380-384.
11 L. H. Wells, “Late Stone Age Human Types in Central Africa,” ibid.,
183-185.
12 R. Singer, “The Boskop ‘Race* Problem,” Man, no. 58 (1958), 232.
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pretation, finds Hamites all over the Maghreb, Northeast Africa, the
Sahara, and East Africa—with the Hottentot “Hamites” migrating
to South Africa directly from the Sahara through the Congo. 13
During the time in question (late Stone Age), we have evidence
only of Negroid populations in the Sudan and southern Sahara.
British historians as well as members of the Kulturhistorische
Schule seem compelled to seek out migrations in order to account
for any significant cultural changes in Africa. 14 Huntingford has
Hamites swarming over East Africa in waves in order to explain the
physical variations among modern peoples there. Lewis, in the
papers already cited, discusses these and similar shortcomings of
cultural-historical methodology in some detail. 15 He suggests,
among other things, that the movements of peoples in northern and
eastern Africa were more limited and less momentous than previ-
ously assumed. He argues that the Afroasiatic ( Hamito-Semitic )-
speaking peoples as a whole were indigenous to the eastern Sudan
and that the Galla and Somali (eastern Cushitic-speaking groups)
moved, at a relatively late date, north and east from southern
Ethiopia—northern Kenya rather than having invaded East Africa
as exotic foreigners. Whether or not this is true, the fact remains
that the sole prehistoric large-scale migration which seems to be
documented by independent lines of evidence ( archaeology, radio-
carbon dating, linguistics, cultural distributions) is the spread of
Bantu-speaking peoples in Central, East, and South Africa, possibly
from a West African source,16 and even in this instance we are in
need of much more detailed proofs. Notably, there is no evidence
that a single physical type was involved, although it is commonly,
and not unjustifiably, supposed that the people were Negro.
In another vein, we find Coon treating Bushmen (“Capoids”) as
North African immigrants, when virtually every shred of evidence
13 K. H. Honea, “A Contribution to the History of the Hamitic Peoples of
Africa,” Acta Ethnologica et Linguistica, no. 5 (Vienna, 1958), passim.
14
J.
D. Fage, An Introduction to the History of West Africa (Cambridge,
Eng., 1959); R. A. Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (Har-
mondsworth, 1962); Huntingford, “Peopling of the Interior.”
15 Lewis, “Ethnology” and “Historical Problems.”
16
J. Greenberg, Studies in African Linguistic Classification (New Haven,
1955), passim.
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points to an origin in Southern Africa. 17 Coon’s explanation of an
alternative source relates to relict hunting-and-gathering popula-
tions of the Sahara who are not Bush physically and to “Bushman”
rock paintings in North Africa, which are fully as much like East
Spanish rock art and have never been related convincingly to South
African art.
Racial Typologies
Before giving our attention to problems more intimately associ-
ated with the treatment of prehistoric human remains as such, it is
necessary that we briefly examine some of the fundamental ap-
proaches to an understanding of physical variability.
It is rather difficult to explain just what “race” means to physical
anthropologists at the present time, since current opinions are in a
state of flux. Apart from those who still cling to outmoded views, it
can be said that a more dynamic evaluation of human variability has
come into being, one that is no longer strictly caliper-oriented. It
has even become respectable to challenge the very existence of
races, especially in regard to classificatory delineation. Livingstone,
as a geneticist, is convinced that the proper study of human vari-
ability is individual genes and that one should trace the distribution
and histories of specific genes rather than work within an artificial,
and sometimes misleading, framework of racial typology. 18 Wash-
burn, as a student of functional morphology, likewise eschews racial
classification as a worthwhile exercise because variability means
nothing unless it can be explained in terms of interrelated genetic
and cultural histories. 19 More specifically, we must study the causes
of evolutionary change ( of which races are a minor reflection ) and
do so within specific cultural and environmental contexts.
For problems of race formation, then, archaeology and its sister
sciences are going to be of greater value to the physical anthropolo-
gist in understanding prehistoric populations than extrapolation
17 Coon, Origin of Races, 636ff.
18 F. B. Livingstone, “On the Non-Existence of Human Races,” Current
Anthropology, III (1962), 279-281.
19 S. L. Washburn, “The Study of Race,” American Anthropologist, no. 65
(1963), 521-531.
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from preconceived racial typologies. This inevitably means more
than just digging up the bones of prehistoric man; we must also, as
far as possible, reconstruct cultural behavior in particular environ-
mental settings. Tracing populations beyond historical horizons can-
not be accomplished solely by the traditional methods of compara-
tive skeletal morphology or by the newer method of comparing
present gene frequencies. Both of these depend implicitly, if not
explicitly, upon racial typologies of existing peoples, and the pheno-
typical configurations (much less the genetic ones) of earlier
peoples need not have been the same (and would not have been,
according to the almost universal rejection of the notion of “pure
races”). It is not claimed that these methods are not useful as ad-
juncts to a wider approach, but they do need to be seen in proper
perspective.
Comparative Morphology and Racial History
Skeletal morphology by itself is notoriously limited, even when
one is dealing only with modern man, since the soft tissues reveal
physical distinctions of racial significance much more clearly than
bones and because there is much overlap in the racial characteristics
of skeletal components. By questioning the validity of typologies for
the living, we automatically admit the drawbacks of skeletal classi-
fications, where the errors can only be compounded. While acknowl-
edging the fact that racial differences are genetic in origin, we do
not ordinarily approach genetic variation through bones because we
know too little of genetic factors relating to bone formation; and
other parts of the body such as the circulatory system have, up to
this point, been found more easily subject to investigation. Until we
know more about bone growth and function and their genetic bases,
examination of skeletal remains is bound to be of limited value. In
the meantime, we should not continue to divorce these remains
from their cultural contexts and thereby lose valuable data for
future genetic and morphological research.
With regard to documentation of prehistoric physical differences,
a few comments concerning the treatment of skeletal remains might
be made. One attitude contributing to confused interpretations of
such material is the obsession with racial typology, particularly in
the predisposition of most investigators to equate earlier sapiens
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groups with living ones. Thus we find “Caucasoids” as far afield as
East and South Africa and “Negroes” on the Italian Riviera. When
the typologies do not mesh, some prefer to invent new races, hence
the “Boskopoids” and “Australoids” of South Africa. Another alter-
native is to create hybrids, regardless of the probabilities of hybrid-
ization having taken place or the difficulties of recognizing them
skeletally. Added to this is the fact that few make sufficient allow-
ances for variation, an especially important point in view of the
small size of most samples. This shortcoming is apparent when
individual specimens are taken out of context (for instance, assign-
ing “Boskopoid,” “Australoid,” or “Caucasoid” characters to one or
two crania found with others that clearly show Bush-Hottentot affin-
ities). Le Gros Clark’s admonitions concerning the pitfalls of un-
necessarily multiplying genera and species ( in this case, races ) , and
underestimating ranges of variation when small samples or even
single specimens are involved, are just as pertinent to studies of
prehistoric races as they are to studies of fossil man.20
Furthermore, much of the prehistoric skeletal material in Africa
is subject to chronological uncertainties or is not properly placed
within a cultural context. This is sometimes the result of its having
been recovered under conditions in which cultural or chronological
associations could not be ascertained; but all too often it is a reflec-
tion of slipshod excavation.
Gene Frequencies and Racial History
The possibility of deducing racial histories from tabulations of
gene frequencies alone is now seen to be dangerously oversimpli-
fied. The optimistic enthusiasm for this approach a few years ago21
has lessened appreciably, although some individuals seem to be
holding out.22 The breakthrough toward a real understanding of
the selective nature of human genetic structure came with the work
20 W. E. Le Gros Clark, The Fossil Evidence for Human Evolution (Chi-
cago, 1955), passim.
21 W. C. Boyd, Genetics and the Races of Man (Boston, 1950), passim.
22 W. C. Boyd, “Four Achievements of the Genetical Method in Physical
Anthropology,” American Anthropologist, no. 65 (1963) 243-252; R. R. Gates,
“Racial Genetics: A New Branch of Anthropology,” Current Anthropology, IV
(1963), 208-209.
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of Allison and others on the sickling trait in Africa.23 The Rh system
was known to be subject to selection from the first, and the adaptive
nature of the ABO system, although still imperfectly understood,
has thrown this whole problem into sharper focus.24 Further infor-
mation has been gained through the study of abnormal hemo-
globins.25 The result of these findings is that we cannot assume
gene frequencies to remain constant through time, and therefore
they can be used effectively only with other kinds of evidence. The
geneticist is in no position to become a cultural historian, as is pop-
ularly believed; on the contrary, he requires detailed cultural his-
torical facts in order to work out the history of specific genes.
Livingstone’s history of the sickling gene, based on ecological and
cultural considerations, is the classic example of this.26
In all probability, gene-frequency calculations alone can accom-
plish but two things: to help to demonstrate relatively recent his-
torical connections between different groups of people or to show
broad distinctions between major geographical populations (say,
Africans versus Europeans or Asians). More important is the eluci-
dation of the bases for genetic and morphological variation in dif-
ferent populations as determined by genetic analysis in conjunction
with other kinds of evidence.
23 A. C. Allison, “Protection Afforded by Sickle-Cell Trait Against Sub-
tertian Malarial Infection,” British Medical Journal
,
I (1954), 290-294. The
sickling gene, which causes a severe form of anemia, is largely restricted to
populations of Sub-Saharan Africa.
24 A. M. Brues, “Selection and Polymorphism in the ABO Blood Groups,”
American Journal of Physical Anthropology, XII (1954), 559-597; J. A. Buck-
waiter et al., “Natural Selection Associated with the ABO Blood Group,”
Science, no. 123 (1956), 840-841; F. B. Livingstone, “Natural Selection,
Disease, and Ongoing Human Evolution, as Illustrated by the ABO Blood
Groups,” Human Biology, no. 32 (1960), 17-27.
25 W. W. Zuelzer et al., “Abnormal Hemoglobins,” in Progress in Hema-
tology, ed. I. Toncantins (New York, 1956); J. A. Hunt and V. M. Ingram,
“The Genetical Control of Protein Structure: The Abnormal Human Hemo-
globins,” in Biochemistry of Human Genetics, ed. Wolstenholme and O’Connor
(London, 1959); F. B. Livingstone, “Balancing the Human Hemoglobin Poly-
morphisms,” Human Biology, no. 33 (1961), 205-219.
26 F. B. Livingstone, “Anthropological Implications of Sickle-Cell Gene
Distribution in West Africa,” American Anthropologist, no. 60 (1958), 533-562.
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Causes of Human Variability
Of the four recognized causes of evolutionary change—mutation,
selection, gene flow, and gene drift27—only the first seems fairly
immune to cultural practices (if we ignore modern means of in-
creasing mutation rates through indiscriminate use of nuclear
devices, chemical insecticides, and the like). As we have already
seen, selection—culturally as well as naturally induced—cannot be
ignored. However, some of the “climatic” explanations of race28 are
probably oversimplified and even reflect a basic lack of anatomical
and physiological knowledge.29 But if some of these particular
theories are ill-considered, one must look at human variability in
terms of the reciprocal effects of the human organism, environment,
and culture upon one another. Human ecology can never be quite
the same as that of animals.
Birdsell has argued that current anthropology tends to play down
the environmental determinants of human biology and culture to too
great a degree.30 One must agree with him that environmental
factors undoubtedly impose more restrictions on foraging popula-
tions than on agriculturists, but this only qualifies rather than
negates the cultural contributions to change. An alteration in mating
preferences could still be of more consequence genetically than a
shift in climatic patterns, which might be met effectively even by
food collectors.
As Washburn indicates,31 there is no such thing as an adaptive
gene; it will be adaptive or nonadaptive under specific conditions,
and these conditions will not necessarily remain static. The Bush-
men, for example, have avoided picking up the sickling gene not
27 Gene flow: intergroup mating. Gene drift: random fluctuations in gene
frequencies occurring in small, isolated populations.
28 C. S. Coon, M. Garn, and J. B. Birdsell, Races (Springfield, 1950), passim
;
D. F. Roberts, “Body Weight, Race and Climate,” American Journal of Physi-
cal Anthropology, n.s. no. 11 (1953), 553-558; P. T. Baker, “Climate, Culture,
and Evolution,” Human Biology, no. 32 (1960), 3-16.
29 Washburn, “Study of Race,” 525-527.
30
J. B. Birdsell, “On Population Structure in Generalized Hunting and Col-
lecting Populations,” Evolution, XII (1958), 189-205.
31 Washburn, “Study of Race,” 525.
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because of any distaste for mating with Negroes who have it, but
probably because their settlement patterns (possibly developed
through experience) have tended to keep them away from rivers
and other areas where malaria is endemic.32 This in turn has pre-
vented the creation of the conditions in which the sickling gene
flourishes as part of a balanced polymorphism (the sickling gene
appears to be associated with greater resistance to falciparum
malaria, and so individuals possessing such a gene are selectively
favored in this sense).
We have never been quite sure just how much effect the random
alterations in gene frequencies known as gene drift have had in
the promotion of racial differences in humans, but this is essentially
a function of population size and isolation, both of which reflect
cultural behavior. Technology and subsistence have as much bear-
ing on the size of breeding populations as environment, and social
behavior as well as geography can isolate them. It is possible that
some of the morphological differences between human remains from
different levels of the same archaeological sites could have resulted
from gene drift; it is said to account for differences of the same
order among Australian aborigines, who probably all descend from
the same Upper Pleistocene immigrants.33
Birdsell comments at some length on the longer periods of nurs-
ing infants among most food collectors and the relation of this to
the size of effective breeding populations (and therefore to gene
drift).34 He estimates that the low variance in the number of off-
spring per mating (0-6) is about one half that of agricultural
peoples. Whatever the causes, and they could be cultural, Kalahari
Bushwomen seldom produce more than five children even though
they are normally married at puberty.35 Also relevant to the size
of breeding population is the infant-mortality rate, which is obvi-
ously subject to cultural influences in the form of diet, birth prac-
tices, infanticide, and so on. Both cultural and natural inducements
to a higher mortality rate may be more pronounced among hunter-
32 R. Singer, “Some Biological Aspects of the Bushman,” Zeitschrift fur
Morphologie und Anthropologie, no. 51 (1960), 4.
33 Singer, “Boskop.”
34 Birdsell, “Population,” 193-194.
35 Singer, “Biological Aspects,” 5.
Prehistoric Populations of Africa 13
gatherers like the Bushmen who have lived, or are living, under
stringent conditions with a limited technology. According to
Singer,36 infant mortality among the Kalahari Bushmen runs to
about 50 per cent. In a collection of 182 Stone Age ( Oranian ) skele-
tons at Taforalt, Morocco, nearly 53 per cent of this 13,000-year-old
population were infants.37 Vallois indicates that of a total sample of
163 Oranian individuals, including some from Taforalt, 62 per cent
died before reaching 21 years of age.38
On the other hand, gene drift, like mutation, selection, and migra-
tion, can be overworked as an explanation of racial differences. It
is quite possible that we sometimes stress the isolation of food-
collecting groups more than we should, for they are often exoga-
mous and range over large areas. There is some evidence of the
territory covered by prehistoric hunters and gatherers in South
Africa in the form of rock paintings done by the same artist as much
as 65 miles apart, and depictions of marine animals up to 100 miles
from the sea.39 Likewise we may be guilty of placing too much
emphasis upon similarities between prehistoric food collectors and
living Bushmen, whom we know to have been driven out of the
more desirable areas into the most marginal types of environment.
This change, which has occurred largely in the past few centuries,
has reduced the Bushman population south of the Zambezi alone
to perhaps a twentieth or less of its original size40 and probably
could not help but also cut down the size of local groups. In the
36 Ibid.
37 D. Ferembach, “Les Restes Humains Epipaleolithiques de la Grotte de
Taforalt (Maroc Oriental),” Comptes-Rendus Hehdomadaires des Seances de
VAcademie des Sciences
,
CCXLVIII (Paris, 1959), 3465-3467.
38 H. Vallois, “Vital Statistics in Prehistoric Population as Determined from
Archaeological Data,” in Heizer and Cook, eds., The Application of Quanti-
tative Methods in Archaeology (Chicago, 1960), 195-196.
39
J. D. Clark, The Prehistory of Southern Africa ( Harmondsworth, 1959),
217.
40 Tobias has estimated the number of living Bushmen at about 55,000. P. V.
Tobias, “On the Survival of the Bushmen,” Africa
,
no. 26 (1956), 174-186.
Singer feels that this figure is too high, but guesses that there must have been
at least a million Bushmen south of the Zambezi in early historic times—when
decimation of their numbers surely must have been underway already. Singer,
“Biological Aspects.” Actually, Singer’s own figure seems rather high from an
ecological point of view.
14 Creighton Gabel
final analysis, prehistoric population size and settlement patterns
can only be defined by more extensive and careful archaeological
investigation.
Gene flow tends to break down dissimilarities between different
groups by introducing the same genes to numbers of local popula-
tions. Geneticists have been rather prone to invoke migrations also,
but genes, like culture traits, can be transmitted without widespread
population movements. Local-group exogamy, warfare, slavery,
and trade all aid in breaking down genetic barriers that might
contribute to phenotypical differences of a racial order. As far as the
social dynamics relating to population structure are concerned, it
should be possible to construct models that could be used to illus-
trate the genetic significance of exogamy or other cultural factors
even in prehistoric levels.41
The amount of gene flow in Africa is to be seen in the fact that
one can recognize an African population and distinguish it from
those of other major areas in the world. Newman, quoting Roberts,
cites the following genes common to populations south of the
Sahara: high frequencies of Rh chromosome cDe(R0 ), blood group
P, the Kidd gene Jka
,
low frequencies of S (MNS system), and the
Duffy gene Fya .42 To these he adds the relatively high frequencies
of the Hunter (Hu) and Henshaw (He) genes, gene v in the Rh
system, Duffy subtype Fy, Jsa (Sutter blood group), abnormal
hemoglobins S (sickling) and C, and haptoglobin Hp1 .43 The essen-
tial “African-ness” of Sub-Saharan peoples is further underlined by
the fact that it seldom proves possible genetically to distinguish
very clearly or consistently even among such morphologically
diverse groups as Bushmen, Pygmies, and Negroes. At the same
time, gene frequencies do not seem to indicate a close relationship
between morphologically similar Melanesians and African Negroes44
or between African and Oceanic Negritos.45
41 Birdsell, “Population.”
42 M. T. Newman, “Geographic and Microgeographic Races,” Current An-
thropology, IV (1963), 189-207; D. F. Roberts, “The Distribution of Some
Human Serological Characters in Africa,” British Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, no. 51 (1956), 194-196.
43 R. Singer, “Serum Haptoglobins in Africa,” South African Medical
Journal, no. 35 (1961), 520-523.
44 T. Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving (New Haven, 1962), 259.
45 Boyd, “Four Achievements,” 250-251.
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In summary, the question of racial origins in Africa, as elsewhere,
is a complex one that has been complicated by the confusion of
biological attributes with those of a cultural nature and the over-
worked projection of untested migration theories as an explanatory
device. The perpetuation of these approaches in African studies is
difficult to understand unless it is that some historians remain un-
willing to credit black Africans with any significant accomplish-
ments of their own, and thus feel compelled to introduce "Cauca-
soids” whenever possible. Above and beyond this, however, there
are important problems relating to the identification of races and
their reconstruction through time. Apart from the shortcomings of
inadequate morphological data pertaining to prehistoric populations
and our inability to utilize genetic factors in the manner envisioned
by Boyd and others, we still know far too little of the prehistoric
cultural and environmental backgrounds contributing to human
variability. More intensive investigation of these can lead to better
understanding of earlier Africans, although we cannot expect to find
that such populations will necessarily coincide with stereotyped
racial groups of modern times. The conclusions, and indeed the
motivation, of such research will relate primarily to the unraveling
of individual trait distributions, and these may or may not be
directly applicable to problems of racial history in the conventional
sense.
2. North and East Africa
Turning now to the evidence pertaining to prehistoric popula-
tions, we can examine some of the major collections of material and
the theories relating to them. There are surprisingly few sapiens
fossils or subfossils that can be confidently assigned to a period of
time before the end of the Pleistocene. Ignoring such highly dubious
examples as Leakey’s Kanam and Kanjera remains, we find only a
handful of examples which may possibly be of Upper Pleistocene
date. Before describing the skeletal materials from different areas,
it should be said that this scarcity of Pleistocene specimens does
not necessarily betoken a later appearance of Homo sapiens in
Africa than in Europe or Asia, as some have argued. There are
serious dating problems to be dealt with, and the corpus of material
is small and scattered. In fact, only the Maghreb, Kenya, Tanzania,
Zambia, and South Africa have given us any pre-iron Age human
remains of value up to this point, excepting a few from the Sudan
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and interior Sahara. The skeletal material recovered from the Egyp-
tian Predynastic and Neolithic appears seldom if ever to have been
adequately described. It is desirable that we do not forget this
skewed geographical representation, for it may unduly influence
our interpretation of population distributions.
North Africa
In North Africa, numbers of human remains have been found in
association with Oranian and Capsian (Mesolithic) industries over
the years. The majority of such sites are concentrated in the Con-
stantine region of northeastern Algeria (see the accompanying
map). It should be noted that much of the total skeletal material
has been lost or destroyed without being properly studied, so that
the actual amount of available specimens is less than one might
suppose.
There has been considerable controversy over the respective age
and origin of the Oranian and the Capsian. The former is largely
restricted to the littoral between Atlantic Morocco and the Gulf of
Gabes; the Capsian occurs farther inland and is not found as far
westward. The only C-14 dates for the Oranian are from Taforalt,
Morocco, where they average 11,000 b.c. Capsian dates from Tuni-
sian and Algerian sites range from 6650-4950 b.c. This, as well as
some stratigraphic evidence, suggests the Oranian began earlier,
although it lasted at least as long as the Capsian.46 Certain au-
thorities have maintained for years that the Oranian was nothing
more than a coastal variant of the Capsian, as in a sense it was
during its final stages.
Briggs and Coon seek the origins of the Oranian in southwestern
Asia;47 McBurney derives it from the final Upper Paleolithic of
southwestern Europe on the basis of its geographical proximity and
the absence of Oranian-type industries between Cyrenaica and
Palestine. All three seem to agree that the Capsian, directly or in-
directly, must have come from the Near East also, but the same
46 C. B. McBurney, The Stone Age of Northern Africa ( Harmondsworth,
1960), 213-216.
47 L. C. Briggs, “The Stone Age Races of Northwest Africa,” American
School of Prehistoric Research (Peabody Museum, Harvard University), Bul-
letin, no. 18 (1955), 58; Coon, Origin of Races, 604.
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objections apply since it is confined to Northwest Africa, except for
a few weak expressions along the Gulf of Sirte between Tunisia and
Cyrenaica. On the other hand, the typological and technological
resemblances between the Capsian and European microlithic indus-
Late Stone Age Sites
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tries of Tardenoisian type have always been recognized. One is
inclined to suggest, on the basis of the facts now at our disposal,
that Northwest Africa from earliest Oranian through late Oranian-
Capsian times (and to some extent during the Neolithic also) was
part of a western Mediterranean cultural province, whatever the
mechanics of diffusion may have been. That the Straits of Gibraltar
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constituted a greater barrier to diffusion than fifteen hundred miles
or so of arid coastline is almost beyond belief, especially since the
Maghreb belongs to much the same ecological zone as the rest of
the western Mediterranean.
Briggs has dealt with the Northwest African skeletal remains most
exhaustively.48 With fifty-six more or less usable crania, he has
defined four “types” which, in order of chronological appearance,
are (A) Palaemediterranean, (B) African Mediterranean, (C)
African Alpine, and ( D ) Mechta-Afalou. With some qualifications,
he has upheld the notion that the Oranian and Capsian were asso-
ciated with distinct physical types. However, in his scheme, this is
true only insofar as the A type does not occur in Capsian sites.
Types B, C, and D are found in both Oranian and Capsian deposits.
Briggs's analytic approach to these materials was based on the
system employed by Hooton for his Canary Islands and Pecos
Pueblo studies, in which skulls were visually sorted into types and
then subjected to statistical examination for verification. It is to be
doubted whether this division into types or the quantitative treat-
ment of them is valid.49 Briggs, in a later work, perhaps rings the
knell himself when he says: “The skeletal material that we have
just discussed is both inadequate in quantity and too widely scat-
tered geographically to serve as a sound basis for any final conclu-
sions, and, what is worse, almost none of it can as yet be dated
except within broad and uncertain limits.”50 To this one might add
the observation that if some of the Oranian sites containing skeletal
material are 5000-7000 years older than Capsian sites, as radio-
carbon dating suggests, we could well expect to find differences in
the makeup of the populations in question.
One should also underline the fact ( as Briggs admits ) that, of the
forty-five specimens actually included in his type series, thirty are
from Afalou-bou-Rhummel and five of the remainder from Mechta-
el-Arbi. Even to the casual observer, this simply would imply that
48 Briggs, “Stone Age Races.”
49 F. C. Howell, Review of Briggs’s “Stone Age Races,” American Anthro-
pologist, no. 58 (1956), 584-585; J. T. Robinson, Review of Briggs’s “Stone
Age Races,” Man, no. 55 (1955), 174.
50 L. C. Briggs, “The Living Races of the Sahara Desert,” Papers of the
Peabody Museum, XXVIII (1958), 12.
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we are dealing with a somewhat heterogeneous population which
resembles contemporary prehistoric populations of the Mediter-
ranean area in general. Just in looking at Briggs’s photographs of
type specimens, it is difficult to be impressed with the distinctions
between them, and I would add that the existence of three or four
different racial types, supposedly of different geographical origins,
in the same site (and presumably belonging to the same time
period) defies reason.51
Without going into this classification any further, there are two
final points to be noted. One is that traits reminiscent of populations
farther south are said to be present in the first three types. If these
are indicative of non-Caucasoid intrusions, one cannot help but
wonder where they may have come from. An interesting speculation
(even if totally devoid of factual support) is that the Upper Paleo-
lithic Aterian industries of the Sahara and Northwest Africa were
produced by basically Negroid peoples who perhaps left their mark
on the Oranians and Capsians. There is no demonstrable continuity
between the Aterian and the later industries, which are supposed
to have been of outside origin, and the Aterian does show the same
retention of Levalloisio-Mousterian flaking techniques as most late
Upper Pleistocene industries in Northeast, East, Central, and south-
ern Africa. The western Sahara seems to have been less of a barrier
during the Pleistocene than the Libyan Desert,52 and there is now
believed to have been a period of increased humidity during Aterian
times ( as well as the wet phases of the late Acheulian and Neolithic
periods), which would have promoted diffusion and population
movements across the Sahara. 53 Secondly, Briggs notes similarities
between his North African specimens and Leakey’s Kenya Capsian
and Elmenteitan crania. Other investigators also accept this associa-
tion, but it is open to criticism. ( I shall return to this shortly.
)
Neolithic remains in North Africa are even scantier. In the
Maghreb, Briggs finds a modified version of his Mechta-Afalou type
51 Briggs, “Stone Age Races,” 29.
52 McBurney, Stone Age, 78.
53 In viewing the Sahara as a physical barrier between the two parts of
Africa, one must not assume the area has always been as it is today. At times,
it has supported savannah-type flora and fauna, and signs of human occupation
are correspondingly more numerous.
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still predominating and expresses the opinion that this group con-
tributed most heavily to the makeup of the eastern Berbers.54 The
addition of Neolithic projectile point forms, pottery, polished stone
tools, and perhaps domestication to a Capsian-Oranian base he
judges to be the result of diffusion rather than of migration, prob-
ably quite correctly. “Negroid” elements are again noted, but the
explanation is simpler here. Briggs’s “Neolithic of Capsian (or
Oranian) Tradition” appears to coincide with the Neolithic wet
phase of about 5500-2500 b.c., when the desert interior was much
more intensively settled, and one can see indications of cultural ties
all the way from the Maghreb down to the Sudan and eastward to
the Nile. In fact, much of the cultural diffusion from the Nile area
to Northwest Africa is likely to have been through the Sudan and
southern Sahara.
About all one can say now of Northwest African Stone Age pop-
ulations is that they probably were related to others of the Mediter-
ranean basin. There is no real amount of information on the role
played by these people in the Sahara before historic times. Exclud-
ing relatively recent intrusions of whites, Negroids appear to have
been dominant in the Sudan and Sahara at least as far back as
5000-3000 b.c., and probably earlier. The contributions of Mediter-
ranean whites and Sudanese Negroids in ancient Egypt is still not
clear, although indications of cultural influences from Southwest
Asia and the Sudan-Sahara region suggest that both were involved.
The Sudan and Sahara
In this area, although most of the skeletal material has been
assessed as Negroid, there are precious few specimens. The Asselar
skeleton, found without cultural associations north of the Niger
Bend, used to be thought Upper Pleistocene, but is now regarded as
probably Neolithic. Boule and Vallois see it as a “generalized Negro
type” not identical to present-day Sudanese Negroes.55 This state-
ment underscores the hopelessness of attempting to project modern
physical types backward very far in time, even if we were able to
agree on what constitutes a type.
At Tamaya Mellet in Niger, very fragmentary remains of fifteen
54 Briggs, “Stone Age Races,” 76, and “Living Races,” 14.
55 M. Boule and H. Vallois, Fossil Men (New York, 1957), 432-433.
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or so individuals have been assigned Negroid status.56 At Uan
Muhaggiag, in the Fezzan, the desiccated burial of a Negroid child
has been radiocarbon-dated at 3500 b.c .57 The Khartoum Mesolithic
inhabitants, represented by seventeen fragmented burials, are also
described as Negroid.58 These probably date to a time around
4000 b.c., but may be earlier.
It is widely believed that the varying degrees of Negroid features
in current Saharan populations go back to at least the Neolithic,
although slaving in more recent times has undoubtedly contributed
its share. People such as the Bella (Haratin) agriculturists may
actually represent Sudanese intrusions of Neolithic date, although
this is difficult to prove. The Negroid appearance of the Teda
pastoralists also is hard to explain wholly in terms of slave raiding.
While some of the Negroid elements may be late, this is just as true
of predominantly white populations, such as the Tuareg, who reflect
population displacements resulting from Arab intrusions since the
eighth century.59
I find unconvincing the commonly expressed viewpoint that,
because we have no Negro skeletal remains from an early date, this
variety of African must have been “the last to evolve.” For one
thing, this places too much emphasis upon the identification of
“typical” Negroes in prehistoric horizons. For another, it tends to
ignore the fact that we have no material from the West or Central
African forest regions, where indigenous peoples today show the
greatest clustering of traits ordinarily regarded as Negroid. Looking
at the map, one can see that preserved remains of prehistoric peo-
ples are entirely on the northern, eastern, and southern peripheries
of the continent. Only the handful of Saharan and Sudanese sites
just cited are exceptions, and these are clearly on the fringes of the
zone where “Negroidness” is now most heavily concentrated.
East Africa
Prehistoric sapiens remains in East Africa are not numerous and
tend to be quite localized. From a general anthropological outlook,
56 Briggs, “Living Races,” 13.
57 F. Mori and A. Ascenzi, “La Mummia Infantile di Uan Muhaggiag,”
Rivista di Antropologia
,
XLV (1959), 125-148.
58 A. J. Arkell, Early Khartoum (London, 1949).
59 Briggs, “Living Races,” 85.
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the Stone Age material from this area is taken as support of early
“Hamitic” invasions. This assumption is certainly subject to some
qualification, even if direct refutation is difficult. I shall not attempt
to define “Hamites” at the historical level (although this problem
requires re-examination ) but only to treat their presumed Stone Age
predecessors.
One point to be considered is that, culturally speaking, the region
as a whole is essentially part of the Stillbay-Magosian-Wilton con-
tinuum of the eastern side of the continent. The Kenya Capsian
blade-and-microlithic industries are limited to the highland regions
of Kenya and northern Tanzania, and the succeeding Elmen-
teitan assemblages are more restricted still. Only relatively minor
blade increments are found in the Horn, where the Hargeisan in-
dustries of the Somali Plateau60 may parallel the Kenya Capsian,
although no real relationship can be proven. None of these indus-
tries is adequately dated; nor is there any means of determining
how or if they came to East Africa either from Northwest Africa
or the Near East. As Clark indicates, one cannot really say much
more about them than that they, together with the Dabban blade
industries of Cyrenaica, may have been part of a spread of blade
traditions from the Near East at a time very close to the end of the
Pleistocene. 61 It is conceivable that what might have been a rather
feeble intrusion of blade techniques into East Africa was reasserted
and amplified in the obsidian-rich areas where the Kenya Capsian
is located, simply as the result of having finer raw material ad-
mirably suited for blade and microlithic tools. Another viewpoint is
that the Kenya Capsian was a purely local development. Whatever
the answer, it seems unlikely that direct migrations from Asia are
required to supply an explanation.
Another question to be asked is whether we have enough proof
of these supposed population movements in anatomical evidence
alone. Much has been made of the “Caucasoid” character of skeletal
materials from Gamble’s Cave, the Bromhead’s Site, Naivasha,
60
J. D. Clark, The Prehistoric Cultures of the Horn of Africa (Cam-
bridge, Eng., 1954).
61 Clark, “Africa South of the Sahara,” in Courses Toward Urban Life, ed.
R. J. Braidwood & G. Willey (Chicago, 1962), 9. But the Dabban industry is
now radiocarbon-dated at 38,000-31,000 b.c.
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Olduvai, and certain Neolithic sites, but it seems reasonable to ask
what is being implied by the use of this term. The combination of
skeletal and cultural resemblances, however superficial, to material
from the Mediterranean area is naturally conducive to the con-
struction of migration theories, but clear intermediate links with
either Northwest Africa or Southwest Asia do not exist. More im-
portant is the obvious fact that “Caucasoid” traits in this instance
(which is rather different from the one in Northwest Africa) are
seen in cranial characteristics and in nothing else. It is questionable
whether we can explain “Caucasoid” features in pigmentation or
facial structure of certain modern East Africans simply as the result
of hybridization between Negroids and these ancient “Caucasoids,”
any more than we can explain in these terms the combination of
Negroid and Caucasoid traits of Australian aborigines. The indica-
tions are, in the absence of sound support for extensive population
movements from the eastern and western Mediterranean, that the
majority of East Africans who display some morphological overlap-
ping with whites are nonetheless African and Negroid, and there
is not yet sufficient basis for the outright assumption that these
so-called Proto-Hamites represent anything other than one of a
number of variables among perfectly indigenous prehistoric peoples
of eastern Africa. That Briggs can find his “African Mediterranean”
type all the way from Morocco to South Africa only emphasizes this
point. 62 In short, skeletal material alone, in this tenuous business of
reconstructing prehistoric populations, cannot always provide
enough evidence. No real proof exists that either Capsian man or
Capsian culture was derived from Northwest Africa or from Asia
via the Horn.
If we accept the Pore Epic mandible as Neanderthaloid, there are
no sapiens remains from the Horn (which further complicates the
migration question), excepting a badly fragmented skeleton from
Bur Hakaba in Somalia.63 Cole’s statement that “the bones were too
fragmented to determine their racial type” but that the person was
“almost certainly Hamitic”64 is self-contradictory, and another ex-
ample of the tenacity with which the Hamitic theory is embraced.
62 Briggs, “Stone Age Races.”
63 Clark, Prehistoric Cultures.
64 S. Cole, The Prehistory of East Africa ( Harmondsworth, 1954), 104.
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Leakey has described most of the Kenya material in some detail.65
Briefly, his five skeletons from Gamble’s Cave are all thought to
have been associated with the Upper Kenya Capsian C, which he
believes to be of Upper Pleistocene date (the presence of pottery
in the earlier A-B levels, among other things, gives us some reason
to doubt this ) . These people were long-headed, narrow-faced indi-
viduals with prominent chins and nasal bones, who, as I have said,
are considered to be the prototypes of the hypothetical East African
“Caucasoid stock.” The Naivasha Railway skeleton found in 1940
and the Olduvai skeleton recovered by Reck in 1913 are regarded
as comparable types.
The succeeding Elmenteitan people, known from burials at the
Bromhead’s Site, Nakuru, combine two types—the presumably
earlier Capsian one and a broader-headed one that appears to be
“reminiscent” of the “Proto-Bushmen” of South Africa.66 This dual
pattern of morphology is continued into the early Neolithic at Hyrax
Hill. Ultra-dolichocephalic individuals are said to have been more
characteristic in the later (Gumban A) Neolithic at Willey’s Kopje
and Makalia, but the brachycephalic strain reappears again at Njoro
River Cave, the only dated site (ca. 970 b .c.).67 More Bush-like in
appearance are skeletons from Wilton C shell middens on Lake
Victoria, which are complemented by the Singa skull found near
the Blue Nile in Sudan,68 although this may be of Upper Pleistocene
date.
While there possibly was a limited extension of Mediterranean-
related populations into the East African highlands, this requires
further investigation. Also, until we have some absolute dates, we
cannot determine its antiquity with any degree of certainty. Still
further extensions of such peoples southward into the Rhodesias and
South Africa are even more dubious and cannot be proven on the
basis of physical, cultural, or linguistic evidence now at our disposal.
In Northwest Africa, it can be argued on cultural, ecological, and
65 L. S. B. Leaky, Stone Age Races of Kenya (London, 1935), passim.
66 Cole, Prehistory of East Africa, 102.
67 L. S. B. Leaky, Excavations at the Njoro River Cave (Oxford, 1950),
passim.
68 L. H. Wells, “The Fossil Human Skull from Singa,” in Fossil Mammals
of Africa, no. 2 (London, 1951), passim.
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physical grounds that post-Pleistocene Stone Age populations prob-
ably were, to a large extent, part of a western Mediterranean con-
tinuum. Although Briggs’s morphological series is too elaborate for
the data on which it is based, it is likely that Oranians and Capsians
as a whole were more Caucasoid than Negroid. Farther south, into
the Sahara and Sudan, it is possible that Negroid peoples played a
larger role, although the evidence is still fragmentary. It is clear
that we cannot offhandedly assume Negroid populations to have
been latecomers, since the critical forest areas are all but unknown
in this respect.
Regarding East African "Caucasoids,” there seems to be no real
means of settling the issue at present, but it can be said that proof
of such intrusions is scarcely convincing and that these long-headed,
long-faced people may well have been more closely related to mod-
ern Nilotic peoples than to Hamitic ones, real or imagined. To find
this kind of continuity between the southeastern Sudan and the East
African highlands would be less demanding with respect to geo-
graphic considerations as well as others (such as the presence of
Masai and other Nilotes in East Africa).
3. Central and Southern Africa
Congo Basin
The greatest gap in the prehistoric record is the total absence of
any material that can be definitely linked to the Pygmies. Their
historical distribution from the Cameroons and Gabon over the
Rwanda, and even down as far as the lake country of Zambia,69
suggests they must have played a major role in the Central African
Stone Age. Murdock’s attempt to identify them with the Upper
Pleistocene Sangoan and Lupemban industries of the forest zone is
interesting,70 but there is nothing to substantiate it ( especially since
there is reason to think that Negroes were also associated with this
forest area). The sole skeletal remains from the whole region are
two mandibles and a few cranial and jaw fragments which de
Heinzelin recovered from the Ishango shell middens on Lake Ed-
ward (ca. 6500-6000 b.c. ). These are described by Twiesselmann,
69
J. D. Clark, “A Note on the Pre-Bantu Inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland,” Northern Rhodesia Journal
,
I (1950), 42-52.
70 Murdock, Africa, 48.
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who seems to conclude from this unsatisfactory sample that the
inhabitants were more Bushmanoid or Negroid than Pygmoid. 71
Two partial crania from Chipongwe, near Lusaka, Zambia, have
been described by Toerien as having Pygmoid affinities, but they
appear to have as many or more Bush characteristics. 72 The high
cranial index of Chipongwe I and the prognathism of Chipongwe II
are not traits limited to Pygmies. These remains are likely to be of
Iron Age date, even though associated with a stone-tool industry.
The origin of the Pygmies can only be a matter for speculation
at this time, since we know nothing of them except in an ethno-
graphic sense. Toerien explains them as Bush-Negro hybrids, on the
basis of his studies of mixed populations in South Africa. 73 Coon,
on the other hand, believes Negroes arose through “a backcross
between an original proto-Negro stock and Pygmies.”74 Clearly both
cannot be right. Nor do we know much more about their relation-
ships with Negritos in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, who have
been alternatively viewed as descendants and ancestors of the Afri-
can Negritos. It has been argued that African and Asian Negritos
could not derive from the same ancestry because of differences in
their blood-group frequencies. Congo Pygmies are high in R0 (0.63),
whereas it is almost absent in Asia; r (ede, or Rh-) is relatively
high in African Pygmies (0.101) and lacking in Asian Negritos;
M and N are represented in about equal proportions among pyg-
mies but differ sharply in Asian Negritos; and Ri, which is extremely
common in the Pacific groups (0.85 to 0.92) is low (0.074) in the
Congo.75 However, it is doubtful whether these distinctions are
altogether meaningful. Assuming any possible connection to be of
some antiquity, differential selection, gene drift, or gene flow could
account for the differences. Where the African and Asian Negritos
do vary is in the same direction as the other populations in their
71 F. Twiesselmann, “Les Ossements Humains, Site Mesolithique dlshango,”
Exploration du Parc National Albert, V, no. 5 (1958), passim.
72
J. D. Clark and M. J. Toerien, “Human Skeletal and Cultural Material
from a Deep Cave at Chipongwe, Northern Rhodesia,” South African Archaeo-
logical Bulletin, X (1955), 107-116.
73 M. J. Toerien, “Bush-Bantu Hybrids and Central African Pygmies,” South
African Journal of Science, no. 57 (1961), 215-217.
74 Coon, Origin of Races, 655.
75 Boyd, “Four Achievements,” 250.
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respective areas. This is not to say that all Negritos have a common
origin, but simply that the genetic proof advanced against it is
insufficient. Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be an ecolog-
ical one, as expressed in the suggestion that the physical character-
istics of present-day Negritos reflect adaptation to phosphorus- and
calcium-deficient soils in the equatorial forest zone.76
Southern Africa
The remainder of the continent, from the Rhodesias down to the
Cape, appears to have been dominated by Bush-Hottentot peoples
and their progenitors prior to the Iron Age, which began only about
the time of Christ and later. The consensus of opinion today is that
the Bushmen, if not the Hottentots, originated in southern Africa
and not in the northern part of the continent, as Schapera, Coon,
and others have contended. The former view accords with almost
all of the evidence at our disposal, not only that from archaeology
and paleontology but also as seen in modern population distribu-
tions.
Tobias believes the Bush-Hottentot group (or groups) to have
developed out of a “gerontomorphic” fossil line represented by the
Broken Hill and Saldanha skulls,77 but it is probably futile to spec-
ulate on the actual relationships of these or the Florisbad specimen
to later peoples. 78 Wells has summarized the chronological state of
affairs relating to men of the South African Middle Stone Age ( final
Upper Pleistocene) and reaches the conclusion that few if any
known specimens are really that early. 79 The Florisbad skull frag-
ments from the Orange Free State may be Middle Stone Age or
possibly earlier; 80 on the other hand, they may be a more recent
76 M. T. Newman, “Ecology and Nutritional Stress in Man,” American An-
thropologist,
,
no. 64 (1962), 22-23.
77 P. V. Tobias, “Some Developments in South African Physical Anthropol-
ogy,” in Galloway, The Skeletal Remains of Bambandyanalo (Johannesburg,
1959), 43.
78 R. Singer, “The Future of Physical Anthropology in South Africa,”
South African Archaeological Bulletin
,
no. 17 (1962), 209.
79 L. H. Wells, “The Problem of Middle Stone Age Man in Southern Africa,”
Man, no. 59 (1959), 244.
80 R. Singer and J. R. Crawford, “Archaeological Discoveries at Hopefield,”
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 88 (1958), 11-19.
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intrusion. There has never been agreement as to how the Florisbad
skull relates to its presumed contemporaries. Boule and Vallois treat
it as fully sapiens; 81 others have regarded it as a close relative of
Broken Hill or, conversely, as a quite distinct, though chronologi-
cally equivalent, pre-sapiens type. Radiocarbon dates of 37,000
years and more are felt to be excessively high as the result of con-
tamination from Palaeozoic carbon derived from formations under-
lying the mineral springs in which the skull was found. 82
The Boskop skullcap from the Potchefstroom district of the Trans-
vaal has also been termed Middle Stone Age,83 although there is no
proof of this other than a single instrument of the Middle Stone Age
type found nearby. 84 This fragmentary cranial specimen has been
regarded as an ancestor of the Bushman and has given rise to the
concept of a “Boskopoid race.”
The Tuinplaats (Springbok Flats) skull from north of Pretoria,
first described by Broom, may belong to the later part of the Middle
Stone Age. 85 Some have compared this with the East African
“Caucasoids” and thus make him the earliest of the South African
“Hamites ”86
Near Cape Town there were found two other skulls previously
given a Middle Stone Age date. Both are now placed in the post-
Pleistocene period. The Cape Flats ( Philippi ) cranium87 is probably
Later Stone Age, according to its high nitrogen content. Drennan
called this “Australoid”; Singer feels it combines Negroid and Hot-
tentot features.88 The Fish Hoek skull from Skildergat is probably
81 Boule and Vallois, Fossil Men, 462.
82 K. P. Oakley, “The Dating of the Broken Hill, Florisbad, and Saldanha
Skulls,” Proceedings of the Third Pan-African Congress on Prehistory (London,
1957), 78.
83 S. H. Haughton, “Preliminary Note on the Ancient Human Skull Remains
from the Transvaal,” Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa, VI
(1917), 1-10.
84 C. van Riet Lowe, “An Artefact Recovered with the Boskop Calvaria,”
South African Archaeological Bulletin, IX (1954), 135-137.
85 R. Broom, “The Transvaal Fossil Human Skeleton,” Nature, no. 123
(1929), 415-416.
86 Clark, Prehistory of Southern Africa, 92.
87 M. R. Drennan, “An Australoid Skull from the Cape Flats,” Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 59 (1929), 417-427.
88 Singer, “Boskop.”
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of Magosian date (early post-Pleistocene ) and has usually been
aligned with the Bush-Hottentot group in one way or another. 89
The six Zitzikama crania90 from the Cape Coast west of Port
Elizabeth are no longer regarded as Middle Stone Age and in fact
are felt to be undatable. These have been included in the Boskopoid
category and should be interpreted as Bush-Hottentot, inasmuch as
Boskopoids fall in that range.91
The Ingwavuma, or Border Cave, skull from the Zululand-Swazi-
land border is unlikely to be earlier than Magosian.92 Briggs and
others have seen in it resemblances to his "African Mediterraneans,”
but Wells does not agree with this.93
Among the better-known and larger series of skeletal material are
those from Matjes River Rock Shelter and the Oakhurst Shelter on
the Cape coast. The Matjes River collection includes thirteen skel-
etons from three distinct cultural levels.94 The earliest of these
levels, formerly thought to be Middle Stone Age, is now interpreted
as Smithfield A ( early Later Stone Age ) . Radiocarbon dates for this
horizon are surprisingly high—8550 and 9300 b.c.—and would align
it with the Magosian elsewhere (ca. 10,000-6000 b.c.). While crania
from this and the third level are essentially Bush in character, those
from the second level have been compared both with Hottentots
and with Leakey’s East African Caucasoids. These constitute
Meiring’s “Wilton race,” since the cultural deposits belonged to this
phase of the Later Stone Age. Radiocarbon dates for this second, or
Wilton, level are 3450 and 5765 b.c. The third level, which has been
assigned to Smithfield B, has no C-14 dates. The value of this
89
J. A. Keen, “Report on a Skeleton from the Fish Hoek Cave,” South
African Journal of Science, no. 38 (1942), 301-309.
90 H. S. Gear, “A Further Report on the Boskopoid Remains from Zitzi-
kama,” South African Journal of Science, no. 23 (1926), 923-934.
91 Singer, “Boskop.”
92 H. B. S. Cooke, B. Malan, and L. H. Wells, “Fossil Man in the Lebombo
Mountains, South Africa. The ‘Border Cave/ Ingwavuma District, Zululand,”
Man, no. 45 (1945), 3.
93 Briggs, “Stone Age Races,” 65; Wells, “Late Stone Age,” 184.
94 A. J. D. Meiring, “The Wilton Skulls of the Matjes River Shelter,”
Soologische Navorsing, Nasional Museum Bloemfontein, no. 1 (1937), 51-93;
A. Keith, “A Descriptive Account of the Human Skulls from Matjes River Cave,
Cape Province,” Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa, no. 21(2)
(1934); Lowe, “Artefact Recovered,” 135-137.
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assemblage of skeletal remains has been diminished through poor
excavation and inadequate publication.
The Plettenberg Bay skull, regarded by Tobias as a Later Stone
Age “Boskopoid,”95 was found about four miles away from the
Matjes River site and fits into the general pattern of morphology
seen at the Matjes Shelter; it compares favorably with Bush-Hotten-
tot crania collected from the same area.96 The Oakhurst Shelter, in
contrast to the Matjes River site, was well excavated by the late
A.
J.
H. Goodwin, and Drennan describes the skeletal material in
considerable detail.97 The Oakhurst occupants were also associated
with Smithfield and Wilton industries and have been likened by
some to the Wilton people at Matjes River. Drennan regards both
as Hottentot. The males conform with Hottentots in the size and
shape of their skulls; the females are somewhat more Bush-like in
appearance ( five males and four females provided most of the com-
parative evidence on adult morphology).
Moving beyond the frontiers of South Africa, the amount of data
falls off radically. Nothing whatever has come to light in Angola,
Southwest Africa, or Mozambique. Elsewhere I have briefly sum-
marized the materials of the Central African Later Stone Age and
will make only a few comments here.98 The total Central African
sample is concentrated in the southern part of Zambia, and since
1960 at least three quarters of these remains have been recovered
from two adjacent sites at Lochinvar in the central Kafue River
Basin. A single skull (no. 7418) from Inyanga in Southern Rho-
desia99 and two skeletons from Hora Mountain in northern
Malawi, 100 associated with a Nachikufan Later Stone Age industry,
are the only human remains found thus far outside Zambia. Only
95 P. V. Tobias, “Physical Anthropology and Somatic Origins of the Hotten-
tot,” African Studies, 14 (1955), 1-22.
96 Singer, “Boskop,” 4.
97 A. J. H. Goodwin, “The Archaeology of Oakhurst Shelter, George,” Trans-
actions of the Royal Society of South Africa, no. 25 (1938), 229-334; M. R.
Drennan, “The Cave Dwellers and Children of the Cave Dwellers,” in ibid.,
259-293.
98 C. Gabel, “Further Human Remains from the Central African Later Stone
Age,” Man, no. 63 (1963), 44.
99 P. V. Tobias, “Skeletal Remains from Inyanga,” in Inyanga, ed. R. Sum-
mers (Cambridge, Eng., 1958), appendix.
too Wells, “Late Stone Age,” 183-185.
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one site in the whole group has been dated by radiocarbon, and
this is the one containing the largest number of usable specimens:
Gwisho A at Lochinvar, with dates ranging from 2750-2300 b.c.
The Maramba skeleton and Mumbwa skulls IV. 1 and IV.2 may
possibly be Middle Stone Age; the remainder are clearly Later
Stone Age. Virtually all are allied to the Bush-Hottentot group, and
all with clear cultural associations, except the Hora Mountain skel-
etons, are Wilton. Toerien, as we have seen, sees some Pygmoid
traits in the Chipongwe material, and Wells has claimed Caucasoid
status for Mumbwa skull IV.3 and at least one of the Hora Moun-
tain skeletons. 101
Below is a list of published Central African Later Stone Age
materials. 102
Name Location Original description
Chipongwe Lusaka, Zambia Bushmanoid, with some
Pygmoid traits.
2 partial crania.
Gwisho A Lochinvar, Zambia Bushmanoid. 14
skeletons; 6
crania suitable for
analysis.
Hora Mountain northern Malawi Bushmanoid, with some
possibly Negroid
and Erythriote
traits. 2 skeletons.
Inyanga Inyanga Ruins, eastern
Rhodesia
Bushmanoid, possibly
with some Negroid
and Boskopoid
traits. 1 skull.
Leopard’s Hill Lusaka, Zambia Bushmanoid. 1
occipital fragment.
Maramba Livingstone, Zambia Bushmanoid. 1 in-
complete skeleton.
101 L. H. Wells, “Fossil Man in Northern Rhodesia,” appendix in Clark,
Stone Age Cultures of Northern Rhodesia (Claremont, 1950); Wells, “Late
Stone Age.”
102 T. R. Jones, “Human Skeletal Remains from the Mumbwa Cave, North-
ern Rhodesia,” South African Journal of Science, no. 37 ( 1940), 313-319; Wells,
Fossil Man, and “Late Stone Age”; Clark and Toerien, “Human Skeletal and
Cultural Material ’; Tobias, “Skeletal Remains”; Gabel, “Human Crania from
the Later Stone Age of the Central Kafue Basin, Northern Rhodesia,” South
African Journal of Science, no. 58 (1962), 307-314.
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Location Original description
Mumbwa, Zambia Bushmanoid, except
IV.3 (said to
be related to the
East African Cauca-
soids). 3
partial crania and
fragmented remains
of a dozen or so
other individuals.
In addition, the Rhodes-Livingstone Museum has recovered twenty
burials from the Gwisho B site at Lochinvar, no more than a few
hundred yards from the site now known as Gwisho A and excavated
by me in 1960-1961. These new remains are reported to be predomi-
nantly Bushmanoid, although they have yet to be studied in
detail. 103
While the southern and south central parts of the continent have
yielded more human remains up to this point than the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa, the samples are small and do not represent the
entire area. Yet the similarity of most of the material to Bush and
Hottentot populations of South Africa is inescapable. It has been
argued that certain specimens—Tuinplaats, Border Cave, Mumbwa
IV.3, Hora Mountain—are ancient “Caucasoids” reflecting migra-
tions of East African “Hamites” and, further, that peoples such as
the Kakamas Hottentots and Herero are modern survivals of these
hypothetical migrations. Others, such as Cape Flats and occasionally
even Florisbad, have been called “Australoids,” and Broom de-
scribed the Korana Hottentots as Australoids also.104 More robust
Bush-like examples that do not show the same amount of “pedo-
morphism” as modern Bushmen have often been lumped together
in the “Boskopoid” group. Singer, in attacking the concept of a
Boskopoid race, has made some observations that can apply to the
acceptance of any of these exotic racial elements in the Stone Age
of southern Africa.105 An essential precondition for assessing these,
103 B. Fagan, personal communication.
104 R. Broom, “A Contribution to the Craniology of the Yellow-Skinned
Races of South Africa,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 53
(1923), 132-149.
105 Singer, “Boskop,” passim.
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as he points out, is determination of the amount of variability among
recent Bush and Hottentot peoples. It is shown that, on the basis
of our current knowledge, “Boskopoid” and “Australoid” crania fit
well within the Bush-Hottentot range of variation; probably the
same can be said of the “Hamitic” inhabitants. Singer notes that
when these supposedly non-Bush-Hottentot skulls have been found
with others, the latter are usually Bush-Hottentot. This in itself
throws some suspicion on contrary placement of the exceptions, and
as long as they can be fitted into the Bush-Hottentot range there
seems little reason to treat them otherwise.
Acceptance of these skeletal remains as representative of anything
apart from Bush-Hottentot is necessarily contingent upon the ori-
gins and relationships of the Hottentots, who have been cited in
whole or in part as a variant of the Bush group, as “Hamites,” and
as “Australoids.” Presumably the first designation acknowledges a
South African origin. As Hamites, the Hottentots are visualized as
East African immigrants or hybrids resulting from such a population
movement. As Australoids, they might be seen as an indigenous but
essentially non-Bushmanoid group. This last possibility probably
need not concern us greatly, since rather few specialists have ever
wholeheartedly espoused the Australoid cause. The second alterna-
tive, however, cannot be ignored. Part of the apparent support for
this view is linguistic and cultural evidence, which unfortunately is
not always used with proper discretion. The linguistic support is
actually nonexistent; the Hottentots are Khoisan, not Hamitic, as
some maintain. Nor is their speech a special branch of Khoisan, for
the division of Khoisan into northern, central, and southern sub-
families cuts across both Bush and Hottentot populations. 106 It
would be difficult also to imagine a technologically more advanced
group of people, in this instance “Hamitic” cattleherders, adopting
the languages of resident hunter-gatherers. The fact that the Hot-
tentots had cattle and fat-tailed sheep does not necessarily make
them East African “Caucasoids” either, since we do not know when
they became pastoralists and have little reason to assume that this
change in subsistence pattern was the result of migration rather than
diffusion. There is no reason, for example, why these animals could
not have been obtained from early Bantu-speaking neighbors. Such
106 Greenberg, “Languages of Africa,” 44.
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cultural traits as stone bowls in Southwest Africa, and Nama pottery
reminiscent of the East African Neolithic, may indicate contact to-
ward the northeast, but not necessarily migration. On the other side
of the ledger, the presence of Bushman-like remains at Singa and
Lake Victoria, the continuation of Magosian and Wilton industries
as far as the Horn, the Bush-like Nebarara skull from Tanzania, 107
and the Hadza and Sandawe of Tanzania with their physical,
cultural, and linguistic similarities to the Bushmen,108 strongly sug-
gest major Bush-Hottentot occupations of East Africa. (With this
evidence, incidentally, one might just as well conclude that the
Kenya “Proto-Hamites” were also Hottentots and simply a Bush-
manoid variant in an area settled mostly by Bushmen.
)
Particularly in view of the “robust Bushmanoid” characteristics of
most Stone Age skeletal remains in southern Africa, there seems
every reason to see the historical Hottentots as a local development
in that part of the continent. The Hottentot groups, however vari-
able, do show resemblances to the Bushmen. Keen and others have
outlined the similarities and differences between the two popula-
tions, the differences being primarily in the greater length, higher
cephalic index, and longer face of the Hottentot. 109 Comparing fig-
ures given by Keen for 205 Bush and Hottentot skulls with those
for two of the largest and most widely separated Stone Age sam-
ples, 110 Oakhurst, 111 and Gwisho A, 112 shows clearly that all basic
cranial and facial measurements and indices are in close agreement.
The Oakhurst and Lochinvar skulls, from an osteometric viewpoint,
not only fall within the Bush-Hottentot range but are close to the
107 A. Galloway, “The Nebarara Skull/' South African Journal of Science,
no. 30 (1933), 585-596.
108
J. C. Trevor, “The Physical Characteristics of the Sandawe,” Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 77 (1947), 61-80; Greenberg, “Lan-
guages of Africa,” 72-73.
109
J. A. Keen, “A Statistical Study of the Differences between Bantu, Hot-
tentot and Bushman Skulls,” Soologische Navorsing, Nasional Museum Bloem-
fontein, I (1947), 191-199; J. A. Keen, “Craniometric Survey of the South
African Museum Collection of Bushman, Hottentot and Bush-Hottentot Hy-
brid Skulls,” Annals of the South African Museum
,
no. 37 (1952), 212-226.
110 See Table 1, in Keen, “Craniometric Survey.”
111 See Table 3, in Drennan, “Cave Dwellers.”
112 See Table 1, in Gabel, “Human Crania.”
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median part of it. It may be noted also that some individuals in each
of the two prehistoric groups, especially the females, appear more
Bushman-like, while others are closer to the Hottentots.
Looking at the skeletal material from the Bushman side, it is quite
obvious that the modern Bushman is not well represented even as
late as the earlier part of the Later Stone Age, when a larger body
type as well as bigger faces and heads still seem to have prevailed.
Some of the earlier men are therefore closer to modern Hottentots
than to the Bushman in cranial and facial features. It is judged that
the smaller, modern Bushman is a relatively recent development.
The explanation for this change has not been determined. It would
be tempting to interpret it as a response to life in the desert, with
consequent cultural and biological adjustments, if we did not know
this adaptation to be so recent. We might hope to learn more about
it from growth studies such as Drennan was able to make on the
Oakhurst people, a good proportion of whom were children from
0-7 years of age.113 Further data of this kind, combined with bio-
logical surveys of existing Bushmen114 and archaeological studies of
technology, subsistence, and social organization among their prede-
cessors, could lead to a much better understanding of the end
products as seen skeletally or in the flesh.
At present, one can only observe that pre-iron Age populations
of southern Africa were overwhelmingly Bush-Hottentot and that,
if there were Negro or “Caucasoid” contributions during the Stone
Age, we have yet to demonstrate this with any degree of certainty.
Furthermore, there is a distinct difference if we judge these addi-
tions to have been made some thousands of years before Christ ( as
would be the case with Tuinplaats or Border Cave) or at 1400-1600
a.d. It must be admitted that stone bowls, East African ceramic
types, the Herero, hybridization between Bantu and Hottentot (or
between Bushmen and “Caucasoids”), and linguistic borrowings
(if any, in fact, exist) could well have been very late in date and
would not disenfranchise the Hottentot as a native South African.
It is likely, therefore, that Bush-Hottentot populations predom-
113 Drennan, “Cave Dwellers.”
114 Singer, “Biological Aspects” and “Future of Physical Anthropology”;
P. V. Tobias, “Studies of Bushmen in the Kalahari,” South African Journal of
Science
,
no. 57 (1961), 502-506.
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inated during pre-iron Age times in southern Africa at least as far
northward as Zambia. In addition, there probably were extensions
of these people up into Tanzania, Kenya, and perhaps even the
Horn and southeastern Sudan. The physical and cultural evidence
implies considerable continuity of Stone Age populations all along
the eastern side of the continent.
4. Archaeology and Human Variability
From the foregoing observations, it is quite clear that skeletal
evidence alone contradicts the notion that the physical attributes
of earlier populations must coincide with those of modern Africans,
even where a genetic relationship is regarded as likely. Oranian and
Capsian peoples were not identical to historical Maghrebians; the
Bushman's ancestors were larger and less “infantile”; and Asselar
Man was a “generalized” Negroid. This confirms the theoretical
position, held by physical anthropologists for many years, that racial
characteristics are not static but change through time in response to
selective pressures, by mutation, and as the result of gene flow or
gene drift. Where associations can be made between prehistoric
and recent populations, they are bound to be somewhat vague, and
this should not be a cause of concern to an extent that requires the
formulation of new races or unwieldy migrations. Migration the-
ories, in order to be taken seriously, must be based on the fullest
possible documentation and not fabricated to serve as an easy
means of explaining similarities and differences.
Those of us whose interests are primarily archaeological can be
of help not only in testing migration hypotheses but in providing
background information for the spread of specific genes—especially
those with known or suspected adaptive values, such as the abnor-
mal hemoglobins—or the development of particular morphological
traits. Most certainly work of this kind is in an embryonic stage,
but, as archaeological techniques and interpretation improve along
with those of human biology, one can see a productive future ahead.
The greater concern of archaeologists at the present time for recon-
structing human ecology in terms of environment, total technology
(as opposed to artifact typology alone), food sources and diet,
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settlement patterns, population structure, and social organization115
should eventually supply the physical anthropologist with much
significant data for assessment of genetic and morphological varia-
tion.
Excavation of more sites like Oakhurst, with good skeletal series
in clear cultural contexts, might well lead to a better understanding
of growth patterns and physical makeup of local Stone Age popu-
lations. The intensive work around the Gwisho Springs at Lochinvar
in the Kafue Basin will provide us with one of the most detailed
pictures of Later Stone Age man in Africa. The three sites excavated
thus far have been extraordinarily rich in cultural and natural-
historical remains as well as having produced the largest collection
of Stone Age skeletal material in Central Africa.
The framework for studying Later Stone Age populations is rela-
tively broad, since most individual cultural traditions persevered
for thousands of years. Dates for Oranian and Smithfield industries,
combined with what we know of their late survivals, suggest a time
span of around 10,000 years, or something on the order of four
hundred generations. The Tshitolian industries of Equatoria go back
to about 10,000 b.c. and must have persisted in some areas until very
late. Radiocarbon dating shows that the Wilton and Nachikufan
industries probably covered at least five to six thousand years. Thus
there is no lack of time for environmental and cultural influences
to have left their mark on the peoples producing these technologies.
Within this framework and with proper archaeological research, we
should be able to establish the probable size of local groups and the
distribution of settlements, and to calculate patterns of social orga-
nization through comparison with technologically similar peoples
of the historical period, so as to grasp something of population
genetics in prehistory. More easily still, we should be able to pin-
point environmental factors, food habits, and technological details
that might have some bearing on human physical variation.
115 For instance, R. J. Braidwood and C. Reed, “The Achievement and Early
Consequences of Food-Production: A Consideration of the Archaeological and
Natural-Historical Evidence,” Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative
Biology, no. 22 (1957), 19-31; J. D. Clark, “Human Ecology during Pleisto-
cene and Later Times in Africa South of the Sahara,” Current Anthropology, I
(1960), 307-324; Heizer and Cook, Application of Quantitative Methods in
Archaeology (1960).
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During the preparation of the paper on the dynamics of feudalism
in Bornu history which follows this one, I encountered the problem
of the historiographic validity of traditional Kanem-Bornu king
lists. 1 It was my aim to show that monarchs who obtained the throne
from their own fathers ruled for longer periods than those who
obtained the monarchy through nonfilial succession. Hence these
different varieties of royal recruitment were counted and compared
in various prior lists: first in Barth’s king list, then in Urvoy’s.2
Differences in the predicted direction appeared in both, but only
weakly in Urvoy. To maintain a conservative balance, I used the
Urvoy list in presenting the material: very little is known about the
validity of these king lists, and I decided to use Urvoy because his
list gave the least amount of support to the hypothesis maintained
in this essay. Urvoy obtained his list by collating those of Barth, I
Landeroin, and Palmer, while Barth gathered his material in Bornu
in the 1850s. However, a question remains as to which list is more
accurate, or whether greater accuracy and more historical insight
can be gained by a closer scrutiny of all the Bornu king lists avail-
able in the literature.
The problem of this paper is thus a historiographic one, and by
derivation a historical and anthropological one. First, can we assess
the reliability of the Bornu king lists, and, second, can these be
made to yield historical information valid enough for purposes of
generalization?
For purposes of analysis, I decided to enter all the kings men-
1 This essay and the one which follows owe much to discussions with Daniel
McCall and to the assistance of Helgi Osterreich who drew up the composite
table of king lists. Raoul Naroll, Fred Voget, Norman Chance, and Robert Hess
made valuable comments and suggestions, and Jeffrey Butler edited the final
draft.
2 H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa (London,
1857); Y. Urvoy, “Chronologie du Bornou,” Journal de la Societe des Afri-
canistes, XI (1941), 21-32.
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tioned by all authors on a unified table. At the same time, genea-
logical charts of the major lists were constructed so that diagram-
matic representation of discrepancies and agreements could be more
easily observed in the lineage segments.3 In addition, I examined
the means by which the various authors had collected their infor-
mation. Finally, I constructed my own king list from the composite
table of information about the major lists available in print, and
attempted some analysis and generalization.
1. The Sources
As in other parts of Africa, and indeed in other parts of the world,
in Bornu the lineage history of the monarchy was considered the
responsibility of specialists, who were usually in the entourage of
the king. Court scribes under the Kanem-Bornu monarchy wrote
this history out in Arabic script, and praise-singers passed it on
orally from father to son and from master to apprentice. Written
historical documents are referred to in the literature as diwan and
oral traditions as girgam. In the country itself I found only a few
people who used any single word other than girgam to describe all
historical information, which may reflect the fact that court his-
torians are not as important or as recognized a group today as they
were traditionally. The Kanuri have a reverence for written docu-
ments and keep them for long periods. Thus I met peasants who
had somehow or other managed to keep court-fine receipts for ten
years. Sacred and valuable documents are held by the heads of
households and recopied when they are in danger of being lost.
It is by this copying technique that Kanuri written records going
back to at least the sixteenth century and perhaps beyond have been
carried down to the present day. Having given little systematic
attention to this subject when in the field, I can only say that it is
my impression that ( 1 ) there are manuscript records in Bornu that
have not yet been gathered, and (2) there is very little, if any,
recopying of these documents going on today.
The various European sources of the Bornu king lists span nearly
a hundred years, but they are only partially independent of one
3 These turned out to be less useful than expected because the entire list was
too bulky. When diagrammatic representation was required, I simply made
sketches of that section of a king list under study at the time.
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another, except for Barth, of course, who had no earlier work by an
outsider to compare with his own.4 Barth visited Bornu in the early
1850s, Nachtigal in the late 1870s, Landeroin came with the Tilho
expedition in 1906, and Palmer collected his material over a period
of twenty-six years up to 1930. Later in the 1930s and 1940s Urvoy
started to work on Bornu history and published a list of his own in
1941. No one of these authors completely agrees with any other.
Although Urvoy 1 s list does result in part from his study of previous
lists, it is considered independently here because Urvoy made judg-
ments about the materials based on his own studies in Kanem-Bornu
history.
The ever-careful Barth devotes an entire chapter to the validity
of his historical materials, as he rather ponderously says, “to con-
tend against the strong prejudices of numerous critics who are
accustomed to refuse to believe whatever is incapable of bearing
the strictest enquiry.”5 His main source is a chronicle or diwan that
related the entire history of Kanem-Bornu from its earliest begin-
nings to the end of the Magumi Sefuwa dynasty. He reports that
this is supposed to be an abridgment of a much larger work that
never appeared, and that various parts of it are said to have been
composed at different times. 6 Barth notes that, from Imam Ahmed’s
work in the latter part of the sixteenth century,7 it is evident that
no written documents existed before the reign of Idris Katakarmabi
(first half of the sixteenth century). The oldest Kanuri author of a
written history mentioned is Masfarma Omar ben Othman, who
wrote a history of Idris Katakarmabi’s reign. 8 In other words, Barth
felt that Kanem history was in the oral tradition and always had
been. This must not be taken to mean that the people of Kanem-
Bornu had no knowledge of writing before the sixteenth century.
Arabic sources reveal a letter from Bornu, written shortly after the
Magumi had left Kanem, addressed to the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt
4 Barth, Travels, II, chap. 29.
5 Ibid., 253.
6 Ibid., 255.
7 Later presented by Palmer: H. R. Palmer, History of the First Twelve
Years of the Reign of Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu ( 1571-1583 ), by Imam Ahmed
ibn Fartua (Lagos, 1926),
8 Barth, Travels, 256.
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in 784 a.h. (1392 a.d. ), and asking for help against Arab slave
raiders in Bornu.9
However, whether or not there were written history or documents
before the beginning of the sixteenth century, Barth was deeply
impressed and elated by the very high correspondence between the
pre-sixteenth-century king list in the diwan and the list given by
Imam Ahmed, court historian to Idris Alooma, for his monarch's
own genealogy. Barth also had two other short chronicles (diwan)
that varied greatly from the longer one. These he judged to be
unworthy of attention except with regard to the fifty-ninth king on
his list, whose “well established reign” he added to his other infor-
mation. 10 By “well established” Barth meant that it was present in
the oral tradition and was part of the lore of interested court officials
with whom he could discuss the matter in Kanuri. Barth of course
also used any outside source he could and mentions specifically Ibn
Said (1282 a.d.), Ibn Batuta (1353), Ibn Khaldun (1385), Makrizi
(1400), Leo Africanus (1528), and a document published in Paris
in 1849 concerning embassies established in Tripoli by Bornu
monarchs. 11
In order to obtain his chronology, Barth took the best estimates
of the documents on the length of reign for each ruler and counted
backwards from the death of Dunama in 1818. He then checked his
dates with the few absolute dates found in Arabic writing and found
a striking correspondence between Bornu traditions and information
given by Arabic writers. For example, he studied a fisting of Kanem
monarchs given in Makrizi, then compared dates, names, and the
order of succession. He found that, with the exception of a “slight
discrepancy in the order of succession of the later kings, whose reign
was of very short duration,” there was a “surprising harmony” be-
tween his own material gathered in Bornu and that of Makrizi, who
had obtained his information much earlier and most probably from
merchants or pilgrims passing through Egypt. 12
Several decades after Barth, in the early 1870s, Nachtigal visited
9 The letter is given in English in H. R. Palmer, Bornu, Sahara and Sudan
(London, 1936), 218.
10 Barth, Travels, 258.
11 Ibid., 254.
12 Ibid., 264.
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Bornu. His host was Ahmed Ibn Brahim, a courtier of Shehu Omar.
Omar ordered Ahmed to seek out historical documents and make
them available to Nachtigal, who worked out his king list on this
basis, although he reminded his readers that his material was not of
very great accuracy. 13 This was his own view, and it is especially
true of all the kings on his list before his twenty-eighth, for whom
he could obtain no proper dates. It is difficult to know what weight
to put on Nachtigal’s assessment of his own work as inaccurate. It
could have been the result of his understanding of the methods by
which it was obtained or its lack of agreement with Barth’s material,
which he published with his own for comparative purposes, or a
combination of the two. Actually, its partial independence from
other works makes it valuable since it adds weight to correspon-
dences when these occur and makes us ask questions when there is
lack of agreement.
Just after the turn of the century, Landeroin accompanied the
Tilho expedition to the Chad basin and recorded a wide variety of
ethnological and historical material. His own compilation of the
political history of nineteenth-century Bornu is quite extensive, an
invaluable source for anyone interested in this period of Kanuri
history.
Landeroin made no attempt to combine the various sources
already available, although he allowed the reader to compare his
material with that of previous workers. During his stay in the area
he obtained a document purporting to give the entire Bornu king
list, plus all principal events of world history from its creation up
to the inception of the first Kanem-Bornu dynasty. He had this
document translated (into French), and his published king fist was
taken directly from it. He made very little comment one way or
another about the accuracy of the material, being content merely
to present it. Landeroin suggested that his document was first writ-
ten sometime near the beginning of the seventeenth century, 14 but
13 G. Nachtigal, Sahara und Sudan (Berlin, 1881), II, 392.
14 Landeroin, “Du Tchad au Niger. Notes Historiques,” in Tilho, Docu-
ments Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, II (Paris, 1911), 342. Landeroin quotes
the document as saying that there are 1080 years from Jesus to Mohammed,
and 600 years since that time or 1630 years in all. In a footnote on the same
page he then corrects this by suggesting that there may be 622 Gregorian years
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after a number of futile attempts I had to abandon any attempt to
follow his reasoning on this point. Since the list ends with a first
dynasty king who reigned around 1812, it seems obvious that,
whether or not the document was in fact first committed to writing
in 1600, it has been added to since.
In order to obtain his dates, Landeroin counted backwards from
1900, after adding the known dates to the second Bornu dynasty.
According to his account, elder informants in Bornu could not
remember very clearly beyond the founding of the second dynasty
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It should be noted that
Landeroin’s ability or inability to date exactly when this document
was first committed to writing could have no clear relation to the
reliability of the document itself. That particular difficulty was one
of interpretation, whereas errors in the documentary material itself
would have been based on faulty translation into French or on
faulty recital of the king fist—their lengths of reign, the royal
parentage, or the order of kingly succession; the author made no
specific mention of these points.
Palmer was a British colonial official in northern Nigeria who col-
lected historical documents and oral traditions from 1904 to 1930.
In his own words, his work represents “a conspectus of widely held
Sudanese beliefs about the past, viewed in the light of relevant data
and a historical perspective . . . inaccessible to Sudanese erudi-
tion.”15 Palmer used much of the same material as Barth and trans-
lated it along with other documentation that he discovered and
published in his Sudanese Memoirs16 and his later work, Bornu
,
Sahara and Sudan. I have used the list published in his later work,
since he added to earlier material in this publication. Palmer trans-
lated from the Arabic and published Barth’s diwan of Bornu, 17
which he copied from the original in Leipzig and checked against
and 1008 Moslem years in this calculation, and if this is so then the date should
be corrected by using the formula 622
-f- [(1630-622) X 32]/33, which works
out to 1599 or 1600 a.d. in round figures. This calculation was checked by the
Islamic Institute, McGill University, and authorities there state they cannot
recognize or follow Landeroin’s reasoning on this point.
15 Palmer, Bornu, chap. 8.
16 H. R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs (Lagos, 1926).
17 Ibid., 96-111.
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Blau’s version of the same document. He compared girgams (oral
traditions ) and mahrams ( grants of privilege given by Bornu mon-
archs to their subjects) against Arabic, Egyptian, and classical
sources, in order to produce the revised list and historical summa-
tion that he presented as the major portion of his Bornu
,
Sahara and
Sudan. In discussing this revision he claimed that it was very similar
to Barth’s, but more complete. 18 He noted that, of all European
sources, Barth’s was the only one having any degree of accuracy.
Nachtigal’s list he branded as "very corrupt,” and claimed that
Landeroin’s list was also suspect since he used materials taken from
secondary sources written during the nineteenth century. 19
As far as general validity is concerned, Palmer recognized the
exceptional difficulties in writing accurate African history. He noted
that in the eighteenth century, if not well before, court historians
began remembering the kings in groups descended from one or
another of the famous rulers, thus distorting the sequence and the
chronology.20 In other words, lineage segments tended to be
bunched together in the oral traditions, and this must have had a
continuous smoothing or leveling effect on king-list material that
otherwise would reflect interlineage competition and conflict for
the throne. Because of such errors, Palmer admitted that he was
dealing with a tangled skein that must always involve some error.
However, since he was fairly sure that he had some documents
written at earlier times (for instance, Imam Ahmed’s work for the
latter sixteenth century), and corroboration from Arabic historians,
he felt justified in claiming a high degree of accuracy for his
material.
Parenthetically, two comments should be made about Palmer’s
work. First, Palmer has had a very strong influence on the older
men in Bornu who are interested in oral traditions. Indeed, my own
copy of Bornu
,
Sahara and Sudan was obtained from a district
head’s follower in rural Bornu. Others in the capital told me that
Palmer was the man to consult if I wanted to know anything about
Kanuri history. This means that the oral traditions have been
is ibid., 105.
19 Ibid., 108.
29 Ibid., 106.
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affected by the work of Palmer, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to discover the exact nature of these distortions. Second,
Palmer’s philological reasoning, and the myriad of classical refer-
ences he used, make his works very difficult reading. However, he
collected a large amount of primary material that should now be
given more careful study.
In the late 1930s and the 1940s, the French historian Urvoy
worked steadily through a large mass of the historical materials of
the western Sudan, especially those concerned with the history of
Kanem-Bornu. In 1941 he considered all the Bornu king lists and
published a revision based on his own work.21 He used various
Arabic sources, the works of Imam Ahmed (the sixteenth-century
Kanuri historian),22 mahrams, and girgams published in Palmers
works.23 He also used the Barth, Nachtigal and Landeroin king lists
in his attempt to come up with an improved synthesis. He noted
that the greatest difficulty in historical reliability came in the period
between the mid-thirteenth and the early sixteenth century. For this
period there is much disagreement among the sources. Urvoy ex-
plained it to some extent by claiming that many of the names had
been changed for this period. However, he felt that the agreement
between the diwan of Barth and the work of Imam Ahmed was
sufficient ground for using Barth over any other source. Urvoy noted
that, in both Nachtigal and Landeroin, all members of a collateral
line of siblings tended to be set down in royal succession, then those
of another branch line, then another, and so on.24 On the other hand,
in Barth’s list there is a good deal of alternation in the succession
between various lineage segments. He concluded from these differ-
ences that Barth’s greater lack of pattern was closer to the truth,
while the more systematic pattern of succession in Nachtigal and
Landeroin was a simplification of the actual events of dynastic
history. Nevertheless, Urvoy felt that he could still make use of
Landeroin, especially for dating the length of reigns.
21 Urvoy, “Chronologie.” See note 2 above.
22 Palmer, History. See note 7 above; and Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs, I.
23 Palmer, Bornu; Sudanese Memoirs, II, III.
24 Urvoy, “Chronologie,” 25.
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2. Analysis of the Lists
The sources do not differ appreciably in the names given to any
particular king, and most of them give several names for each
monarch. These generally include a Kanuri name and an Arabic one
as well, although for the first twenty-one kings only seven are given
Moslem names, and of these only the first two are exclusively
Moslem. After the coming of Islam to the area, it may be assumed
that all monarchs had a Moslem name, whether or not this name
has been remembered. In a few cases the king is remembered only
by some convenient appellation, such as “the great.” This is because
it is a traditional Kanuri practice to be known publicly by a name
that reflects some quality of one's role or status, or a quality con-
nected with the person after whom one has been named. In Bornu
today, a large number of men are called abba gana (small father,
or father's younger brother ) , which means that they are named after
a male grandparent or their father’s younger brother. More often
than not it is the grandparent, and since the child's parents have a
nonreciprocal name avoidance with their parent generation, they
must use the circumlocution “small father” when addressing or
referring to their child rather than his “real” name, which they must
avoid. Similarly, in the king lists numbers twenty-three and twenty-
four on Barth's list are Kanuri names that refer to sibling seniority.
Kure gana means kure the younger, and kure kura is kure the elder.
This also means that the throne went first to a younger, then to an
elder, brother. Kure means “formerly” and could refer to the fact
that the younger came first in the succession so that he was the
“small one” (gana) formerly, but through prior succession he be-
came the bigger or senior one (kura).
Not all the Kanuri names given in the lists have meanings that are
understood at present. However, both Sabm25 and Dunama are well
known; Sabm means dark or dark-skinned, as opposed to kime or
lighter and more reddish in color; Dunama means “the strong” or
“the great.” Both terms may refer to a quality of the person to whom
it is attached, or to the person after whom they were named. It
should be remembered in dealing with such fists that it is impos-
25 The a in salam is phonetically similar to the oo in look or book.
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sible, without other kinds of evidence, to attribute qualities given
in names to the person bearing the name. One interesting paradox
in these two names is the fact that in two out of three cases Sobm
is coupled with the Arabic name Djilil (the magnificent), which
should more logically belong with the name Dunama. The reason
why this should be so is not known, although it suggests a meta-
phorical meaning for the word Sobm that spreads its connotations
well beyond the simple translation of the word as dark or dark-
skinned.
One final caution should be emphasized concerning the names
on the king lists. Although there are more indigenous Kanuri names
at the beginning of the lists and more Arabic names toward the end,
this must not be considered anything more than a very rough
measure of the spread of Islam in the area. Those remembering the
king lists, many of whom spoke Arabic, could easily have ascribed
Arabic names or common equivalents to earlier monarchs who,
during their own lives, did not possess them.
In order to represent the various European sources comparatively,
I present all the king lists together in one table. Each item in a col-
umn, except for the name, is described under a subcolumn labeled
B (for Barth, 1857), P (Palmer, 1936), U (Urvoy, 1941), L (Land-
eroin, 1911), and N (Nachtigal, 1881). This order was chosen be-
cause on inspection it seemed to be the order of agreement. With
the table it is possible to assess the exact nature of agreement and
disagreement among the various historical sources. I have combined
Barth and Palmer, who rarely disagree, and Nachtigal and Land-
eroin, since they tend to agree with one another when they dis-
agree with the others. As a separate synthesizer, who had been
working with many sources on the Sudan, Urvoy is kept separate.26
Table 1 illustrates the degree of agreement or disagreement between
the five king lists of Barth, Palmer, Urvoy, Landeroin, and Nachtigal.
The divisions of the table are as follows: Section 1 compares the paternal
lineage as given by each author; Section 2, the maternal lineage and the
length of reign; and Section 3, the dates of reign for each king. In order
to scan the complete data for any one king, therefore, the reader must
refer first to the appropriate monarch in Section 1, then to Section 2, and
finally to Section 3.
26 Urvoy, “Chronologie.’
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Comparing Urvoy with Barth and Palmer combined, and counting
all differences except those of sequence, there is an over-all agree-
ment of 93 per cent. Doing the same thing with Urvoy on the one
hand and Nachtigal and Landeroin on the other, there is a 75 per
cent correspondence. If we take Barth and Palmer on the one hand
and Nachtigal and Landeroin on the other, there is a 71 per cent
agreement between the two combined sets of data. Breaking the
lists down into sections of high and low agreement gives us further
insight into the material. Using Barth’s order of kings, all the sources
are in complete agreement for the first seventeen Kanem-Bomu
monarchs, except for Landeroin and Nachtigal who omit king no. 7.
This gives Landeroin and Nachtigal a 94 per cent correspondence
with the others for this period. The period from the mid-thirteenth
century to the early sixteenth, that is, from king no. 18 to no. 48, on
Barth’s list shows the greatest variation among sources. Nachtigal
and Landeroin mention or omit twelve monarchs not mentioned or
not omitted by Barth and Palmer for this period. In other words,
they vary from Barth and Palmer by 40 per cent, not counting dif-
ferences in order or sequence, which would bring the differences up
to over 50 per cent. Urvoy differs from Barth and Palmer in three
cases (10 per cent) for this time span, and from Landeroin and
Nachtigal in ten cases (30 per cent). In the final section of the
king lists, nos. 49 to 68 on Barth’s list, Palmer differs from Barth in
only one case, while Landeroin and Nachtigal differ from Barth and
Palmer in seven cases (29 per cent). However, in this time span
Landeroin and Nachtigal differ from one another in five cases (25
per cent). Urvoy differs from Barth and Palmer in only three cases
(15 per cent), and from Nachtigal and Landeroin in eight cases
(40 per cent), for this period. Finally, if we arrange all the authors
singly and the percentage similarity they bear to one another, we
get the results shown in Table 2. This table27 indicates that Palmer
27 This type of table has been used in archaeology to determine time se-
quences by G. W. Brainerd, “The Place of Chronological Ordering in Archaeo-
logical Analysis,” American Antiquity, XVI (1951), 301-313; and by W. S.
Robinson, “A Method of Chronologically Ordering Archaeological Deposits,”
ibid., 293-301; and in social anthropology by H. E. Driver and W. C. Massey,
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is most similar to Barth, Urvoy is next similar, then Landeroin, and
then Nachtigal. The regular descending order of figures also means
that each of the sources is similar to all the others in the order given
in the table. This was my guess in constructing the original table,
but there was no means of proving it until this lenticular table was
constructed. Incidentally, Table 2 also shows that, if we simply had
the published works of these various authors and no dates of publi-
cation, it would be plausible to claim their actual order of publica-
tion to be that given in the table ( if we knew Barth was first ) , and
to add that Landeroin and Nachtigal are closer to one another than
they are to any of the others.
TABLE 2. Percentage Similarities Between King Lists
B P U L N
B 93 91 74 72
P 88 75 72
U 78 76
L 88
N
In making my own king list I followed Urvoy’s axiom that the
course of history, like love, is often a tortuous one. Thus I was sus-
picious of fraternal succession series that ran from one sibling to the
next until all had been on the throne consecutively. This I felt to be
especially true if there were several lineage segments all of which
had possible contenders. In three cases I merged two of the kings
for what I considered good and sufficient reasons. For example, king
no. 20 on my list is given to two separate names, Djilil (Arabic) in
Nachtigal and Biri (Kanuri) in Landeroin. These are the only
sources to mention these kings in this position, and each king is
accorded the same place by both authors, given the same father
and the same length of reign. If such a reign existed at all, it is
probable that it was held by one man, no matter how many names
he is remembered by. On other occasions, I felt it wise to make
“Comparative Studies of North American Indians,” American Philosophical
Society, Transactions, XLVII, 2 (1957), 163-465, to determine the relative
order of change among various aspects of social organization.
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only a very provisional decision. Thus, king no. 42 is said to be a
son of Othman, and there are no other clues as to which of the three
Othmans in the preceding generations he might belong (nos. 30, 31,
or 39). Traditions record that he was murdered by his brother.28
But since the term “brother” can apply to brother or cousin, we can-
not tell whether no. 42 is closely or distantly related to no. 43, his
alleged murderer, who is also attributed to be a son of one of three
Othmans. Urvoy and Palmer both make a choice in this case, and
each a different one, without indicating why they have done so. In
fact, the documented or genealogically logical choice is unavailable.
It would seem more accurate simply to make it clear that we are
ignorant about some things. My own revised king list is given with
explanatory notes at the end of this essay.
TABLE 3. Father-Son as Compared with Nonfilial Succession
in the Bornu King Lists
List
Father-Son rule Nonfilial rule
SignificanceN
Mean years on
the throne N
Mean years on
the throne
Cohen 15 16.5 41 9.6 .05 level
Barth 16 17.4 34 9.7 .05 level
Palmer 15 18.6 35 8.7 .01 level
Urvoy 15 11.1 41 10.4 not sig.
Landeroin 20 11.5 31 11.8 not sig.
Nachtigal 21 14.3 27 10.3 not sig.
In all cases I began counting with king no. 17 and ended with
no. 72 on my own list. All reigns of one year or less were counted as
half a year. Table 3 shows the differences between father-son as
opposed to nonfilial succession in all of the various king lists. The
letter N in the table refers to the number of monarchs included in
this category, so that there are, for example, fifteen monarchs who
inherited the throne from their own fathers as against forty-one who
did not. The significance level is an indication of the difference be-
tween the means, which takes into account each separate rule con-
sidered per list and the variation of each from the mean itself. The
standard .05 and .01 levels of significance are used to show that, on
28 Barth, Travels, II, 642.
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two of the lists, the difference between means could have occurred
only five times in one hundred by chance, and in one of them
(Palmers) this significance level is even higher. On three of the
lists, those of Urvoy, Landeroin, and Nachtigal, none of the differ-
ences among means was great enough to reach the .05 level, al-
though all, excepting Landeroin, are in the predicted direction.
The differences in the lists are the result of choices made by the
authors or of variations in their material. Urvoy copied a misprint
in Barth for king no. 17 and gave him a reign of fourteen years in-
stead of forty. He differs from Barth, Palmer, and me on the length
of two other reigns, each of which effectively cuts down his father-
son score and, indeed, makes insignificant the over-all difference
between the two types of inheritance. Nachtigal and Landeroin, as
indicated in Table 3, simply have more father-son succession and
fewer nonfilials in their lists, thus giving the father-son successions
more chances to share in the shorter reigns and making them quite
similar in this respect to the nonfilial successions. Although there are
still some difficulties, it seems more solidly established now to claim
that my original supposition was correct, and that father-son succes-
sions to the throne are longer-lasting than other varieties and are
thus more stable.
Two other points of anthropological and historical interest seem
worthy of mention at this point. First, it is clear that there is an in-
verse relationship between the range of the royal genealogy (num-
bers of rulers per generation) and the size of the kingdom. When
the range is narrow, the kingdom is large; when it is wide, the king-
dom has collapsed or is diminishing. This points to the simple fact
that a large number of contenders at any one time causes internal
dissension, so that tributary states and tribes are less vigilantly in-
cluded in the hegemony of the kingdom. This relationship can be
seen in the accompanying maps of Bomu power at different dates.
(The maps are taken from Urvoy, “Histoire de Tfimpire du Bor-
nou.”29 The accuracy of this material should be subjected to the
same scrutiny as the king lists themselves. However, this is the
best estimate we have at present without going into detailed his-
toriographic analysis.)
29 Y. Urvoy, Histoire de VEmpire du Bornou, Memoires de l’lnstitut Fran-
cais d’Afrique Noire, No. 7, Librairie Larose.
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Map 1. Kanem-Bornu in 1300.
Map 2. Kanem-Bornu in 1450.
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Map 3. Kanem-Bornu in 1600.
Second, the early periods of Kanem-Bornu king lists make con-
siderable mention of the clan or ethnic background of the rulers
mother. This seems to diminish and die out after the end of the
twelfth century, and in its place the lineage properties of the king’s
mother are emphasized, especially if she herself is related to the
royal line. This is admittedly insufficient evidence on its own, but it
may reflect a clan background to Kanuri political life that lost im-
portance as state centralism and the importance of royalty increased
through time.
As far as historical research is concerned, absolute dating may be
a summum bonum to a historian, but to an anthropologist, most of
whose historical information comes from archaeology or ethno-his-
tory, such desirable goals are virtually unobtainable. In some ar-
chaeological work it is considered a highly successful result if one
can arrive at valid relative dating or sequential dating, and this may
involve years of study if sites are shallow and unstratffied. Given the
fact that in only five instances in all the king lists are all authors
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agreed on the exact length of any rulers reign, it seems overly
ambitious to attempt to distill absolute dates for all the various
reigns of the Bornu kings. Indeed, the only absolute date given for
the death of a monarch in the pre-nineteenth-century period, that
of Ali Gajedeni, differs in Palmer (April 3, 1503) and Urvoy (March
29, 1507 ) . Dates given by outside sources are again lacking in exact
agreement, and it is difficult to fit the entire fabric of dates into
some meaningful whole without in the end arbitrarily choosing one
over another. Consequently I have lowered my sights and aimed
for a set of discrete historical periods whose validity is attested to
by many sources, although there would probably be some disagree-
ment among them about the exact beginning and end of any one
period. On the other hand, it should be noted that, unlike those
anthropologists who must use only archaeological or ethnological
data, we are in the case of Bornu much closer to the orthodox his-
torian since we do in fact have calendrical dates for many events,
which, if not in exact agreement, are quite close to one another.
I have divided the history of the first Kanem-Bornu dynasty into
six periods, using the kings as units within a period and as boundary
points for their beginning and end.
I. Legendary Period—Earliest Times to the End of the Eleventh
Century. The first period of Kanem-Bornu history has no known
beginning, and it probably goes back to at least classical times, when
the Carthaginians were contacting the Garamantians in the southern
Fezzan. This is a period for which we have very few outside dates
or references to indicate that any of the kings from no. 1 to no. 11
has any real historical validity. More than likely, most of the future
research for this period will have to come from archaeology and
comparative ethnology, in which social and political developments
are deduced from comparative sociocultural and ecological relation-
ships.
II. The Beginnings of Political Consolidation—1100 to 1250. This
period begins with the reign of king no. 12 and runs through to the
death of no. 17 on my list, that is, from the eleventh century to the
middle of the thirteenth. It is marked at its beginning by the reign of
Mai Hume, who is supposed to have been a Moslem and to have
died in Egypt on his way to Mecca, according to Kanuri traditions.
Palmer questions this and says that Islam did not come to Kanem
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until the time of Dunama Dibalemi (no. 17 on my list).30 Whatever
the actual dates, this period may validly be said to bear witness to
the recognition of Kanem as a developing state, with an expanding
hegemony in the central Sahara, and the inception of Islam as a
state religion.
111. Period of Imperial Florescence and Competition Between the
Kade and Kachim-Biri Royal Segments—1250 to 1350. This short
period from king no. 18 to no. 27, or from the middle of the thir-
teenth to the mid-fourteenth century, marks the florescence of
Kanem-Bornu power in the central Sahara. In the shape of a boom-
erang, the kingdom covered almost the entire north-south depression
in which the Chad-Tripoli trade was established; it curved west-
ward at Chad to cover the major trade routes to Hausaland and
perhaps the area directly north of it. The competition between the
Kade and Kachim-Biri segments is mentioned as such only by in-
ference, since no record of great conflict has come to my attention.
The use of this term is only a relative one, for the earlier periods
have nothing but a single line of kings who have no ruling sibling
segments.
TV. Period of Conflict and Competition Between the Idris and
Daud Segments of the Kachim-Biri Line—1350 to 1475. This period
of some one hundred years’ duration is widely recognized as one of
Sturm und Drang. On my list it runs from kings no. 28 to no. 52.
Kachim-Biri s line finally won out or outlasted that of Kade in the
previous period, and Bin s son, Ibrahim Nikale, had four sons who
ascended the throne. Two of these, Idris and Daud, created seg-
ments containing relatively large numbers of monarchs. The Daud
segment has ten, perhaps eleven, rulers in it before it dies out, and
the Idris segment produced at least twelve kings before the period
came to a close. Needless to say, the period is replete with short
reigns, usurpations, assassinations, and rebellions, one of which led
the Magumi Sefuwa rulers to abandon Kanem and move to Bornu.
V. The Second Period of Imperial Expansion, The Bornu King-
dom—1475 to 1750. From the late fifteenth century to the middle or
even late eighteenth century (from king no. 53 to no. 69 or 70),
Bornu rebuilt its hegemony in the Chad basin and the central Sa-
30 Palmer, Bornu, 159.
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hara. The period is ushered in by the long reign of Ali Gajedeni and
the founding of the capital of Birni Ngazargamo. Bornu may not
have been the enormous power it seems to have been in the 1250-
1350 period, but the empire was still one of the great military and
political powers in the Sudan. Some writers tend to depict Bornu as
declining in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, it
should be remembered that in the mid-eighteenth century Bornu
was sending military expeditions into the Hausa country and pre-
sumably elsewhere as well. 31 Boahen claims that of all the trans-
Saharan trade routes, the Fezzan-Chad one was the most active
from the beginning of the seventeenth right up to the early nine-
teenth century.32
VI. The Collapse of the Magumi Sefuwa Dynasty—1750 to 1846.
The end of this period is too well documented to spend much time
in discussing it here. Its end, and the demise of the dynasty, was
brought on by the rise of the Sokoto Fulani and the concomitant
rise to power in Bornu of the Kanembu Shehus. King no. 70 on my
list, who reigned from approximately 1750 to 1790, seems to have
ushered in a period of military weakness, which became acute just
as the Fulani threatened Bornu. The fact that trade from Tripoli to
Bornu flourished until at least the 1820s indicates that the decline
was a gradual one, and that latter-day greatness maintained the
power of the state even after its military might was not equal to the
task of its imperial sovereignty.
3. Conclusions
This essay began as an exercise in historiography from which his-
torical and anthropological problems were derived. I began the
work on the king lists because it seemed impossible by any simple
reference to the lists to prove or disprove a hypothesis about the
length of reigns. It was predicted that father-son succession would,
on the average, be associated with longer and more stable mon-
archies. Closer study of the king lists as historical documents has
given me a more reliable basis for making the generalization. How-
ever, since reigns are much shorter than periods, and since there
si Ibid., 253.
32 A. A. Boahen, “The Caravan Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal
of African History, III (1962), 349-359.
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are very few outside sources to corroborate the length of reigns,
the entire subject is open to some doubt unless we can assume an
equal number of mistakes of all kinds, randomly spread throughout
the king lists of each author. If there is any reason to suspect that
father-son successions are biased toward lengthiness of rule, or that
other kinds of succession are biased toward shortness, then of course
the hypothesis has not been validated. Luckily, my material is
actually biased heavily against the hypothesis in those cases where
it has not been upheld. Urvoy considerably reduces the length of a
number of father-son reigns, while Nachtigal and Landeroin in-
crease the number of these reigns, consequently giving some of the
shorter reigns a greater chance to appear in this category and mak-
ing it more probable that father-son successions will not indicate
any distinct features. In other words, there are reasonable grounds
for understanding why the hypothesis does not operate on those lists
for which it must be rejected.
At least two other anthropological generalizations have been
made more conclusive during the preparation of this essay. First,
there is an inverse relationship between the numbers of contenders
for the throne during any generation and the range or scale of sov-
ereignty exercised by the state. A widely ranging, or increasing,
number of royal contenders is associated with a declining or shrink-
ing state power. Second, it seems likely that clan and ethnic identi-
fication was more important in early Kanem-Bomu and died out as
state centralism and royalty became a more important part of the
national life. Since patrilineal clan organization is very strongly asso-
ciated with nomadic pastoralism, it may be that this decline in the
importance of the clan is also a reflection of a change from pastoral
nomadism to a more sedentary agricultural way of life.
In historical terms, the amount of agreement among all the
Kanem-Bornu king lists is very strong, indeed so strong that some
historical validity must be attributed to these documents. The fact
that there is very high agreement amounting almost to congruency,
as well as straight-line father-son sucession, for the oldest portions
indicates that (1) this part of the king list is probably closer to
legend than fact, and (2) there have probably been several omis-
sions at this level, which have become standardized in the tradi-
tions. The increased disagreement among all sources during the
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period of conflict suggests that king lists are less reliable when they
are wider in range per generation level. The fact that there is quite
high agreement among the sources for the periods since the rule of
Ali Gajedeni at about the end of the sixteenth century, and never-
theless some disagreement too, indicates that this part of the king
list is probably the most reliable, and this is attested to by other
sources as well.
Nachtigal and Landeroin differ in a number of periods with re-
spect to their order of succession, and these changes in order are in
the direction of the smoothing and bunching of consecutive rulers
into lineage segments. It is likely that oral as opposed to written
records will tend to smooth and bunch the sequence of kings on a
remembered list. Further, since Nachtigal and Landeroin do this
more often than the others, it seems plausible to conclude that their
material, even though it comes mostly from written documents, has
been more distorted than that given by other sources; it is probably
more closely related to oral traditions than to written ones. I would
suggest that this stems from the fact that dynastic information is
most easily remembered in segments of siblings descended from a
common parent. It is one thing to remember all of the names in a
dynastic list, and quite another to remember the order of succes-
sion. Remembering the dynasty in terms of lineage segments tends
to interfere with the possibility that the succession can be awarded
to anyone in a royal line whose father has been on the throne. The
names of a group of royal siblings are certainly remembered long
after the order of their succession to the throne. Thus there is a
smoothing and bunching effect in oral traditions of dynastic rule,
such that full and half brothers from each segment of the royal
lineage are named in succession because they are remembered as a
group. In general, then, the more this type of succession appears
to be the case in a royal genealogy where there is no such rule, the
less trustworthy is the historical validity of the information. Critics
of such a generalization may say that brother-to-brother succession
was in fact a Kanuri pattern of some sort. Yet there is no evidence
anywhere in the history of Bornu to support such a criticism.
On the other hand, my lenticular table and the historiographic
information itself indicate that Barth, Palmer, and Urvoy are very
close to one another, while Nachtigal and Landeroin are closer to
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each other and differ from the others. Barth faced the same problem
when he decided to trust documents that were in agreement, and to
take less cognizance of the two shorter lists of kings that disagreed
with the others. Certainly this seems to have been a wise choice
and, if we follow it, we should give greater weight to Barth, Palmer,
and Urvoy, especially when Nachtigal and Landeroin show internal
evidence of distortion. However, if this had not been the case then
we should have expected the lenticular table to form itself into the
order of publication of the sources: Barth, Nachtigal, Landeroin,
Palmer, and Urvoy. It did not because these writers are interrelated.
This of course leads to a dilemma: agreement among sources whose
authors are unknown (as is the case in many of the African ma-
terials ) could be due to contact between them rather than to greater
validity of the material. This obviously means that larger samples
of oral traditions, king lists, and such, are required to make sure
that not the least but the most amount of disagreement is present;
common features then begin to emerge in sharp outline.
One more speculative point could be made about the sources. It
is rather disappointing that the authors did not sort themselves out
in the lenticular table in the order in which they published, although
this was not expected. Had it happened, and had each author been
equally independent in his data collection, then the table would
have shed light on the rate of distortion of such material over time.
This, it seems to me, is a possible next step in this kind of research,
not only for king lists but for other cultural materials as well. A
lenticular table can be of use both in ordering the data and in in-
dicating the precise amount of agreement, thereby giving us a rough
measure of the rate of change.
Finally, from the point of view of an anthropologist, I suggest
that the establishment of periods in African tribal history may be a
first step toward a greater understanding of African history in par-
ticular and cultural history in general. To be of real theoretical and
empirical significance, the establishment of a period must be based
on a theory that is worthy of investigation. The concept of a period
involves that of “type,” a degree of unity such that the culture in-
cluded within the time span differs significantly as a whole from
that in other periods. The unity of the type means, analytically, that
there are a number of discrete correlations that are felt to exist
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within the type; these also differ from type to type and, therefore,
from period to period. It is for this reason that anthropologists do
not go on creating more and more types or periods, since these are
not simply names but theories which must be proven true or false
by the presentation of empirical evidence. Thus the periods de-
veloped here, if they are at all helpful, should imply significant
differences in Bornu society from period to period, and different
kinds of internal conditions and interrelations between the various
sectors of society and culture. Periodization, then, is a first step
toward a theory of change and its constituent elements for a par-
ticular society. Whether or not the periods of Bornu history presented
here do in fact meet these criteria is still unknown. But they are put
forward on the basis of present information in the hope that they
will provide a working theory.
In a geographical region, periods established for one tribe serve as
a standard against which to compare the historical development of
other groups. Such intraregional comparisons reveal problems
of similarities and differences at similar time periods, and problems
of different historical sequences that must be explained. The work
of synthesizing a number of sequences of periods, usually referred
to in anthropology as “developmental sequences,” brings the anthro-
pologist close to one of his ultimate goals, that of producing gen-
eralizations about cultural history as a natural process .33 Historians
and anthropologists can be of great assistance to one another in this
task. Speaking as an anthropologist, I would hope that historians
will criticize the historical methods and validity of the anthro-
pologist’s work, as well as contributing actual histories so that the
data required for widely applicable theories of culture change will
become available to those interested in generalizations based on his-
torical research. On the other hand, it seems to me that historians
can gain a great deal from the general categories of classification
that anthropologists have developed for describing social and cul-
tural life, and from methods of historical research developed by
anthropologists who are accustomed to working with few if any
written documents.
33 See R. Cohen, “The Strategy of Social Evolution,” Anthropologica, IV
( 1962 ), 321 -348 .
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APPENDIX. A Revised Bornu King List
King
Father’s
name
Mother’s
name
Length oi
reign
( approx-
imate
years)
Dates and
period
1. Seif Dhu Yazan _ 20 To end of 11th
2. Ibrahim Seif Aisa 16 century. Leg-
3. Dugu Ibrahim Gafalua 52 endary period.
4. Fune Dugu - 60
5. Aritse Fune Fukalchi 50
6. Katuri Aritse — 20
7. Adyoma Katuri Tumayu 20
8. Bulu Adyoma Ganjaya 16
9. Arid Bulu Azasenaa 44
10. Shu Arki Teksuwa 4
11. Sotama Shu Bure?a 4
12. Hume Soloma Tigiram 12 End of 11th
13. Dunama Hume Kinta 54 century to mid-
14. Biri Dunama Fasama 27 13th century.
15. Abdalla Bikur
16. Soloma (Abd-
Biri Zainab 17 Beginnings of
political con-
el-Jilil)
17. Dunama
Abdalla Bikur Huwa 20 solidation.
Dibalemi Sohma Dibala 40
18. Kadeb Dunama Matala 20 Mid-13th cen-
19. Biri, Othman,
Kachim-Biri
Dunama Zainab 20 tury to mid-
14th century.
(Djililc Dunama — Period of im-
20
- {Biri Dunama - M perial flores-
21. Dirke-Kelem Dunama - 20 cence and
22. Ibrahim
Nikale
Biri (no. 19) Kagudi 20 competition
between the
23. Abdalla Kade (no. 18) Fatima 20 Kade and Ka-
24. Soloma Abdalla Kime 4 chim-Biri royal
25. Kure Gana Abdalla - 1 segments.
26. Kure Kura Abdalla - 1
27. Mohammed Abdalla Kagala 1
28. Idris Ibrahim
Nikale
Hafsa 25 Mid-14th cen-
tury to late
29. Daud Ibrahim
Nikale
Fatima 10 15th century.
Period of con-
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A Revised Bornu King List ( continued
)
King
Father's
name
Mother’s
name
Length of
reign
( approx-
imate Dates and
years) period
30. Othman Daud — 3 flict and com-
31. Othman Idris (no. 28) Famafa 2 petition be-
32. Abu Bekr
( Idrisd
Daud
Daud
- 1
8
i
tween the Idris
and Daud seg-
33. (Dunama Ibrahim, son
of Daud
ments of the
Kachim-Biri
34. Umar Idris (no. 28) - 5 line; involves
35. Said Idris? (no. 28
)
e - 1 the move to
36. Mohammed Idris (no. 28) — 1 Bornu.
37. Kade Afunu Idris (no. 28) — 1
38. Biri Othman Idris (no. 28) — 33
39. Othman
Kalinumawa
Daud (no. 29) — 1
40. Dunama Umar (no. 34) — 2
41. Abdalla Umar (no. 34) - 8
42. Ibrahim Othman - 8
43. Kade Othman — 4
44. Biri Dunama
(no. 40?)
— 1
45. Dunama Biri (no. 38) - 4
46. Mohammed — Matala 1
47. Amarma,
Ume, Amer
— Aisa 1
48. Mohammed Kade (no. 43) — 5
49. Ghaji - Imala 5
50. Othman Kade (no. 43) - 5
51. Umar Abdalla
(no. 41)
— 1
52. Mohammed Mohammed - 5
53. Ali Gajideni Dunama
(no. 45)
Zainab 33 Late 15th cen-
tury to mid-
54. Idris Katar-
gamabe
Ali Gajideni Aisa 23 18th century.
The second pe-
55. Mohammed Idris K. Zainab 20 riod of imperial
56. Ali Idris K. Zainab 1 expansion: the
57. Dunama Mohammed
(no. 55)
Fanna 20 Bornu king-
dom.
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A Revised Bornu King List ( continued )
King
Father’s
name
Mother’s
name
Length of
reign
( approx-
imate
years
)
Dates and
period
58. Abdalla Dunama — 7
59. Aisa Kili1 ? — 7
60. Idris Alooma Ali (no. 56) Amsa 35
61. Mohammed Idris A. Fanna 16
62. Ibrahim Idris A. Gumsu 7
63. Haj Umar Idris A. Fusam 18
i
Birie Umar (no. 63) — ?64 (Haj Ali Umar (no. 63) - 40
65. Idris Ali — 20
66. Dunama Ali - 18
67. Haj Hamdun, Dunama — 14
Haj Dunama (no. 66)
68. Mohammed Haf Hamdun - 15
Ergama
69. Dunama Gana Mohammed? - 2
70. Ali Haj Dunama _ 40 C. 1750 to the
(no. 67) death of Ibra-
71. Ahmed Ali — 17 him (1846).
72. Dunama Ahmed — 7 Collapse of the
73. Mohammed Ali (no. 70) - 3 Magumi Sefu-
74. Ibrahim Ahmed - 28 wa Dynasty.
75. Ali Ibrahim — ?
a Bure is mentioned by Palmer and no one else, although she is given clan af-
filations by Palmer and Barth.
b Kade’s position is discussed in note c in the composite table (Table 1).
c See text.
d I have merged these rulers because they seem to be only vaguely remem-
bered and are not reported in Barth or Palmer. Nachtigal and Landeroin give
the same length of reign to each of them and the same paternity. I suggest that
they are not really in the king list, or one reigned for a short time during the
reign of the other, or they are the same person.
e All sources except Barth agree on the paternity of this ruler. However,
usurper is such a strong designation that I have labeled this case doubtful.
f Aisa Kili is spoken of by Barth as the Magira, or queen mother, who built
the palace of Gamburu near Birni Ngazargamo and helped to raise Idris
Alooma. The mother of Idris was Amsa as indicated in his name, “Amsami.” To
be a queen mother and not his own mother would mean that she was his
mother’s co-wife. It may also be that Aisa and Amsa are variants of the same
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name. I have separated Aisa because there is no valid way of knowing ex-
actly who she was.
8 Biri is omitted from all lists except that of Landeroin. I have joined him
to Haj Ali on the similar logical grounds as the previous case of Dunama and
Idris above: they are either the same person, or Biri did not exist, or there was
a short Biri rule during the reign of Haj Ali.

Ill
The Dynamics of Feudalism
in Bornu
by
RONALD COHEN
Associate Professor of Anthropology and Political Science,
Northwestern University

The idea of feudalism as applied to Africa seems to be a recurrent
one among a number of works having to do with its traditional state
societies. But much of this work has bogged down because of the
lack of a theoretical approach to feudal society that will be able to
cut across differing cultural traditions and social histories. A few
brief examples from some of the recent literature will serve to illus-
trate this point. E. P. Skinner mentions C. Stephenson’s eight char-
acteristics of feudal society: (1) fief-holding with vassalage, (2)
homage and fealty, ( 3 ) mutual obligations between lord and
vassal, (4) military service from vassals, (5) inheritance of fiefs by
heirs of vassals, usually by primogeniture, (6) subinfeudation, (7)
attendance at court, and (8) wardship and marriage arrangements
by which fiefs could be held in trust for minors and, in the case of
female heirs, husbands who could render homage for them. 1 He
then notes that the Mossi have the first six of these but lack the
last two; that is, using Stephenson as a measure, the Mossi are about
75 per cent feudal compared with the original model. Skinner recog-
nizes that this is obviously not a settled question, and asks that the
whole problem of feudalism be kept open until more material from
Africa is available for comparison.2 This deferral is particularly
necessary when it is realized that Stephenson’s categories are not
universally accepted and cannot be applied uniformly over the
whole of feudal Europe.
More recently E. M. Chilver has used her understanding of Euro-
pean feudalism to caution us that analogies between feudal societies
in Europe and elsewhere turn out to be superficial when examined
more closely.3 Although wide-ranging political and social conditions
1 E. P. Skinner, “Analysis of the Political Organization of the Mossi People,”
Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, ser. 2, XIX (1957), 748;
C. Stephenson, Medieval Feudalism (Ithaca, 1956), chap 2.
2 Skinner, “Analysis,” 749.
3 E. M. Chilver,
“
‘Feudalism’ in the Interlacustrine Kingdoms,” in A. I.
Richards, ed., East African Chiefs (London, 1960), 392.
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like feudalism may recur, they are not adequate descriptions of each
separate historical entity covered by the generalization. Thus she
says that Bantu states cannot be said to arise from the breakdown
of previously larger units, as was the case in Europe; or again that
the judgment of a vassal was carried out by his peers in Europe and
by his superiors in Buganda; or that warfare was in the hands of a
professional fighting class in Europe but not in Buganda; and so on.
In other words, at close range the Bantu states are quite different
in many of their basic social and political relationships when com-
pared to European feudal societies.
My chief criticism of such discussions is that they utilize discrete
features as diagnostic qualities of feudalism. In so doing it is fairly
easy to come across variant forms, and then one must either move
to a higher level of abstraction, as Macquet has done,4 or declare
African states to be feudal but perhaps only partially so, as Skinner
suggests, or call them dissimilar in detail, as Chilvers has claimed.
This variety in interpretation indicates the weakness of a purely
formal comparison, and yet it can be seen in the work of other writ-
ers as well. 5 If social or political structures are viewed theoretically
as the products of organizational problems in human society, it
would seem more fruitful to obtain generalizations by examining the
processes by which structures emerge from common sets of prob-
lems, rather than by simply studying the structures at any one point
in time.
Perhaps the best known generalization concerning process and
feudalism is that put forward by R. Coulborn: he sees feudalism as
a form of government based on the lord-vassal relationship and a
process of development based on the decay of a highly organized
empire or centralized kingdom. 6 Anyone familiar with the African
material can see immediately that such a generalization does not
hold for the African states, since very few if any of them are
products of decaying empires or result from the breakdown of state
4
J. J. Macquet, “Une Hypothese pour l’Etude des Feodalites Africaines,”
Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, II, no. 6 (1961), 292-314.
5 S. F. Nadel, Black Byzantium (London, 1946); L. A. Fallers, Bantu
Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1956).
6 R. Coulborn, ed., Feudalism in History (Princeton, 1956).
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centralization. Indeed, many historians would dispute its applica-
bility to Europe as a whole.
Here then is the problem. If we define feudalism by structural
type, it is soon apparent that the systems we wish to compare differ
significantly in detail. If we use the generalization put forward by
Coulborn,7 it does not apply to the African material. Yet there are,
as Skinner suggests, many correspondences. 8 In order to escape this
dilemma, and to maintain the goal of comparability among societies
we call “feudal,” we should look for general processes that will
apply to all of the cases now thought of as being possible examples
of feudalism. These processes must be specific enough so that they
can be used to explain the major structural variations which differ-
entiate feudal societies from one another. Parenthetically, to suggest
as Goody does9 that feudalism is not a useful concept in African
studies begs the question. Some correspondences among a number
of very widely separated societies around the world do exist, and
Goody himself says that the “extent to which developments in
Africa resembled those that occurred in Western Europe is certainly
worth pursuing.”10 Whether we call such resemblances feudal, cen-
tralized, or anything else is really irrelevant to the problem at hand
—that of identifying the nature of the similarities and differences.
To begin with, let us start with the general model of feudalism
put forward by Macquet. 11 There are three12 important elements in
Macquet’s model:
7 Ibid.
8 Skinner, “Analysis.”
9 Jack Goody, “Feudalism in Africa,” Journal of African History
,
IV (1963),
11 .
10 Goody, “Feudalism,” 16.
11 Macquet, “Hypothese.”
12 A fourth proposition by Macquet—that feudalism cannot be found in a
despotic state—is too contentious at present to be useful. Thus H. Codere, in
“Power in Ruanda,” Anthropologica, IV (1962), 45-85, feels that Ruanda
society was an extremely ruthless one, and indeed despotic, while Macquet, in
The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda (New York, 1961), points out that the
same society was based on a great deal of reciprocity between rulers and
ruled.
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(1) An interpersonal bond involving unequal power between
persons, with the superior giving protection, on the one hand,
and the subordinate giving loyalty and service on the other.
(2) A political system in which these feudal social relations are
used as a basis for government.
(3) Possible compatibility with the state or with a state that is
breaking down.
These postulates, however, do not say very much about the proc-
esses that maintain such a system or that tend to propel its develop-
ment in the direction of one set of alternatives. In this essay I should
like to carry Macquet’s thesis one step further by emphasizing a
point already implicit in the model, 13 namely that feudal social rela-
tions and feudal government are quite different and should be kept
separate for purposes of analysis. When stressing this point we find
that feudal social relations are based on a diffuse interpersonal bond
between superiors and subordinates, and that the exact form of a
feudal government is not a product of these relationships. By
diffuse, I mean relationships involving many as opposed to very few
activities. All varieties of feudal polities have these relationships
and probably depend upon them as functional prerequisites, but so
do other so-called nonfeudal polities such as modern Japan. 14 In
other words, this analysis is based on the proposition that feudal
social bonds (item one in Macquet’s model) and the type of govern-
ment present in societies having such relations (item two) are
related, but only to the extent that the governmental system is
always made up of such social relations between persons. This is
what Macquet means when he claims that feudal relations are a
basis for government. On the other hand, as we shall see, whether
there is more power at the center or less, whether there is trial by a
man’s peers or his superiors, and a host of other conditions, depend
on factors not specifically noted by Macquet.
Examined theoretically and stripped of its medieval flavor, the
feudal relationship involves two people, a superior and a subordi-
13 Macquet, “Hypothese,” 299.
14 I. Ishino, “The Oyabun-Kobun: A Japanese Ritual Kinship Institution,”
American Anthropologist
,
LV (1953), 695-704.
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nate within a large interrelated network of these, in which the
superior exchanges protection, economic security, and a position in
the society in return for loyalty, obedience, and service from the
subordinate. The maintenance and development of such a system
of relations depends not on the governmental system so much as on
personal insecurity, a lack of widespread use of payment for specific
purposes, lack of adequate social control outside such relationships,
and the inability of kinship units to perform all the required and
desired services for individuals.
On the other hand, the government of a feudal society can vary
in character. It may take a path of development that leads it toward
greater fragmentation, 15 or it may move toward increased central-
ization, as in the case of Kanem-Bornu. It is my hypothesis that
fragmentation or centralization in feudal government is related to
the manner in which succession disputes come to be settled, and
the consequent effect that such developing customs have throughout
the society upon the monarch’s right of revocability. In other words,
though feudal government may not necessarily be that of a decaying
state, 16 I am concerned to know why it does decay in some cases and
not in others.
In what is to follow, material is presented to show that, both in
Europe and among the Kanuri, feudal social relations depend on
common social conditions. We shall also see that Europe, partic-
ularly France, and Bornu took alternate paths of political develop-
ment within the common feudal framework because of differing
developments in their succession rules and a correlated increase or
decrease in the power of the monarch, and indeed of all superiors
in the political organization.
The Kanem-Bornu state is one of the many empires that devel-
oped at the southern edge of the Sahara, as far as we know, during
the first millennium a.d. It flourished in Kanem northeast of Lake
Chad in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, during which its
influence extended from Murzuk in the north to Kano on the west17
15 See Coulborn et al., Feudalism.
16 Macquet, “Hypothese.”
17 Y. Urvoy, “Histoire de l’Empire du Bornou,” Memoires de I’Institut
Frangais d’Afrique Noire, VII (Dakar, 1949), fig. 3, p. 43.
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and Darfur on the east. 18 Essentially because of internal problems,
the kingdom broke up and its power declined rapidly in the fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries; the Kanuri emerged again in present-
day Bornu and achieved a second strong empire in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. A second period of slow decline is
supposed to have followed, and at the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury the Fulani jihad of northern Nigeria pressed hard on Bornu;
this resulted in the rise to power of the Kanembu Shehus, who
replaced the ancient dynasty and finally abolished the original royal
line. The Shehus were in their turn toppled by Rabeh, a Sudanese
slave raider, in 1893. However, he and his descendants were stopped
in their attempts to found a third dynasty by advancing French
colonial forces, and the Kanembu Shehus were restored after 1900.
The economy was based on peasant and slave agriculture, craft-
work, and trade. The use of money was restricted right up to the
colonial period, 19 and there were never any salaried positions, as
such. The king had final authority in the state, although the exercise
of his power was tempered by the nobles, royal relatives, religious
advisers, followers both slave and free, and strong national adver-
saries. Fiefs were given out to nobles and loyal followers; taxes were
collected through the fiefs as well as by other means; and the pop-
ulace was liable to military service under the nobles, who served as
a cavalry force in the army. Military campaigns were an annual
feature of state fife during strong monarchies, though less frequent
at other times. Personal relationships had always been of the feudal
variety, encompassing all facets of society, and this continues into
the present.
1. Feudal Social Relations
In Europe of the ninth to eleventh centuries, neither the state nor
the family could provide adequate security for the individual. Com-
pared to other periods in the medieval era, these two centuries were
generally marked by a sharp increase in disorder. Even the village
community was barely strong enough to maintain order within its
18 A. J. Arkell, “The History of Darfur, 1200-1700: The Influence of Bornu,”
Sudan Notes and Records
,
no. 33 (1952), 129-155.
19 Ronald Cohen, “Some Aspects of Institutionalized Exchange: A Kanuri
Example,” Cahier d’Etudes Africaine, V, no. 19 (1965), 353-369.
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borders, although the village did afford some protection against
outsiders. Everywhere the weaker man felt the need of a protector,
and even men with followings could not totally ensure their own
positions without some connection to an even more powerful leader.
The result of all this was that, over a period of time, there was built
up an intricate system of personal relationships that interrelated all
levels of the state into hierarchical relationships, in which loyalty
and obedience were exchanged for benefits, protection, and jus-
tice.20 Much of the economic organization was carried on through
these same relationships, or ones very much like them, because
money was not widely used and salaried positions were relatively
rare.
In Bornu, the literature and the statements of older informants
tell a uniform story. Social life in precolonial Bornu was similar in
many respects to that of today, except for one overriding difference:
personal security. A man had little or no protection against raiders,
war service, robbers, overzealous tax collectors, and a judiciary that
often favored those in authority. Ibn Fartua in his contemporary
description of sixteenth-century Bornu military campaigns notes
how villages were attacked, men killed, and wives and children
taken as slaves.21 Over two centuries later Denham described this
same method of warfare: “On attacking a place, it is the custom of
the country instantly to fire it; and as they are all composed of straw
huts only, the whole is shortly devoured by flames. The unfortunate
inhabitants fly quickly from the destructive element, and fall im-
mediately into the hands of their no less merciless enemies, who
surround the place; the men are quickly massacred, and the women
and children lashed together and made slaves.”22 Later Denham
witnessed the plundering after a battle in which two hundred wives
and concubines of the opposing army were captured and distributed
among the leaders of the Bornu army. Barth also describes scenes
in northern and western Bornu in which whole towns were razed
20 M. Bloch, Feudal Society, L. A. Manyon, trans. (London, 1961), 142-150.
21 H. R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs (Lagos, 1926), I, 63. It is significant
that this reference refers to such action against Moslems, since it indicates that
this was a general practice and not limited to pagans.
22 Major Denham and Captain Clapperton, Travels and Discoveries in
Northern and Central Africa (London, 1826), I, 224.
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by enemy forces,23 and even situations where local political leaders
“as soon as they have any debts to pay undertake a predatory excur-
sion, often selling their own subjects.”24
Informants in remote Bornu hamlets during 1955-1957 called my
attention to these facts and others like them during discussions con-
cerning the coming of Nigerian independence. They exclaimed that
life in Bornu before the British was terrible for the common peasant,
Houses could be burned down, wives and daughters taken away,
and goods or crops confiscated almost at will by political superiors.
The only hope in such times, they said, was to have the protection
of a powerful man, or to be under the leadership of a man who was
in his turn the protected subordinate of another. Even then, chang-
ing fortunes and political upheaval made all personal attachments
continually insecure.
In terms of every-day social life, this meant that families could be
broken up at any time, either at home from raids or on the battle-
field ( to which a man brought at least one wife or female slave, and
she her young children). To give some basis for residential and
familial solidarity, it was habitual for the weaker to flock to the
banners of the stronger. Leaders sought subservience, followers
readily gave it, and frequent switching of loyalties became a neces-
sary part of life. Thus Denham reported in the 1820s that, on the
eastern boundaries of Bornu, townspeople “who have now . . . after
military defeat ... as if by magic, all become staunch supporters
of the sheikh [Shehu Leminu].”25 On a previous occasion, wives of
the Bornu chiefs sent messengers to Denham privately, saying that
they would come to him for protection if the Bornu army lost and
if their husbands were killed.26 On another occasion, deserters from
the Bagirmi army to the east of Bornu led the Kanuri “to the pillage
of their own brethren,”27 and thirty years later, in the 1850s, Barth
met a large number of Kanembu near the west bank of Lake Chad
who had moved south into Bornu to obtain the protection of the
23 H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa, I
(London, 1857), 211.
24 Ibid., 553.
25 Denham and Clapperton, Travels, II, 34.
26 Ibid., 32.
27 Ibid., I, 317.
The Dynamics of Feudalism in Bornu 95
Kanuri leaders.28 Life was cheap, and the best, perhaps the only,
protection was that to be obtained from the strong, the wealthy,
and the powerful.29
In the economic sphere, Barth reported that as late as the mid-
nineteenth century currency was restricted, and that barter was still
a widespread form of trade in the markets.30 But only a small pro-
portion of needs could be satisfied in the market place, and there
were no salaries as we know them. Land, marriage, shelter, occupa-
tional training, and a host of other goods and services were, and to
a large extent still are, obtained through organized superior-sub-
ordinate relationships. Since a person could not pay for these vital
goods and services with a generalized currency, he used labor and
obedience instead. In a complex society like that of the Kanuri, this
is one of the few means of assuring the flow of goods and services.
Thus all social relations, political, kinship, and economic, tended to
be diffuse: a subordinate in any political or economic organization
would not be at all surprised to find his superior arranging for his
marriage or seeing that he obtained a plot of land or an occupation.
There were other conditions that support the continuation of
these hierarchical relationships in Bornu, although they are some-
what peripheral to the present discussion. Perhaps the basic use of
such relationships occurs in the Kanuri household organization.
Here individuals could, and still do, join households as subordinates,
and if they prove loyal and accept their subordination they even-
28 Barth, Travels
,
II, 67.
29 It is interesting to compare this generalization with that made by F. R.
Wingate, Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan (London, 1891), 74-75, when he
described the actions of Sudanese troops during the Mahdist revolt: “Nothing is
more extraordinary in the campaigns of the Great Pasha in the Bar el Ghazal
than the facility with which the troops fought alternatively on his side, and on
the side of Suliman Zubeir. Gessi would have one day 15,000 men in his army;
but on the mere report of a stronger force being opposed to him, on the mere
report that Suliman had found some means of success, 10,000 of these would
be arrayed against him in Suliman’s army. And in a like manner, when he in-
flicted a defeat upon Suliman, sometimes even before, so keenly did they watch
the scale, he would at once enroll almost the whole army opposed to him.” It
should be remembered that Gessi Pasha was a European associate of Gordon’s,
and that Suliman Zubeir was the former superior of Rabeh who took a number
of Suliman’s troops and later conquered Bornu in 1893.
30 Barth, Travels
,
II, 56.
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tually obtain land, a wife, and a compound of their own, ideally
close by within the expanding organization of the original house-
hold head. Kanuri towns, and probably Kanuri clans, developed in
this way. Such relationships were also used for apprenticing boys
to craftsmen. When the boy was to learn an occupation other than
that of his father, he was placed in the household of a practitioner
of the craft. Men who wished to get ahead in any field placed their
services at the disposal of powerful men. The pattern was, and is,
very similar for a large gamut of activities, including most important
political positions. The person hoping to obtain a new and better
position obtained acceptance as a tada (son, boy, subordinate,
servant, follower ) of the superior. At first he carried out very menial
tasks while being watched carefully for signs of disloyalty. If he
wished to stay and made a good impression, he was given a more
responsible job; after years of service he might become quite an
important person in his own right.
2. The Problem of Succession
In early medieval Europe, primogeniture resulted from the desire
to preserve holdings intact, even though this form of succession ran
counter to the “ordinary rules of the law of succession, which in the
greater part of Europe favored the equality of heirs of the same
degree .”31 Although there was opposition at its inception, and vary-
ing paths to its general application, the rule was widely instituted
throughout European society by the end of the twelfth century.
Before this time, an heir was customarily chosen from a group of
eligibles if there was only one item, such as an office or a small fief.
If there were a number of prerogatives, the heirs divided the estate
among them. In both cases conflicts and competition could easily
arise. In France, and for a short time in post-Conquest England, a
system known as parage was introduced to solve such problems by
the traditional rules of succession. The eldest brother among a
group of sons paid homage to his deceased father’s superiors, and
thus assumed his father’s responsibilities and status while accepting
in his turn homage and subordination from his younger brothers for
their portions of the estate. However, after several generations the
31 Bloch, Feudal Society
,
203.
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kin ties were so weak among the descendants of the original
brothers that fragmentation occurred. Strict primogeniture finally
became the rule. Fragmentation ceased, and disputes over succes-
sion were minimized by this jural delineation of a person among the
possible heirs to whom the rights of succession must fall.32
There was in Kanem-Bornu before the nineteenth century only
a single dynasty, the Magumi Sefuwa, and this descent group is
supposed to have held a ruling position for at least a thousand years.
Unlike Europe, no rule of primogeniture ever developed in Kanem-
Bornu, and every succession witnessed a competition among pos-
sible heirs to the throne. The basic criterion for succession was ( and
is) the kingly status of one's own father. In practice, the status of
the mother's family and her personal character also helped to deter-
mine the choice, but the good opinion of the court was absolutely
necessary. Thus in the 1884 succession, Urvoy notes that the court
officials designated one heir (Abba Mustafa), then replaced him
with his brother the next day, ‘probably because his investiture gifts
... to the nobles . . . were too meagre."33 Traditions record a tend-
ency on the part of the monarch to designate his own successor. In
Bornu there was a title ( chiroma
)
given to the named heir-
apparent, and in the nineteenth century Shehu Laminu named his
sons in order of their priority to the throne while he was still alive.
In practice, however, this designation never became a firmly en-
trenched part of the proceedings, at least not so firm as to stop com-
petition for kingly office.
If the successions in the first dynasty are counted from ruler 16
(the first to have a named patrilateral relative) to number 72 on
Urvoy's list, there are 15 successions from father to son and 41 from
a monarch to a relative other than own son.34 The average length of
reign is 11.2 years for a father-son succession and 10.2 for others.35
However, a large proportion of the very short reigns were begun by
32 Ibid., 199-208.
33 Urvoy, “Histoire,” 113.
34 Y. Urvoy, “Chronologie du Bornou,” Journal de la Societe des African-
istes, XI (1941), 21-31. This list was chosen before serious work was initiated
on the various lists, because it gave the least confirmation to the thesis ex-
pressed here.
35 Ibid.
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nonfilial succession. There are 18 monarchs in this category who
ruled for less than 5 years; only 4 rulers who obtained the throne
from their fathers ruled for such a short time. Thus, although the
average length of reign is somewhat similar, owing to a few long
reigns by strong monarchs who obtained the throne from other than
their own fathers, succession from father to son generally marked a
more stable and longer-lasting reign for the successor. If this is so,
why are there so many fewer of them than of the non-filial variety?
From a formal point of view, if no individual person in a lineage
is appointed to the throne, and a rule exists that a successor’s father
has to be king, then competition between lineage segments is built
into the system. This can be seen most clearly in the “times of
trouble” between 1350 and 1470, in which 22 kings are listed, most
of them with very short reigns. On several occasions the throne was
held by usurpers; several kings were deposed by the kaigama, or
head of the state military organization. There were also a number
of assassinations, and civil as well as external wars. Thus members
of the royal lineage and even nonmembers were ready to fight for
the privileges of royalty. Indeed, the whole process of competition
was self-accelerating in its intensity. As soon as there were more
nonfilial relatives who obtained the throne, then an even greater
number of next-generation descendants appeared to claim it (as-
suming that each succeeding generation of the dynasty produces a
larger number of male offspring than the preceding one )
.
The only way such competition could diminish was when a strong
man ruled for a long time, then passed the rule on to his son. Count-
ing back only two generations from Ali Ghajedini (a late fifteenth-
century monarch ) , there were eight lineage segments of the dynasty
that lost their royal status. The fact that Ali Ghajedeni, his son, and
his grandson all succeeded one another, and altogether ruled for
about seventy years, ensured their own line of continuity and caused
many others extinction from the dynasty. This did not mean that
these families lost all power in the state. The heads of these noble
households supported themselves through income derived from the
fiefs remaining to them, from their slave settlements throughout
Bornu, and from commerce. At the same time, they attempted to
maintain some influence in the state through judicious alignments
and realignments to powerful or potentially powerful factions.
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Indeed the “times of trouble” are supposed to have been triggered
off by a revolt of the Bulala, from Lake Fitri east of Chad, who
were led by a dissident segment of the Magumi Sefuwa dynasty
that had lost its royal status early in Kanem history.36 Even if this
story is not true, it reflects the traditional Kanuri view that segments
of the dynasty that lose their royal status are potential sources of
revolt.
As noted, the competition could be diminished by a strong ruler;
but it is equally important to note that it could never be stopped
completely. There were always heirs beyond the filial ones. All of
these possible successors were the heads of factions in the state.
The moment any dislocating factor such as famine, disease, or un-
successful warfare produced a threat to the state, the factions began
to advance the cause of their leader in his claim to the throne. The
death of a monarch produced competition among factions, and if no
faction was stronger than another, then shorter or longer “times of
trouble” could result.
Whether or not this tension was useful for the perpetuation of the
state is beside the point; probably it worked both ways. A strong
man of the dynasty, with the ability to enlist the support of large
numbers of followers, would always have a chance to obtain control
of the throne. On the other hand, there were succession disputes
and civil wars that periodically destroyed the stability of the state.
The tension between filial and nonfilial heirs was in turn determined
by ( 1 ) the greater number of nonfilial heirs compared to filial ones
for any ruler, (2) the external tensions facing the state, (3) the
support that heirs could muster among the population and the
nobles, and (4) the self-accelerating quality that produced an in-
creasing number of heirs once the instability developed.
In the society as a whole, although details of succession disputes
from other sources in the political system are less easily obtained,
it is likely that all succession, especially in families having access
to political power, was beset with the same difficulties. Some evi-
dence for this point comes from the many stories of assassination
and intrigue told to me about the family histories of present-day ajia
(district heads). Some of these concerned relations between an-
36 Barth, Travels, II, 640.
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cestors of ajia and the monarch, but others pointed to competition
among agnates for the office and prerogatives of a dead relative,
especially between a dead man’s brother and his son. Even today in
Bornu, succession and inheritance disputes between a dead man’s
brothers and sons over property is one of the most common inheri-
tance problems. Informants felt this to be a basic problem in their
own society, claiming that its only resolution lay in a customary, but
not jural, preference that sons should have rights over their parental
uncles for their dead father’s estate.
3. Revocability
One of the great turning points in the development of early Euro-
pean feudalism was the loss of the power of revocability by supe-
riors. In the Lombard kingdom of northern Italy in the eleventh
century, the conflict over revocability versus inheritable rights gave
rise to a civil war, which was resolved, as the conflict was elsewhere,
by the recognition that fiefs were inheritable rights within the
family line of the holder. At first, superiors “insisted on the life
character of a grant ... [of a fief] and its constant revocability.”37
By the twelfth century, however, the conflict was over, and the
rights of a superior, even if he were a king, had to give way to those
of the vassal dynasties of patrimonies. This is one of the basic de-
terminants in the development of fragmented power within the
centralized state in the medieval period, for it deprived the king of
his right to maintain loyalty and obedience through the constant
threat of confiscation of the rights and privileges of his subordinates.
It is interesting to note that this desire to build up large consoli-
dated patrimonial holdings led to both subinfeudation and to a
plurality of superiors for subordinate lords and nobles. Because of
the real possibility of warfare between one’s superiors, this charac-
teristic resulted eventually in the restriction of obligations between
feudal subordinates and their superiors, which led to what we know
today as rent, and to the inception of more specific ties between
lords and vassals
.
38
There are indications that the trend in Bornu was exactly the
reverse of that in Europe. In early Kanem, the exact details of
37 Bloch, Feudal Society, 198.
33 Ibid., 208-218.
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government organization are not at all clear. However, Urvoy does
feel that members of the royal lineage always had certain territories
reserved for themselves, of which they were the “uncontested
masters.”39 Formally these territories were given for life, but it
seems that in reality they may have been held for long periods of
time by royal lineage segments, as patrimonies. Barth40 recounts
traditions which suggest that the early Kanem monarchy was
strongly limited in power by a council of twelve nobles, without
whose assent nothing could be undertaken by the king.41 After their
expulsion from Kanem in the fifteenth century, the Kanuri monarchs
created a large number of honorific titles for their close relatives,
but “strained to empty these of all territorial powers.”42 Traditions
suggest that Ali Ghajedeni (late fifteenth century) kept the nobles
in his new capital of Birni Ngazargamo and broke up their estates.
The various regions of the kingdom, and the administrative hier-
archy from a regional level upward, he tried to put into the hands
of his own followers, “whose modest origins made them totally de-
pendent upon the prince.”43 It should also be noted that in theory,
if not in practice, all titles in Bornu have always been revocable by
the monarch, although granted to the incumbent for life. 44
Exactly how old the fief system of precolonial Bornu may be is
difficult to document. However, it is quite apparent from all ac-
counts that it involved the fragmenting of holdings (with the
notable exception of the galidima of northwest Bornu, who held a
border territory). Nobles living in the capital were given rights to
tax villages spread over the entire kingdom. These were admin-
istered by chima gana, or subordinates of the fief holder who
resided in the fief. Furthermore, other titled persons, who were the
heads of ethnic groups or clan groupings were often given the right
to a small tax from members of their group in a number of specified
villages. This hierarchy seems to have cut across villages considered
as units, so that one village might contain several of these ethnic or
39 Urvoy, “Chronologie,” 38.
40 Barth, Travels
,
II, 647.
41 Arkell, “History of Darfur,” 137.
42 Urvoy, “Chronologie,” 38.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 39.
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clan groups. Whether or not this tax form represents an earlier form
of social organization is a tantalizing question. The important point
for this discussion, however, is the fact of fragmentation, which
made it impossible for anyone beneath the monarch to obtain terri-
torially based subordination.
The development of revocability in Bornu was in all likelihood
hastened by the displacement of the older Sefuwa dynasty by that
of the Kanembu Shehus.45 Many of the ancient titles that persisted
into the second dynasty of the nineteenth century were given as
“decorations to esteemed followers.”46 For example, the title of
kaigama, formerly chief military leader of the state, and a noble
whose antecedents had often deposed monarchs, was given to a
minor chief, while the official functions were taken over by Kachella
Bilal, a slave follower.47 The title of yerima, a powerful noble in the
Magumi Sefuwa court who administered the northern part of the
kingdom, existed by name only. His functions were taken over by
the digma, a title given to a household slave of the ruler. On the
other hand, the two eunuch titles of very high rank in the old king-
dom, that of the yuroma and the mustrema, were kept as slave titles
and even gained in importance and power.48 In other words, titles
were for the most part placed in the hands of followers personally
loyal to the Shehu, rather than in the hands of noble members of
the realm who might revolt and threaten the monarch.
That the Shehu did have dramatic powers of revocability can be
seen in an episode observed by Denham in northern Bornu in
1823. 49 A chief slave follower of Shehu Laminu, Barca Gana, who
had many male and female slaves of his own, and a number of dis-
tricts of the kingdom under his control, was stripped of all power
and ordered by the Shehu to be sold as a common slave, after he
had reacted resentfully to a royal request. Although this order was
later rescinded because of the entreaties of other courtiers, it seems
clear that the monarch had a right to do just as he wished with the
45 Urvoy, “Histoire,” 100.
46 Ibid., 115.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 116.
49 Denham and Clapperton, Travels, I, 235-237.
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rank of his subordinates, if there was any hint of insubordination.
There is no evidence that his right was challenged.
According to Benton, part of the investiture ceremony of a Shehu
involved the giving of districts to various titled officials.50 Thus in
1880, when a follower of the dead Shehu Umar gave the robes of
office and other regalia to Umar’s son Bukar, thus making him the
new monarch, the follower is supposed to have said, according to a
traditional custom, “What province will you give me?” This par-
ticular province was presumably an area not previously under this
courtier’s jurisdiction. Such redistribution by revocation and reallo-
cation serves, of course, to maintain some of the relations between
the throne and those most closely associated with it, but it also indi-
cates the final authority that the monarch had over the appointment
of state officers.
Further documentation of this point, showing its extension
throughout the political system, comes from the 1920 report of a
perplexed young British official, who was assigned the task of find-
ing the rightful claimants to districts (fiefs) and village headships.
He reported that there was practically no evidence of hereditary
rights to political office in Bornu. Instead, “these were held by the
Chimas ( fief holders ) simply during the pleasure of the Shehu, and
were liable to be taken away and bestowed elsewhere on the slight-
est excuse. A son of the Shehu, a slave, a free born noble, are to be
found following each other as the holders of single fiefs. And with or
without change in the holder of a fief the size of the fief was liable
to be changed, towns in the original fief being taken away and given
to another fief holder.”51
4. Conclusion
This analysis suggests that in Europe the development of primo-
geniture and feudal patrimonies from the twelfth century onward
meant that it was impossible for superiors to enforce obedience
through the threat of revocation of a subordinate’s rights and privi-
50 P. A. Benton, trans., The Sultanate of Bornu, by A. Schultze (London,
1913 ), 275 .
51
J. R. Patterson, “Report on Magumeri District” (MS), in Magumeri Dis-
trict Notebook, Provincial Office, Maiduguri, Bornu Province, Nigeria.
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leges. In Bornu, exactly the reverse situation obtained. The monarch
gained office as one individual among a group of eligibles. Through-
out most of Bornu history, traditions record that father-son succes-
sion occurred in only a minority of cases. Thus a new monarch was
often faced with a potentially disloyal administration because of its
attachment to another branch of the royal family. This led to the
increased use and reliance on personal followers for government
offices as against nobles and royal relations, and thus to such a
strengthening of the royal powers of revocability that monarchs, and
by custom all superiors, could replace disloyal subordinates with
loyal ones. The process was accelerated greatly by the need of the
Kanembu Shehus in the early nineteenth century to found a new
dynasty upon the remains of an older one.
To close with some points of general interest: Feudal societies
are ones in which relationships are typically of the so-called lord-
vassal variety. The maintenance of this relationship does not depend
upon the structure of feudal government. It is dependent, however,
upon (1) forces that create insecurity in continuous interpersonal
relations, such as warfare and slave raiding, and (2) forces that
tend to make interpersonal relations diffuse rather than specific,
such as a lack of salaried positions and currency, that is, forces tend-
ing to increase rather than diminish the number of activities in-
volved in an interpersonal relationship.
The central structure of feudal government is primarily a result
of the means by which succession problems come to be solved, at
the level of jural rules governing the selection of new offices. This
problem exists in all feudal societies. In some, probably the minority
of cases, succession is settled by giving a lineage, and through
primogeniture one person within the lineage, the right to succeed to
the power, territory, and office of another. This includes the
monarchy but is most strongly supported by the king’s subordinates
and leads to the fragmentation of the state through the building up
of noble patrimonies. In other feudal societies, like Bornu, the suc-
cession to the office of monarch remains a choice among a group of
eligibles. This leads to competition and the maintenance of royal
revocability, so that state positions can be used as rewards for
loyalty to the monarch. This becomes the pattern for all relations,
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and the state itself is maintained as a centralized expansionist
monarchy.
Indeed, in the light of this analysis, a great deal of European
feudalism after the twelfth century was not so feudal after all
—
that is, if we think of the lord-vassal relationship and its ideology as
central to the definition. Once the superior lost the power of revoca-
bility, the lord-vassal relationship became more and more of an
empty form, and this applies to most of the medieval period. In a
society like Bornu, however, the superior has always had the right
to withdraw his support from a subordinate, and this has main-
tained the strength of superior-subordinate relations throughout the
country’s entire history.
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In 1873, Sm Bartle Frere arrived in Zanzibar, sent by the British
government to negotiate with the sultan, Sayyid Barghash, a treaty
to end the export of slaves from the mainland dominions of the
sultan to his islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, the only legal sea-borne
slave trade then permitted in the territories under his control. 1
Frere left Zanzibar without accomplishing his mission, and, accord-
ing to a noted scholar, “the honour of thwarting Frere’s diplomacy
was a Frenchman’s.''2 This Frenchman was Charles de Vienne, con-
sul at Zanzibar.
Any analysis of De Vienne's role in the negotiations of 1873 must
take into consideration the extended period of friction between the
British and French in Zanzibar. Although the British were never
seriously challenged, the French consuls in Zanzibar, often going
beyond their instructions,3 did furnish British representatives with
grounds for believing that France had designs upon the island. In
1862, both powers agreed by treaty to respect the independence of
the sultanate, but this did not put an end to their mutual mistrust
of each other's motives.4 Britain’s policy was aimed at suppressing
the slave trade in East African waters, and the French regarded it,
with much justification, as a calculated political device: the British
could gain control of Zanzibar while at die same time avowing that
1 For the treaties regulating the slave trade, R. Coupland, East Africa and
Its Invaders (Oxford, 1938), 186ff.
2 R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890 (London, 1939),
195.
3 This opinion is based upon the dispatches concerning East Africa in the
Zanzibar file of the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres (AAE), Paris, and the
files of the Ministere de la Marine (MM), held in the Archives de l’Ancien
Ministere de la France d’Outre-Mer, Paris.
4
J. D. Hargreaves has said of the British and French in Africa: “conscious-
ness of cultural differences and memories of recent political traditions might
still prevent mutual confidence between individuals,” in Prelude to the Parti-
tion of West Africa (London, 1963), 104.
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humanitarian considerations ruled all their actions. 5 Britain actually
had no serious thought of annexation in this period, but her diplo-
mats saw no reason why a policy designed to end the slave trade
should not contribute to the over-all aim of British supremacy in the
western Indian Ocean through the power this policy gave over the
sultan of Zanzibar. 6
1
Charles de Vienne arrived in Zanzibar to face this uneasy situa-
tion in mid- 1869. The French then had no definite information
about British plans for a renewed effort against the slave trade, but
they had apprehensions of such a move. Bishop Maupoint of Re-
union, who was in close contact with the French missionaries then
working in the sultan’s dominions, 7 sent his views to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, a step arising from information he had secured
of a potential combination of the British and French consuls to end
the public sale of slaves in Zanzibar. The bishop reminded the
ministry of the alleged abuses committed by the Royal Navy in its
efforts to deal with the slave trade of the Indian Ocean as proof of
Britain’s hypocrisy on this issue8 and, in general, gave the advice
that any joint move by the two nations would serve only to weaken
the independence of Zanzibar, a development that would strengthen
the already dominant British position in East Africa.9 De Vienne
agreed. 10
As De Vienne gained experience in Zanzibar, he became even
more convinced that his country should not cooperate with Britain.
5 The Americans in Zanzibar held similar views. See N. R. Bennett, Studies
in East African History (Boston, 1963), 34-35; for French suspicions, see, for
example, Jablonski to Drouyn de Lhuys, March 25, 1865, Politique, Zanzibar, t.
3, AAE.
6 For British policy, see Roland Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice
Denny, Africa and the Victorians (New York, 1961), 41ff.
7 Bennett, Studies, 54ff.
8 For this problem, see ibid., 33-34; Raymond Decary, VIsle Nosy Be de
Madagascar (Paris, 1960), 50ff; Owen Chadwick, Mackenzie’s Grave (London,
1959), 10-12.
9
“Note pour le Ministre,” Nov. 20, 1869, Polit., Zanz., t. 3.
10 De Vienne to Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (MAE), April 21, 1870,
ibid., t. 4.
Charles de Vienne and the Frere Mission 111
Positive that any measures against the slave trade would damage
the authority of the sultan, he went so far as to inform the British
representative, John Kirk, that his acts of interference could be
interpreted as violating the treaty of 1862. Kirk reported to his gov-
ernment De Vienne’s refusal to discuss the matter, a decision certain
to increase the suspicions of his French counterpart. In addition,
according to Kirk, De Vienne began to talk to the sultan about re-
sisting the constant pressure. 11 Thus De Vienne was led to follow
a policy in Zanzibar that ran counter to official French policy in
that area: the consul had, in 1870, presented a dispatch to the sultan
from his government stating its disapproval of the slave trade. 12 But
he now felt compelled to act differently, since he saw the chief
rivals of his country gaining additional influence over the sultan
through their action against the slave trade. 13
De Vienne returned to France in 1872 as the British Foreign Of-
fice initiated steps that culminated in the Frere mission to Zanzi-
bar. 14 Dispatches were sent to British representatives in countries
with interests in East Africa—France, the United States, Germany,
Portugal—instructing the diplomats to inform the governments con-
cerned that the state of the slave trade in that region was “altogether
unsatisfactory.” The representatives were to emphasize that action
was necessary to negotiate a new treaty since the previous agree-
ment, that of 1845, was obviously not working; an estimated 16,000
slaves a year were leaving Zanzibar ports for the slave markets to
the north, in spite of its provisions. They were then to ask for the
cooperation of each country in rectifying the situation, stressing the
fact that Britain preferred a joint effort to force the sultan to act. 15
11 Kirk to De Vienne, June 6, 1871, E-61; Kirk to Foreign Office (FO),
June 6, 1871, ibid.; De Vienne to Kirk, June 12, 1872, E-55, Zanzibar Archives
(ZA); De Vienne to MAE, July 12, 1871, with enclosures, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
12 De Vienne to MAE, Oct. (?), 1870, ibid.
13 See, for example, De Vienne to MAE, June 10, 1871, and July 12, 1871,
ibid. Other grounds for suspicion were the sending of slaves taken from Arab
vessels to a British estate in Zanzibar. See De Vienne to MAE, June 2, 1871,
ibid.
14 The background to the Frere mission is given in R. J. Gavin, “The Bartle
Frere Mission to Zanzibar, 1873,” The Historical Journal, V (1962), 122-148.
15 Granville to the British representatives in France, etc., Feb. 16, 1872, FO
84/1386, Public Record Office, London.
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In France, after some delay caused by the vagueness of the British
dispatch, the foreign minister, De Remusat, promised the assistance
of his country.16 Instructions were soon on the way explaining the
new policy to the acting consul, Alphonse Bertrand. The minister
noted that France had agreed to assist the British in this antislave-
trade endeavor because France, after all, was as much against the
trade as Britain. He pointed out that, though the French govern-
ment did not know the exact details of the treaty Frere was bringing
to the sultan, it would probably not be incompatible with the in-
dependence of that ruler. Bertrand was instructed to use his full
influence in aiding Frere, while simultaneously investigating and re-
porting back to France all of Frere’s doings in Zanzibar. 17
But, at the same time, De Remusat was trying to learn the details
of Frere’s instructions. Lord Granville accepted this desire as valid
and promised to have Frere communicate them to the French gov-
ernment so that more precise instructions could be sent to Zanzi-
bar. 18 Frere stopped in Paris on his way to Zanzibar to meet with
De Remusat; but their conversations were not very fruitful, Frere
reporting that the minister informed him there were no available
copies of the instructions sent to Bertrand. Frere concluded: “I took
leave of His Excellency under the impression that no very active
cooperation was to be expected from the French Government.”19
The attitude of the French is understandable, since they never
had received clear information on Frere’s plans. But De Remusat
did demonstrate his desire to cooperate by informing Frere that De
Vienne was then in Paris and that, if the consul were informed of
the nature of the British instructions, he would do everything pos-
sible to aid the mission. Frere rather curtly noted that he merely
sent the British ambassador, Lord Lyons, a memorandum contain-
16 De Remusat to Sackville West, Oct. 31, 1872, in Sackville West to Gran-
ville, Nov. 5, 1872, FO 84/1387.
17 MAE to Bertrand, Nov. 24, 1872, Polit., Zanz., t. 4. See also De Remusat
to Pothuau, Nov. 6, 1872, OI 14/56, Archives de l’Ancien Ministere d’Outre-
Mer. This dossier contains much information on French suspicions of British
policy in East Africa.
18 Granville to Lyons, Nov. 14, 1872, Lyons to Granville, Nov. 15, 1872,
FO 84/1387.
19 Frere to Granville, Nov. 24, 1872, FO 84/1385.
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ing the points he considered useful for the consul; then he left Paris,
feeling there was nothing further to be gained. The contents of his
memorandum affirmed that the sultan was violating the treaty of
1845 and that Britain was determined to end this situation; the sultan
was to be urged to prohibit the sale of slaves in public markets; all
Zanzibari vessels violating the new agreement would be seized and
condemned; and Britain desired the French to take action to pre-
vent the abuse of her flag by slave traders.20 This reply, however,
did not detail the steps that would be taken to secure these ends, an
omission that troubled the French since the course followed would
affect the sultans independence. The British ambassador recognized
the unsatisfactory nature of the reply by asking his government for
a sketch of Frere’s instructions so that the French could send out
similar orders to Zanzibar.21
Because of Frere’s attitude, the French sent no further instruc-
tions to Zanzibar. The omission was not too important, however,
since De Vienne was to return to Zanzibar as consul, agreeing when
the ministry asked him to reconsider his earlier decision to leave
that post.22 He was given a dispatch to the sultan expressing France’s
interest in ending the slave trade,23 but his own instructions from
De Remusat were somewhat less than positive. The minister passed
on what information the British had provided, adding that France
did not differ from Britain in its goal—the ending of the slave trade.
Then De Remusat added a reservation: “we naturally reserve our
freedom of judgement on the means of attaining the desired re-
sult.” He thought this necessary owing to his fear that Britain would
leave the sultan with only a shadow of his former authority. French
policy, De Remusat concluded, aimed at a solution leading to ef-
fective measures against the slave trade without interfering with
20 Ibid., enclosing the memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1872. Other secondary
matters mentioned were the establishing of stations for the landing of captured
slaves and the taking of steps to prevent Indians from holding slaves. The
complaint against slavers abusing the French flag had often formed the sub-
ject of dispatches in the years before the Frere mission. See Kirk to Gonne,
April 10, 1869, E-57, Tucker to Cumming, June 14, 1872, E-55, ZA.
21 Lyons to Granville, Nov. 25, 1872, FO 84/1387.
22 De Remusat to De Vienne, Dec. 19, 1872, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
23 President de la Republique to Sultan of Zanzibar, Jan. 12, 1873, ibid.
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Zanzibar’s independence—in other words, a solution in accord with
the treaty of 1862.24
2
Frere arrived in Zanzibar on January 12, 1873. During the next
few weeks frequent discussions were held with the Zanzibari gov-
ernment, but with no appreciable result. Sultan Barghash recognized
his difficult position; he said that he was given the choice of “sealing
the doom of his country [by ending the slave trade] or incurring the
displeasure of the British.” But the British kept pressing, and by
early February John Kirk was convinced that the sultan was coming
round to their side. Then on February 11, Barghash gave the British
a decided refusal, an action they claimed was prompted by the as-
surance given by De Vienne, only recently arrived, that France
would act to preserve the sultan’s independence.25
It is understandable that the British reacted in this way. When
Frere’s party arrived in Zanzibar, it did not receive an overly friendly
reception from the resident consuls, all of them being very sus-
picious of British motives. Bertrand, who had received no instruc-
tions, largely because of the delays caused by Frere in Paris, was
forced to tell the mission that he could not act without them.26 The
British, of course, had to bear the blame for this delay.27 De Vienne
arrived in the midst of the impasse, on February 9, to resume con-
trol of the consulate. He asked Frere to allow him a delay of three
days so that he could be brought up to date on Zanzibari affairs
by Bertrand, who was returning to France, before discussing meth-
ods of procedure for the negotiations. But this decision led to an
extremely poor result. Frere sent an aide, Clement Hill, to visit De
Vienne, and the two had an unfortunate meeting. The suspicious
24 MAE to De Vienne, Jan. 13, 1873, ibid. See also the minister’s wish that
the French navy be represented in Zanzibar during the Frere mission, again
based on fears of British motives, in MAE to MM, Feb. 11, 1873, ibid.
25 Coupland, Exploitation, 186-196; Gavin, “Frere Mission,” 145.
26 Frere to Granville, Jan. 14, 1873, FO 84/1389; De Vienne to Frere,
March 14, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4, states that the full instructions did not
arrive until March 9, 1873.
27 The Americans also complained of a similar lack of information. Bennett,
Studies, 37-38.
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British official pressed De Vienne on the delay in meeting Frere;
then he asked if his instructions authorized him to work for the
immediate abolition of the slave trade. According to Hill, De Vienne
declined an answer to the latter question, but intimated they did
not; moreover, he refused to exchange instructions with Frere, even
though Hill informed him of the British plans.28 De Vienne, in view
of his instructions, could go no further without knowing whether
the British planned to use force to secure their aims. Kirk, in a
separate dispatch, supported Hill and, at the same time, reported
that there were rumors in Zanzibar that France was opposed to
British demands. 29
De Vienne reported differently concerning his meeting with the
British. He had finally visited Frere on February 14, but he stated
that, although courteously received, he was given no information
about Frere’s mission and was not told what cooperation was ex-
pected from the French.30 This shifting of the blame to the British
was not accepted by Frere: when he sent home his version of the
visit, he claimed that De Vienne had delayed visiting him until just
before he was preparing to leave Zanzibar for a visit to areas south
of the island. Frere said the long delay had made any French co-
operation useless and, in addition, noted that De Vienne came to
visit unofficially so that it was not possible to talk on positive action
for the future. Frere continued that the French consul made no
reference to Hill’s visit or to Frere’s earlier efforts to meet him, con-
cluding that he had not felt it necessary to impart any information
on his plans.31
28 Hill’s memo of Feb. 10, 1873, in Frere to Granville, Feb. 10, 1873; Frere
to Granville, Feb. 1, 1873; De Vienne to Frere, March 17, 1873, in Frere to
Granville, March 24, 1873, FO 84/1389.
29 Kirk to FO, March 17, 1873, FO 84/1374. Bishop Steere of the Universi-
ties Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) reported the rumors: “They [the Arabs]
say that the French Consul has told Seyed Barghash not to mind what the
English say for . . . the other Europeans don’t go along with them.” Steere to
Ann Steere, March 13, 1873, Diocese of Zanzibar, A. 1, I, Archives of UMCA,
London.
30 De Vienne to De Remusat, Feb. 27, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4. For his
protest on this treatment, see De Vienne to Frere, March 13, 1873, in De
Vienne to De Remusat, March 17, 1873, ibid.
31 Frere to Granville, March 24, 1873, FO 84/1389.
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This impasse resulted from two factors: the mutual suspicions of
the two powers, and the apparent sudden change in the attitude of
the sultan upon the arrival of De Vienne. The first point has been
amplified sufficiently, but the second needs investigation. It was
natural that the British, not taking their own conduct into account,
should hold the French official responsible for the unfavorable turn
in the negotiations. But is there any justification for placing responsi-
bility for the sultan’s attitude on De Vienne? It appears that the
consul did act somewhat equivocally after his arrival. He delayed a
few days in presenting the sultan with the French president’s letter
on the ending of the slave trade, but this was largely because of his
suspicion of the still unclear plans of the British regarding their
proposals for Zanzibar. De Vienne’s letters demonstrate clearly that
he believed that the British, by working against the slave trade,
would upset the economic life of the island and, in the end, either
seize Zanzibar or ruin its prosperity.32 In the light of his ambiguous
instructions to help to maintain Zanzibar’s independence, he could
not freely support Frere. The French consul’s course was under-
standable in view of past friction between the two powers, but it no
doubt gave the sultan the hope that, if he resisted the British, he
might depend on the aid of the French.
Yet De Vienne did seem to resist being driven too far by the sultan
in any effort to play off England against France for Zanzibar’s ad-
vantage. He counseled the sultan against going to Paris, where the
French president would be asked to arbitrate the dispute. De Vienne
of course had no orders for such an action, but he foresaw that the
move would not be welcomed by his superiors.33 The consul limited
his actions to reporting his suspicions to Paris: that England was
pushing for violent measures he could not join and that Kirk, whom
he considered to favor violent solutions, was pushing Frere to that
end.34
Whatever De Vienne’s motives, the British began to press their
complaints to the French government concerning his actions. In
32 De Vienne to De Remusat, Feb. 12, 1873, Feb. 27, 1873, March 28,
1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
33 De Vienne to De Remusat, Apr. 10, 1873, ibid.
34 De Vienne to S’Hilaire, Apr. 10, 1873, in S’Hilaire to De Remusat, May
5, 1873, ibid.
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the view of Lord Lyons, De Remusat appeared ‘Very much sur-
prized and displeased” to learn of his consul’s activities, but the
foreign minister added that he had no information from his own
sources on which to base a judgment.35 When the British continued
their complaints, De Remusat replied that he had renewed his
order to De Vienne and had requested the British to inform him
fully of any further instance of his consul’s hindering actions.36 De
Remusat then wrote to Zanzibar, plainly informing the consul that
his attitude seemed to be violating instructions and that he regretted
the delay in visiting Frere, since it had led to an unfavorable British
interpretation of French motives. De Vienne was ordered to take
appropriate steps to end the slave trade, avoiding measures that
would throw doubt on France’s opposition to the trade.37
Granville continued to press, informing Lyons that De Vienne,
whatever his instructions, “has done all he can to thwart” the Frere
mission. Granville concluded that the French official’s refusal to call
on Frere could have but one interpretation—that of French opposi-
tion to the mission. Thus he instructed Lyons to secure further ex-
planations of De Vienne’s actions, in the hope that the consul would
in the end be disavowed by Paris.38 De Remusat countered this by
reporting that a De Vienne dispatch mentioned only “a slight mis-
understanding” between himself and Frere on the exchange of visits,
the result being “a certain coolness somewhat embarrassing to their
subsequent relations.” De Remusat continued that this information
was not specific enough to cause him to reprimand De Vienne;
rather, he requested any additional information the British might
have. But in spite of this attitude, he did say that perhaps De Vienne
had been compromised by the earlier actions of Bertrand and that
the consul was possibly “entangled in the cause of interests hostile
to the policy he is now instructed to obey.” De Remusat promised
to recall De Vienne if this suspicion proved justified.39
When more news arrived from Zanzibar, De Remusat decided in
35 Lyons to Granville, March 7, 1873, FO 84/1392.
36 Lyons to Granville, March 18, 1873, ibid.
37 MAE to De Vienne, March 13, 1873, and March 24, 1873, Polit., Zanz.,
t. 4.
38 Granville to Lyons, April 11, 1873, FO 84/1392.
39 Lyons to Granville, April 18, 1873, ibid.
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favor of his representative. He considered that, if De Vienne had
done little or nothing to aid Frere, he had also done nothing to
block him. De Remusat asserted that Frere’s mission had “virtually
failed” in any case, for by the time of De Vienne’s return the real
culprit was the sultan, who had tried to gain something from the
rivalry of Britain and France. But De Remusat also showed himself
in sympathy with the sultan, whom he considered as having justi-
fiable fears that his independence was threatened by Britain, so much
so that the ruler of Zanzibar even wished “to place himself under
the exclusive protection of France,” a request France would not
meet. De Remusat concluded this interview with Lyons by saying
that perhaps the alternatives presented by the sultan were worth
considering, particularly his proposal to allow a regulated number
of slaves to enter Zanzibar each year for local use.40
British officials did not accept this reasoning. G. M. Wylde, of the
Foreign Office, noted that Frere had considered his mission to be
progressing favorably until De Vienne’s arrival. To Wylde, “the
hereditary policy of the French at Zanzibar . .
.
[had] been opposi-
tion to everything English,” a course followed by Bertrand and De
Vienne. He concluded that it would be “a perfect absurdity” to ac-
cept the sultan’s proposal to allow a fixed number of slaves legally
to enter Zanzibar. 41 As Granville pointed out, such a policy would
be difficult to regulate and would lead to continued suffering for the
African inhabitants of the continent.42
3
Thus the British continued to make demands in Paris, achieving
finally a measure of success when De Remusat gave assurances that
the sultan could expect no support from France: both nations equally
opposed the slave trade, although they might differ on the means
to combat it.43 But De Remusat moderated his criticism of De
40 Lyons to Granville, May 6, 1873, FO 84/1393; Sultan of Zanzibar to
President de la Republique, March 27, 1873, in De Vienne to De Remusat,
March 28, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
41 Wylde note, May 8, 1873, FO 84/1393.
42 Granville to Lyons, June 10, 1873, ibid.
43 Granville to the British Agent in Aden, May 21, 1873, Granville to Lyons,
May 26, 1873, Lyons to Granville, May 26, 1873, enclosing De Remusat to
Lyons, May 22, 1873, ibid.
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Vienne somewhat as the British continued to speak against him, in-
forming the French consul he was not ready to accept the accusa-
tions blaming the failure of the mission on him, and asserting that
De Vienne might have been right in trying to prevent the violent
means he suspected Britain of planning. However, De Remusat
continued, the British were so aroused that he regretted the con-
subs delays, especially since the sultan’s letter to the French presi-
dent made it look as if France were encouraging the sultan to resist.
De Remusat hoped that perhaps De Vienne could get the negotia-
tions moving again, thus ending the diplomatic quarrel.44
De Vienne assured De Remusat that he would follow orders,
saying with some truth that it was an exaggeration to believe France
had the power to block anything the British wanted in Zanzibar.
The consul added that he had been instructed not only to act against
the slave trade, but also as far as possible to safeguard Zanzibar’s
independence 45
The controversy over a new treaty was brought to a conclusion
in June 1873, when the sultan was given an ultimatum by Kirk,
with the support of the American and German representatives.46
The sultan immediately asked De Vienne, on June 4, to meet and
discuss it. The consul went, accompanied by a French missionary,
who joined him at his request. De Vienne told the sultan he had
not come to discuss British affairs and could only state the French
view on the slave trade—its abolition. The sultan’s previous argu-
ments against the British, De Vienne continued, had been referred
home, along with his request for French arbitration, but no replies
had yet been received.47 There was only one course, De Vienne said,
that he could recommend: the sultan should request the rulers of
European countries to arbitrate the affair, promising his immediate
compliance with the solution reached. 48 The sultan was not very
44 De Remusat to De Vienne, May 7, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
45 De Vienne to De Remusat, May 10, 1873, and June 3, 1873, ibid.
46 Kirk to Granville, June 5, 1873, FO 84/1374.
47 The French government did not accept the proposals. S’Hilaire to De
Remusat, May 13, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
48 P. Baur’s letter of June 6, 1873, in Les Missions Catholiques
,
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happy with this decision, but finding no support among the other
consuls49 he submitted to the British on June 5, 1873. The French
government, although regretting what it considered British ex-
tremism, expressed general satisfaction with the treaty50 and pre-
pared to return to its policy of noninvolvement in Zanzibar.51
In the British view, it was clear that the French government had
“behaved badly” in an effort to improve its position on the island.
Kirk firmly believed this, asserting that the sultan had abused De
Vienne for leading him on with false hopes.52 The British historian
of Zanzibar, Coupland, accepts this opinion, judging that it was
virtually certain that the French were “trying to revive the policy
of 1859,” the policy of striving for predominance. 53
But these opinions cannot be accepted without reservations. De
Vienne, faced with the threat of possible British moves to gain
greater control of the affairs of Zanzibar, could quite understand-
ably say: “I believe that the road followed leads most clearly to the
taking possession of Zanzibar rather than to the abolition of slav-
ery.”54 As long as there was a danger that Britain might intervene
by force in Zanzibar, De Vienne had no course but to act as he did.
The British did not, of course, recognize this danger. And, less
justifiably, they did not comment adversely on Frere’s behavior,
both in Paris and Zanzibar, which further stimulated French fears.
De Vienne may have lacked tact in dealing with the problem, but
the weak British effort in allaying suspicions developed over many
49 Bennett, Studies
,
38; Kirk to Schultz, June 5, 1873, Han/3, Z.A.
50 MAE to De Vienne, July 1, 1873, Aug. 27, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
51 For later French policy, N. R. Bennett, “Some Notes on French Policy
in Buganda and East Africa: 1879-1890,” Mdkerere Journal, VI (1962), 1-17.
52 Kirk to Wylde, July 3, 1873, FO 84/1375. Bishop Steere reported the
interview: “Then he [Barghash] turned to the French Consul and said, you
have done all this, if you had let me consent when Sir Bartle Frere was here I
should have got money and ships and lots of things. Now I get nothing . . .
They say the French Consul could only reply that he had always understood
that the Arabs bore reverses with more dignity than Europeans but now he
found that it was quite the other way.” From Steere to Ann Steere, July 4,
1873, Diocese of Zanzibar, A. 1, III, UMCA Archives. See also De Vienne to
De Remusat, June 6, 1873, Polit., Zanz., t. 4.
53 Coupland, Exploitation, 207.
54 De Vienne to Com. Naval Station, May 5, 1873, ibid.
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years of friction must remove from him any onus for opposing the
aims of the Frere mission. Unfortunately for De Vienne’s hopes,
France, by its refusal to resist British pressures, convinced anyone
who may still have had doubts that it was second to its rival in the
political life of Zanzibar.
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New states in Africa have generally been quick to identify them-
selves with earlier rulers in their territories who have won fame by
resisting the imposition of European rule. Samori in Guinea, Ja Ja
in eastern Nigeria, Bai Bureh in Sierra Leone—all enjoy posthumous
honor from the descendents of men whom they opposed in their
lifetimes. In northern Nigeria there is a more direct continuity of
tradition between pre- and postcolonial rulers. Only where honoring
the resisters might encourage divisions within the modern state
—
as in the case of Ashanti—is this form of piety normally discouraged.
In the case of the Republic of Mali, a powerful African state,
created in the 1850s, preserved its independence until after 1890,
within maximum boundaries not unlike those of the republic
(though stopping well short of them in the north and east). Several
western writers have suggested reasons why the present rulers
might be glad to claim some continuity of succession with the
empire founded by Al-Hajj ‘Umar al-Tal, the Tokolor warrior of the
Tijanniyya fraternity. Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter classify
this with other Islamic states founded in the nineteenth century, as
serving the ends of political unification, social leveling, and resis-
tance to European encroachments—all causes generally favored in
modern West Africa. 1 Elsewhere Hodgkin groups ‘Umar with “the
political ancestors of the revolutionaries and radicals of this genera-
tion;”2 while Suret-Canale, emphasizing similar elements, compares
his prestige to that of Napoleon.3
African politicians, however, seem less eager to stand in succession
to the Tokolor rulers. Senghor, writing while the Federation of Mali
still existed, defined nationality as essentially “un commun vouloir
de vie commune,” transcending the narrower loyalties of la patrie.
1 Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schacter, French-Speaking West Africa in
Transition (New York, 1961), 380-381.
2 T. Hodgkin, African Political Parties (London, 1961), 165.
3
J. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire (Paris, 1958), 174-178.
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So far as there is room for history in his concept, it is actually the
history of the sixty years of colonial rule which has united men of
different patries within the wider unity of Afrique Occidentale
Fran5aise (AOF).4
Madeira Keita, in a well-known speech delivered within a similar
frame of reference, seems positively to repudiate Al-Hajj ‘Umar:
“Naturally, a hundred years ago Islam was a pretext for a certain
number of conquerors in Nigeria, or even in the Western Sudan,
Senegal and Guinea, to carve themselves empires.”5 He too seems
to fear that the limited loyalties inspired by recent history might
jeopardize hopes of achieving wider unity in the present—on the
plane of pan-African politics or within Mali itself. Here he seems to
echo the harsh judgments of other European writers such as
Trimingham, who follows most historians of French colonial expan-
sion in seeing Al-Hajj ‘Umar as “a new type of Islamic adventurer
whose conquests threw western Sudan into a state of complete
anarchy.”6 If the political leadership of modem Mali has indeed
used localized historical experience to increase the sense of national
unity and loyalty among these ethnically diverse subjects, it has
found medieval Mali a more valuable patron, less potentially
divisive, and more congenial to its own leaders than the Tokolor
state. 7
1
There are at least three major fields where research may produce
a clearer view of the historical significance of the empire founded
by Al-Hajj ‘Umar, with its capital at Segou. In the first place, there
is a need to continue the study of the relationship between his cam-
paigns and those jihads and reform movements by which, since
1725, Fula-speaking ulama had successfully established and ex-
4 L. S. Senghor, Nation et Voie Africaine du Socialisme (Paris, 1961), 113.
5 Madeira Keita, “The Single Party in Africa,” Presence Africaine
,
XXX
(1960), 35.
6
J. S. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa (Glasgow, 1962),
163.
7 See the interesting article by Jean Gallais, “Signification du Groupe Eth-
nique au Mali,” L’Homme, II ( 1962), 106-129. For further evidence of African
ambivalence towards Al-Hajj ‘Umar, see Vincent Monteil, Vlslam Noir (Paris,
1964), 88-90.
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panded theocratic states in Futa Jalon, Futa Toro, the empire of
Sokoto, and Macina. There is even greater need for study of the
institutions of the Tokolor empire—its administrative, fiscal, and
military organization, its ruling personnel and their relationships
with subject peoples. Until scholars have begun to work on the
extensive documentary collection taken to Paris by Archinard, and
to search for other sources which may exist within modern Mali,
such general judgments as those cited above must remain tentative. 8
Finally, there is considerable interest in the history of Tokolor rela-
tions with the French, with the interaction between African state-
craft and French policies. The first two fields can be entered con-
fidently only by scholars well versed in Arabic and in Islamic
history, and this essay is primarily a survey of the third field. The
subject has of course been studied before, most fully by Jacques
Meniaud, formerly secretary-general of the huge colony Haut-
Senegal-Niger, in Les Pionniers du Soudan. This work, though pre-
sented in the form of a popular exercise in colonial hagiography, is
solidly based on important correspondence of Archinard and others,
and also uses the printed sources with some discrimination. But
there still seems room for a review of French-Tokolor relations in
the changed historical perspective of the 1960s, with the broader
problem of the nature of the Tokolor state kept visible in the back-
ground.
The problem that underlies the ambivalence of modern African
nationalists is essentially the same as that facing French policy-
makers in the later nineteenth century. Were Al-Hajj ‘Umar and
8 For a general survey of the whole field, see H. F. C. Smith, “The Islamic
Revolutions of the 19th Century,” Journal, Historical Society of Nigeria, II
(1961), 169-185. Jamil Abun-Nasr summarizes an Oxford dissertation, empha-
sizing doctrinal aspects, in Journal of African History ( JAH ), II (1962), 329-
331. T. Hodgkin raises political and institutional problems affecting all these
movements in “Islam and National Movements in West Africa,” JAH, II,
323-327, and “Islam, History and Politics,” Journal of Modern African Studies,
I (1963), 94-96. For additional notes on available sources, see G. Vadja, “Con-
tribution a la Connaissance de la Litterature Arabe en Afrique Occidentale,”
Journal de la Societe des Africanistes, XX (1950), 229-237; E. F. Gautier,
“Documents d’Archives Soudanais Concernant le General Gallieni,” Geographie,
XIII (1924), 133-146; H. F. C. Smith, “Nineteenth Century Arabic Archives
of West Africa,” JAH, III, 333-336; B. G. Martin, “A Mahdist Document from
Futa Jallon,” Bulletin de L’lFAN, XXV, ser. B (1963).
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his successor Amadu capable of welding the peoples of their empire
into a real unity, or were they regarded by most of those peoples
as alien oppressors? Tensions and conflicts clearly existed. Tokolors
who had rallied to Al-Hajj ‘Umar from his homeland of Futa Toro
enjoyed power and privilege disproportionate to their numbers,
many being installed as provincial governors; this was often
resented by peoples accustomed to government by their own
people. These same groups, and others, also resented and resisted
attempts to enforce strict Moslem practice in such matters as pro-
hibitions on alcohol and tobacco, the shaving of heads, and the
limitation of wives to the canonical four. Finally, the Quadiri Fulas
of the theocratic state of Macina resented not only the loss of their
independence, but the imposition of what they considered the
heretical practices of the Tijaniyya.
The amount of local resistance varied among different provinces
of the empire, as Meniaud pointed out when describing the position
in or about 1880.9 His account of the empire at that time distin-
guishes the areas within which the effectiveness of central control
can usefully be studied. Control was then most secure in the im-
mediate vicinity of Segou, particularly on the right bank of the
Niger, between Bamako and Sansanding. In more distant provinces,
kinsmen of Amadu might exercise effective power over their sub-
jects without acknowledging the authority of the capital to any
great extent. In Macina, Meniaud regards Amadu’s cousin Tidiani as
having thrown off the suzerainty of Segou ( though Amadu was able
to re-establish control when he took refuge there in 1891). In
Dinguiraye, Amadu’s half-brother Aguibou acknowledged the cen-
tral authority in principle while pursuing independent policies
internally and externally. Kaarta and the other northwestern prov-
inces were, after 1873, rather more directly responsive to Amadu’s
will; but communications and control from the capital were liable
to interruption in the Bambara district of Beledugu, wild country
which, though never subject to the Bambara states of Segou or
Kaarta, became a center of resistance for the dynasties that ‘Umar
had ousted from those states. Finally, perhaps most uncertain in its
allegiance, there was the upper basin of the Senegal and its tribu-
taries, a politically fragmented area of mixed population, largely
9 Jacques Meniaud, Les Pionniers du Soudan (Paris, 1931), I, 127-134, 139.
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Mandinka. Here the respect enjoyed by the chief Tokolor fortresses,
Koundian and Mourgoula, seems to have varied considerably over
the years. Since this was the country through which most French-
men traveled toward the Niger, temporary trends here might easily
be generalized by observers in Saint-Louis and applied to the
empire as a whole.
The testimony of Frenchmen who visited the Tokolor state often
emphasizes its tensions and divisions. But it also provides evidence,
not always consciously, of attempts to create a new type of African
Moslem state—one that would transcend ethnic quarrels, draw
through trade on the technology of the European world, and utilize
the skills of Africans, whose experience or training might be relevant
to this aim. Some officials at the time, like some scholars later, may
have given prominence to evidence of the tensions at the expense
of writing down these underlying tendencies.
2
There is ambiguity in the record of ‘Umars early attitude toward
the French settlements on the Senegal. Prevailing opinion in Saint-
Louis—as expressed, for example, in a book published in 1855 by
a French official and a prominent Eurafrican trader10—held that
militant Islam represented a serious challenge to French civilization,
to the Christian religion, and (since there was a streak of social
egalitarianism in ‘Umar’s preaching that won him much support
among artisans and small traders in the settlements) to the social
order of the colony. Yet ‘Umar’s first communications with the
colonial government suggest that he regarded his mission as pri-
marily directed against “black Kaffirs” rather than French Chris-
tians. In 1847 he proposed a bargain to Governor Gramont: if
France would supply arms and assist ‘Umar to subdue Futa Toro,
he in turn would guarantee order and allow Christians to trade on
payment of duty. 11 These overtures he renewed to Governor Protet
in 1854. Again the request for firearms was prominent, but the basis
proposed for collaboration is worth noting: “The whites are only
traders: let them bring merchandise in their ships, let them pay me
10 F. Carrere and P. Holle, De la Senegambie Frangaise ( Paris, 1855 )
.
H Ibid., 195.
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a good tribute when I’m master of the Negroes, and I will live in
peace with them. But I don’t wish them to erect permanent estab-
lishments or send warships into the river.”12
By 1855 it seems to have been commonly assumed among the
Frenchmen of Saint-Louis that conflict with ‘Umar was inevitable.
Three new developments strengthened this conviction. 13 In the first
place, ‘Umar’s force seized some of the stocks held by Senegalese
traders in the upper river. Secondly, he issued a manifesto addressed
to the “men of Guet N’dar” (Saint-Louis) declaring that he had
taken the goods of the Christians because they would not sell him
arms and ammunition; now he would make war on Christians as
well as unbelievers until they agreed to pay him tribute, and
Saint-Louis Moslems should not join the Christians against him. 14
Although this was alarming enough, his language does not seem to
make a direct call to disobedience to the Moslem residents of Saint-
Louis itself, but rather appeals to them not to assist the French in
operations up-river. Moreover, the repeated reference to “tribute” is
ambiguous. The word used ( djezia
)
is that which describes the
special tax owed to Moslem rulers by Christians and Jews; but the
same term was used in the Senegal for customary payments and
stipends made by the French to local rulers in return for cessions of
land or protection of trade. There were obvious practical reasons
why ‘Umar should wish to obtain a regular income of this sort; if
he represented it to his followers as religious tribute, so did other
Moslem rulers in the Senegal. 15
The third development, and the most complex, was the growth
of enthusiastic support for ‘Umar among peoples of the lower
Senegal, in the area of French trade and French influence. Among
the Tokolors of his homeland of Futa Toro, ‘Umar was gaining
support, though not among the chiefs; 16 those who emigrated to
12 L. L. C. Faidherbe, Le Senegal (Paris, 1889), 140; cf. E. Mage, Voyage
dam le Soudan Occidental (Paris, 1868), 240, 248.
13 There is a useful account of these events, from an anti-Moslem point of
view, in the semiofficial French publication, Annales Senegalaises de 1854 d
1885 (Paris, 1885).
14 Translation in Carrere and Holle, Senegambie, 204-207.
15 Annales Senegalaises
,
vii.
16 A. Gouilly, Vlslam dam VAfrique Occidentale Frangaise (Paris, 1952),
75.
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join his forces often urged him to turn his main energies toward the
lower Senegal. To meet such a threat, the chiefs of Futa looked
increasingly for French support. This interaction and the migration
between Futa Toro and ‘Umar’s empire are subjects that would
repay study. Farther up-river too, enthusiastic Moslems were in-
spired to make uncoordinated attacks on their neighbors. When
the area of their commerce was thus troubled, the French looked for
African allies. It seems that they did not always choose wisely. The
new fort built by Faidherbe at Medina became the refuge of chief
Dyouka Sambala of Khasso, a warlike old man whose subjects had
largely opted to follow ‘Umar. When ‘Umar attacked this fort in
1857, his primary aims were not to challenge French power directly,
but to complete his control of Khasso, and perhaps to facilitate
communications with Futa Toro. 17 But after this siege was dramati-
cally raised by Faidherbe, ‘Umar showed himself willing to nego-
tiate on less imperious terms while he turned his armies eastward
against the Bambaras of Segou and the Fulas of Macina. Faidherbe
was the first governor he found willing to consider such a bargain
seriously.
Although Faidherbe is the dominant figure in French African pol-
icy of the nineteenth century, he still lacks an objective biographer.
Hence the authority of his name has been invoked by successors to
cover diverse and even contradictory policies. It is clear that Faid-
herbe was impressed
—
probably overimpressed—by the economic
and political prospects of the western Sudan and aimed to establish
French influence in the upper and middle valley of the Niger. But
for his methods he seems to have looked less to military conquest
(as implied by admirers of later French expansion) than to negotia-
tion backed by force; he saw some possibility of associating African
states with his imperial purposes. Policymakers in contemporary
Britain were often anxious to find African collaborators capable of
guaranteeing security for the activities of European traders and
missionaries without themselves incurring responsibility or expense.
Witness the eagerness of Adderley, chairman of the Parliamentary
17 C. Monteil, Les Khassonkes (Paris, 1915), 38-44; L. Tauxier, Histoire des
Bambaras (Paris, 1942), 152-153; also Mage, Voyage, 38, 247, 404-405; P. Soleil-
let, Voyage a Segou (Paris, 1887), 130-133, 340; Faidherbe, Senegal, 180ff; M.
Delafosse, Haut-Senegal-Niger (Paris, 1912), II, 363-366.
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Committee of 1865, to discover in West Africa "strong native gov-
ernments” willing to take over the functions of the British settle-
ments. 18 Though less obvious in French policymaking, similar ideas
can be found there; in Algeria there had been sincere though unsuc-
cessful attempts to work with Abd-el-Kadr, and Napoleon III was
to talk of creating an “Arab kingdom” there. 19 Faidherbe’s Algerian
service had not produced such prejudices as would preclude at-
tempts to cast the Tokolor empire for a similar role in West Africa.
In August 1860 he agreed with a Tokolor emissary on a truce and
demarcation of spheres of influence along the line of the Bafing
River, and provisionally agreed to send a French ambassador to
discuss the possibilities of further collaboration with ‘Umar him-
self.20
But it was not until his second governorship, in 1863, that Faid-
herbe despatched a young naval officer in colonial service, Eugene
Mage ( 1837-1869) on a mission to ‘Umar’s new capital of Segou. He
was to seek Tokolor cooperation in Faidherbe’s plans to protect the
caravan route between the head of navigation on the Senegal and
Bamako on the Niger with a line of fortified posts, and to develop
commercial navigation on the upper Niger. “This marabout” wrote
the governor, “who in the past has stirred up so many difficulties
for us, might in the future promote a transformation of great benefit
to the Sudan and to ourselves, if he will only accept our point of
view.”21
Mage, accompanied by a French surgeon called Quintin, left
Saint-Louis in October 1863 and reached Segou in February 1864
by a circuitous northerly route. The timing of his mission was sin-
gularly unfortunate. Late in 1863 the Fulas of Macina, conquered
only in the previous year, revolted against the Tokolors and were
18
J. D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London, 1963),
64-78.
19 Quoted H. Deschamps, Methodes et doctrines coloniales de la France
(Paris, 1953), 112.
20 Annales Senegalaises, 443; Faidherbe to Chasseloup-Laubat, 583 Aug. 28,
1860, Archives Nationales: Section Outre-Mer; Paris (ANSOM), Senegal 1/46;
Faidherbe, Senegal, 236-237.
21 Faidherbe to Mage, Aug. 7, 1863, ANSOM, Senegal III/9/c (printed in
Mage, Voyage, 12-16).
The Tokolor Empire of Segou 133
joined by many Bambaras. When Mage arrived, ‘Umar was absent
on a military campaign, where later in 1864 he met a somewhat
mysterious death. Segou was full of conflicting rumors. Amadu, the
slight, thoughtful son and heir-presumptive of ‘Umar, detained the
Frenchmen in or near the capital for more than two years. Only in
February 1866 did he judge conditions stable enough to open nego-
tiations with the French. Not surprisingly, the frustrations and
vicissitudes which Mage suffered made him somewhat dubious
about the advantages of cooperation with Amadu, whose authority
at this stage was clearly precarious. He took back a treaty of seven
clauses providing for peace and free circulation of trade, subject to
a tax of 10 per cent on caravans entering the Tokolor state. But
Faidherbe’s successor Laprade, less well disposed toward coopera-
tion with Moslem states, refused to agree to the proposed duty, and
Mage was not inclined to fight very hard for his treaty.22 Neverthe-
less, he made it plain that the Tokolor empire was still a force to be
reckoned with, quite capable of preventing the construction of
Faidherbe’s proposed line of forts. The book that he based on his
journals provides the most informative French source for study of
the organization of authority within this state.
There is no question that discontent was serious in several quar-
ters. Besides the revolt of the Macina Fulas, ‘Umar was facing per-
sistent resistance from the Bambaras, around Segou as well as in
Beledugu.23 But Mage also speaks of the “immense hatred” felt more
widely for the talibes, the elite group of followers who provided
military and administrative leadership within the empire. His im-
plication, that this was symptomatic of general opposition to a
22 The treaty is printed in Mage, Voyage, 588-589. Copies of two reports
by Mage at the close of his mission are in ANSOM, Senegal, 111/9/c; a brief
one of July 21, 1866, and a longer one without date. See also Yves Saint-
Martin, “Les Relations diplomatique entre la France et l’empire Toucouleur
de 1860 a 1884,” Bulletin de 1’IFAN Series B, XXVII (1965), 183-222, a
study which appeared after this paper was written.
23 Among the many references to Bambara discontent, see Mage, Voyage,
103, 162, 187, 272-282, and his undated report in ANSOM, Senegal 111/9/c.
The account in Delafosse, Haut-Senegal-Niger, II, 321-331, draws heavily on
Mage’s testimony. See also C. Monteil, Les Bambaras du Segou et du Kaarta
(Paris, 1924), and Tauxier, Histoire, passim.
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ruling Tokolor minority, has been followed by many subsequent
writers.24
Yet the random sample of information which Mage gives about
the ethnic origins of those servants of the empire whom he hap-
pened to meet does not suggest that Tokolors monopolized positions
of power in either army or local administration. At the provincial
capital and fortress of Koundian, for example, though the military
commander was a Tokolor (‘Umar's kinsman, Racine Tall) the
provincial chief was a Mandinka and he was surrounded by a great
variety of peoples, including a former house servant from Saint-
Louis.25 Indeed, Saint-Louis men were conspicuous in many places.
In 1855, Carrere and Holle had complained of the shortage of good
carpenters and masons in Saint-Louis; freed from slavery in 1848,
these men were now listening to marabouts who turned them away
from European service.26 Mage's repeated references to such people
in centers of Tokolor power show where they went.27 Mage’s host
in Segou, Samba N’diaye, formerly a slave in Saint-Louis and trader
on the river, had become chief engineer of the Tokolor army, where
his skill in directing the building of substantial stone forts and in
repairing and servicing two howitzers and gun carriages captured
from the French in 1858 was a major factor in ‘Umar’s later vic-
tories.28 Other prominent men—including the chief of Toumboula
and a leading griot of Segou—had lived in Sierra Leone.29 Such
men, having experience of European ideas and technology, seem to
have been encouraged to come and apply their skills or knowledge
to the modernization of this African state.30 Traders also were en-
24 Mage, Voyage
,
422, 225, 456; cf. Meniaud, Pionniers, I, 131-133.
25 Mage, Voyage 75-82.
26 Carrere and Holle, Senegambie, 12-15; cf. A. Villard, Histoire du Senegal
(Dakar, 1943), 128-129.
27 Mage, Voyage, 78, 136-137, 241, 247, 295, 386.
28 Ibid., 221-222, 247; cf. Soleillet, Voyage, 330; cf. Yves Saint-Martin,
“L’Artillerie d’El Hadj Omar et d’Ahmadou,” Bulletin de VIFAN Series B,
XXVII (1965), 506-572.
29 Mage, Voyage
,
155, 229, 307f.
30 Compare Mage’s references in Voyage, 265, to the way smiths accom-
panied the army and made 10,000 bullets a day during the fighting with
Macina; and to the collection of taxes in saltpetre and charcoal, for the manu-
facture of local gunpowder; ibid., 297-298. For a hint of other policies designed
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couraged, whether Sarakules, Moroccans, or Gambia Akus; these
influential people welcomed the extension of the empire, and still
more the prospect of its reaching an agreement with the French.31
Despite the obvious obstacles to the unification of the diverse
peoples of the region into a large Moslem state, Mage’s evidence
suggests that there were positive forces within the empire which
favored the attempt.
For some years, however, the prospects of unity for the empire
remained in the balance. Amadu had to deal not only with revolts
of Bambaras and Fulas, but with the tendency of his kinsmen,
charged with the government of outlying provinces, to act in an
independent and even hostile manner. Only in 1874, when he had
defeated his half-brothers Abibou and Moktar and assumed the
prestigious title of “Commander of the Faithful,” did Amadu’s posi-
tion seem reasonably assured. During these years trade with Sene-
gal was still desirable, for it could provide Amadu with decisive fire
power, and an occasional caravan did reach Medina.32 But with
Kaarta’s loyalty uncertain, this route could hardly be depended
upon, and Amadu continued with some success to develop trade
with the British in the Gambia and Sierra Leone.33
For twelve years after Mage’s return, the French were content to
remain passive. They did not supply the mountain guns that Mage
had promised Amadu or send him the Arabic text of the treaty that
he expected.34 Colonel Valiere, appointed governor in 1869 with
instructions to avoid further annexations,35 soon went further, with
the approval of local opinion in Senegal and of the ministry in Paris,
and withdrew from the attempts at direct control which his pre-
decessors had initiated in Futa Toro and certain other parts of the
lower Senegal valley. Instead, Valiere (whose policies have been
to improve the trade balance of the state, see the reference in F. Ricard, Le
Senegal: Etude Intime (Paris, 1865), 73 ff., to ‘Umars attempts to encourage
the use of caps and other articles of African manufacture.
31 Mage, Voyage
,
106, 120, 640, 662-663.
32 Valiere to Minister of the Marine and Colonies (MMC), 187 May 15,
1871, ANSOM, Senegal, I/56/b; 348 June 15, 1872; 205 April 14, 1873.
33 Valiere to MMC, 483 July 21, 1874, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/58/a; Briere to
MMC, 463 June 5, 1878, Senegal, 1/61/c; cf. Soleillet, Voyage, 96 ff.
34 Mage, Voyage, 607-609; Soleillet, Voyage, 432-433.
35 Rigault de Genouilly to Valiere, Sept. 25, 1869, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/56/a.
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little studied but frequently condemned) attempted to exercise
influence through independent chiefs whose authority could com-
mand the support of their subjects. In particular, he restored Lat-
Dior, whom Faidherbe had deposed as darnel of Cayor.36 Such an
attitude might logically have been extended to embrace collabora-
tion with Amadu. But Valiere, impressed by reports of dissension in
the empire, and unable to decide whether Moslem states repre-
sented a menace or a constructive force,37 was complacently content
to have stabilized the position in the lower Senegal and to have
restored the French colony to its former role of extended trading-
station. In September 1874, Valiere received friendly letters from
Amadu, asking for cannon and the implementation of the treaty. He
negotiated a new treaty with Tambo, the emissary, which reduced
the duty payable to Amadu to a nominal level but which on the
whole was designed to attract caravans to the Senegal rather than
to encourage Senegalese traders to penetrate the Tokolor empire.
Tambo was killed on his return journey to Segou, and no new policy
developed under Valiere.38
His successor in 1876, Colonel Briere de lisle, was a man of more
active temperament. He feared that Valiere’s policies had strength-
ened Amadu’s prestige by giving an impression of French weakness,
and that renewed migration to his empire might dangerously de-
populate the French sphere of influence on the left bank of the
Senegal. Moreover, after coming into conflict with the British in the
“Southern Rivers” of modern Guinea, Briere was also worried by
signs that British influence might be extending from the Gambia
valley toward Bondou and the upper Senegal.39 In 1878, he secured
authority for a show of force in support of France’s one loyal de-
pendent in the upper river, Dyouka Sambala of Khasso; as in 1855,
36 Valiere to MMC, 142 April 14, 1870, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/56/c; 306
July 15, 1870; 334 Aug. 14, 1870; 233 July 14, 1871.
37 Valiere to MMC, 233 July 14, 1871, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/56/b; 590
Oct. 14, 1872.
38 Valiere to MMC, 622 Sept. 24, 1874, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/58/a; 741
Nov. 22, 1874, Senegal, 1/61/b. Valiere’s notes for Briere, May 20, 1876. The
text of these proposals was shown to Gallieni at Nango in 1880. See Saint-
Martin, “Les Relations,” 192—196.
39 Briere to MMC, 36 Jan. 23, 1878, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/61/c; 463 June 5,
1878.
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France’s relations with this turbulent old man involved action
against the Tokolors. Niamodi, ruler of a district called Logo on the
left bank of the Senegal, had disavowed Sambala’s authority, and
allowed the Tokolors to build a fort at Saboucire; in September this
was destroyed by a military expedition and Logo, with Natiaga, was
temporarily reunited with Khasso.40
Although this attack took place within the French sphere of 1860,
it inevitably increased Amadu’s suspicions of French intentions.
Briere, though suspiciously disposed, had not decided to pursue a
hostile policy toward the Tokolor empire. At the time of the attack
on Saboucire,
J.
S. Gallieni (1849-1916), a young officer of the
marine infantry in the colony’s directorate of political affairs, was
proposing to renew negotiations on the basis of Mage’s treaty.41
Earlier in the year Briere himself had financially supported the
journey to Segou of Paul Soleillet (1842-1885), a patriotic radical
who had become a leading advocate of a trans-Saharan railway.42
His account of the journey to Segou and his residence there from
October 1878 until January 1879 (posthumously edited, embel-
lished, and published by G. Gravier ) , contains a good deal of infor-
mation (some based on direct observation, some learned from
African informants) about the development of the Tokolor empire
and its mode of government. The total impression is not drastically
different from that given by Mage. Soleillet does not underrate
Amadu’s difficulties in getting his authority respected in his prov-
inces, but recognizes the progress made since 1874.43 Traders (in-
cluding slavetraders ) were moving freely through various parts of
the empire; in the Monday market of Segou there was local pottery,
jewelry, metalwork, African cloth in twenty qualities and thirty
designs, and a wide assortment of foods, besides European goods
brought up from Senegal, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. 44 The rebel-
40 Briere to MMC, 36 Jan. 23, 1878, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/61/c; 350 April
21, 1878. Briere to MMC, 645 Nov. 6, 1878, Senegal, 1/63/a; 262 March 23,
1879. Badou to Briere, June 23, 1879, Senegal III/10 bis/b.
41 P. Lyautey, Gallieni (Paris, 1959), 33-35.
42 Briere to MMC, 350 April 21, 1878, ANSOM, Senegal, 1/61/c; cf. Les
Voyages et Decouvertes de Paul Soleillet (Paris, 1881), biographical note by
P. Barnel; P. L. Monteil, Souvenirs Vecus (Paris, 1924), 15-16.
43 P. Soleillet, Voyage a Segou (Paris, 1887), 379.
44 Ibid., 425-426.
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lious Bambaras were always liable to interrupt trade; in 1879 they
destroyed the market of Guigne, which had impressed Soleillet on
his outward journey through Beledugu.45 Soleillet, nevertheless, re-
turned impressed by the economic possibilities which might be
opened up in the Tokolor empire, if the formidable problems of
transport could be solved.46
Soleillet was equally impressed by signs of benevolence toward
France. He had a warm greeting in Segou, led by Samba N’diaye
and by a former slave in Saint-Louis who called out, “Liberte! Mil
huit cent quarante-huit! Merci!”47 Amadu was cordial, at least until
he heard the news of Saboucire, anxious to renew relations with
“mon ami Briere.” His kinsman and chief minister, Seydou Djeylia
(an able and learned man whom Mage had met as leader of the
army of Nioro), discussed the possibility of a new treaty of trade
and friendship and of receiving a resident French agent, though
without precluding the establishment of similar relations with the
British. 48 If the European powers could provide Amadu with suffi-
cient power to bring his empire under effective control,49 he would
offer in return access to the wide and ordered market they dreamed
of. In view of the apparent British danger, this prospect seemed not
unattractive to Briere de lisle, who planned to send an official
envoy to negotiate a new commercial treaty in 1879.50
In 1879, a new factor was introduced when the French parliament
approved the study of plans for a Senegal-Niger railway. Such a
project would almost certainly require France to exercise a more
direct influence in the Tokolor empire than Amadu would willingly
concede. So it was to the Mandinkas that Briere and Gallieni now
began to look for assistance in their new task. After the capture of
Saboucire, the French realized at last that Sambala was not pop-
ular in Logo and Natiaga; in September 1879 they evicted the
Khassonkes and restored the former Mandinka rulers, who professed
both their readiness to accept French protection and their dislike of
45 ibid., 251ff.
46 Ibid., preface.
47 Ibid., 393.
48 Ibid., 378, 398, 437-439, 442-444; cf. Mage, Voyage, 323. Soleillet’s spell-
ing: Zeidou Zeila.
49 Cf. Saint-Martin, “L’Artillerie,” passim.
50 Briere to MMC, 350 April 21, 1878, ANSOM, Senegal, I/61/c.
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the Tokolors.51 Chiefs of the area sent their children to Saint-Louis
with requests for education a la frangaise;52 they expressed willing-
ness to use their influence with other Mandinka states to further
French influence in the upper basin of the Senegal, not merely in
the French sphere on the left bank of the Bafing but as far as Kita
and even Bamako. Prospects opened of a Mandinka confederation
under French patronage which would facilitate peaceful penetra-
tion of the very districts through which the railway was to run.
That these districts included areas clearly recognized as part of
Amadu’s empire seemed a consideration of secondary importance.53
With these ideas in mind, Gallieni set out in September 1879, not
on the projected mission to Segou but on a reconnaissance trip to
the area of Bafoulabe. Mandinkas on both banks of the river, both
above and below Bafoulabe, were in arms against the Tokolors and
their Mandinka protege Tiecoro, whose claim to the area of
Bafoulabe itself they had recognized. Gallieni spoke of this as a
“national movement.” Professing strict political neutrality and be-
having coldly to Tiecoro, he allowed the other Mandinkas to see
his strong sympathy for their cause. He took with him to Saint-Louis
representatives of the Mandinka and Bambara chiefly families from
several districts; all were given favored treatment in Saint-Louis
and those from Kita and Bamako remained to help Gallieni on his
next expedition. But the clearest sign of hostility toward Amadu
was the commencement, in November 1879, of the construction of
a French fort at Bafoulabe. Although both Mandinka claimants had
expressed willingness to welcome a French presence, this was situ-
ated on territory which the French had accepted since 1860 as lying
within the Tokolor empire. They now found it convenient to regard
Amadu’s claim as “contestable.”54
51 Badou to Briere, June 23, 1879, ANSOM, Senegal, III/10 bis.
52 Briere to MMC, 757 Oct. 8, 1879, ANSOM, Senegal, I/63/a. Briere ac-
cepted the pupils, but pointed out that “nous ne voulions pas en faire des sujets
frangais, parce que nous ne voulions pas faire de conquetes. Notre but exclusif
etant d’etendre notre commerce dans des pays libres, ou nous ne voulions avoir
que de bonnes routes et des postes pour les entretenir.” The ministry com-
mented, “bon langage.”
53 Briere to MMC, 526 July 8, 1879, ANSOM, Senegal, I/63/a; 639 Aug. 7,
1879; memo, July 23, 1879.
54 Gallieni to Briere, Nov. 17, 1879, ANSOM, Senegal, III/10 bis; cf. Briere
to MMC, 964 Dec. 7, 1879, Senegal I/63/a; Monteil, Souvenirs
,
22.
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Thus, as I have described elsewhere,55 there was ambiguity and
even duplicity in Gallieni’s purpose when, early in 1880, he set out
with an armed party on the long-deferred mission to Amadu. There
was a fundamental, and eventually fatal, uncertainty as to whether
his primary aim was to associate the Tokolor empire with Frances
endeavor to forestall the British on the upper Niger or to temporize
until the French army was prepared to advance into the Sudan as
liberator of the Mandinkas, Bambaras, and other “subject peoples.”
Interwoven with this political ambiguity was a parallel uncertainty
about the expedient attitude toward the Moslem religion, an uncer-
tainty that persisted during the later formulation of French colonial
policy and doctrine. Aware of Islam’s potentialities both as a state-
building force and as a possible focus of resistance to French power,
Gallieni uneasily blended his disdain for the incoherence of the
small animist states of the upper Senegal basin with certain intima-
tions of their possible future as economic and political clients of
French civilization. On these great questions the thought of this
future pro-consul had not yet come to a synthesis ( if indeed it ever
did). Comparison of his published account of this mission with his
reports preserved in the colonial archives show his judgment fluc-
tuating from day to day. It also reveals a readiness to adjust not only
his opinions but sometimes the text of documents, if his original
reports showed French power in a less than glorious light.56 In the
words of Colonel Borgnis-Desbordes, “it is curious how the over-
vivid imagination of this young officer drags him now to one side,
now to the other.”57 On the whole, it is fair to say that the spirited
soldiers who now governed the Senegal were growing less sympa-
thetic to Faidherbe’s conceptions of collaboration with African
states. As Seydou Djeylia had foreseen in his conversations with
55 Hargreaves, Prelude
,
256-265.
56 For example, his original minute of his negotiations with Seydou Djeylia,
Nov. 2, 1880, makes the latter say, “Nous aimons les Frangais mais nous n’avons
pas confiance en eux. Eux au contraire ont confiance en nous, mais ne nous
aiment pas.” (Gallieni to Briere, 17 Nov. 14, 1880, ANSOM, Senegal, III/10
bis). Cf. J. S. Gallieni, Voyage au Soudan Frangais ( Haut-Niger et Pays de
Segou), 1879-81 (Paris, 1885), 404: “Nous aimons les Frangais mais nous les
craignons. Eux au contraire ne nous aiment pas, mais ne nous craignent pas
non plus.”
57 Desbordes to Governor, April 1, 1881, ANSOM, Senegal, IV/73 bis.
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Soleillet, "military men, accustomed to giving orders, were tempera-
mentally ill-adapted for peace negotiations.”58
But Gallieni’s vacillations were not entirely arbitrary; they largely
reflect variations in the apparent strength of Amadu’s authority in
different parts of his empire. Gallieni makes these distinctions in the
concluding chapter of his book, published in 1885 at a time when
he was less favorable to the idea of collaboration with Amadu than
he had been at certain stages of his journey. On the right bank of
the Niger, Gallieni admitted in his book, Amadu’s authority was
established over a population of 100,000, with an army of up to
12,000 men. His reports from Nango emphasized still more strongly
Amadu’s power and influence in this area. 59 In the words of one of
his companions, as soon as the Frenchmen crossed the river, “this
semblance of social organization, in contrast to the disordered
barbarism through which they had just passed, inspired in them a
certain confidence in the good faith of their hosts, even leading
them to hope to establish serious and durable relations with them
on behalf of our country.”60
Elsewhere the position was different. Gallieni reproduces the
usual doubts about Amadu’s control of the outlying provinces; but
it was above all on the basis of his experience in the districts through
which he had traveled on his way to the Niger that Gallieni (like
Colonel Desbordes later61 ) concluded that Amadu was faced with
something like a national revolt of Mandinkas and Bambaras, which
France should support. The change in his opinions after crossing
the Niger is all the more impressive.
Certainly there were weaknesses in the Tokolor state. Yet Galli-
eni’s account of his negotiations suggests that Amadu and Seydou
Djeylia had clear ideas of how an agreement with France might
help to remedy them. As had long been clear,62 Amadu’s primary
58 Soleillet, Voyage, 442-444.
59 For instance, Gallieni to Briere, 5 July 7, 1881, ANSOM, Senegal, III/10
bis; cf. Gallieni, Voyage, 606-610.
60 Captain Pietri, Les Frangais au Niger (Paris, 1885), 208.
61 See his long report, July 1, 1881, ANSOM, Senegal, IV/73 bis.
62 Cf. memo of July 23, 1879, probably drafted by Gallieni: “11 s’applique
a entretenir de bonnes relations avec le gouvemment du Senegal et voudrait
meme se creer par cette amitie des moyens de guerre qui resteraient sans im-
portance pour nous mais qui seraient certainement de nature a lui creer une
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aim was to secure artillery and other arms with which to consolidate
and extend his power eastward to Timbuktu, southward to the sup-
posed “mountains of Kong”; in return, he offered France the benefits
of access to an expanding market, though preferably not the exclu-
sive access which Gallieni demanded. The basic condition of such
a bargain would be respect for Tokolor independence. Seydou
Djeylia made it very clear that Amadu would not willingly admit
French power as distinct from French influence, especially in view
of the recent policies at Saboucire and Bafoulabe. Any French resi-
dent should be an African Moslem; there was to be no railway, and
no steamboats were to be involved in the projected navigation of
the Niger; most important of all, the French were to withdraw from
Bafoulabe and to build no more forts on Amadu’s territory. The
French text of the treaty that was signed speaks of the Niger’s being
placed under French protection, but the Arabic text does not. To
attribute this discrepancy to African “bad faith” is to ignore the
whole drift of Seydou’s contentions, as recorded by Gallieni him-
self. 63
By 1880, the trend of French policy seemed to be toward a more
direct exercise of power. While Gallieni was still at Nango, Des-
bordes began to advance to the Niger with four hundred well-armed
combatant troops; when he returned to Saint-Louis it was decided
not to ratify his treaty, even in its French version. Amadu regarded
the agreement as in force; but the French column advanced through
his territory to Bamako, and the promised firearms never reached
him. Yet, after all, the conflict was postponed. From 1882 on, the
French found their attention increasingly diverted toward another
Moslem ruler who threatened to impede their advance: Samori.
Fortunately for the speed of the French advance, Amadu and
Samori never found a basis for working together. Still, the rise of
a powerful state under Mandinka leadership may have had some-
superiorite militaire considerable vis-a-vis des ennemis indigenes; avec les
canons faisant plus de bruit que de mal, il subjuguerait facilement tous les
peuples sur lesquels portent ses visees. C est pour cela qu’il demande sans cesse
des canons et un instructeur pour apprendre a ses gens a s’en servir.” ANSOM,
Senegal, I/63/a.
63 These texts are printed, in part, in Meniaud, Pionniers, I, 336-40. Cf.
minutes of negotiations, ANSOM, Senegal, III/10 bis, and the somewhat dif-
ferent text in Gallieni, Voyage, 398-407.
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thing to do with the increasing unrest which the French encoun-
tered among the Mandinkas they had hoped to “liberate” in the
upper Senegal basin.
There was a temporary stalemate. In 1884, Amadu moved his
headquarters from Segou to Nioro (where Desbordes had now
driven the Tokolor colony of Mourgoula), thus escaping from the
immediate range of French operations. The French military, recip-
rocating Amadu’s distrust, did not yet feel strong enough for a direct
attack on the Tokolors. 64 Some of their forces were already com-
mitted against other Moslem warriors; their lines of communication
were endangered by Lat-Dior in Cayor (1882-1886), and by Ma-
madu Lamina in Galam (1885-1887). The technical and financial
difficulties of railway construction were becoming dishearteningly
apparent; political opposition to colonial adventures was sharpened
by a French set-back in Indo-China in March 1885. All these rea-
sons made the prospect of conflict with Amadu less easily accept-
able.
So, for reasons of expediency rather than principle, the idea of
collaboration with Amadu recovered respectability for a few more
years. Lieutenant-Colonel Frey, who commanded French troops in
the Sudan in 1885-1886, regretted the “fever of colonization” that
demanded military operations in this unrewarding territory. Dis-
illusioned by public attacks on his methods, he proposed a return
to the true Faidherbian policy, as he interpreted it, of helping
Amadu to bring order to his empire and looking to him for guaran-
tees for the future of French trade. 65 Gallieni, when he succeeded
Frey, revived the idea of collaboration with Amadu by re-opening
the supply of firearms and concluding a revised protectorate treaty
in 1887.66 But these treaties proved little more than temporary
expedients, which secured Gallieni’s flank while he concentrated on
64 Meniaud, Pionniers, I, 164-166, 177-178, 184-186, 194-198. There is a
good study of military attitudes in A. S. Kanya-Forstner, “The Role of the
Military in the Formulation of French Policy towards the Western Sudan,
1879-1899” (unpubl. diss., University of Cambridge, 1965).
65 H. Frey, Campagne dam le Haut Senegal (Paris, 1888), part 3; Meniaud,
Pionniers
,
I, 343-346.
66
J. S. Gallieni, Deux Campagnes au Soudan Francais (Paris, 1891), 34,
618-621; cf. 46, 196, 429. For his correspondence with Amadu, see Lyautey,
Gallieni, 70-74.
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defeating Mamadu Lamina and extending French influence south-
ward towards Futa Jalon. French military opinion increasingly
regarded Moslem states as inevitable enemies; in 1889 Gallieni’s
more bellicose successor Archinard embarked on a new drive to
destroy the Tokolor empire. But it proved harder than anticipated
to construct an alternative political system out of the “oppressed
nationalities.” The Diara dynasty of the Bambaras, restored at
Segou, had hoped that Amadu’s fall would restore their former inde-
pendence; their plot to get rid of the French was detected and vio-
lently suppressed. Subsequent attempts to impose more pliable
rulers from the Massassi clan met fierce opposition from France’s
supposed “natural allies” among the Bambaras. 67
3
In this essay I have not sought to idealize the Tokolor state or to
deny the difficulties of creating a united Moslem state out of the
diverse peoples of the nineteenth-century Sudan. But the testimony
of the French observers studied here does not confirm the judgment
of those who have described the Tokolor state with words like
“anarchy.” Instead, it provides many clues to the existence of a
political order that deserves a more thorough investigation, based
upon its own surviving records. 68
Certainly, the Tokolor state was sufficiently well organized to
convince Frenchmen of many varied backgrounds that there were
real possibilities of advancing French influence and interests in
some sort of association with Amadu or al-Hajj ‘Umar. Policies of
this sort are commonly held to be characteristic of British rather
than French imperialism. Yet, in practice, colonial policies are
always shaped under the pressures of circumstances. Such circum-
stances have decisively affected the more philosophical debates be-
tween Frenchmen who favored supporting Islam and those who
regarded it as an enemy—between the advocates of “association”
and those of “assimilation.” In this context Gallieni’s vacillating
approach may represent merely a healthy empiricism carried to
67 Tauxier, Histoire
,
184-185. On Archinard’s campaigns and policies, Me-
niaud provides a wealth of documentation.
68 It is being studied by Mr. Olatunji Oloruntimehin of the University of
Ibadan.
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excess by an enthusiastic but immature practitioner. And possibly
these early experiences with the complexity of African politics may
have helped to produce that administrative "eclecticism” which he
practiced during his later career in Madagascar, and for which he
has frequently been praised. 69
These reflections suggest a fascinating though speculative con-
clusion. It was not preconceived doctrine which led the French to
destroy the Tokolor state; witness their later attempt to rule Macina
through Aguibou. No doubt the conditions under which they
launched the conquest of the western Sudan were not favorable for
policies involving the maintenance of established Moslem empires.
But it is not absolutely unreasonable to envisage Amadu’s state
surviving into the period of French rule and serving, like the Nige-
rian emirates, as defenders of African practices and institutions
against European influence. Conceivably, it might be an apprecia-
tion of this averted possibility that accounts for the cool reverence
of his successors in modern Mali.
69 Cf. P. Gourou, “Gallieni,” in C. A. Julien, Les Techniciens de la Colonisa-
tion (Paris, 1947), 104-105; H. Deschamps, Gallieni Pacificateur (Paris, 1929),
25.
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Pan-Africanism and pan-Negro nationalism are historically related
phenomena with similar origins. 1 Both grew out of resentment at
the treatment of black-skinned peoples, whether as slaves in the
West Indies and in the American South, as “free persons of color,”
or, later, as subjects of new European empires in Africa. Pan-
Africanism as an organized movement, concerned with the griev-
ances of all black-skinned peoples, and particularly involving an
attack on colonialism in Africa, is a twentieth-century phenomenon:
the term came into use in 1900 when Henry Sylvester Williams, a
West Indian barrister from Trinidad, organized a Pan-African con-
ference in London, attended by delegates from the West Indies and
the United States.2
Five other conferences were held, largely through the efforts of
the American Negro scholar, W. E. B. Du Bois, at which delegates
met to articulate their grievances and to devise means of removing
them.3 These delegates were almost entirely from the New World;
indeed, it was only at the last of the extra-African conferences—at
Manchester in 1945—that Africans were adequately represented.4
No meetings had been held on African soil, though African issues
1 This article on Pan-Africanism and pan-Negro nationalism is based on a
paper given at the University of Massachusetts on December 13, 1962. I am
grateful to Professor Gwendolen Carter for her assistance. Research was made
possible by a travel grant from the Central Research Fund of the University
of London, and by the British Commonwealth Scholarship Commission; to both
of these bodies I am grateful.
2 The Times, July 24, 25, 26, 1900; also the account by an American dele-
gate, Bishop Alexander Walters, My Life and Work (New York, 1917), xx.
3 See W. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa (New York, 1947), 7-12,
236-242; George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? (London, 1956),
137-151; American Society of African Culture, ed., Pan-Africanism Reconsidered
(Los Anegeles, 1962), 37-52; and Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics
(New York, 1963), 93-108.
4 For a list of the delegates of the 1945 Pan-African conference, see George
Padmore, ed., History of the Pan-African Congress (Manchester, n.d. ), 71-73.
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were discussed at every conference. After Ghana gained its inde-
pendence in 1957, the Pan-African movement began to take on a
more African character, largely because it had die support of the
first of the new African states created after World War II. Though
New World Negroes had played, and continued to play, a part on
the African continent, the movement passed finally into the hands
of African leaders. 5
This specifically named and organized Pan-Africanism was not
the first Negro movement with “African” and “all-African” aspira-
tions. There were at least two earlier such manifestations of thought
and feeling, the most recent—Marcus Garvey’s “Back to Africa”
movement in the nineteen-twenties—being the best known. 6 But
early in the nineteenth century there developed among Negroes in
the West Indies and in the United States a movement preoccupied
with the promotion of emigration and the creation of new states,
most of them in Africa. As in the case of Garvey’s movement, these
early pan-Negro nationalists were concerned with the plight of
Negroes in the New World. They failed, however, to produce a
charismatic leader or a mass movement. Nevertheless, in their state-
ments and actions these pan-Negro leaders anticipated many of their
twentieth-century successors,7 particularly in their interest in Africa,
their belief in a great African past, and their dilemma of choice be-
tween reform of the New World and “regeneration” of their an-
cestral home.
1
Haiti had a chance to be the first state to provide a base for a
pan-Negro program. The slaves of Haiti revolted in 1804 and gained
their independence from the greatest military power in Europe, to
become the second modern sovereign state in the Americas. The
rulers of the Negro “empire” were aware of a responsibility to the
Negro race when they invited Negroes to cooperate in building a
5 For Pan-Africanism since 1958, see Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism ( London,
1962); also McKay, Africa, 109-133.
6 See Edmund David Cronon, Black Moses (Madison, 1955).
7 See George Shepperson, “Notes on American Negro Influences on the
Emergence of African Nationalism,” Journal of African History, 1.2:299-312
(1960); Nnamdi Azikiwe, “The Future of Pan-Africanism,” Presence africaine,
12:11 (1962).
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model state as the final, convincing answer to assertions of Negro
inferiority.8 However, because of internal division, Haiti failed to
fulfil its promise.9 Even so, its continued existence remained for
many Negroes proof of Negro ability, and a source of hope for a
better future for the race.
Of course, many New World and British Negroes had maintained
a sentimental attachment to, and interest in, Africa. It is noteworthy
that practically all Negro organizations formed in the United States
up to about the third decade of the ninteenth century had the word
“African” in their titles. 10 And among the Negroes in Britain, set
free by Lord Mansfield’s judicial decision in 1772, there were a few
who advocated what was essentially the point of view of British
evangelicals and humanitarians, namely, that Britain should exert
itself to stop the slave trade, replace it by legitimate commerce, and
help to christianize and civilize Africa. 11 These Negroes of Britain
also played a part in inducing British humanitarian groups to found
the colony of Sierra Leone in 1787. The Negroes themselves formed
the great majority of the emigrants who embarked from Britain. 12
Less than two years after the first emigrants landed, the Free African
Society of Newport, Rhode Island, showed an interest in the colony
and in 1795 sent out a delegate to prospect. 13 Sierra Leone also at-
tracted Negroes from Nova Scotia, where they had been settled
after fighting on the side of the British in the American revolution.
8 James Redpath, ed., A Guide to Hayti (Boston, 1861), see preface and 104.
9 See James G. Leyburn, The Haitian People (New Haven, 1941), passim.
10 Some examples are: Prince Hall’s African Lodge No. 1, the Free African
Societies of Philadelphia and Newport, the African Institutions of New York
and Philadelphia, various independent African Baptist churches, and the Afri-
can Methodist Church. From about the third decade on, when American
Negroes became convinced that the American Colonization Society (founded
in 1817) wished forcibly to deport them to Africa, the title “African” became
less popular among them and was replaced by “Colored.”
11 See Ignatius Sancho, Letters (London, 1782); Ottobah Cugoano,
Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery (London, 1787); and Gustavus
Vassa, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus
Vassa, the African (London, 1789).
12 R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire
(London, 1948), 40-43; also Christopher Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone (Lon-
don, 1962), 13-19.
is Ibid., 112.
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Anxious to leave behind an uncongenial climate and society, 1,131
of them—led by Thomas Peters, a millwright, who had negotiated
with the directors of the Sierre Leone Company, and David George,
a zealous Baptist preacher—emigrated to the “Colony of Freedom”
in 1792. Both Peters and George can be regarded as prototypes of
those Negro leaders who sought to lead Negroes out of “bondage”
and back to the “fatherland” in Africa.
Moreover, the arrival of the Nova Scotians saved the colony from
complete dissolution. Further reinforcements came in 1800 in the
form of 532 Maroons who had taken part in a revolt in Jamaica, had
been transported to Nova Scotia, and had then elected to emigrate
to Sierra Leone. In 1807, the British government outlawed the slave
trade and on January 1, 1808, assumed from the Sierra Leone Com-
pany direct control of the colony, which was to be used as a center
for the suppression of the slave trade in West Africa as well as for
settling and civilizing liberated Africans. In 1804, the Church Mis-
sionary Society began work in the colony, and Sierra Leone became
the center of British humanitarian activities in West Africa. By 1808,
Sierra Leone had a population of nearly two thousand westernized
Negroes and had become an obvious focus for further Negro emigra-
tion to Africa. Sierra Leone might do what Haiti was failing to do.
In the early years of the nineteenth century, there were already
signs that the freed American Negro might have to seek a home
outside the United States. Those years marked a sharp decline in his
fortune. The invention and use of the cotton gin in the last years of
the eighteenth century, and the subsequent remarkable spread of
the cotton kingdom to the south and southwest, had served to re-
vive the waning institution of slavery. Manumission of slaves, which
had been frequent in the years following the American revolution,
had come to a virtual end in the South by the turn of the century.
The relatively large free Negro population that had grown up was
regarded by many white Southerners as an anomaly and a threat
to its society. 14 In the North, Negroes fared no better: although by
14 In 1800, there were 108,435 free Negroes in the United States. By 1830,
this had risen, mainly by natural increase, to 319,599, and to 488,070 by 1860.
The free Negro population remained at roughly one tenth of the entire Negro
population. See Negro Population of the United States, Bureau of Census
(Washington, 1918), 57.
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1804, all slavery there had been abolished, Negroes were not ac-
cepted as an integral part of American society. 15 And as the Southern
states began taking measures intended to return free Negroes to
slavery or to drive them out, the North, fearful of an influx, seemed
to vie with the South in making their lives difficult.
Despite the growing discrimination against them, however, many
American Negroes continued to assert their rights as American
citizens. Many, for instance, began to look upon the efforts of the
American Colonization Society, 16 founded in 1817 as a barely dis-
guised attempt on the part of slaveholders, who were prominently
associated with the organization, to rid the United States of a
potentially troublesome element and thus make secure the Southern
system of slavery. 17 From 1830 on, Negroes met in national conven-
tions to denounce slaveholders and the American Colonization So-
ciety, and to declare their determination to fight for their civil
rights. 18
2
While many Negroes in the United States sought to achieve com-
plete integration within American society, others became pan-Negro
nationalists. Despairing of becoming first-class citizens in their own
country, they became advocates of Negro emigration to Africa and
elsewhere, and held visions of new states on a continent regenerated
by their efforts. Prominent among them were Paul Cuffee, Daniel
Coker, Lott Cary, and John Russwurm. 19 All but Cuffee died in the
newly established Negro settlements in West Africa.
15 For an elaboration of this thesis, see Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery:
The Negro in the Free States
,
1790-1862 (Chicago, 1962).
16 For the history of the society, see Earle Lee Fox, The American Coloniza-
tion Society, 1817-1840 (Baltimore, 1919); and P. J. Stadenraus, The African
Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York, 1961).
17 See Louis B. Mehlinger, “The Attitude of the Free Negro Toward
Colonization,” Journal of Negro History, I (July 1916).
18 See John W. Cromwell, “The Early Negro Convention Movement,” Oc-
casional Papers [of the American Negro Academy!, IX (Washington, 1940);
August Meier, “The Emergence of Negro Nationalism,” Midwest Journal, TV
(Winter 1951-52), 96-104; and Howard H. Bell, “A Survey of the Negro
Convention Movement, 1830-1861” (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern
University, 1953).
19 This is not, of course, meant to be an exhaustive list: these were chosen
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Cuffee was a devout Quaker from Massachusetts, a prosperous
trader and shipowner who, as a young man, had fought for the rights
of Negroes in his native state.20 When this met with little success, he
turned to Africa, and particularly to Sierra Leone, to work for the
“improvement and civilization of the blacks” of Africa, to provide
selective emigration to Sierra Leone, and to seek the suppression of
the slave trade and its replacement by legitimate commerce. His
trader’s mind was excited by the possibility of extensive commerce
between Negro America and West Africa, to raise the wealth and
prestige of the race. In 1808, he obtained the support of the African
Institution, a British humanitarian organization comprised mainly
of former directors of the Sierra Leone Company and still influential
in directing the affairs of the colony. Three years later he visited
Sierra Leone, where he showed considerable care in making plans
for emigration. Finally, he founded the Friendly Society of Sierra
Leone “to open a channel of intercourse” between Negro America
and Sierra Leone; as an earnest of his good faith, he bought a house
in Freetown.21
Long interested in Negro education in America, Cuffee also
showed interest in promoting education in Sierra Leone: “Africa
calls for men of character to fill stations in the Legislature,” he
wrote.22 On his return to America, he sought personally to persuade
Negroes in such centers as Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Bos-
ton, and his own town of Westport to support colonization in Africa.
In 1815 Cuffee made his second trip to Sierra Leone, taking, largely
at his own expense, thirty-eight Negroes in family groups. In letters
to America these emigrants urged other Negroes to follow their
example.23 When Cuffee returned, he made his experience available
to the founders of the American Colonization Society. Indeed, he
was chosen to lead emigrants to be sent out by the society, but he
because they were articulate or outstanding men of action. For a discussion of
American Negro procolonization views in this period, see Mehlinger, “Attitude.”
For an example of a project for colonization outside Africa, see the discussion
of Delany and Holly below.
20 For Cuffee’s biography, see Henry Noble Sherwood, “Paul Cuffee,” Jour-
nal of Negro History, VIII (April 1923), 153-229.
21 Ibid., 176.
22 Ibid., 206.
23 Ibid., 218.
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died before the first expedition left for West Africa. However, shortly
before this he expressed the widespread feeling Negroes shared
against the society by cautioning against too eager an acceptance
of its scheme.24
Despite Cuffee’s warning, the society won the support of his
friend Daniel Coker. A runaway slave who as a boy had acquired
a rudimentary education, Coker had become schoolmaster and re-
ligious leader in the free Negro community of Baltimore. As a young
man, he had angrily denounced the institution of slavery and as-
serted that, despite its handicap, "the African Race . . . had given
proof of talents.”25 Coker had played a leading role in the break
with the Methodist Episcopal Church, which resulted in the forma-
tion of the African Methodist Episcopal Church.26 Elected its first
bishop, he had declined the honor. Intent on emigrating to West
Africa, he was among the first eighty-eight emigrants sent out by
the Colonization Society. Although the expedition was led by three
white officials, it seems that in the eyes of the emigrants Coker was
the leader 27 His journal shows him as keenly conscious of the pos-
sibilities of the enterprise and of some responsibility for its success.
In the two years of hardship and uncertainty that followed before
the emigrants finally settled at Cape Mesurado—the first beginnings
of Liberia—the leadership devolved mainly on him. He later set-
tled in Sierra Leone.
Lott Cary, who was among the second group of emigrants, played
a versatile role as clergyman, doctor, militiaman, builder, and pio-
neer in agriculture. 28 He regarded himself as primarily a missionary
to the native Africans, and from the start he was concerned that the
24 Ibid., 213-221; also Henry N. Sherwood, “Paul Cuffee and his Contribu-
tion to the American Colonization Society,” Proceedings of the Mississippi Val-
ley Historical Association, VI (1913), 370-402.
25 A Dialogue Between A Virginian and an African Minister, Written by
Daniel Coker, a Descendant of Africa, Minister of the African Methodist Epis-
copal Church in Baltimore (Baltimore, 1810), 10.
26 Daniel A. Payne, History of the African Methodist Episcopal Church
(Nashville, 1891), 89.
27 The Journal of Daniel Coker, A Descendant of Africa ... in the Ship
Elizabeth, on a Voyage for Sherbro in Africa . . . (Baltimore, 1820), 15-16.
28 Harry Johnston, Liberia (London, 1906), I, 135; R. R. Gurley, Life of
Jehudi Ashmun (Washington, 1835), 147-160; Alexander, History, 241-254.
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colonists should have friendly relations with the tribes and so exert
a civilizing influence. He was born a slave, and, though ignorant at
twenty-seven, he acquired considerable learning and became a
well-to-do Baptist preacher in Richmond, Virginia, by the age of
thirty-three. Yet he gave up this relatively comfortable position to
go to Liberia. He wrote: “I am an African; and in this country,
however meritorious my conduct and respectable my character, I
cannot receive the credit due to either. I wish to go to a country
where I shall be estimated by my merits not by my complexion, and
I feel bound to labour for my suffering race.”29 Cary died, in an
accident, on November 10, 1828.
John B. Russwurm was born in Jamaica, and became one of the
first two Negro graduates from an American college.30 In March
1827, he founded and became the editor of the first American Negro
newspaper, Freedom’s Journal. He abandoned his opposition to the
American Colonization Society, and in 1829 announced his conver-
sion to the view that the free Negro could help himself and his race
best by giving strong support to Liberia.31 He soon left for Liberia
and in 1830 founded the Liberia Herald. He also held the positions
of superintendent of education and colonial secretary; from 1836
until his death in 1851, he was governor of Maryland, a colony
adjacent to Liberia to the south, which was founded by the Mary-
land Colonization Society in 1834.32 As the first Negro governor in
West Africa, Russwurm felt that the conduct of his office was a test
of the ability of the Negro: he seems to have ruled, with substantial
justice to colonists, Africans, and missionaries alike.33
These four leaders in the early phase of the Pan-African move-
ment had much in common. All were men of substance, in nearly
every case through their own talent and industry. All of them, in-
cluding Russwurm the Jamaican, were protesting against discrimina-
tion in the United States. Indeed, Coker had taken part in the setting
29 Quoted in ibid., 243.
30 See William M. Brewer, “John B. Russwurm,” Journal of Negro History,
XIII (Oct 1928), 413-422.
31 See his editorials in Freedom’s Journal, II (Feb. 14, 1829 et seq.).
32 For a history of the founding of the colony, see Journal of the Maryland
Historical Society, V (Feb. 1850), 129-152.
33 Russwurm’s letters and reports as governor, not used in Brewer’s “Russ-
wurm,” are in the archives of the Maryland Historical Society.
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up of an “African” church, an early example of the use of historical
origins as the basis of a protest. Although Russwurm and Cuffee
showed an understandable suspicion of the white-dominated Amer-
ican Colonization Society, they gave Liberia their support, perhaps
on the good practical ground that, whatever the motive of the so-
ciety's leaders and supporters, the society was creating a Negro state
in Africa.
Between 1830 and about 1850, there seems to have been some-
thing of a falling off of activity among American Negroes. No new
and effective leader appeared to take up the pan-Negro cause,
although there is evidence that sentiment in favor of emigration
continued to grow.34 In the West Indies, particularly in Jamaica and
Barbados, there was widespread interest both in leaving the place
of former bondage and continued discrimination and in taking
Christianity to “benighted brothers” in Africa.35 In Barbados, in
the three decades after the abolition of slavery, at least three or-
ganizations were formed for promoting emigration to Liberia: the
Barbados Colonization Society, the Fatherland Union Society, and
the Barbados Company for Liberia.36 But because of the lack of
adequate financial resources among Negroes or external aid, the
opposition of the still powerful West Indian sugar planters, and
perhaps the absence of any oppressive discrimination, little emigra-
tion was organized.37
It is, however, interesting that groups in the West Indies should
have looked to Liberia. After the emancipation of the slaves, there
was less pressure on them in the form of discrimination than on the
34 Carter G. Woodson, The Mind of the Negro as Reflected in Letters Writ-
ten during the Crisis, 1800-1860 (Washington, 1926), passim.
35 See A. E. Payne, Freedom in Jamaica (London, 1946), 73-74; C. P.
Groves, Planting of Christianity in Africa (London, 1954), II, 54; A General
Account of the West Indian Church Association for the Furtherance of the
Gospel in West Africa (London, 1855), 5-7.
36 Maryland Colonization Journal, IV (1848), 213; also American Coloniza-
tion Society, Forty-Ninth Annual Report (Washington, 1866), 7.
37 There is one exception to this. In 1865, 365 Negroes from Barbados emi-
grated to Liberia in an expedition sponsored by the Liberian government but
financed mainly by the American Colonization Society. See American Coloniza-
tion Society, Fifty-Second Annual Report (Washington, 1869), 53; and chap.
3 my book on Blyden cited below.
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American Negro to seek a home elsewhere. It is significant that the
three important West Indian advocates of pan-Negro nationalism
discussed here—Russwurm, Edward W. Blyden,38 and Robert Cam-
pell39—had all experienced and resented the discrimination against
Negroes in the United States.
The desire of West Indian Negroes who wanted to emigrate for
other reasons had important consequences for West Africa. It was
these people who urged the start of missionary work in West Africa
by both the British Baptist and the United Scottish Presbyterian
societies. West Indians played an important role in their work, as
well as in that of the Basel and Wesleyan missions. They accounted
also for the formation of the West Indian Church Association, whose
missionaries worked in the Rio Pongo area in West Africa. The as-
sociation was an autonomous body which, unlike the other mis-
sionary societies, derived its support in money and men mainly from
West Indian Negroes. 40 The West Indian missionaries and teachers
worked, so they felt, for the regeneration of Africa and on behalf
of the Negro race.41 Men like Joseph Fuller, Henry Wharton, and
John Duport respectively spent forty, twenty-eight, and eighteen
years in Africa.42
In the eighteen-fifties, however, there was a rapid revival of in-
terest among American Negroes, as the conflict over slavery became
more intense. Negroes were, of course, deeply involved and, as
38 See discussion of Blyden below; also Hollis R. Lynch, Edward W. Blyden
( 1832-1912 ) , Pan-Negro Patriot ( London, 1966 )
.
39 See discussion of Campell below; also Robert Campell, A Pilgrimage
to My Motherland (New York, 1861), 11.
40 A. Barrow, Fifty Years in Western Africa: Being a Record of the West
Indian Church on the Banks of the Rio Pongo (London, 1900), passim.
41 In addition, many West Indian artisans and professionals were attracted
to West Africa, particularly to Sierra Leone, but primarily because of the better
economic opportunities there. See Abioseh Nicol, “West Indians in West
Africa,” Sierre Leone Studies, N.S., no. 13 (June 1960), 14-23. Also from
about 1840, Brazilian and Cuban Negroes trickled back to Lagos and its hinter-
land where, as artisans, agriculturists, and traders, they formed an important
section of the community.
42 For biographical details on these three missionaries, see Robert Glennie,
Joseph Jackson Fuller (London, 1925); G. G. Findlay and W. W. Holdsworth,
The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Society (London, 1922), 164; and
Barrow, Fifty Years, passim.
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events appeared to be set on a course against them, more wanted to
emigrate. In 1850, the Fugitive Slave Bill was passed, giving federal
commissioners virtually unlimited power for the apprehension and
return of alleged fugitives. This was only the first shock in a decade
of “sorrowful and unmixed gloom.”43 There followed the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott decision, the failure of John Browns
raid, and an apparent blow from the Republican Party when Abra-
ham Lincoln, a compromise candidate, assumed the presidency. It
would be useful to study the period between 1850 and 1862 in detail
because not until Garvey’s “Back to Africa” movement of the 1920s
did pan-Negro nationalism seem again to possess real vigor.
The independence of Liberia in 1847 could hardly have come at
a more opportune time for the cause of emigration from the New
World. Congratulations to the new republic came from all major
Negro groups, and many hoped with John B. Hepburn of Port-au-
Prince that Liberia’s course was now “onward to empire and to
fame.”44 In 1848, the American Colonization Society sent out dele-
gates to report on Liberia’s possibilities as a future home.45 West
Indian Negroes, too, showed interest: the Barbados Colonization
Society “for assisting in the suppression of the Slave Trade, and the
introduction of civilization into Africa” received the news of Li-
beria’s independence with “inexpressible joy” and regarded it “as
another demonstration to the world, that the descendants of Africa,
when placed in a fair position, are not inferior in civilization, re-
ligion, and morality, to those nations amongst whom it was their lot
to be cast for a given time.”46 The new interest in Liberia reflected
itself in a substantial increase in the annual number of American
emigrants, which rose from 51 in 1847 to 441 in 1848. This increase
in emigration was maintained throughout the next decade.47
43 The phrase is that of the American Negro leader, James McCune Smith.
See his introduction to a Memorial Discourse by Rev. Henry Highland Garnet
,
Delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives . . . (Washington, 1865),
56.
44 Maryland Colonization Journal, IV (1848), 213.
45 The American Colonization Society, Thirty-Second Annual Report (Wash-
ington, 1849), 8.
46 African Repository, XXIV (Aug. 1848), 24.
47 American Colonization Society, Fifty-Second Annual Report (Washing-
ton, 1869), 53.
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The new Liberian republic, of which so much was hoped, had a
disappointing beginning. In 1850, three years after independence,
it was a country of roughly 13,000 square miles, with a coastline of
approximately 300 miles. Its emigrant population, depleted by a
high mortality rate, was about 6,000. Since 1827 the majority of those
sent out by the Colonization Society had been slaves who were
emancipated expressly for that purpose,48 and many were unfit for
pioneering.49
It is not surprising, then, that the sense of mission and destiny
which inspired the early emigrants was largely missing among the
later ones. Between its founding and 1850, Liberia seems to have
produced only one outstanding champion of the pan-Negro ideology,
the “poet and philosopher,” Hilary Teage, son of Colin Teage, who
had come from Lott Cary’s congregation in Richmond, Virginia. He
succeeded Russwurm as editor of the Liberia Herald in 1835, and
for the next fourteen years used it to express his pan-Negro senti-
ments. He was certainly the first poet of pan-Negro nationalism: his
poetry is concerned with the themes of the past achievements of
his race and of a mission to fulfil.50 He was also an accomplished
orator. He said to a group of Liberians in 1846: “Upon you, rely
upon it, depends, in a measure you can hardly conceive, the future
destiny of the race. You are to give the answer whether the African
race is doomed to interminable degradation—a hideous blot on the
fair face of creation, a libel upon the dignity of human nature; or
whether they are capable to take an honourable rank amongst the
great family of nations.”51 In 1847 he was a representative at Liberia’s
constitutional conference.
48 Up to 1850, 6,116 emigrants were sent out by the Society: 2,315 were
bom free, 165 purchased their freedom, and 3,636 were emancipated for emigra-
tion.
49 Edward W. Blyden, A Voice From Bleeding Africa (Monrovia, 1856), 26.
50 For quotations from his poems extolling the Negro past and urging
Liberia to “press towards the prize in glory’s race,” see Edward W. Blyden,
From West Africa to Palestine (Freetown, Manchester, London, 1873), 104;
also Fredrick Alexander Durham, The Lone-Star of Liberia (London, 1892), 1.
51 Quoted in Wilson Armistead, A Tribute to the Negro (Manchester and
New York, 1848), 532; also J. A. B. Horton, West African Countries and Peo-
ples (London, 1868), 273.
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On the whole, however, Liberians did not demonstrate much unity
of purpose or public spirit. They were berated by their white gov-
ernors and their progressive leaders for their “want of self-respect”
and their easy dependence on foreign philanthrophy.52 Socially
there had quickly developed in Liberia an American pattern of
stratifications based on color, the mulattoes considering themselves
superior to the black emigrants while the colonists, generally speak-
ing, held the natives in contempt.53 The Liberians exploited native
labor on their plantations, but, on the whole, agriculture was ne-
glected for trading, which brought quick profits without developing
the productive capacity of the country.
Until its independence, the supreme authority in the colony was
the American Colonization Society. Independence came from the
demand by Liberians for, among other things, the sovereign power
to deal with recalcitrant European traders scornful of the develop-
ing Negro nation. 54 And so on July 26, 1847, Liberia became a sov-
ereign nation with a constitution modeled on that of the United
States.55 Unfortunately, the constitution contained a provision which
was later to keep the young nation in a chaotic political condition:
the president, the House of Representatives, and half of the senators
were to be elected every two years. Moreover, the franchise was
confined mainly to American colonists.
With renewed support from New World Negroes, however, the
new nation could have retrieved itself. Such was the view of Ed-
ward Wilmot Blyden, probably the most articulate advocate of pan-
Negro nationalism in the nineteenth century.56 Born free57 on the
Danish West Indian island of St. Thomas in 1832, and educated at
the local primary school and by private tuition from his American
pastor, the Reverend John Knox, and his own mother, Blyden early
decided on the ministry as a career. In May 1850, Knox took him to
52 Johnston, Liberia, 149, 182-184.
53 Abayomi Karrnga, History of Liberia (Liverpool, 1926), 45.
54 Johnston, Liberia, 187-195.
55 The basic document was drafted by Simon Greenleaf, Professor of Law
at Harvard University, but was somewhat revised at Liberia’s constitutional
convention; Liberians wrote the preamble.
56 See Lynch, Edward W. Blyden.
57 Slavery was not abolished in the Danish West Indies until 1848, but
here, too, there was a small group of free Negroes before general emancipation.
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the United States and attempted to enroll him in Rutgers’ Theo-
logical College, Knox’s alma mater. Blyden was refused admission
because of his race, and, aware of the operation of the Fugitive
Slave Law, he accepted an offer from the New York Colonization
Society to emigrate to Liberia.
Even before he left the United States, Blyden expressed pride in
the newly independent Negro republic: Liberia, he thought, could
“include within its limits the dark regions of Ashantee and Dahomey
and bring those barbarous tribes under civilized and enlightened
influence.”58 In his first letter to the United States he described his
pleasure at being on African soil: “You can easily imagine the delight
with which I gazed upon the land of Tertullian, ancient father in the
Christian Church; of Hannibal and Henry Diaz, renowned generals;
yes, and the land of my forefathers . . . The land here is teeming with
everything necessary for subsistence of man.” The skeptics, he wrote,
should come and see for themselves. 59 He continued his studies at
Alexander High School, a Presbyterian school in Monrovia. In 1858
he was ordained a minister and became principal of the high school.
From the beginning of his time in Liberia, Blyden was active in
public life, both as a correspondent for the Liberia Herald and as
editor during 1855-56. Moreover, he remained an active propagandist
for Liberia and the cause of emigration, writing often for the African
Repository (the journal of the American Colonization Society) and
for the journals of the New York and Maryland Colonization so-
cieties.
Blyden was an articulate and critical defender of his new home,
and from an early stage he was concerned about diverting the ex-
pected flow of emigration from the United States to Africa, par-
ticularly to Liberia. It is probable that his first pamphlet, A Voice
from Bleeding Africa, published in Monrovia in 1856, appeared just
before the emigration conference of 1856 was scheduled to meet in
Cleveland,60 though there is no evidence that it was discussed there.
In the pamphlet he appealed to “colored men of every rank and
58 New York Colonization Journal, I (Dec. 1850).
59 African Repository, XXVII (Sept. 1851), 266.
60 The conference is discussed below. See also Martin R. Delany, Official
Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party (New York, 1861), for a discussion
of the conference.
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station, in every clime and country” to support the colonization
movement. Moreover, he urged Negroes to take the name of the
new state seriously: the object of the creation of Liberia was “the
redemption of Africa and the disenthralment and elevation of the
African race, objects worthy of every colored man.” At the same
time, he attacked Liberians for a lack of dedication to the cause:
How painful is the reflection that there are but few of the young men of
Liberia who seem to give the future of their country a moment’s
thought
. . . ! O young men and women of Liberia, arise from your
lethargy, shake off your puerile notions and practices! It is high time to
bestir yourselves to be men and women. Let the brave achievements and
noble deeds of your fathers arouse you to effort. Let the future glory that
awaits your country kindle within you an honorable ambition and urge you
onwards.61
He wanted to see “the young men of Liberia, like the youth among
the ancient Spartans, exercise themselves vigorously in all things
which pertain to the country’s welfare.”62
An opportunity for him to act as a defender of Liberia came in
1852. Gerrit Smith, a veteran abolitionist and member of Congress
from New York, in opposing a scheme to send Negroes to Liberia,
dubbed the American Colonization Society “the deadliest enemy of
the Negro race,” and Liberia “a frightful graveyard.”63 Blyden at-
tacked Senator Smith for “doing . . . considerable harm ... by
blinding the minds of colored men to their true interests.” Coloniza-
tion in Africa, he contended, was “the only means of delivering the
colored man from oppression and of raising him up to respectabil-
ity.” He would not accept the advice of Smith and other abolitionists
that, if necessary, free Negroes should retire to Canada to await the
outcome of the issue of slavery. Admitting that the mortality rate in
Liberia was high, Blyden claimed that this was a temporary condi-
tion, common to all pioneer communities.64
While Blyden was rebuking Senator Smith, Martin R. Delany, a
Negro doctor trained at Harvard and a former newspaper editor
61 New York Colonization Journal
,
IV (Aug. 1854).
62 African Repository, XXXI (April 1855), 18.
63 Howard H. Bell, “The Negro Emigration Movement, 1849-54: A Phase of
Negro Nationalism,” Phylon, XX (Nov. 1959), 136.
64 Liberia Herald, n.s., Ill (July 7, 1852); also Maryland Colonization Soci-
ety, VI (Nov. 1852), 277-280.
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and abolitionist, was devising a scheme based on a Negro empire
in the Caribbean and South and Central America. After the passage
of the Fugitive Slave Bill, he despaired of American Negroes ever
enjoying the full rights of citizenship in the United States. He had
grown impatient even with the white abolitionists when he realized
that Negroes were “occupying the very same position, in relation to
our anti-slavery friends, as we do in relation to the pro-slavery part
of the community—a mere secondary, underling position, in all our
relations to them, and anything more than this comes by mere suf-
ferance.” He dismissed with “contemptuous indignation the absurd
idea of the natural inferiority of the African,” warned Negroes not
to carry their religion to the point of hoping for a divine interven-
tion on their behalf, and urged them to support him in constructive
action. 65
His projected empire was to be formed by American Negroes emi-
grating to South America, an area for which he made two doubtful
claims: first, that it was predominantly Negroid and, second, that
there had “never existed there an inequality on account of color or
race.”66 His advocacy of a Negro empire in the Americas was partly
for strategic reasons: by its proximity it would, either by moral or
physical force, bring about the collapse of slavery in the United
States. But he also believed that Negroes, as developers of the eco-
nomic base of the New World, were entitled to their full share of
its fruits. Still he did not overlook Africa, which he hoped would be
“civilized and enlightened,” with Liberia in a “high and elevated
position . . . among the nations of the earth.” Yet he continued to re-
gard the American Colonization Society as working to promote the
interest of slaveholders and was, therefore, severely critical of Li-
beria’s dependence on it. 67
It is hardly surprising that Blyden and Delany came into conflict.
65 See Martin R. Delany, The Condition, Elevation and Destiny of the
Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered (Philadelphia,
1852).
66 Ibid., 27. Although Delany’s statement was not strictly true, it is true that
in Latin American countries Negroes were on the whole better treated than in
Anglo-Saxon America. For a comparative study of the treatment of Negroes in
the Americas, see Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen (New York, 1947);
also Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery (Chicago, 1959).
67 Ibid., 169, 170.
Pan-Negro Nationalism in the New World 165
Blyden defended the American Colonization Society and Liberia
with some spirit. Delany’s plan was a diversion, he wrote, and
doomed to failure in any case. Only in Africa could the Negro race
rise to distinguished achievement.68
Before Delany could act on his scheme, the largest Negro national
conference up to that time was convened in Rochester, New York,
in 1853, and the persistent division between emigrationists and anti-
emigrationists was forced into the open. The anti-emigrationists, led
by the Negro leader Frederick Douglass, persuaded the conference
to go on record as opposing emigration. 69 But as soon as the confer-
ence was over, the emigrationists, led by Delany, James M. Whit-
field, a popular poet, and James T. Holly, an accomplished Episco-
palian clergyman, called a conference for August 1854, from which
anti-emigrationists were to be excluded. Douglass described this
action as “narrow and illiberal,” and he sparked the first public
debate among American Negro leaders on the subject of emigra-
tion. 70
The conference on emigration met in Cleveland as planned. It
was, according to Delany, the most widely representative one ever
convened by Negroes.71 Shortly before it met, the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act had provided another triumph for the sup-
porters of slavery. Understandably, the mood of the conference was
militant. Delany repeated his call for the creation of a Negro empire
in the New World, where “the inherent traits, attributes
. . . and
native characteristics peculiar to our race could be cultivated and
developed.”72 He warned that “submission does not gain for us an
increase of friends nor respectability, as the white race will only
respect those who oppose their usurpation, and acknowledge as
equals those who will not submit to their rule.” They were to take
concerted action: “We must make an issue, create an event and
establish for ourselves a position. This is essentially necessary for
68 Liberia Herald, n.s. Ill (Oct. 6, 1852).
69 Cromwell, “Early Negro Convention,” 16.
70 Frederick Douglass’ Paper, VI (Oct. 6, 1853 et seq.).
71 Delany, Official Report, 6.
72 Martin R. Delany, “Political Destiny of the Colored Race of the American
Continent,” appendix no. 3, in Report of the Select Committee on Emancipation
and Colonization (Washington, 1862), 37-59.
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our effective elevation as a people, in shaping our national develop-
ment, directing our destiny and redeeming ourselves as a race.” A
Negro empire was further necessary to put “a check to European
presumption and insufferable Yankee intrusion and impudence.”73
Although the conference adopted Delany’s report, there were dis-
tinct territorial preferences among those who thought in terms of
the Western hemisphere. Whitfield favored colonization in Central
America, while Holly opted for Haiti. No public announcement
about Africa emerged from the conference, but that too had been
discussed. According to Delany: “The Convention ... in its Secret
Session made Africa, with its inexhaustible productions and the
great facilities for checking the abominable Slave Trade, its most
important point of dependence; though our first gun was levelled,
and the first shell thrown at the American continent driving the
slave-holding faction into despair
. . .
Africa was held in reserve”74
As a result of the conference, the National Emigration Board was
set up. Delany began negotiations with “several states of Central
and South America as well as Jamaica and Cuba.”75 Holly left for
Haiti to conduct negotiations there, which, although inconclusive,
were encouraging enough to cause him on his return to begin agitat-
ing for Negro emigration to that territory. 76 In August 1856, the bi-
ennial meeting of the National Emigration Conference convened
again in Cleveland; delegates supported emigration again and de-
cided to organize a publishing company for propaganda purposes.
4
As the conflict between Delany and Blyden shows, it was not
merely a dispute between emigrationists and their opponents that
was preventing a rapid flow of Negroes back to Africa. The emigra-
tionists were quarreling among themselves. Fortunately for those
who wished emigration to Africa, Delany abandoned his scheme
73 ibid., 43.
74 Delany, Official Report, 8-9.
75 Ibid., 10.
76 James T. Holly, A Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for
Self-Government, and Civilized Progress, as Demonstrated by Historical Events
of the Haitian Revolution; and the Subsequent Act of the People since their
National Independence (New Haven, 1857), preface.
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for an empire in the Americas, soon after the National Emigration
Conference in Cleveland. Whitfield died in California on his way to
Central America, and Delany began to develop a positive enthusi-
asm for Africa, stimulated by the publication in 1857 of works by
Thomas Bowen and David Livingstone.77 In particular, it was
Bowen’s “intelligent and interesting account of Yorubaland” which
spurred him to explore the Niger Valley in search of a base for a
Negro nation. 78 Even when he turned to Africa, Delany persisted in
looking beyond Liberia. His enthusiasm for an expedition to Yoruba-
land was matched by that of his assistant, Robert Campell, a
young Jamaica-born chemist. When the third National Emigration
Conference met in Chatham, Ontario, in August 1858, Delany had
his plans ready. The conference endorsed the expedition to the
Niger Valley as well as Holly’s Haitian scheme.
Those interested in West Africa received further help in 1858
when the African Civilization Society was formed, with Henry
Highland Garnet as president, to support emigration to that region.
Garnet was one of the most aggressive of the American Negro lead-
ers. As early as 1843, he had called on slaves “to rise in their might
and strike a blow for their lives and liberties,” a counsel which, al-
though it won the endorsement of John Brown, failed to win the
general support of Negroes. 79 He left the United States in 1850 for
England, where he lectured as an abolitionist for three years. On
his return to the United States in 1855, he became a strong supporter
of emigration. He had no sympathy for those Negro leaders who
opposed free emigration to Africa simply because slaveholders pro-
moted it, and he castigated Frederick Douglass and his associates
as “humbugs who oppose everything they do not originate.”80 The
main object of Garnet’s society was “to establish a grand center of
Negro nationality from which shall flow the streams of commercial,
77 These were Thomas J. Bowen, Central Africa: Adventures and Missionary
Labors in the Interior of Africa, from 1849-1856 (Charleston, 1857), and Dr.
Livingstone’s Seventeen Years’ Explorations and Adventures in the Wilds of
Africa, fohn Hartley Coomb, ed. (Philadelphia, 1857).
78 Delany, Official Report, 10.
79 fohn W. Cromwell, The Negro in American History (Washington, 1916),
126; also William Wells Brown, The Black Man: His Antecedents, His Genius,
and His Achievements (Boston, 1863), 149-152.
80 Weekly Anglo-African, I (Sept. 3, 1859).
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intellectual, and political power which shall make colored people
respected everywhere.”81 Though he preferred such a center to be
founded in West Africa through select American Negro emigration,
he was not averse to the building of a Negro state in the Americas.
Furthermore, by 1858, a few Liberian trading vessels were plying
regularly between the Negro republic and eastern American ports.
Garnet was impressed by this; the establishment of a vast commer-
cial network between West Africa and Negro America, he wrote,
“would do more for the overthrowing of slavery, in creating a re-
spect for ourselves, than fifty thousand lectures of the most eloquent
men of this land.”82
In turning to West Africa as the geographical center for their
pan-Negro program, the Delany-Gamet groups were not overlook-
ing one of their major objectives: the overthrow of slavery in the
United States. The new plan, in theory, represented a more effective
strategy: it would bring about the collapse of American slavery as
well as annihilate the slave trade at its source. The first object was to
be attained by the planting of cotton in the selected sites, with the
object of underselling in world markets the cotton produced in the
Southern states. 83 American Negroes, with their special knowledge
of the cotton culture, so it was reasoned, were peculiarly well fitted
to succeed in this.
Campell, Delany’s assistant, reached West Africa before his
leader. On June 24, 1859, he sailed from Liverpool aboard the
“splendid ship, Ethiopia,” in the company of an American Negro
from New York, John Bennet, who had invested $125 in two cotton
gins and was on his way to Lagos to start an independent venture
in cotton growing. 84 Campell landed at Freetown, Sierra Leone, on
July 12, and here met “several natives ... of respectability and . . .
education.”85 He made short stops at Cape Palmas and Cape Coast
before arriving at Lagos on July 21. Through the acting British
consul of Lagos, Lieutenant Lodder, Campell met Okukenu, the
Alake of Abeokuta, and found him favorable to the idea of select
si Ibid.
82 ibid.
83 Ibid.; also Delany, Official Report, 14.
84 Weekly Anglo-African, I (Sept. 3, 1859).
85 Campell, Pilgrimage, 11.
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Negro emigration into his territory. Already in the Alake’s domains
were several hundred emigrants
—
“semi-civilized” liberated Afri-
cans from Sierra Leone who had returned to their homeland or had
been repatriated from Brazil and Cuba. 86 In Campell’s view, these
emigrants “had inaugurated a mighty work, which . . . must be con-
tinued in a higher form by the more civilized of the race.” He advo-
cated that emigrants should organize on “municipal” lines. But his
goal was that of a “national government” which would require the
cooperation and support of native Africans. He therefore advised
prospective emigrants to “remember that the existing rulers must be
respected, for they alone are the bona fide rulers of the place. The
effort should be to lift them up to the proper standard, and not to
supersede or crush them.”87
Delany, leader of the Niger Valley exploring party, sailed from
New York aboard the Liberian vessel, Mendi
,
on May 24, 1859, and
arrived in Monrovia early in July. Also aboard the Mendi as an
emigrant to Liberia was William C. Monroe, an Episcopalian clergy-
man from Detroit, a former missionary to Haiti, and former presi-
dent of the National Emigration Conference, who had come to
believe that Liberia was “the chief instrument in determining the
future destiny of the Negro race.”88 In Monrovia Delany received a
hero’s welcome as he reported to a large public meeting of Liberi-
ans, who had come “from all parts of the country,” that “the desire
of African nationality has brought me to these shores.”89 At Grand
Bassa, a council of “the most eminent Liberians” approved Delany’s
mission and policy. This meeting gave Delany “one of the most
happy hours of his life” and produced in him “an unforgettable and
profound sensation.”90 On July 26, he participated in Liberia’s
twelfth annual Independence Day celebration, which “came off
with grand effect.”91 On August 1, Delany and Blyden, now much
86 Ibid., 18. For the fullest treatment of this, see Jean F. Herskovitts, “Lib-
erated Africans and the History of Lagos Colony to 1886” (unpublished dis-
sertation, Oxford, 1960).
87 Campell, Pilgrimage, 137.
88 Weekly Anglo-African, I (Oct. 1, 1859). Holly’s Vindication was dedi-
cated to Monroe.
89 Weekly Anglo-African, I (Oct. 1, 1859).
90 Delany, Official Report, 23.
91 Weekly Anglo-African, I (Sept. 24, 1859).
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closer together in policy, were speakers at the twenty-fifth anni-
versary of the emancipation of British West Indian Negroes, cele-
brated “with great spirit by the leading citizens of Liberia.”92
Delany left Monrovia on August 4, 1859, for Cape Palmas, where
he stayed six weeks. During his two and a half months’ stay in
Liberia, Delany moved even further toward Blyden’s views: his
opposition to the Negro republic had been transformed into support.
He was especially impressed with the area up St. Paul’s Biver—its
beautiful location, its thriving sugar and coffee plantations, its “live-
stock of all kinds,” and its neat brick houses.93 Although still wishing
to see the Negro republic more self-reliant, he was now able to
recommend it to the “intelligent of the race.”94 Blyden had also been
prominent in welcoming Delany. He hailed him as “the far-famed
champion of the elevation of colored men,” as the “Moses” who
would “lead the exodus of his people from the house of bondage.”95
Delany reached Lagos on September 20, spending five weeks
there and winning the confidence of Docemo, king of Lagos. Delany
wrote to Garnet from Lagos:
Lagos is a fine, and will be a great, commercial city. It is destined to be
the great metropolis of this part of the world. Entirely under a black gov-
ernment, it only wants a few of the right stamp of black men to make it
one of the most desirable cities in the world. They bid us come, and to
that end the authorities have presented me with two acres of land in the
heart of the city plot on which to build my residence . . .
There will be for you and also Mr. J. T. Holly, after our return to Africa,
a fine prospect in this rich city of Lagos, where Christians . . . desire to
have black instead of white preachers.96
From Lagos he went to Abeokuta, where he joined his fellow
commissioner, Robert Campell, and together they spent six weeks
touring the principal cities of Yorubaland. On their return to Abeo-
kuta, they held talks with the obas and chiefs and, on December
27, signed a treaty that assigned to them as “Commissioners on be-
half of the African race in America the right and privilege of set-
tling in common with the Egba people, on any part of the territory
92 Ibid., I (Oct. 15, 1859).
96 Ibid., I (Sept. 24, 1859).
94 New York Colonization Journal, IX (Oct. 1859).
95 Ibid.
96 Weekly Anglo-African, II (fan. 1861).
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belonging to Abeokuta, not otherwise occupied.”97 The signing of
the treaty was witnessed by the famous African missionary, Samuel
Crowther, and his son, Samuel, Jr. Delany had taken the first step,
he felt, in “the grandest prospect for regeneration of a people that
ever presented itself in the history of the world.”98
The expendition had aroused great curiosity and interest in both
humanitarian and commercial circles in England; men were deeply
divided on the issues of the coming American civil war, and atten-
tion was turning to sources of supply of cotton in areas outside
the United States.99 On their way back to the United States, Delany
and Campell arrived in London on May 17, 1860, and on the next
day were invited to a meeting “of a number of noblemen and gentle-
men interested in Africa’s Regeneration,” held in the parlor of Dr.
Thomas Hodgkin. A series of meetings was subsequently called,
from which grew the African Aid Society, founded to assist by
“loans or otherwise” the emigration of Negroes from North America
to Africa for the purpose of cultivating tropical products, including
cotton, and of promoting “the Christian Civilization of the African
Races and the annihilation of the slave trade.” Though extremely
cautious of any alliance with white men, Delany agreed to cooperate
with the society after he had impressed upon its members that the
relations between the two groups were to involve strictly business,
and that Negro emigrants were to be completely free in managing
their own affairs. “Our policy,” Delany emphasized, “must be . . .
Africa for the African race and black men to rule them.”100
5
Although Delany had abandoned his idea of an empire in Central
America and Whitfield had died, James T. Holly was still active in
promoting his scheme for emigration to Haiti. The scheme began to
gain support even before Delany and Campell left for West Africa.
The emigrationist position was generally strengthened by the Dred
97 Delany, Official Report, 27.
98 Ibid., 30.
99 New York Times (Dec. 20, 1860).
100 Delany, Official Report, 64. Thomas Hodgkin was a prominent London
physician and philanthropist; see Dictionary of National Biography, XXVII,
63-64.
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Scott decision of 1857,101 which led directly to the founding of the
Weekly Anglo-African and the Anglo-African Magazine by Robert
Hamilton, who in 1859 urged Negroes to “set themselves zealously
to work to create a position of their own—an empire which shall
challenge the admiration of the world, rivalling the glory of their
historic ancestors.”102 Meanwhile Holly was leading his campaign
and in 1857 wrote of Haiti’s revolution: “This revolution is one of
the noblest, grandest and most justifiable outbursts against oppres-
sion that is recorded in the pages of history ... [it] is also the
grandest political event in this or any other age ... it surpasses the
American revolution in an incomparable degree.”103 “Never before,”
he continued, “in all the annals of the world’s history did a nation
of abject and chattel slaves arise in the terrific might of their
resuscitated manhood, and regenerate, redeem and disenthral them-
selves: by taking their station at one gigantic bound, as an inde-
pendent nation among the sovereignties of the world.”
His object in recounting this phase of Haitian history was to
arouse Negroes of the United States “to a full consciousness of their
own inherent dignity.” They were to help in building up Haiti
“until its glory and renown overspread and cover the whole earth,
and redeem and regenerate by its influence in the future, the be-
nighted Fatherland of the race of Africa.” As a tactical measure.
Holly was against immediate American Negro emigration to Africa:
for a start, efforts should be concentrated on building a “Negro
Nationality in the New World.” Such a successful state would then
“shed its . . . beams upon the Fatherland of the race.”104
The Haitian emigration movement received a further fillip when
the Haitian government gave it official sanction. The Haitian “Call
for Emigration” was issued on August 22, 1859, by R. E. DuBois,
Secretary of State for Justice and Public Worship.105 Haiti’s doors
were now open to all Negroes who wished to emigrate. Fabre Gef-
frard, the new president who seemed bent on reforming Haitian so-
ciety, joined in the appeal, inviting Negroes to bring “their arms and
101 John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (New York, 1956), 264.
102 Weekly Anglo-African
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minds.” He predicted: “Haiti will soon regain her ancient splendor
. . . and . . . will be a formal denial, most eloquent and peremptory,
against the detractors of our race who contest our ability to attain
a high degree of civilization.”106 And F. J. Joseph, Secretary of State
for Agriculture, who was directly responsible for settling emigrants,
said that “welcoming men of our blood, the victims of these out-
rageous persecutions, is to continue the work of rehabilitation un-
dertaken by the Founders of the Republic, and to remain faithful
to the National Traditions.”107 Among the agents of the Haitian
emigration bureau were Holly and Garnet, the latter showing his
willingness to support emigration both within the New World and
to Africa.
Events in the United States were continuing to give impetus to
the emigration movement: the failure of John Brown’s raid, the split
in the Democratic Party, and the founding of the avowedly anti-
slavery Republican Party had both exacerbated feelings against
Negroes and increased the interest in emigration. By January 1861,
the Haitian emigration campaign seemed to be succeeding. After
five weeks in Philadelphia, Holly reported that “the choicest spirits
among our people
. . . are thoroughly awake to the importance of
the present movement and ready to give it their contribution.”108
Garnet also rejoiced “to see that there are more of the colored people
... in favor of this movement than they are of any other of the
present age.”109 Indeed, by 1861 almost all American Negro leaders
had given some expression of support to Negro emigration. Even
the formidable Frederick Douglass gave in and accepted an invita-
tion by the Haitian government to visit that country. 110
Thus, when Delany and Campell returned to the United States in
late December 1860, they found that the feeling for emigration was
stronger than ever. But Delany did not become involved in a con-
flict with the Haiti group. He soon let it be known that he was
preparing for “a hasty return to Africa where my duty calls me.” He
106 Ibid., preface.
107 ibid., 104
108 Weekly Anglo-African, II (Feb. 16, 1861).
loo Ibid., II (Jan. 26, 1861).
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called for the cooperation in his venture “of intelligent persons . . .
of various occupations, among whom mechanics and cotton cultiva-
tors are acceptable.” Select emigration was essential, he felt, to
ensure the success of his plan; for “Africa is our fatherland, we, its
legitimate descendants, and we will never agree or consent to see
this . . . step that has been taken for her regeneration by her own
descendants blasted.”111
Liberians, too, were encouraged by the steady, if moderate, flow
of emigrants. In the 1850s, Liberia had settled a total of 5,029
—
almost as many as had been settled in the previous thirty years. The
Negro republic’s incorporation of Maryland in 1857 and purchase
of territory in the area of the Mano and Gallinas Rivers had given
it a coastline of 500 miles. Late in 1860, the Reverend James Payne
wrote a series of articles in the Liberia Herald entitled “A Plea for
Liberia,” with a view to arresting the attention of American Negroes
and directing their attention to the land of their fathers. And the
vice-president, D. R. Warner, a close friend of Blyden’s, wrote that
he was gratified “that Liberia had begun to make a favourable im-
pression abroad among whites and colored.” He hoped American
Negroes would “reestablish themselves in this our fatherland.”112
6
There is one more Negro leader who should be mentioned here,
Alexander Crummell. He left the United States in 1847 at the age
of thirty-six; after graduating from Queens College, Cambridge, he
went to Liberia in 1853. As in the case of Blyden, he sought to bring
about reform in Liberian society and to impress upon his country-
men their high responsibility. 113 He wanted Liberia to extend its
influence and jurisdiction over the inland peoples, and he took a
leading part in organizing schemes for exploring and opening up the
interior. In September 1860 he published an open letter to win the
111 Weekly Anglo-African, I (Jan. 26, 1861).
112 African Repository, XXXVI (Jan. 1861), 87.
113 See, for example, Alexander Crummell, The Duty of a Rising Christian
State, Annual Oration Before the Common Council and Citizens of Monrovia,
Liberia, July 26, 1855. (London, 1856).
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support of all the American Negro leaders, both emigrationists and
anti-emigrationists, for Africa. 114
To appease the anti-emigrationists, he rejected the idea that Amer-
ica could never be the home of the Negro, but he maintained that
the task of civilizing Africa was peculiarly that of westernized Ne-
groes: “without doubt God designs great things for Africa and . . .
black men themselves are without doubt to be the chief instru-
ments.” The civilizing process could be accomplished by voluntary
emigration, by the pooling of economic resources and inauguration
of trade between America and Africa, and by support of the mis-
sionary activities of American Negro churches: “From the port of
Lagos in almost direct line through a crowded population, and
passing by cities containing tens of thousands of people, a highway
is now open reaching to Rabba on the banks of the Niger. All through
this country the coloured churches of America can send their mis-
sionaries, build up Christian churches, and lay the foundation of
Christian colleges and universities.”115 By utilizing this combination
of commerce and Christianity, not only would Africa be civilized,
but American Negroes would gain in wealth and respect:
At an early date whole fleets of vessels, manned and officered from the
United States and Liberia, would outrival all the other agencies which are
now being used for grasping West African commerce. Large and important
houses will spring into existence among you, all through the States.
Wealth will flow into your coffers, and affluence would soon exhibit itself
amid all your associations.
The kings and tradesmen of Africa, having the demonstration of Negro
capacity before them, would hail the presence of their black kinsmen from
America and would be stimulated by a generous emulation ... To the
farthest interior, leagues and combinations would be formed with men of
commerce, and thus civilization, enlightenment and Christianity would be
carried to every state and town, and village of interior Africa.116
Crummell, like Blyden and Delany, had strongly supported the
founding of Liberia College, on which construction had begun by
1860. The college was to be the first modern, secular English-speak-
114 Alexander Crummell, The Relation and Duties of the Free Colored Men
in America to Africa (Hartford, 1861), 55.
ns Ibid., 45.
116 Ibid., 25.
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ing institution of higher education in tropical Africa. Crummell and
other Negro patriots hoped that the college would attract Negro
scholars and students from all parts of the world.
Crummell and Blyden left Liberia in February 1861 for England
and America, to win financial support for the college and to study
institutions of higher learning. In England, Blyden met W. E. Glad-
stone, Chancellor of the Exchequer, with whom he had been in
correspondence, and Lord Brougham, the great humanitarian, both
of whom he sought to interest in the “little Republic” that was
destined to “revolutionize for good that whole portion of Africa.”117
When Blyden and Crummell arrived in the United States in June
1861, war had already begun between the Union and the Con-
federacy. But this seemed to make no difference to the plans of the
emigrationists. By May, Delany and Campell had joined forces with
Garnet’s African Civilization Society in an attempt to raise funds
to promote colonization in the Niger Valley. 118 Campell, “appearing
in native costumes,” lectured regularly on West Africa and vowed
that “my home shall be in Africa though I be the only person from
America.”119 Delany and Campell had each published a book de-
scribing the expedition to the Niger Valley and propagandizing for
the cause of colonization. 120 In November the African Civilization
Society increased its strength by gaining the support of men who
held high offices in the African Methodist Episcopal Church.121
Blyden and Crummell joined with the other emigrationists. Blyden
himself welcomed the civil war as the “purifier of a demoralised
American conscience,”122 and no doubt as a means of bringing slav-
ery to an end. However, he warned Negroes that they were de-
ceiving themselves if they thought they could earn proper respect
in the United States. He urged them to be makers and witnesses
of history: “It need not imply any pretensions to prophetic insight
117 Blyden to Gladstone, May 3, 1861, British Museum Add. Mss. 44396/63;
Blyden to Lord Brougham, May 24, 1861, Brougham Papers, University Col-
lege, London.
118 Constitution of the African Civilization Society (New Haven, 1861), 1.
U9 Weekly Anglo-African, II (March 16, 1861).
120 Delany, Official Report, and Campell, Pilgrimage.
121 Constitution of the African Civilization Society, 4.
122 Blyden to Gladstone, June 16, 1862, British Museum Add. Mss. 44398/
183.
Pan-Negro Nationalism in the New World 177
for us to declare that we live in the shadows of remarkable events
in the history of Africa.”123 Crummell asserted that “the free black
man of this country ... is superior to the Russian, the Polander, the
Italian” and was now “in a state of preparedness for a new world’s
history, for a mission of civilization.” He saw the decline of Anglo-
Saxon civilizations in “the moral and political convulsion” within
the United States. But “now the Negro is rising and will rise . . . God
has destined a great future for the Negro race . . . On the continent
of Africa, a civilization of a new type and more noble and generous
. . . than has ever existed, is on the eve of starting a new life.”124
When Blyden and Crummell returned to Liberia in the fall of
1861, they reported the support of American Negroes for emigra-
tion. The Liberian government decided to act: legislation was passed
by which Blyden and Crummell were appointed commissioners “to
present the cause of Liberia to the descendants of Africa in that
country, and to lay before them the claims that Africa had upon
their sympathies, and the paramount advantages that would accrue
to them, their children and their race by their return to the father-
land.”125
The action of the Liberian government had little effect. The out-
break of the civil war was the turning point after which there was
a fairly sharp decline in pan-Negro nationalism. At the start of the
war, Douglass canceled his trip to Haiti and urged American Ne-
groes to stay and help to decide the outcome of the struggle, advice
that apparently found quick response. The emigrationists, who had
at first regarded the war as irrelevant to their plans, were unable
to act because of lack of funds. The war apart, emigration to Haiti
had by December 1861 virtually come to an end because of reports
of the high mortality rate among the emigrants and unattractive
living conditions.126 There was a correspondingly swift decline in
emigration to Liberia. By early 1862, Negro leaders were again
united to work for the victory of the North. Indeed, when in the
123 Edward W. Blyden, Hope for Africa, A Discourse . .
.
(tract no. 8 from
the Colonization Journal, 1861), 16.
124 African Repository, XXXVII (Sept. 1861), 279.
125 Cited in the American Colonization Society, Forty-Sixth Annual Report
(Washington, 1863), 6.
126 Benjamin Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro (New York, 1962), 120.
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summer of 1862 Lincoln decided to put into effect his scheme for
gradual Negro emancipation with colonization, he received no sup-
port from American Negro leaders. 127 Thus when Blyden and Crum-
mell returned to the United States as official commissioners in the
summer of 1862, to urge American Negroes to “return to the father-
land,” they found “an indolent and unmeaning sympathy—sympathy
which put forth no effort, made no sacrifices, endured no self-denial,
braved no obloquy for the sake of advancing African interests.”128
Further, Lincoln’s proclamation of January 1, 1863, ending slavery,
and the use later in that year of Negro troops in the Union army,
made American Negroes feel sure that a new day had dawned for
them.
In this they were wrong, of course. Although Negroes were
awarded political and civil rights during the period of Reconstruc-
tion (1867-1877), their hopes of full integration within American
society were largely frustrated. This disappointment, continuing
throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, again
resulted in a desire to leave for other parts of the Americas or for
Africa. Many Negro leaders once more urged emigration to Africa:
Henry M. Turner, bishop in the African Methodist Episcopal
Church; Pap Singleton; R. H. Cain, like Turner an AME bishop;
J.
McCants Steward, a lawyer; and
J.
Albert Thorne, a doctor from
Barbados. Their activities are, however, beyond the scope of this
article. 129
7
Pan-Negro nationalists before 1862 did not succeed in creating
and sustaining either a return to Africa on a large scale or any
significant and persistent contact with African communities. The
movement did not come to an end in 1862 and, in spite of the dif-
ficulties of the years following the American civil war, it is hardly
likely that everyone at the first Pan-African conference of 1900 had
forgotten the personalities and events of fifty years earlier. The
twentieth-century Pan-Africanists were concerned that Negroes
127 Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (Boston, 1953), 147-149.
128 Blyden, Liberia's Offering, 69.
129 See August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915 (Madison,
1963).
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should mobilize to defend and extend their rights wherever they
lived. They held their first congress in London, the most imperial of
capital cities, in the middle of the South African War, and increas-
ingly they identified themselves with the larger movement against
imperialism.
Nineteenth-century pan-Negro nationalism and Garveyism had
much in common. They both owed their existence almost entirely
to discrimination against Negroes in the New World, particularly in
the United States. They shared a preoccupation with emigration,
with a great African past, and with an equally great future, and
both relied heavily on leaders from the West Indies, particularly
those who had lived in the United States. Nineteenth-century pan-
Negro nationalism produced no leader to match Marcus Garvey in
the emotional quality of his oratory, the scale of organization and
mobilization of resources he achieved, or, indeed, the bitter disil-
lusionment that followed his failure. Though the nineteenth-century
movement did achieve a sustained, if limited, emigration, both
movements failed to achieve a massive emigration to Africa or its
“regeneration.”
In their frequent references to the need for action to save Africa,
and to prove by deeds the fundamental equality of Africans with
other peoples, these Negroes from the New World showed their in-
debtedness to the societies from which they came. References to
the effects of “commerce and Christianity,” “the mission of civiliza-
tion,” the great resources of Africa, and the racial bases of society
are found as much in the writings of the pan-Negro nationalists as
in the writings of missionary groups and subsequently among some
believers in imperial rule. It is, however, in reference to “regenera-
tion,” with its implication of a great African past, and to the frontal
attack on notions of white superiority that the pan-Negro nationalists
of the nineteenth century were pioneers.
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The existence of foreigners in Ethiopia was by no means a new
phenomenon in the nineteenth century. The country had experi-
enced foreign contacts since ancient times, and in the Middle Ages
several Ethiopian monarchs had requested the rulers of other lands
to send them craftsmen, particularly armorers; other foreigners had
come as adventurers on their own account. Foreigners resident in
the country in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries
had included Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks, Syrians, Egyp-
tians, Armenians, Turks, and Indians. These immigrants, though
seldom more than a score or two in number, had played a significant
role: they were in the main traders or craftsmen and were thus
engaged in economic activities which were either unknown to or
despised by the natives of the land. 1
The foreign community was still relatively small in the early part
of the nineteenth century, limited to a handful of Greeks and
Armenians, Arabs, Indians, and Persians who had come to the coun-
try on their own initiative. Many of them were traders, but others
were craftsmen, particularly blacksmiths, gunsmiths, and jewelers.
The growing impact of Europe during the Industrial Revolution,
particularly after the advent of the steamship and the British occu-
pation of Aden in 1839 caused the rulers of Ethiopia, then emerging
from civil war, to revive the old idea of importing skilled workers
from abroad.
The object of this essay is to examine the activities of these for-
eigners and the attitude of the Ethiopian rulers toward them prior
to the advent of Menilek; the period covered, then, includes the
situation in Shoa up to 1865, when Menilek became king of that
province, and in the rest of the empire up to 1889, the year of his
coronation as emperor of Ethiopia. The role of foreigners in the
Menilek era owed much to the situation in the earlier period under
1 R. Pankhurst, Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia (London,
1961 ), 289-306 .
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review. The foreign minorities, particularly the Armenians and
Greeks who had established themselves in earlier years, continued
to play their accustomed economic role. The developments of
Menilek’s reign were, moreover, based on the principle, established
by previous rulers, that Europeans should be imported to undertake
whatever work was required of them by the sovereigns of the land.
This utilization of foreign skill had two corollaries that helped to
give modern Ethiopia its distinctive character. First, the role of
foreigners as the king’s servants tended to create the image of for-
eigners as a race of servants—not a race of masters as they appeared
in the areas of Africa subjected to colonial rule. Second, the fact
that foreigners came or stayed at the request, or at least with the
approval, of the indigenous rulers of the country meant that devel-
opment was carried out by a variety of European nationals without
the dominance of any single foreign nationality. The Menilek era,
however, differed from the Ethiopian situation earlier in the nine-
teenth century: it was a period of innovation that witnessed the
founding of Addis Ababa, the establishment of many modern insti-
tutions, and the opening of diplomatic relations with the important
foreign powers. Many of these developments were linked, either as
cause or effect, with the advent of a sizeable foreign community,
when increasing numbers of foreigners were employed as advisers
and technicians or came as traders and entrepreneurs.
1
Throughout the first part of the nineteenth century, the foreign
community in Ethiopia was minute. Excluding Arabs, who were less
clearly differentiated from the local populations and were thus often
overlooked by visiting travelers and writers, there was little more
than a score of foreigners in the country at any one time. Mainly
traders or craftsmen, they were principally to be found in three
places: Adowa, the capital of the northern province of Tigre and
an important town on the main trade route to the coast; Gondar,
the nominal capital of the whole empire and a town of considerable
trade; and Ankober, capital of the southern province of Shoa and
home of Menilek’s grandfather, Sahle Sellassie, who reigned from
1813 to 1847.
The foreigners in Adowa in the first part of the century comprised
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a handful of Greeks, an even smaller number of Armenians, Egyp-
tians, Englishmen, and Germans, and apparently a lone Italian. In
the first decades of the century, the travelers Salt and Gobat both
tell of the few Greeks: one, Apostoli, had been in the country over
forty years and was a rich trader, and as such fairly typical of the
Greeks in Ethiopia who, according to Salt, occasionally went abroad
to settle their accounts. There is record of another Greek, Avostalla,
who had been a gunsmith; Pearce says he was killed when a cannon
exploded. Still another Greek, a Moslem called Nasser Ali, lived in
the nearby town of Antalo; he constructed a horse-drawn corn mill
and, Salt says, was a loyal subject of the Ottoman Empire who went
so far in his praise of the Porte as to tell the Ethiopians that
“England was a petty state under the rule of the Turks.”2
Some expansion in the Greek population appears to have taken
place in the next few decades, mainly as a result of immigration.
Mansfield Parkyns, who visited Adowa at mid-century, mentions the
presence of several Greek silversmiths, who were “obliged to be
rogues” and made “a tolerably good thing of their business . . .'by
appropriating a large proportion of both the gold and silver en-
trusted to them for their work.” One of them, called Mikael, had
previously worked in Khartoum, but had run away from that city
with the silver he had been given to make into jewelry. There was
also a Greek tailor, variously referred to as Demetrius and Sidi
Petros, who had been in the country well over three quarters of a
century. Mention is also made of another Greek at Adowa, who was
known by the Ethiopian name Walda Rufael and may therefore
have been half Ethiopian.3
The Armenian community was smaller than the Greek. Gobat
mentions a few Armenians in the 1830s, but at least four are identi-
fiable. They all played a distinct role in the city’s life. One, Haji
Yohannes, was a metalworker; he was said to have counterfeited
Maria Theresa dollars and may well have been the Armenian whom
2 H. Salt, A Voyage to Abyssinia (London, 1814), 360-361; J. Wolff, Jour-
nal (London, 1839), 355; S. Gobat, Journal of a Three Years’ Residence in
Abyssinia (London, 1847), 5; N. Pearce, The Life and Adventures of Nathaniel
Pearce (London, 1831), I, 257-258, Abba Tekla-Haimanot, Abouna Yacob ou
le Venerable de Jacobis (Paris, 1914), 79.
3 M. Parkyns, Life in Abyssinia (London, 1854), I, 208, II, 16-17, 34, 39,
41-42, 288; Salt, Voyage
,
404; Tekla-Haimanot, Abouna Yacob, 79.
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Wolff refers to as making a seal for the local ruler, Ras Wube. The
second Armenian was an old man called Gorgorius who had come
to the country as a trader with 1,500 Maria Theresa dollars and was
reputed to know an excellent specific for venereal disease. The third
Armenian, known as Bethlehem, was a native of Tiflis and had an
Ethiopian wife. He served in Wube’s army and was on one occasion
sent to Cairo to purchase arms. 4 A little later there is evidence of
another Armenian called Warque, who seems to have been a trader.
Yet another Armenian lived in Chelicut, also in Tigre province, and
is described by Krapf as a leather worker.5
The Egyptian community left little impression on observers of
this time and probably did not have much economic significance.
Parkyns mentions only two Egyptians: an old man, Haji Ali, who
had formerly been a servant to one of the Mamelukes in Egypt, and
a Copt who had been a servant to an Egyptian ecclesiastic. 6
The English community in the early part of the century com-
prised William Coffin, the former servant of the British explorer
Henry Salt, and a young sailor called Nathaniel Pearce. Both en-
tered the service of Ras Walda Sellassie, the ruler of Tigre, in 1810,
and remained in Ethiopia for many years—over forty in the case of
Coffin. They were employed by Walda Sellassie and his successors,
Sabagardis and Ras Wube, in various matters including the import
of arms (always considered very important in Ethiopia). 7 Their
4 E. Combes and M. Tamisier, Voyage en Abyssinie (Paris, 1838), I, 196-
198, 251-252.
5 Parkyns, Life, 17, 41, 218, 227-228; Combes and Tamisier, Voyage, I, 195,
198-199; T. Lefebre and others, Voyage en Abyssinie (Paris, 1845-1846), I, 53-
54, II, 55-56; C. W. Isenberg and J. L. Krapf, Journals Detailing Their Pro-
ceedings in the Kingdom of Shoa (London, 1843), 503; A. d’Abbadie, Douze
Ans de Sejour dans la Haute-Ethiopie (Paris, 1868), 37; Tekla-Haimanot,
Abouna Yacob, 79.
6 Parkyns, Life, II, 41.
7 Salt, Voyage, 359-361; Wolff, Journal, 346; T. Heuglin, Reise nach Abes-
sinien (fena, 1868), 551; British Museum Add. Mss. 19,343; Pearce, Life,
passim; Correspondence Respecting Abyssinia, 1848-1868, presented to the
House of Commons in pursuance of their Addresses on the 2nd and 5th Decem-
ber (London, 1868), 7 (hereafter Correspondence, 1848-1868 ) ; E. A. W.
Budge, A History of Ethiopia (London, 1928), II, 490; H. Rassam, Narrative
of the British Mission to Theodore (London, 1896), I, 22.
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fortunes doubtless fluctuated from time to time, for a letter of
Pearce’s, now in the British Museum, relates that on the death of
Walda Sellassie he had “fallen into trouble, as I have no relations;
and I have not found any Master to feed me, clothe me, and defend
my head.”8 A third Englishman was John T. Bell, a trader and
adventurer who joined the service of Ras Wube and later that of
Emperor Theodore.9
The German community at Adowa numbered three persons, a
carpenter called Eichinger, the well-known botanist, Dr. G. H. G.
Schimper, and a painter named Christoph Edward Zander. Eichin-
ger, who came to Ethiopia with the German missionary Samuel
Gobat, built the church of Cherkos at Adigrat and thus began a
nineteenth-century tradition of construction work by Europeans
that continued throughout the century. 10 Schimper, who arrived
around 1836, was destined to spend almost the rest of his life in
Ethiopia. He was appointed by Ras Wube as governor of Enticcio;
he was a highly privileged person until the death of the Ras, when
he was deprived of his lands. He erected a number of buildings for
the ruler, notably a stone church near Debra Egzie. Deeply inter-
ested in the country’s flora, Schimper also endeavored to introduce
new crops, among them potatoes and watercress, both of which he
established in the Adowa area. 11 Zander worked on the church at
Debra Ezgie and commanded Wube’s artillery until the defeat by
Theodore in 1855, when the German, as we shall see, transferred his
8 Pearce to Salt, n.d., BM Add. Mss. 19,343, f. 10.
9 C. T. Beke, The British Captives in Abyssinia (London, 1869), 20; Combes
and Tamisier, Voyage, I, 231; M. E. Herbert, Abyssinia and Its Apostle (Lon-
don, 1867), 147. See also C. Da Terzorio, L’Etiopia Prima e dopo il Massaja
(Rome, 1937), 80.
10 Isenberg and Krapf, Journals, 512-513; Wolff, Journal, 351.
11 T. Heuglin, Reisen in Nord-Ost Afrika (Gotha, 1857), 55, 60-70; Herbert,
Abyssinia, 68, 70; H. A. Burette, A Visit to King Theodoras (London, 1868),
47-48; G. Rohlfs, Meine Mission nach Abessinien (Leipzig, 1883), 324; A. B.
Wylde, ’83 and ’87 in the Soudan, 2 vols. (London, 1888), I, 264; A. Girard,
Souvenirs d’un Voyage en Abyssinie (Cairo, 1873), 100-101, 121-127, 235;
Heuglin, Reise, 141; P. N. E. Fournier, Des Tenifuges Employes en Abyssinie
(Paris, 1861), lOn; J. De Coursac, Une Page de I’Histoire d’Ethiopie. Le
Regne de Yohannes (Paris, 1926), 23, 141-151; E. Hammerschmidt, “A Brief
History of German Contributions to the Study of Ethiopia,” Journal of Ethiop-
ian Studies, I, (1963), 43-44.
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loyalty to the new emperor. Many of Zander’s drawings of Ethiopia,
which are now preserved in the British Museum’s department of
prints and drawings, were published in 1868. 12
The only Italian in Adowa was a workman called Valieri, whom
Wube entrusted with a small old piece of artillery that Salt had
imported a generation or so earlier. This weapon, at that time the
only one of its kind in Adowa, was considered extraordinary; it was
popularly said that it could destroy a mountain. 13
All of these foreigners, who came without wives or families and
in most cases remained for years in the country, tended to become
“Ethiopianized.” Many of them married Ethiopian women or took
them as mistresses. The Greek tailor Sidi Paulos had at least two
daughters by an Ethiopian woman; one girl later married the
Englishman Pearce, while the other was wedded to an Ethiopian of
good family. The Greek trader Apostoli had a half-caste son called
Ingida, who, Parkyns says, had been accustomed to eat raw meat—
a
traditional Ethiopian delicacy—since childhood. Several other for-
eigners, including Pearce, Coffin, Bell, Schimper, and Parkyns, also
had children by Ethiopian women. 14 Parkyns states that some of the
foreigners were nevertheless conscious of their common “white
descent,” and he indicates that they to a certain extent formed a clan
among themselves. 15
The foreigners in Adowa were in privileged positions, at least
partly because they possessed skills unknown to the rest of the
population. On the other hand, often they were detained unwillingly
in the country. Parkyns, in a passage expressly referring to the
Greeks, seems to have summed up the position of at least some other
12 Heuglin, Reise, 83-84; J. M Flad, 60 Jahre in der Mission unter den
Falaschas in Abessinien (Basel, 1922), 61-62; British Museum Dept, of Prints
and Drawings, 197, a.5; S. F. F. Veitch, Views of Central Abyssinia (London,
1868), passim ; Hammerschmidt, “Brief History,” 44.
13 P. V. Ferret and J. G. Galinier, Voyage en Abyssinie (Paris, 1847-1848),
II, 39-43.
14 Salt, Voyage, 403; Parkyns, Life, II, 39, 41; BM Add. Mss. 19,348, 70,
244, 276, 278-279, 325; C. Markham, A History of the Abyssinian Expedition
(London, 1869), 340; A. J. Shepherd, The Campaign in Abyssinia (Bombay,
1868)
,
251-252; H. M. Hozier, The British Expedition to Abyssinia (London,
1869)
,
219-220; Tekla-Haimanot, Abouna Yacob, 79.
15 Parkyns, Life, II, 41.
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foreign nationals when he says that they were ‘‘more to be pitied
than blamed,” for, though “treated with considerable kindness,” they
were “considered almost as slaves” and were “not allowed to leave
the country.”16
The imperial city of Gondar also had its foreign community, but
apparently a smaller one. Combes and Tamisier mention a “con-
verted Jew” who for a time served as cook to the above-mentioned
Armenian Bethlehem; 17 Riippell relates that he saw a number of
Greek and Egyptian gunsmiths and gun repairers in the city. Some
of them, he said, cheated their customers by soldering over the de-
fects in old guns instead of repairing them, a practice that caused
many injuries when the solder burst apart. 18 Combes and Tamisier
state that the armorers of this time were invariably Greeks, Copts,
or Armenians, while d’Abbadie says that Armenians and other for-
eigners generally acted as metalworkers in Begemder. 19
There were also a number of foreigners in Shoa during the reign
of Sahle Sellassie. They included several Greeks, at least one Arme-
nian, and several traders from eastern lands. The principal Greek
was an armorer called Elias, who had come to Ankober at the age
of fourteen; he taught the soldiers how to shoot, and on one occasion
made the king a gun plate that was considered quite an achieve-
ment in its day.20 Another prominent Greek was a mason named
Demetrius, who built the king a two-story palace at Angolala. With
the help of a compatriot called Yohannes, he also constructed a
water mill, but it was never used because of opposition from the
priests. Demetrius, like so many of his compatriots, took a local wife,
whom Harris describes as a “high class dame.”21 Other foreigners
is ibid., 17.
17 Combes and Tamisier, Voyage, I, 247; III, 344.
18 E. Riippell, Reise in Abyssinien (Frankfurt, 1838-1840), II, 180-181.
19 Combes and Tamisier, Voyage, III, 68-69; d’Abbadie, Douze Ans, 211.
20 Ibid., I, 216; III, 8-10; IV, 69.
21 C. W. Harris, The Highlands of Aethiopia (London, 1844), II, 43, 88,
382; Isenberg and Krapf, Journals, 57; C. Johnston, Travels in Southern Abys-
sinia (London, 1844), II, 60, 140; D. C. Graham, Glimpses of Abyssinia (Lon-
don, 1867), 32; G. W. Forrest, Selections from the Travels and Journals Pre-
served in the Bombay Secretariat (Bombay, 1906), 273; Combes and Tamisier,
Voyage, III, 27; R. Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa (London, 1894), II,
223, 231; P. Soleillet, Voyages en Ethiopie (Rouen, 1886), 131-133; L. L.
190 Richard Pankhurst
included an Armenian, called Warqe, who lived at Angolala in the
1840s and was reported to have been a long-time resident in Shoa,22
and a Persian priest Abba Mahlem, who interviewed strangers on
Sahle Sellassie’s behalf.23 Other foreigners were to be found among
the trading population of the nearby commercial center of Aliu
Amba, a community, Johnston says, composed of Indians and Per-
sians as well as Arabs. 24
The reign of Sahle Sellassie was notable for the advent of diplo-
matic missions from France and Britain to Shoa, the arrival of a
religious mission composed of the Reverends C. W. Isenberg and
J.
L. Krapf, both of the Church Missionary Society, and the resi-
dence for some time of the British ship’s surgeon Charles Johnston.
The presence of so many foreigners, though only a temporary
phenomenon, was said to have caused great excitement. Krapf re-
lates that, in March 1842, the queen mother exclaimed to him more
than once: “What astonishing things we have seen in the time of
Sahela Sellasieh! Formerly we only heard of these things and of
your White people; but now we have seen with our eyes and believe
what we are told.”25 Opinion on the whole, however, does not seem
to have been very sympathetic to such immigrants. A member of
the British mission reported popular prophecies to the effect that
the Europeans would come during Sahle Sellassie’s reign, but that
many of the chiefs were frightened lest the foreigners strengthen
the central power of the king 26
The king’s attitude was clearly explained by Krapf, who reports
that Sahle Sellassie on one occasion observed that “he did not need
spiritual teachers so much as doctors, masons, smiths, etc.” The
missionaries, Isenberg and Krapf, were subsequently expelled from
Shoa in 1843. S. P. Haines, the British political agent in Aden who
reported that Sahle Sellassie had “interdicted the return of the
missionaries to the country,” adds: “The cause of the King of Shoa
interdicting missionaries from entering his territory, is owing to the
Lande, “Un Voyageur Frangais dans l’Ethiopie Meridionale,” Revue des Deux
Mondes (1878), 889.
22 Johnston, Travels, II, 140.
23 Combes and Tamisier, Voyage, III, 27-28.
24 Johnston, Travels, II, 87.
25 Isenberg and Krapf, Journals, 294.
26 Forrest, Selections, 265; see also Correspondence, 1848-1868, 511.
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power of the Priesthood there, who considered the Reverend
Gentlemen have interfered with the religion of their forefathers.”27
Krapf, who also blames the priests for his difficulties, observes: “It
was mainly the bigoted priests and monks who tried to inspire the
King with a distrust of foreigners. The priests were angry with me
especially, because they thought that I had induced the King to
allow the admission of the English and their presents.”28
Despite their mistrust of missionaries, the rulers of this period
—
which also witnessed the modernizing work of Mohamed Ali in
nearby Egypt—showed considerable interest in attracting craftsmen
from abroad. After the visit of the British nobleman George, Vis-
count Valentia, to Ethiopia in 1805, the ruler of Gondar, Emperor
Gwalu (1801-1818), wrote in the following year to George III of
England requesting assistance. According to Valentia, Gwalu’s
wishes were “that a person should be sent to him who understood
raising water, a medical man, and a carpenter.” The difficulties of
communication were considered too great to allow the dispatch
of these craftsmen, though the British foreign secretary, George
Canning, gave orders that the emperor should be sent such presents
as would be acceptable and “at the same time serve as specimens of
our finer manufactures.”29
Subsequent rulers of Ethiopia, however, continually returned to
the question of importing foreign artisans. In 1827, Sabagardis of
Tigre sent his English servant, William Coffin, to England with a
request written on his behalf by Coffin on April 24, stating that the
chief wanted “one hundred fight horsemen for one or two years,”
as well as “a Doctor, Painter, and Carpenter, or any other Trades-
man, some paints, Saws, Carpenters Tools, and some lead to finish
the Churches I have built.”30 The British government found the
project impracticable, though Coffin had suggested returning with
his brother John and three other men—a surgeon, called Henry
Abbott, and two draftsmen, James Warwick and H. Tefeyman.31
27
J. L. Krapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours (London, 1867),
23; Secret and Political Reports; letters from Aden (1843), 137-138, India
Office.
28 Krapf, Travels, 29.
29 George, Viscount Valentia, Voyages and Travels (London, 1811), III, 267.
30 Sabagardis to George IV, April 24, 1827, FO 1/2.
31 Mount Morris to Palmerston, Nov. 19, 1829, March 10, 1831; Foreign
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But in the end the arrangements failed, and Coffin returned to
Ethiopia alone. The idea of importing craftsmen from England did
not die; it was revived a decade or so later by a subsequent ruler
of Tigre, Ras Wube. Some years later, Pearce, who was rather un-
lettered, summed up his masters ideas as follows: “it is the Ras’
greatest wish for me to mention that he would wish any Tradesman
to come and settle here with him; he will give them House, Land
and Cattle—such as Carpenters, Black or White Smith or any.”32
Shortly afterwards, Wube made an official request for craftsmen
in a letter to the British consul, Walter Plowden, which the latter
forwarded to the British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, on
March 3, 1849. The letter declared: “If you can find five or three
workmen if possible at Massowah, if not by sending to your country,
builders or masons; bring them for me: if they wish for lands or
appointments I will give them plenty; if they wish for wages I will
give them wages and take care of them.” Plowden gave this request
his full support. In his covering letter to Palmerston, he claimed
that Wube had hitherto “shown the greatest contempt for all Euro-
peans,” but that Plowden’s own efforts had succeeded in effecting
“a complete change in his ideas.” The consul, who added that Wube
had displayed a desire for “some European masons to build him a
church,” then recommended that “one man of creditable attainments
as an architect and, if possible, bridge builder, be sent as chief, with
four assistants, who should understand stone-cutting and the making
of bricks; they should be amply provided with instruments for these
purposes and for building.” The consul also suggested the advisa-
bility of sending out a carpenter with all the tools necessary for his
work. 33 A similar demand for European workmen was received
from Shoa at almost the same time. On May 21, the British repre-
sentative in Egypt, C. A. Murray, forwarded a letter of greeting to
Queen Victoria from King Haile Malakot, who ruled as King of
Shoa from 1847 to 1855. The messenger bringing the letter carried
a request that the queen should send the king “persons who can
Office (FO) memo, “The Case of the Abyssinian Agent, Mr. Coffin,” Dec. 17,
1831; Backhouse to Barker, May 7, 1822, FO 1/2.
32 Pearce to Salt, n.d, BM Add. Mss. 19,348, f. 13.
33 Plowden to Palmerston, March 3, 1849, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 29.
Plowden was appointed consul on January 3, 1848, and died in February 1860.
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make a crown, and make cannons, and paint pictures and build
palaces.”34 Such appeals for assistance were destined to frustration.
Palmerston immediately dismissed the request from Shoa as imprac-
ticable. In a letter of July 4 to the king, he wrote: “Her Majesty
commands me to explain to you that the distance between England
and your country is great, and the journey occupies much time, and
moreover, the workmen in her dominions are at present much occu-
pied.”35
Palmerston, however, at first looked upon Wube’s request with
slightly more favor, perhaps because of Plowden’s support. He in-
quired of the commissioners of works whether the project were
practicable and what would be the probable expense. The commis-
sioners replied on July 14, providing some rough estimates of cost
but adding that “the climate of Abyssinia, the expense of travelling,
conveyance, residence, and personal maintenance, are so little
known here that any statement of this Board
. . . must be consid-
ered only as a proximate estimate.” The commissioners went on to
urge that the three or five craftsmen requested by Wube appeared
“too few to afford proper aid to each other, or to enable the Chief
to form an adequate idea of the value of the services of English
workmen”; the craftsmen “should be at liberty to quit the service at
their discretion, and be satisfied that, while employed, their personal
safety and agreed for remuneration would be secured; as without
some such assurance it is doubtful whether respectable English
mechanics would be induced to undertake such a service, for which
none but men of good character in every respect can be fit.”36
The foreign secretary was apparently discouraged by this com-
munication. On July 23, a letter was dispatched to the commission-
ers on his instruction, stating that it was not necessary to take fur-
ther notice of the scheme.37 On the same day he wrote to Plowden:
Considering the difficulties and the expenses which would attend a com-
pliance with Ras Oobeay s request, it is desirable that you should divert
his thoughts from the notion of obtaining the assistance of English work-
34 Murray to Palmerston, May 21, 1849, ibid., 27-29.
35 Palmerston to King of Shoa, luly 4, 1849, ibid., 32.
36 Turner to Addlington, July 14, 1849, ibid., 34.
37 Addlington to Commissioners of Woods and Works, July 23, 1849, ibid.,
35.
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men; but, if you cannot do so, you must send me some precise and specific
information as to the purpose for which these persons would be wanted,
and as to the length of time they would be required to remain in Abys-
sinia ... It might be possible that the assistance desired by Ras Oobeay
might be obtained from India more easily than from England, and the
natives of that country would doubtless be quite competent to perform
any services which the Ras might require of them.38
(This suggestion of the possible dispatch of Indians is interesting
in view of the penetration of Indians farther south along the east
coast of Africa.)
Wube, however, was not to be diverted from his aim. On April 2,
1850, Plowden reported to the Foreign Office that the chief “ap-
peared somewhat vexed at the non-arrival of the workmen he had
applied for, and pointed out the number of Europeans, Armenians,
Greeks, etc., who had resided securely for years in his dominions,
as the best guarantee that he could give, trusting that something
might yet be done for him.” Plowden, who was personally favorable
to the project, agreed that, if the foreign secretary wished for “closer
intimacy with Abyssinia,” it would be worthwhile to procure two
or three workmen from India, where they could be obtained more
cheaply than in England, who “would probably possess sufficient
skill for Oobey’s present purposes.”39
Palmerston’s suggestion had in fact been taken up: he wrote on
April 2 to Sir John Hobhouse of the India Office, enclosing copies
of the correspondence and observing: “The expense which sending
workmen from England to Abyssinia would necessarily occasion,
seems to be a sufficient reason for declining to comply with the
specific request of the Ras; but I should be glad to have your opin-
ion as to the practicability of engaging persons in India.”40 Hob-
house replied only on September 3, forwarding a letter from the
secret department of the Bombay Military Board, which stated that
“well conducted and able men” could no doubt “be procured either
from the Department of Public Works or from the European Regi-
ments stationed in India.”41 The foreign secretary, however, seemed
determined not to countenance the plan, for on October 1, 1850,
he informed Plowden quite bluntly that “Her Majesty’s Government
38 Palmerston to Plowden, July 23, 1849, ibid., 34-35.
39 Plowden to Palmerston, April 2, 1850, ibid., 42.
40 Palmerston to Hobhouse, June 5, 1850, ibid., 51.
41 Hobhouse to Palmerston, Sept. 3, 1849, ibid., 54-55.
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think it best to let the matter drop; if the Ras should again refer to
his wishes in this respect you will say there is much difficulty in
bringing such persons from distant countries to Abyssinia.”42 Thus
in the middle of the nineteenth century, after the invention of the
steam engine and the telegraph, Lord Palmerston professed himself
unable to send out foreign craftsmen, although this had been under-
taken no less than four centuries earlier by King Alfonso of Aragon
and although, to take but one other example, the Portuguese had
landed as many as seventy craftsmen at Massawa in 1541.43 Despite
Wube’s interest in importing foreign skills, his country was obliged
to rely on such individual foreigners as might enter the country on
their own initiative in search of wealth, adventure, or romance.
2
Emperor Theodore II (1855-1869), with his determination to re-
build his country, to reorganize his army, and to commence the
production of modern weapons, was naturally interested in attract-
ing foreign craftsmen.44 (His abortive efforts to import workmen
from England and the detention of some of the foreigners at his
court are discussed in the next essay in this volume.) Well before
that time, while still a minor chief, Theodore had employed a cer-
tain Dominico, who was half Italian and half Greek, to assist him
in military matters,45 and he showed signs of wishing to use more
European skills. This was recognized by Consul Plowden, who de-
clared that Dejazmach Kassa, as the future emperor was then called,
appeared “disposed to encourage strangers.”46 Plowden’s declaration
was made on July 25, 1853, fully two years before Theodore’s
assumption of power. Three days later, Plowden reported to his
government that Kassa had shown in his reception of Europeans
that “he valued them and their arts far more highly than any other
Abyssinian chief has lately been disposed to do.”47 Foreigners, it
should be repeated, were at that time still relatively unknown in the
country. In a report of July 9, 1854, Plowden noted that the Ethio-
42 Palmerston to Plowden, Oct. 1, 1850, ibid., 55.
43 Pankhurst, Introduction, 289.
44 R. Pankhurst, “Theodore II, Empereur d’Ethiopie,” Presence Africaine,
XLVII (1963), 123-144.
45 Herbert, Abyssinia, 147.
46 Plowden to Russell, July 9, 1854, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 77.
47 Memo by Plowden, ibid., 127.
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pians had only "a faint conception that a few white men exist be-
yond the sea, on a spot of ground not worth mentioning; but they
do not believe that kings or kingdoms, fruitful soil or genial climate
are found save in Abyssinia.”48
Immediately after his coronation in 1855, Theodore revealed his
interest in attracting foreigners to his court. One of his first acts was
to appoint Ras Wube’s English assistant, John Bell, to the position
of his principal adviser. Bell was entrusted with a thousand soldiers,
whom he was supposed to give a British military training. But the
men did not take kindly to the discipline, and the scheme had to be
abandoned.49 Theodore also made friends with Plowden and af-
forded favorable treatment to a third Englishman, Captain
Speedy.50 Plowden’s secretary, Barroni, reported that, as early as
April 1855, the emperor had expressed his desire for European
engineers and instructors to come to Ethiopia.51
In the same year Theodore received an offer by Samuel Gobat,
then Protestant bishop of Jerusalem, to send him a group of young
missionary graduates of the Chrischona Institute near Basel, Swit-
zerland.52 These young missionaries were specially trained as crafts-
men. The offer was carried by the missionary Krapf, to whom the
emperor characteristically replied, “Is Bishop Gobat well? His letter
pleases me, and I wish him to send me for the present only three
artisans, a gunsmith, a builder and a letter press printer”—by this
last designation Krapf thought Theodore meant a die-sinker or a
seal engraver
—
“I will pay them well, and if they are content with
what I give them and satisfy me, I will ask Gobat for more work-
men.”53
Despite the emperor’s cautious request for only three men, a
larger group was later dispatched, composed of four missionaries
48 Plowden to Russell, July 28, 1853, ibid., 77.
49 H. Dufton, Narrative of a Journey through Abyssinia (London, 1867),
183-184; see also H. Blanc, A Narrative of Captivity in Abyssinia (London,
1868), 25; G. Massaia, I Miei Trentacinque Anni di Missione nelV alta Etiopia
(Rome, 1885-1895), X, 152.
50 Plowden to Clarendon, April 7, 1855, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 144;
Beke, British Captives, 20; G. Lejean, Voyage en Abyssinie (Paris, 1872), 10.
51 Barroni to Bruce, April 15, 1855, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 143.
52 H. A. Stem, Wanderings among the Falashas in Abyssinia (London,
1862), 225.
53 Krapf, Travels, 456.
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(Flad, Bender, Kienzlen, Mayer) and two gunsmiths who died be-
fore reaching the emperor's camp. The members of the workman's
mission, as it was called, received a salary of £ 100 to £ 120 a year
from their missionary superiors; they were treated with kindness by
the emperor, who took them along on his military campaigns.
Dufton says the missionaries busied themselves for the most part in
roadmaking, their presence resulting in “a decidedly improved con-
dition of some of the more frequented routes."54 Plowden, in an
early report on their activities, stated that Theodore would no doubt
view any public preaching by them with disfavor, but allowed them
“to ramble about and distribute Bibles as they pleased."55
The first group of missionaries was later joined by two other
graduates of the Chrischona Institute: Theophilus Waldmeier, a
carpenter, and Charles Saalmiiller, an ironworker. Three other for-
eigners, all of them laymen, soon afterwards arrived independently.
They were M. Bourgaud, a French gunsmith; Zander, the German
painter to whom I have already referred; and Moritz Hall, said to
have been a Polish deserter from the Russian army.56 Though not
themselves missionaries, they made friends with the Chrischona
group and joined in their work. Several other missionaries, including
Stern, Cornelius, and Rosenthal, arrived from England at about the
same time.57
The tiny band of missionary craftsmen were settled in June 1860
at Gafat, near the emperor’s capital of Debra Tabor, although Flad
left his companions for a time to teach among the Falashas, or
Ethiopian Jews. Waldmeier relates that he and his comrades built
twelve small houses at Gafat so that Flad, Mayer, Bender, Saal-
miiller, Kienzlen, and himself, together with their families, should
each have two houses, one for dwelling and sleeping and the other
for cooking. Each member of the party was put to work at his trade,
for which, Dufton says, they were well paid by the king.58
54 Flad, 60 Jahre, 102; Dufton, Narrative
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57 Blanc, Narrative, 39; Stern, Wanderings, passim.
58 Dufton, Narrative, 83; T. Waldmeier, Autobiography (London, 1887),
63; Lejean, Voyage, 228-229; Fusella, “Cronaca,” 105-106.
198 Richard Pankhurst
The missionaries also constructed a large workshop, one hundred
feet long, thirty feet wide, and thirty feet high, with strong walls
three feet thick. A powerful waterwheel for turning various types
of machinery was also erected. Dufton says that no less than a thou-
sand Ethiopians—mainly Galla slaves and Falashas—were em-
ployed. One of the former, a man from Kullu in southern Ethiopia,
rose to the position of head workman; he did carpentry work “with
a skill and neatness to be surpassed by few Europeans working
under the same conditions” and displayed “a corresponding vivacity
of mind in literary occupations.”59 This, it may be added, would
appear to be the first reference to foreigners’ being deliberately
engaged in the training of Ethiopian craftsmen. Blanc, a British
physician who visited the country some years later, reported that
the missionaries worked very hard for the emperor; in addition to
working on the roads, they made him carriages, pickaxes, and other
articles. Later, subordinating their missionary principles to the
emperor’s requirements, they agreed to manufacture brandy and,
much more important, cannon, mortars, gunpowder, and shells. 60
The missionaries’ willingness to undertake the production of fire-
arms was the most remarkable aspect of the story. It was apparently
in 1861 that the question first arose. Dufton, whose account of the
matter is perhaps the best, says:
Things went smoothly for some time, until one day orders came from His
Majesty to the effect that he wished them to commence the construction of
mortars and bombshells. The order came upon them like the bursting of a
bomb itself, for none of them had ever had an idea that they would have
been required to undertake work of that description. They of course de-
murred, informing the king that, not having learnt the founding of cannon,
they were totally unprepared to enter an engagement of that description,
and that if he really desired to have these war implements in his country,
manufacturers in Germany, England or France would supply him with a
much better article than they could possibly produce.
But this argument carried little weight with the king. He was not in
a position to import weapons from abroad because the Turks on the
coast had imposed a blockade against him.
The king [Dufton continues] was dissatisfied with their reply: he wished
to have these things made in his own country, and to be quite inde-
59 Dufton, Narrative, 164-166; Waldmeier, Autobiography, 73.
60 Blanc, Narrative, 37-38.
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pendent of other nations. They still, nevertheless, objected, more on
grounds of inability than unwillingness; but their refusal only vexed the
king the more, and he now seized all their servants and put them in chains,
there to remain until their masters gave consent to carry out his will.
Since the emperor would not relent in his demands, the craftsmen
had no option but to obey.
In their perplexity [writes Dufton], they could not do otherwise than
promise to try. Only one of them, Herr Moritz [Hall], could be said to
have the slightest acquaintance with the work at all, and his knowledge
only extended to the formation of the mould; the clay to be used in the
construction of the fire-bricks, the formation of the furnace, the propor-
tion of the metals, and the making of the fuse being equally unknown to
him as to the rest. However, by putting their heads together, and seeking
information from books, they eventually managed to turn out something.
What? A mass of vitreous matter formed by the melting of the fine sand of
the bricks; the metal refused to flow. Their only recourse was to try
again; and away they went over the country to seek better fire-brick clay,
and now another venture was made. The result was a flow of metal that
came pouring out in a molten stream now, and all hearts are hopeful that
at last their object is gained; but alas! the metal had stopped, and the
mould was only half full. They tried again. To the inexpressible joy of
these persevering men, and the intense delight of the king himself, their
wishes are accomplished, and Debra Tabor for the first time saw the balls
souring up into the air and bursting with a loud crash, which made the
hills resound with a hundred echoes . . . The success was the cause of
great favour being conferred by the grateful king on his “children,” as
he called them. Shirts of honour, horses and mules with gold and silver
trappings, and 1,000 dollars apiece were the reward of their persevering
efforts. 61
Blanc confirms that Theodore “behaved very liberally” toward
his European armorers. In addition to grain, butter, honey, and
other provisions, the emperor gave them large sums of money and
honored them by allowing them all the privileges of a Ras. 62 Be-
sides their craftwork, the missionaries did a certain amount of teach-
ing. Waldmeier and Saalmiiller opened a boarding school for poor
children: the younger ones were taught reading and writing; the
older, useful handicrafts and mechanical work. Waldmeier later
61 Dufton, Narrative, 84-86; see also R. Pankhurst, “Fire-Arms in Ethiopian
History,” Ethiopia Observer (162), VI, 140-146.
62 Blanc, Narrative, 37.
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recalled that the school “brought us into great favour with the king
and people.”63
The Gafat missionaries proved so useful to Theodore that he was
determined that they should not leave. Blanc states that the em-
peror, “knowing that he would have a greater hold upon them, and
that they would have more difficulty in leaving the country . . .
ordered them to marry: they all consented.”64 Some of them mar-
ried the half Ethiopian daughters of John Bell, and Bender and
Kienzlen married the half Ethiopian daughters of Moritz Hall. Men
with Ethiopian wives included Mayer, Zander, Plowden, and David
Pietro, an Italian servant of the British consul, Duncan Cameron,
who succeeded Plowden in 1861. 65
In addition to the Chrischona group and the friends who had
joined them, at this time there were a number of other foreigners
in the country. The emperor was always willing to give them work,
especially in military matters, which he, in common with his prede-
cessors and successors, considered of paramount importance. Mark-
ham, who visited the country some years later, states that Theodore
employed in his army a certain Aba Merzam who is described as a
“Bengal Jew,”
—
probably an Armenian—and his son, Ingida Warqe,
who was one of the principal gunmen of the day. Kirkham, an
Englishman who later served Theodore’s successor, states that “two
or three” Frenchmen were also employed as army drillmasters.66
Armenians and Greeks were still in Ethiopia, though both com-
munities, as we have seen, had intermarried extensively with the
local population and were at least partially assimilated. Girard,
writing of Adowa in 1868-69, and perhaps exaggerating, stated: “all
the workers I saw . . . were of European origin, but not one had
the slightest idea of his original language.”67 Most Armenians and
Greeks, as well as their descendants, were at Adowa and other
places only for a time under Theodore’s control; so they find little
63 Waldmeier, Autobiography, 63, 66.
64 Blanc, Narrative, 37; Heuglin, Reise, 305.
65 Ibid., 339; Fusella, “Cronaca,” 86-87, 116; Markham, Abyssinian Expedi-
tion, 340-341; Shepherd, Campaign in Abyssinia, 251-252; Hozier, British Ex-
pedition, 219-220.
66 Markham, Abyssinian Expedition, 347, 371; W. Mac E. Dye, Moslem
Egypt and Christian Abyssinia (London, 1880), 472; Heuglin, Reise, 384.
67 Girard, Souvenirs, 191; Heuglin, Reise, 144.
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place in the story of his reign, though it is recorded that an Arme-
nian called Serkis Ciackijian was at one point imprisoned by royal
command. 68 There are also references in this period to foreign mer-
chants of various nationalities who occasionally entered the country
for purposes of trade. They include a number of Greeks, one of
whom, called Marcopoulo, is known to have traveled between
Massawa and Metemma; an Italian called Angelo, who exported
coffee and beeswax via Galabat; and two Levantine Christians from
Nazareth, Jerjis and Elias. Traders from Arabia and Egypt were
also active.69
3
Theodore's death on April 13, 1868—a direct result of his dispute
with the British government over the question of obtaining artisans
from England70—was followed by a period of anarchy in which
foreigners seem to have played a restricted role. Apart from the
Armenians and Greeks, who were more or less permanent settlers,
there were few other immigrants. When the British expedition
against Theodore was leaving in 1868, Kassa, the ruler of Tigre,
requested the British commander, Napier, to lend him two or three
of its members to teach his soldiers the use of the weapons which
the British had presented him in return for his friendship. British
accounts quoted him as stating that “he did not wish to see strangers
in his country, but that if strangers came he preferred that they
should be Christians.” Napier nevertheless refused the request, say-
ing “that the soldiers belonged to the Queen of England and could
not be left behind without her special orders”; but he did hold out
the offer that the British authorities in Aden would train anyone
whom Kassa sent there. 71 Though disappointed, Kassa succeeded
in obtaining the services of an Englishman,
J.
D. Kirkham, who had
participated in Napiers expedition and was destined, as we shall
68 Burette, Visit
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see, to contribute significantly to Kassa’s emergence as the next
emperor of Ethiopia.
Kassa, well aware of the advantages of a British connection, also
wrote to Napier privately, asking for rockets and a man to instruct
his soldiers in using them. The British government turned down the
request, since it had no wish to become further involved in Ethio-
pian affairs. 72 Undeterred by this rebuff, Kassa despatched emissa-
ries to England in 1870, with a letter in which he declared, “I should
like that somebody would come to me, who might teach any arts or
wisdom.” The British representative in Egypt, Edward Stanton,
who interviewed the envoys in that country, stated that “they are
very anxious to induce English Engineers and Artizans to go to
Abyssinia, adding that they would be well received and that they
are also desirous of obtaining the services of people clever at work-
ing mines, as Abyssinia produces gold, silver, tin, lead and coal, but
owing to their ignorance of the proper method of working the mines
they get but little for them.” The British government, remembering
the difficulties with Theodore, was unwilling to countenance the
employment of British workmen in Ethiopia: Kassa’s letter was not
answered for a year, and his request for craftsmen was ignored. 73
Kassa was also anxious for contact with the French, and declared
that the advent of French traders might be beneficial, since the
Banyan (Indian) merchants at Massawa had long robbed his
country. 74 After becoming Emperor Yohannes IV in 1871, he wrote
a letter to M. de Sarzec, the French consul at Massawa, on Decem-
ber 15, declaring his willingness to tolerate foreigners:
The Europeans in my country, merchants and workers, drink tej [honey
wine] and alcohol and get drunk; they fire off their guns, and walk about
my town insulting me and my people. Up to now I have not wished to
punish them because I wish to remain in good relations with all the powers
of Europe. From this day I will allow all European traders to cross my
country without paying taxes. I instruct the officers charged with the
collection of taxes not to levy any tax on them. When the merchants have
come bringing me their merchandise I have paid them properly and have
accorded them the right to remain freely in my country. A good work-
man who has worked well according to my wishes, I have not only paid,
72 Kassa to Napier, Aug. 10, 1869; Napier to Duff, Oct. 29, 1869, FO 1/28.
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but have given him signs of distinction so that he should be happy. And,
my friend, if in the future, workers wish to come to my country, ascertain
if they are good and honest; and if you find them such address me a
letter signed by you, sealed with your seal, and then I will receive them
well. In the contrary case I will not receive them.75
Yohannes was less interested in foreign contacts than his immedi-
ate predecessor had been. Holding strongly to the faith of his
fathers, the new emperor regarded European missionaries with par-
ticularly deep misgivings. 76 Upon the arrival of a party of Swedish
missionaries, according to the Italian explorer Bianchi, the emperor
asked: “Are there Jews in your country?” Receiving an affirmative
answer, he asked, “And through what country did you pass to reach
mine?” “We went through Egyptian territory,” they responded.
“Then why,” he exclaimed, “did you not stay in your own country
or in Egypt to baptise the people there; we have no need of this
here.”77
Yohannes reverted to much the same argument in his talks with
the English traveler Winstanley, to whom he declared that the
British, with all their interests in Egypt, would be better occupied
in promoting Christianity in that Moslem country than in Ethiopia,
which had already been converted a millennium earlier: “For-
eigners,” the emperor declared, “I cannot say I love, or trust, but I
owe much to the English, and your Queen is, I know, a sincere
Christian. Why do foreign nations come here Christianizing Chris-
tians? They make trouble in my country, and are not wanted. Are
there no men who are pagans to be converted? In the history of my
nation, the preachers of foreign religions have filled a bloody and
disastrous page. We are Christians like yourselves, with different
forms; you represent a Mussulman government, and I find western
nations profess a great interest in Egypt. Why do not your Euro-
pean missionaries convert these, your friends, to Christianity?”78
75 De Coursac, Regne de Yohannes
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76 Waldmeier, Autobiography, 138; Rohlfs, Meine Mission, 225; P. Vigoni,
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The emperor was particularly opposed to Roman Catholic Mis-
sionaries. According to Wylde, he expelled all of them from this
country, except one priest whom he mischievously left behind as an
example of his “immoral character, he having so many illegitimate
children.”79 Wylde, a former British vice-consul, wrote that
Yoliannes was more favorably inclined toward the Swedish Protes-
tant missionaries, but “was obliged to forbid them from his country,
as if he made an exception in their favour other nations would have
asked for the same rights.”80 Determined entirely to remove what he
considered a menace to all Ethiopia, he succeeded in getting the
missionaries once again expelled also from Shoa, and most of them
left Menilek’s capital of Ankober on February 10, 1886. 81 Wylde
was on the whole sympathetic to the emperor’s policy and observes
that the missionary in Ethiopia tended to be not a martyr but a
“nuisance,” and an “intolerant, unmitigated bore.” Many of the
missionaries, he adds, had “mixed themselves up with politics and
matters that did not concern them,” and had no one to thank for
their expulsion but themselves.82
Despite the emperor’s opposition, missionaries were able to ex-
pand their activities beyond the borders of the empire, particularly
at Monkullo on the mainland near Massawa and at Keren on the
frontiers of the Sudan. In both places the missionaries did a certain
amount of educational work and made a significant contribution to
the training of local craftsmen. At Monkullo, the Swedish evan-
gelical mission ran what Wylde calls a first-class establishment, with
school buildings, carpenters’ shops, and a smithy. With no consul
to bother them, they had “set about their affairs in a quiet manner”
and were always ready to help a person to improve himself. They
gave a “very useful education,” which included a knowledge of such
manual work as that of masonry and carpentry.83 Most of the stu-
dents were Christians who had come from the emperor’s domains.
But Wylde feared that, since most Ethiopians were strongly at-
tached to their religion, it was “only the most worthless ones”
—
79 A. B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London, 1901), 164.
so Wylde, ’83 to ’87, II, 1.
81 Waldmeier, Autobiography, 140-141.
82 Wylde, ’83 to ’87, I, 91, II, 3-5.
83 Ibid., I, 91, II, 1.
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people who were “willing to change their faith as they would their
clothes”—who were attracted. Any form of Christianity, supported
by money, could nevertheless get “any quantity of lambs to feed
and clothe.” For his own part, he adds, he would never have a male
servant who had been near a mission, if he could help it. Female
servants were different: they were usually taught to sew, wash, and
cook, and were generally clean in their habits.84
The other important mission station was at Keren, where the
Lazarists were active in the Moslem area. Wylde, who was not
generally an unjust critic, states that they were “always a nuisance
to the King” and adds: “Through the French mission, France has
always her fingers in the pie, and claims to be interested in the
country, and doubtless always regrets that in 1870-71 [during the
Franco-Prussian War] she was too busy to interfere in Abyssinian
politics, as she would have certainly accepted the Hamasen, with
its nearly European climate and its natural productiveness.”85 The
Keren missionaries also had an educational role. They ran a printing
press and taught the boys in their care printing and sewing, the
latter also a subject of instruction for the girl students. But many
difficulties were encountered: “The most distressing part of the
mission,” observed a British observer, F. L. James, “was, as the
Fathers and Sisters confessed to us, the difficulty of finding situa-
tions for their proteges after they had reared and educated them.
Outcast from their own people and unable to find employment
under the Mussulman authorities [under Egyptian rule] they are
thrown on their own resources, which proves more fatal to the
women than the men.”86
The emperor’s distrust of foreigners prevented him from making
84 Wylde, Modern Abyssinia
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as great a use of them as Theodore had, although this would have
been easier for Yohannes. The empire, which was now centered on
Tigre, was nearer to the coast than Theodore’s realm, which had
been farther to the west and therefore much more land-locked. So
it was not without significance that when a group of Italians and
other foreigners, led by a Greek, arrived in 1876, Yohannes declared
he had no use for them, although they included a number of crafts-
men. Only one of them, an Italian called Giacomo Naretti, remained
in the country; still he was used, as we shall see, to good advantage.
Despite his dislike and fear of foreigners, the emperor continued
the tradition of previous rulers and employed them as specialists in
various essential fields, particularly in military matters. During the
first part of his reign, Yohannes obtained the services of a British
sergeant, Kirkham, who had taken part in the Magdala campaign.
Considered more or less the emperor’s chief adviser on military
affairs, he played an important part in the defeat of Gobaze, the
ruler of Amhara, in 1871, and was rewarded with a fertile estate at
Ghinda on the Massawa road. Kirkham was subsequently entrusted
with the task of training a select corps of young Ethiopian soldiers.
The British traveler De Cosson, who visited the country at this time,
recalls that he was "not a little astonished” to hear the commands
“present arms,” “shoulder arms,” “right turn,” “left turn,” and “quick
march,” clearly pronounced by an Ethiopian lieutenant in English.
The soldier and his companions had been trained by Kirkham. The
project, however, was soon abandoned, like Theodore’s before it,
because the cadets rejected the discipline to which they were sub-
jected. De Cosson was told by Kirkham himself that he had been
given two thousand men to train, “but could never keep them
steadily at drill for any length of time, as they said they would
rather be put to death at once than work so hard.”87
Other foreigners at one period or another employed in the em-
87 E. A. de Cosson, The Cradle of the Blue Nile (London, 1877), I, 148-149,
302, II, 63-64; Earl of Mayo, Sport in Abyssinia (London, 1876), 37-38, 45,
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,
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Khedive Ismail (Cairo, 1936-1941), III, pt. 2, 326, pt. 3b, 741; R. Perini, Di
qua dal Mareb (Florence, 1905), 186; Allen to Salisbury, Sept. 17, 1879,
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peror’s army included a Swiss adventurer called Louis88 and at least
three Greeks, Basha Salomides, Dejazmach Nicholas, and a certain
Ghiorghis. The latter, who left his native land at an early age, had
resided for some time near Kassala before making his way to the
emperor’s court. He later served Ras Walda of Semien and then
Negus Takla Haymanot of Gojam, who awarded him the Ethiopian
military title of Balambaras. 89 At least two half-castes, the sons
respectively of the German naturalist Schimper and the English
traveler Parkyns, also served in the emperor’s forces. Young
Schimper, who was taken to England after the battle of Magdala,
had studied in Germany, fought against France in the war of 1870,
and later returned to Adowa where he became an officer. According
to Wylde, he spoke German, Italian, and Amharic very well and
had a fair knowledge of English and Arabic.90 The son of Mansfield
Parkyns was known as Basha John: on being released from Mag-
dala, where he had served as an artisan, he entered the bodyguard
of Emperor Yohannes; but evidently he was a man of many skills,
for he was put in charge of the customs at Adowa, Hausen, and
Adigrat and also worked as a silversmith.91 Young Schimper subse-
quently married the daughter of Basha John. Both men served the
Ethiopian cause until the advent of the Italians in Eritrea, when
they became Italian agents and informers.92 The half-caste Zander
also obtained work with the Italians.93 Another half-caste in the
service of Yohannes is variously referred to as Takla Mikael, Haile
Mikael, and Walda Mikael; he supervised the customs at Ferkabar
between Wagara and Begemder and was, according to Rohlfs, the
88 De Cosson, Cradle, II, 11.
89 Bianchi, Terra dei Galla, 528; A. Zervos, VEmpire d’Ethiopie (Alexan-
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son of a “famous French scholar,” possibly Antoine d’Abbadie, who
was still alive in 1881.94
Foreigners were also prominent in the repair and purchase of
guns. They included a Frenchman, Jean Baraglion, a Hungarian
called Andre, two Greeks one of whom is referred to as Andrike,
and the Italian Naretti. Baraglion, a former communard from
Provence, was one of the few people in Adowa who understood the
new Remington rifles that began to pour into the country in the
1870s;95 he did a very profitable trade as a gunsmith and, according
to Wylde, was so successful that he forced all his rivals out of the
trade, enjoying a monopolistic position throughout the northern
provinces.96 He had an Ethiopian wife and was obliged to take
kosso, the local cure for tapeworm, because of his love of raw meat.
His principal trouble was that the emperor considered him too
useful to be allowed out of the country; like so many of the earlier
foreigners in Ethiopia, Baraglion was prevented from leaving. He
also did a certain amount of gunsmith work,97 while Andrike, who
seems to have been a merchant, visited Europe on the emperor’s
behalf to purchase arms and other supplies.98 Harrison Smith also
mentions a Greek armorer who had come to Adowa from Shoa."
Naretti was primarily a builder and carpenter, and in employing
him as such the emperor was following the tradition of such earlier
rulers as Ras Wube and Sahle Sellassie, both of whom used for-
eigners in the construction of churches and palaces. Naretti under-
took a number of important tasks for the emperor, including the
construction of the palace at Makale. The English diplomat Portal,
who inspected it shortly afterward, says that the Italian “personally
superintended the laying of every stone” and “with his own hands
cut out and fitted nearly all the joints of the wood work.” He also
built palaces at Aksum and Samara, near Debra Tabor, and carried
94 Girard, Souvenirs
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out the woodwork for a number of churches, including the church
doors at Adowa. Long resident in the country, he married the half
Ethiopian daughter of Theodore’s German craftsman Zander. After
the arrival of the Italians in Eritrea in 1885, Naretti found his posi-
tion at the court of Yohannes no longer tenable. 100
Another foreigner, whom the emperor utilized in a very different
capacity, was a Greek physician, Dr. Parisis, who personally treated
the monarch and thereby set the tradition for later rulers of
Ethiopia (who made a point of encouraging European medicine). 101
The Hungarian armorer Andre also made artificial arms and legs
for bandits whose limbs the Emperor had amputated as a punish-
ment; Andre charged ten Maria Theresa dollars per limb and was
also given gifts of grain, honey, and meat; it is said that when the
king first saw the artificial limbs, he could not believe his eyes.102
Other craftsmen of lesser importance who served Yohannes in-
cluded Naretti’s younger brother, who died in 1881,103 and a French
or Swiss artisan called Dubois, who built the church of Medhane
Alem at Sokota. 104
4
In addition to the foreigners in the emperor’s service, there were,
as in the past, a certain number of foreign traders and craftsmen as
well as a small but growing number of entrepreneurs. These groups
of foreigners were largely drawn from the Greek and Armenian
communities.
The Greeks had been in Ethiopia throughout the nineteenth
100 Smith to Baring, May 20, 1886, FO 403/87; De Cosson, Cradle, I, 114,
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century and emerged as a community of traders, entrepreneurs, and
craftsmen. A handful of Greek traders were prominent at Adowa
and Asmara, as well as in the import-export activity at the port of
Massawa and across the western frontier at Keren and Kassala. One
of the most prominent among them at the time of the Italian oc-
cupation of Asmara was Marcopoulo, who first began to trade in the
area in the 1860s. 105 A certain amount of Greek enterprise can also
be found in other fields. In the 1870s, F. L. James mentions several
Greeks growing tobacco in the Keren area, while to the east at
Ghinda, also under Egyptian rule, the earl of Mayo wrote of a Greek
called Aristides who was cutting olive trees for export to Egypt. 106
As the principal European community in Ethiopia, the Greeks con-
stituted something of a link between the country and the outside
world. Thus Harrison Smith observed in 1866: “At present, the King
and his subjects derive all their knowledge of the political doings
of Europe from the traders.” He added that the Greeks in question
were “without exception of a bad class.”107
The Armenian community, which seems to have been largely
based on new immigration in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, resembled the Greek in many ways, but tended to concentrate
somewhat more on handicrafts and a little less on trade. This dif-
ference between the communities was to become more marked in
the Menilek period. The leading Armenians in Adowa included two
goldsmiths, Garabet Warqe and Dickran Ebeyan, both of whom
had been born in Constantinople, and a trader Boghos Marcarian,
who came from Sivas in Asia Minor. Garabet Warqe married an
Ethiopian wife and educated two of his sons, Gabre and Mercha, at
Bombay; they were later employed by the emperor as inter-
preters. 108 Ebeyan (1845-1926) arrived at Massawa in 1881 and
worked as a jeweler for the emperor, but only remained about a year
in Tigre before traveling south to Ankober in Shoa. He subsequently
105 Sapelli, Memorie, 38.
106 Smith, Through Abyssinia
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made crowns for Emperor Menilek and his consort, Taitu, and also
carried out certain commissions for King Takla Haymanot of
Gojam. 109 Marcarian (1830-1922), who came to Ethiopia in 1867,
lived in Adowa for five years and then requested the emperor’s
permission to leave for Gojam. Yohannes refused and advised him
to go to Shoa; the Armenian was very well received there by
Menilek, who sent him on a mission to Egypt and gave him an
extensive property at Liban near Mount Zuquala, not far from
Addis Ababa. 110
Foreigners of other nationalities were also found as traders, entre-
preneurs, and craftsmen. Among the traders mention may be made
of a Syrian merchant called Elias, who traded between Gojam and
Massawa. 111 In the entrepreneurial field several Frenchmen were
active on the periphery of the empire. One, who had an Ethiopian
wife, ran a sawmill for the governor of Massawa at Subaguma, in-
land from the port; another tried to make a substitute for rubber
out of the qulqual tree or Candelabra euphorbia that grew east of
Keren; a third, Constant Demange, grew tobacco at Keren; a
fourth, who operated in partnership with a Maltese, set up an un-
profitable business at Kelamet on the Massawa-Keren road for the
manufacture of fiber from wild aloes. 112 In handicrafts, the gold-
and silversmiths of Gondar, according to Rohlfs, were mainly
Greeks or Moslems converted to Christianity, while one of the
silversmiths of Adowa was the half-caste Englishman, Basha
John. 113
5
The examination of Ethiopian economic life in the period covered
here indicates that foreigners played a significant and distinctive
role, as in the past, and that most Ethiopian rulers were anxious to
attract them to the country. Gibbon was exaggerating in his famous
phrase: “Encompassed by the enemies of their religion, the Aethi-
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opians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world by whom
they were forgotten.” The prevalence of foreigners, and the strong
interest in attracting them, may be attributed partly to the low
esteem in which commerce and manual work were regarded by the
majority of the local population, 114 and partly to the country's isola-
tion and technical backwardness; both factors, of course, rendered
it difficult for Ethiopians to acquaint themselves with modern tech-
niques.
Since the majority of the population was reluctant to engage in
such essential occupations as trade and handicrafts, an economic
vacuum was created that was filled by foreigners and by minority
groups. The extent to which each predominated varied from oc-
cupation to occupation. The vacuum in the field of trade drew many
foreigners to the country, especially Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians,
though they met with a certain amount of competition from the
local population, particularly among the Moslems, who tended also
to be a trading class. 115 The foreigners, who had better contacts
outside the country, were dominant in large-scale business, while
the local Moslems handled the greater part of the retail trade. The
vacuum in handicrafts produced a more complex situation. The
oldest and basic types of work, such as those of the weaver and the
blacksmith, were generally carried out by local minority groups,
mainly by the Falashas and Moslems, but the newer occupations
provided an area in which foreigners made a significant contribu-
tion. Greeks and Armenians thus acted as silversmiths and gold-
smiths, while the occasional Greek, German, or Italian was found
useful in the construction of palaces and churches.
The advent of modern techniques and inventions, above all in the
area of firearms but to a lesser extent in medicine, produced a
demand for new skills, which no section of the local population
possessed. Since the society displayed a marked inability to inno-
114 R. Pankhurst, “Status, Division of Labour and Employment in Nine-
teenth and Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia,” University College of Addis
Ababa Ethnological Bulletin, II, no. 7 (1961), 7-57.
115 R. Pankhurst, “The Trade of Northern Ethiopia in the Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries,” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, II, no. 1 (1964),
64-120.
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vate,116 the rulers of the country were faced with the alternatives
of relying on foreigners or of stagnating in a world of increasing
technological progress. The ruler’s choice depended largely on his
personality and the circumstances of his reign, some monarchs
paying greater attention than others to the utilization and import
of foreigners.
The foreigners came mostly from technically advanced countries,
Germany, France, England and Italy, though often Greeks, Ar-
menians, and Egyptians also possessed sufficient skill to do useful
work. In the case of firearms, the alternatives facing the rulers were
starker than in any other sector: no less than innovation or threat-
ened annihilation. Thus almost all the emperors and princes of
Ethiopia were at one in their desire to obtain makers and repairers of
guns, as well as men who would import military equipment or train
soldiers in its use.
Although there were naturally variations depending on individual
circumstances, the foreigners who arrived in Ethiopia, whether they
came on their own initiative or at the sovereign’s request, tended to
be treated with courtesy. They were regarded, like most of the
minority groups and even like the slaves, as persons with specific
occupations in which ordinary Ethiopians did not engage, but which
were nonetheless essential. On the other hand, foreigners, provided
they were Christians, were allowed to take wives from among
the local Christian population, even from daughters of good families,
which would have been impossible for slaves or native craftsmen,
who were despised as an inferior class.
The foreigners were, on the whole, treated aloofly by the Ethi-
opians, who considered them servants or technicians. Ethiopians
gave orders, and the foreigner was to execute them. Only in rare
cases would a foreigner rise to a position of trust, and still more
rarely to one of influence. Yet foreigners were readily accorded a
position of economic privilege. They were frequently prevented
from leaving the country, but this was considered a manifestation of
the royal prerogative—a sign of their necessity rather than an un-
friendly action against them. Even when detained against their will,
116 R. Pankhurst, “Misoneism and Innovation in Ethiopian History,” Ethiopia
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they were usually well rewarded for their services and were often
given large estates with many tenants to serve them.
It may be concluded that the traditional Ethiopian attitude to
foreigners, that they could execute but not dictate policy, rendered
it easy for the rulers of the country to use them rather than to be
used by them. On the other hand, the idea that foreigners were a
class apart, with specific occupations largely outside the experience
of the local people, had serious consequences—it meant that until
the advent of Theodore there was little attempt to get them to
impart their knowledge to the native population. The skill of the
individual foreigner, then, often died with him and was in any case
not diffused among the inhabitants at large. Later Ethiopian eco-
nomic development led to a greater employment of foreigners. It
was, however, based on established precedents of how to employ
them, as well as on the more dynamic policy of using them to train
Ethiopians, an idea that Theodore, the modernizing genius of mid-
nineteenth-century Ethiopia, had done much to pioneer.
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The importing of craftsmen from England was one of the life
ambitions of Ethiopia’s Emperor Theodore (1855-1868); this played
a central role in the dispute with the British government, which
culminated in the expedition to Magdala of 1867-68. Theodore was
described by Clements Markham, the historian of that expedition,
as the most remarkable man of nineteenth-century Africa. 1 Deter-
mined to revive the former greatness of Ethiopia, he considered the
utilization of foreign skills essential to that end.2 In the early 1860s,
he returned to Ras Wube’s idea of procuring craftsmen through the
good offices of the British government. The story of Theodore’s
frustrated attempts to obtain these workmen constitutes an im-
portant chapter in the history of nineteenth-century Ethiopia’s rela-
tions with the outside world.
1
The first British consul in Ethiopia, Walter Plowden, died in 1860
and was succeeded by Duncan Cameron, who wished to persuade
the emperor to agree to the establishment in Ethiopia not only of a
British consulate, but of one with the right to try all cases involving
British subjects. This demand for extraterritorial rights had been
rejected when Plowden presented it in 1855,3 but Cameron repeated
it on October 22, 1862, in a letter to the emperor in which he de-
clared that it would be impossible for British artisans to live in
Ethiopia “unless there was an officer of some kind, either Envoy or
Consul, to look after them.”4
Though anxious to persuade the emperor of the impossibility of
1 C. R. Markham, A History of the Abyssinian Expedition (London, 1869),
354; see also R. Pankhurst, “Theodore II, Empereur d’Ethiopie,” Presence
Africaine, XLVII (1963), 123-144.
2 Pankhurst, ibid.
3 Plowden to Clarendon, fune 25, 1855, Correspondence Respecting Abys-
sinia, 1848-1868 presented to the House of Commons, in pursuance of their
Addresses of the 2nd and 5th December 1867 (London, 1868), 152.
4 Cameron to Theodore, Oct. 22, 1862, ibid., 222.
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obtaining craftsmen without first accepting a consulate, Cameron
did not in fact wish to make the latter a sine qua non of sending the
artisans, for he was strongly in favor of the project, believing that
the presence of British workmen would strengthen British influence
in the country. On November 2, he wrote to the British political
resident in Aden that there “need be no fear of bad treatment” for
British subjects in Ethiopia, since the lay missionaries already in
the country were “very liberally dealt with.” Urging the need for
permanent English influence in Ethiopia, he asked the resident to
suggest to the British authorities in India that an envoy be sent with
suitable presents and several doctors, “plentifully supplied with
surgical instruments and medicines.” “His Majesty,” Cameron added,
“also wants an engineer to make roads for him. Such a gentleman
might likewise be sent.” Turning to the potential value of the crafts-
men from Britain, he continued: “such persons would keep up our
knowledge of what was passing, and certainly exercise an important
influence on the opinions as well as the conduct of the king, espe-
cially if they did not aim at this as their principal object. Besides
which, we would have placed him under an immediate and serious
obligation.” Cameron then recommended that craftsmen be sent out
from Britain before they could be supplied by any other power and
that the men selected should be persons “of great tact and patience”
and “entirely conciliatory and unpretending: as much, in short, like
lay-missionaries as possible.”5
Cameron’s proposal, like that of Plowden before it, failed to in-
terest his superiors in London, who preferred to remain on good
relations with the Ottoman Empire rather than to alienate it by
befriending Ethiopia. The project of dispatching British artisans
to Theodore was therefore ignored. The emperor, who was acutely
proud of his rights as a sovereign and not a man to be trifled with,
was naturally offended. But even new vistas of humiliation were
soon to appear before him. A letter he wrote to Queen Victoria in
November, suggesting the dispatch of an embassy, was also un-
answered. Though this may have been no more than an administra-
tive oversight, it reflected the British Foreign Office’s lack of in-
terest in the matter. To the emperor, however, this neglect appeared
5 Cameron to Political Resident, Aden, Nov. 2, 1862, ibid., 223-224.
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to be an expression of British contempt. His anger at the dis-
courtesy was intensified in the spring of 1863 when Cameron visited
the western frontier province of Bogos, which was then under
threat of Egyptian attack. Far from championing the Christian
population of the area, as Plowden had done, Cameron visited the
Turkish pashas at Kassala and Metemma, with whom he exchanged
expressions of friendship, thus giving the impression that he was
intriguing with the enemy, and that Britain in fact condoned, if it
did not actually favor, Egyptian aggression. Furthermore, some
months later the emperor received news from the Ethiopian monks
in Jerusalem that they had been deprived of their deeply cherished
convent in the Holy Land, and that the local British consul, Noel
Moore, had abandoned his predecessor’s policy of protecting them
from the Turks.
To understand the significance of these events, it must be realized
that Jerusalem meant no less to Theodore and other Ethiopians of
his time than it had to the Western Crusaders of old. The with-
drawal of British protection from Ethiopians residing there seemed
particularly ominous and, correctly or not, appears to have been
interpreted by Theodore as implying that the British recognized
the Turkish claim that all Ethiopians were subjects of the Ottoman
Empire. Theodore, for his part, regarded the age-old conflict be-
tween Christian Ethiopia and its Moslem neighbors as more or less
inevitable; he found it almost inconceivable that the British as
Christians should not be his allies, all the more so in view of Plow-
den’s earlier expressions of friendship. Perhaps because of his anger
at the British for failing to implement their supposed policy of
friendship, he took offense at the conduct of two foreign mission-
aries, H. A. Stern and H. E. Rosenthal, whom he held partly respon-
sible for defaming him in European eyes: Stern had written a book,
Wanderings among the Falashas in Abyssinia
,
in which he declared
that Theodore’s mother had once sold kosso
,
the medicine tradi-
tionally used in treatment of tapeworm, while Rosenthal was re-
ported to have spoken badly of the emperor, declaring that the
country would have been better off under the rule of the Turks. 6
6 H. A. Stem, The Captive Missionary (London, 1868), 35, 67-68; C. T.
Beke, The British Captives in Abyssinia (London, 1867), 118-119.
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Briefly, the result of the emperor’s mounting anger was that he
imprisoned the British consul and the two offending missionaries.
A British envoy, Honnuzd Rassam, a former assistant to the political
resident in Aden, who was sent to attempt their liberation, was also
detained. 7 These acts, it should be emphasized, were less remarkable
in the Ethiopian context than they might seem to European eyes.
Ethiopian noblemen, let alone foreigners, were traditionally unable
to leave the court without the sovereign’s permission, and such
permission was by no means always granted. 8 It was, moreover,
a well-established fact that Europeans in Ethiopia during the Mid-
dle Ages had frequently been prevented from returning home.9 The
detention of Europeans in Africa was nonetheless considered in
Europe as a most remarkable event and led to grave concern in
England. 10
It was in these circumstances that the question of obtaining
craftsmen from England was again raised by Theodore. Waldmeier
quotes the emperor as declaring on April 16, 1866, that he needed
craftsmen from Queen Victoria “to open my eyes and guide me from
darkness to light,” because, he added, the Ethiopians were “uncul-
tured, untaught and in all things stupid, wild, blind and like
donkeys.”11 Almost at the same time, Theodore sent Rassam a mes-
sage in which he said: “My desire is that you should send to Her
Majesty the Queen and obtain for me a man who can make cannons
and muskets, and one who can smelt iron, and an instructor of
artillery. I want these people to come here with their implements
and everything necessary for their work, and then they shall teach
us and return. By the power of God, forward this our request to
7 H. Rassam, Narrative of the British Mission to Theodore (London, 1869),
II, 82-121.
8 R. Pankhurst, “Status, Division of Labour and Employment in Nineteenth
and Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia,” University College of Addis Ababa
Ethnological Society Bulletin, II, nos. 1, 7 (1961).
9 A. H. M. Jones and E. Monroe, A History of Abyssinia (London, 1935),
62; R. Pankhurst, Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia (London,
1961), 290.
10 See, e.g., H. M. Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala (London, 1874), 283;
Beke, British Captives, 1-3.
11 T. Waldmeier, Erlebnisse in Abessinien (Basel, 1869), 54.
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England.”12 This emphatic desire to use foreigners in teaching the
local people was, it should be noted, something quite new in
Ethiopian history.
Rassam, who had been placed in detention and thus had good
reason to be diligent in explaining the emperor’s wishes, reported
to the British foreign secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, on April 18,
1866, that Theodore had “for some years a desire to procure some
scientific men from England.” On the previous day he had spoken
to Rassam “about obtaining for him two or three men who could
teach his people to make cannons, muskets and shot, and how to
melt iron; also an instructor of artillery. He said he wished these
persons to come to him with their instruments and everything
necessary for their work, and after they had taught his people they
should be allowed to return . . . His Majesty would be much obliged
to Her Majesty’s Government if his request could be complied
with.”13
Not satisfied with normal diplomatic channels, the emperor, who
kept a close guard over all foreigners and would not allow any to
leave, ordered Flad, one of the German lay missionaries, to London
and gave him instructions to procure craftsmen together with all the
equipment they might require. Theodore gave Flad a letter that
had apparently been translated by one of the German missionaries:
I am sending Mr. Flad to Europe because I am in want of skilful artists.
All those workmen who would like to come to my country, rejoicing in
their coming, I shall receive them with honour, and give them good pay
for their services. If they wish to remain in my country, I shall make
them most happy. But, if they after having teached [sic] my people their
arts for some years, wish to return to their country, I shall, through the
power of God, give them a splendid pay, and with great honour I shall
send them back to their country.
Flad’s instructions were to engage two gunsmiths, an artillery of-
ficer, an iron founder able to build a foundry and furnace, one or
two boatbuilders, and a cart- and wheelwright. In addition, the
missionary was ordered to purchase a small blast steam engine, a
12 Theodore to Rassam, n.d., Correspondence
,
1848-1868, 568; Rassam,
Narrative, II, 101.
13 Rassam to Clarendon, April 18, 1866, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 467.
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turning bench with all necessary tools, a distilling machine, ma-
chinery for the production of gun caps together with the copper
plate required, a gunpowder mill, a large supply of gunpowder and
gun caps, a number of double-barreled guns and pistols, two regi-
mental swords, a good telescope, some handsome square carpets,
silks, tumblers and goblets, and a few European curiosities. 14
Some weeks after Flad’s departure, the emperor again pressed
Rassam, asking him to write to the Bombay government for workers
who could cast cannon. “I told him,” Rassam reported, “that Bom-
bay, being a dependency of England, the authorities had no power
to do as he requested without the sanction of England.”15 Flad,
meanwhile, was making his way to Europe and, on his arrival in
England, at once set about his task with enthusiasm and diligence.
He requested an audience with Queen Victoria and produced a
lengthy report for the foreign secretary in which he pointed out
that European workmen had hitherto been well treated by the em-
peror, that the latter had spent 30,000 Maria Theresa dollars in gifts
of money and other things for the British representatives, Plowden,
Cameron, and Rassam, and that, if the British government were
willing to invest even a fraction of this sum, all necessary engage-
ments could be made. 16 Shortly afterward, on July 18, Flad wrote
to Theodore declaring, “Her Majesty’s Governors take everyday
great trouble to find the artizans your Majesty wants.”17
The British authorities, who had long dallied with the question
and had already brought the dispute with Theodore to a head by
ignoring his letter of November 1862 to Queen Victoria, were by
now alarmed by the detention of their envoys and had, at least,
realized some sense of urgency. Lieutenant-Colonel William Mere-
wether, the British political agent in Aden who was responsible for
Ethiopian affairs, urged that the emperor should be presented with
the articles on Flad’s list and that
14 Flad to Clarendon, n.d., Theodore to Flad, n.d., Rassam to Clarendon,
May 27, 1866, ibid.; see also Beke, British Captives, 472, 478, 484, 230; K. St.
C. Wilkins, Reconnoitering in Abyssinia (London, 1870), 31-32; G. Douin,
Histoire du Regne du Khedive Ismail (Cairo, 1936-1941), III, pt. I, 331.
15 Rassam to Merewether, May 28, 1866, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 486.
16 Flad to Clarendon, n.d., ibid., 475-476.
17 Flad to Theodore, July 18, 1866, ibid., 479.
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efforts should be made to obtain the services of an enterprising, well
educated person, who would proceed to Abyssinia to set up the machinery
which Government sends out, and who would be able to do what the
King most requires, to teach some of his people the use of machinery, and
how to take advantage of what his country contains. This person should
be able to superintend everything, and might take with him four or five
men of his own selection, who would work under him as smiths, carpenters
etc. It is better so than to send simple artizans by themselves, who being
under no control would quickly destroy themselves by excesses, or fatally
offend the King. He and they should go out entirely of their own free will
and accord; should be fully informed of the risk they run, and that they
are to serve the King for three years or longer, if agreeable to both parties.
That Government are not responsible for their safety, or that they shall be
allowed to return punctually at the end of three years; for this they must
depend on themselves, and on their satisfying the King. If they work well
for him, I am confident, and so is Mr. Flad, that they will not only be
perfectly safe, but that they will be highly honoured, and greatly en-
riched. 18
After expressing confidence that a suitable person could be found
who would be “glad of so good an opportunity of advancing him-
self,”19 Merewether added:
All I think would be required of Government in the event of a person
being met with is that his expenses and those of his companions out, also
his and their salaries until they joined the King, should be paid by the
Government; and
. . . that Government should guarantee the payment, to
any persons appointed by them in England, of their full salary for the
three years according to the sum agreed on, should it so happen that the
King failed to remunerate them himself according to the compact, that
their health yielded to the effects of climate, causing their return home, or
death, and their salary was not paid by the King, or that their lives were
taken by the King or lost in his service, and he failed to recompense their
friends. Beyond the above, Government is to have nothing to do with
them.20
As far as the actual arrangements were concerned, Merewether pro-
posed that the superintendent, his assistants, and the equipment
should leave England for Aden about the middle of September 1866,
so that the journey inland from Massawa into Ethiopia could be
made that year after the rains.21
18 Memo by Merewether, Aug. 16, 1866, ibid., 492.
10 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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Before he finished drafting this report, Merewether had inter-
viewed an Irishman, Matthew Talbot, whom he had found “exactly
the sort of person required” as superintendent. In later talks it was
proposed that Talbot should set forth with seven assistants: a gun-
smith, a fitter, an iron founder, a smith, a ship’s carpenter, and two
ordinary carpenters. All personnel would receive a salary from the
Emperor from the day of their arrival at his camp, but until then
they would be paid by the British government, which would also be
responsible for travel expenses and an outfit allowance.22 The pro-
posal was warmly welcomed in government circles. On August 18,
only two days after Merewether produced his document, the Foreign
Office wrote to the Treasury, requesting the necessary funds on the
ground that “no reasonable means should be neglected” to obtain
the release of the captives. Three days later the secretary of the
treasury replied that the scheme had been approved.23
2
The result of the emperor’s bold action in detaining Cameron,
Rassam, and some of the missionaries was that the dispatching of
artisans to Ethiopia, which had been in the air for almost two
decades and had been actively sought by Theodore for several years,
was decided upon and authorized in less than a week. Flad proudly
reported back on September 1 that “the business Your Majesty sent
me for to England is, through the grace of Christ our Lord, ac-
complished. The artists [sic] Your Majesty was anxious to get are
found, and ready to come with me to your country.” On the question
of the detainees, he added: “Regarding Your Majesty, Queen Vic-
toria is a little grieved, saying, 'why has the Emperor Theodore not
sent over to me the prisoners, whose relations are daily weeping
before me?’ In reply to this I said, ‘After having conveyed the artists
to Your Majesty I shall come back, and bring the released prisoners
over with me to England.’ This hope I gave to Her Majesty.”24
For the next few weeks, the scheme prospered. Talbot set about
obtaining the machinery, but it was a slow business since all items
22 ibid., 493-495.
23 Murray to Treasury, Aug. 18, 1866; Hamilton to Hammond, Aug. 21,
1866, ibid., 496-497.
24 Flad to Theodore, Sept. 1, 1866, ibid., 503.
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had to be made in small pieces for transport in Ethiopia, then a
country almost totally without roads. Merewether, however, ex-
pected that everything would be ready by October 10, little more
than three weeks after the date originally specified. By September
17, the craftsmen had drawn outfit allowances, and their contracts
were ready for signing. On the following day Merewether reported
that the machinery was “progressing well” and should be ready on
schedule.25
At about this time or shortly afterward, however, Flad received
a letter from his wife, which led to an abrupt change of policy in
London. The note, dated July 7, was written in a pessimistic vein:
it spoke of the captives’ “gloomy future” and revealed that Theodore,
who was irritated with the British and had been further stirred up
against them by a Frenchman called Bardel, had actually imprisoned
the captives (who until then had merely been under a kind of re-
strictive detention). But the St. Chrischona “workman’s mission” at
Gafat had not been arrested and were “making a very large cannon”
for the emperor, who was still friendly toward them.26 Flad, who
was greatly distressed by the insecurity of his wife and friends,
reacted on September 19 by declaring that the British government
should abandon the idea of sending out the craftsmen. “It is no
advantage,” he now wrote to Merewether, “to send him [Theodore]
the required artisans, because the release of the prisoners would, I
fear, not be obtained. Most likely he would go on requiring other
things from the British Government to which they never could sur-
render ... I deem it advisable that Her Majesty’s Government should
at once use stronger terms.”27
Theodore’s hard policy, which had brought the project to the very
brink of success, had thus miscarried, in part perhaps because slow
communications between Ethiopia and Britain prevented the em-
peror from knowing that his earlier action had already achieved the
desired result. No one in London paused to reflect that the em-
peror’s latest act, as described by Mrs. Flad, had taken place almost
25 Merewether to Murray, Sept. 17, 1866, ibid., 504-505; see also Mere-
wether to Murray, Sept. 18, 1866, ibid., 505; Merewether to Hammond, Nov.
5, 1866, ibid., 533-538.
26 Pauline Flad to J. M. Flad, July 7, 1866, ibid., 508.
27 Flad to Merewether, Sept. 19, 1866, ibid., 508.
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two months before the writing of Merewether’s memorandum, or
that Flad’s letter to Theodore, written on September 1—almost two
months after Mrs. Flad’s—might yet produce the satisfactory set-
tlement. Instead Merewether wrote a new memorandum, dated
September 25, in which he stated that his earlier analysis had been
“most materially altered by the news contained in Mrs. Flad’s
epistle.” The imprisonment of Rassam was “so gross an outrage and
insult to the English Government that simple adherence to the
original plan is rendered impossible.” Merewether then recom-
mended that Flad be sent back to Ethiopia with a letter from Queen
Victoria pointing out what her intentions had been, but stating that
her government could not tolerate the imprisonment of British sub-
jects. “Their immediate release and safe conduct beyond the Abys-
sinian frontier should be demanded in the first instance, and should
this demand not at once be complied with, the King of Abyssinia
should be distinctly told that he will be made to answer for the con-
sequences, and for the evils which he will bring on his country.”
Despite this hardened attitude toward Theodore, Merewether
also proposed that the question of the artisans should not be com-
pletely abandoned, but should be made dependent on the release
of the captives. He went on to suggest that the craftsmen and ma-
chinery be sent as already planned to Massawa, “so that should
matters have again changed, and the King make a proper amende,
harsh measures might still perhaps be avoided.” On the other hand,
if “the King still retains Mr. Rassam and the others in close con-
finement, and will not comply with the demand made upon him by
the English Government, then I would strongly advise that no fur-
ther delay should be allowed; but that the question should be taken
up vigorously, and every means adopted to show that the promptest
measures would be taken to compel him to do so, and to punish him
for his insulting outrage.”28
Merewether’s new memorandum, like its predecessor, provided
the starting point for renewed official discussion, the more so since
Merewether appeared to have produced a compromise between
conflicting views. On the one hand, the Cabinet considered it “in-
28 Memo by Merewether, Sept. 25, 1866, ibid., 508-510.
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expedient, not to say impossible, to proceed to extremities/’29 On
the other hand, the German missionary, J. L. Krapf, warned that any
concessions would give Theodore the prestige of being a “lion-like
King” who had “humbled the greatest nation of Europe.” Krapf
advocated the use of force, claiming that a mere two or three
thousand Englishmen could “completely overthrow the numerous
army of the King” and that it would be most desirable for Ethiopia
to be “regulated, if not permanently occupied by a European
Power.”30
Merewether, it should be noted, at no stage advocated foreign
occupation. He elaborated his position in a letter of October 1, 1866,
to the Foreign Office, urging that Flad be sent to the emperor with
a message from the queen, and that he (Merewether) would follow
with the artisans and equipment, to go no further than Massawa
unless a satisfactory reply were received. “If the King received Flad
properly and was inclined to change his tactics,” Merewether ar-
gued, “the fact of my following with artificers and presents would
be a convincing proof to him of the desire of Government to act in
fair and full faith towards him, and may afford a good opening for
adjustment of differences.” If Theodore persisted in his “violent and
unjustifiable” course of action, the artisans could be sent back to
England, and little more cost would have been incurred than was
originally intended. “The artificers,” Merewether concluded, “would
not be allowed to enter Abyssinia unless matters were materially
changed from what they now are, and then only at their own choice
and free will. They are willing to go, provided there is not more
than ordinary risk attendant on living in a country where law af-
fords no protection, and the will of a despotic monarch is the only
rule.”31
The British Cabinet, however, was for the time being reluctant
to take risks of any kind. Unprepared to concur in Krapfs idea of
invasion, it was also unwilling to support Merewether’s scheme of
promising Theodore the artisans on the condition that he release the
prisoners. Nor was the Cabinet prepared to assume the responsi-
29 Merewether to Murray, Oct. 1, 1866, ibid., 513.
30 Krapf to Stanley, ibid., 511, 513.
31 Merewether to Murray, Oct. 1, 1866, ibid., 513-514.
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bility of countermanding its earlier orders for the preparation and
dispatch of workmen and machinery
—
perhaps because this would
have further angered the emperor. The Cabinet’s decision was,
therefore, to adopt Merewether’s idea of sending the emperor a
letter of remonstrance from the queen, but to allow the government
the maximum freedom of action by omitting from it any mention
of the craftsmen. The letter (written on vellum) declared that the
detention of Her Majesty’s servants and the other Europeans had
given rise to uncertainty about the emperor’s intentions, with the
result that
we cannot allow Flad to be the bearer of those tokens of good-will which
we purposed that he should convey to Your Majesty. But in full confi-
dence that the cloud which has darkened the friendship of our relations
will pass away on the return of Flad, and desiring that you should as soon
as possible thereafter receive the articles which we had proposed to send
to Your Majesty in token of our friendship, we have given orders that
those articles should be forthwith sent to Massowah, to be delivered for
conveyance to Your Majesty's Court to the officers whom you may depute
to conduct our servant Rassam, and our servant Cameron, and the other
Europeans, so far on their way to our presence.32
The all-important question of the workmen was thus ignored,
though it was clearly the question in which the emperor, already
deeply mistrustful of the British government, was primarily in-
terested. The omission of any mention of the craftsmen was de-
liberate, as is apparent from a letter written to Flad by the foreign
secretary, Lord Stanley, on October 8:
You will see, that the letter from the Queen speaks only of presents to
be sent in return for the prisoners. You are not authorized to hold out any
expectation that the British Government will be directly or indirectly in-
strumental in inducing any other Europeans to place themselves in the
power of the King. You will not conceal from the King that, in coming
to a decision to that effect, the British Government have been mainly in-
fluenced by the intelligence that has lately reached them; but it will rest
in your discretion to point out that, if the King really desires to obtain
the services of foreigners, his best chance of doing so is to prove, by re-
leasing those whom he now detains against their will, that any persons
who may enter into his employment may have no apprehension of similar
detention when desirous to depart.33
32 Victoria to Theodore, Oct. 14, 1866, ibid., 514-515; Rassam, Narrative,
II, 233.
33 Flad to Stanley, Oct. 8, 1866, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 516.
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Despite these strong words, no steps were taken to cancel the
workmen’s contracts or to find them alternative employment. On the
contrary, the sailing order was not countermanded, and the respon-
sibility for deciding whether or not they should make their way into
Ethiopia should Theodore prove reasonable was left to Merewether
and the men themselves. On October 27, Merewether reported that
they were due to board ship at Southampton on November 3 and
were supposed to set sail on the following day.34 Lord Stanley’s
secretary replied that the foreign secretary was glad to hear that
arrangements had advanced, but did “not understand that any
special instructions are required for the guidance of your conduct
in this matter.” The letter concluded: “If the prisoners arrive, the
presents may be exchanged against them; but as regards Mr. Talbot
and the artisans, their departure for the interior, of which no promise
has been held out to the King, must be regulated by circumstances,
and if at the last hour you should feel doubt as to their safety you
may suspend your departure, or at all events, after stating the case
to them, leave them to decide whether they will go or not. You will
in no case urge them to go if disinclined.”35
Talbot and six assistants, John Brampton, Richard Joy, Wil-
liam Lewer, George Carr, John Morris, and Charles Bowers, left
Southampton as planned on November 4, 1866. 36 On the following
day, Lord Stanley’s secretary wrote to Merewether, giving the for-
eign secretary’s final instructions that “you should not put yourself
or any other European in the power of the King unless the prisoners
are safely delivered.”37 Despite the queen’s letter to the emperor,
and the foreign secretary’s explanatory note to Flad, it now seemed
that the British government did in fact envisage sending out the
craftsmen under certain circumstances.
Although the foreign secretary appeared to be thinking in terms
of allowing Theodore to have the workmen, Flad, the man on the
spot, had become a strong advocate of a tougher policy. On reach-
ing Massawa, he wrote to the emperor on October 29, explaining
“why Her Majesty’s Government would not send up the workmen
34 Mereweather to Hammond, Oct. 27, 1866, ibid., 518-519.
35 Hammond to Merewether, Oct. 31, 1866, ibid., 519-520.
36 Merewether to Hammond, Nov. 5, 1866, ibid., 522-528.
37 Hammond to Merewether, Nov. 5, 1866, ibid., 521*
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before he sends over the prisoners.”38 A plaintive letter from Mrs.
Flad, telling her husband that the prisoners were in chains,39 con-
vinced him that there was “not the least hope” of Victoria’s letter40
having any effect. “There is only one way,” he declared on Novem-
ber 5, “which the Government ought to take without delay. Captain
Cameron . .
.
gives the advice to go to war at once; and this, I think,
is the opinion of all.”41
3
In the next months its became increasingly evident that there was
no chance of reconciling the emperor’s demands with the British
offers, for both sides adopted rigid positions. Theodore’s dispute
with the British, as Sylvia Pankhurst observes, now developed “with
the inevitability of a Greek tragedy till its culmination in his defeat
and death by his own hand.”42 The artisans reached Massawa on
December 10,43 but official policy dictated that they should not be
sent inland until Theodore released the captives. The emperor, on
his part, seems to have made it clear that he would not do this until
the arrival of the artisans. His attitude was described by W. Staiger,
one of the German missionaries at his camp, who declared that the
emperor “would not enter any conditions” as he believed that “he
alone has to make conditions.” Irritated at the distrust shown by the
British, he had said, according to Staiger in 1868: “The English
ought to trust me and send me the articles and men I want of
them.”44
Theodore left no doubt about his passionate desire for the work-
men. On January 5, 1867, he wrote to Rassam, appealing to him in
Biblical language:
Now, in order to prove the good relationship between me and yourself,
let it be shown by your writing and getting the skilful artisans and Mr.
38 Flad to Hertslet, Nov. 5, 1866, ibid., 538.
39 P. Flad to J. M. Flad, n.d., ibid., 539-540.
40 See note 32 above.
41 Flad to Hertslet, Nov. 5, 1866, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 538.
42 S. Pankhurst, “Advancing Ethiopia,” New Times and Ethiopia News, no.
549 (1946), 4.
43 Merewether to Stanley, Dec. 10, 1866; Merewether to Stanley, Jan. 15,
1867, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 544-545, 547-548.
44 Staiger to Meriwether, Ian. 2, 1867, ibid., 581.
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Flad to me. This will be a sign of friendship . . . Even Solomon, the son
of David, the great King, God’s created being and slave, when he wished
to build the Temple in Jerusalem, was perplexed [about finding skilful
artisans]. Falling at the feet of Hiram of Tyre, he begged him for car-
penters and skilful artisans, who assisted him in building the Temple . . .
As Solomon fell at the feet of Hiram, so, I under God, fall at the feet of
the Queen, and her Government, and her friends. I wish you to get them
[the artisans] ... in order that they may teach me wisdom and show
me clever arts; when this is done I shall make you glad and send you
away.”45
Rassam, however, remained unmoved and was opposed to any
policy but one of force. His comment on January 10 was that it was
impossible to trust Theodore any longer: “Presents and artisans may
be sent him, but what security have we that he would let us leave
Abyssinia?”46 On January 29, the envoy reported that Theodore had
expressed the wish for Merewether “to come up with the artisans
and the things from England.”47 But Rassam’s own opinion, and
that of his fellow captives, he said, was that “the sooner the crisis
comes the better for us.”48 On February 15, Merewether informed
the Foreign Office that he had “with great regret” come around to
this view, and added somewhat comfortingly that the emperor’s
once large army had dwindled to only a fraction of its former size. 49
Merewether, who had thus joined forces with the advocates of
British military intervention, began to impugn the emperor’s mo-
tives. On March 4, he wrote to the foreign secretary that Theodore
wished to “get more people into his power so as to have greater hold
on the English.” It was the emperor’s belief, Merewether went on,
that control of the artisans would “enable him to get anything he
chooses to ask for.” Theodore’s position was, however, already on
the decline: he had become “desperate,” his enemies were “closing
round him,” and his power was “daily getting less and less.” Every-
thing was therefore favorable to the British. Provided they made it
clear that they were intervening only to punish Theodore and would
then leave the country, they would meet with little opposition. The
45 Theodore to Rassam, Jan. 5, 1867, ibid., 569-570.
46 Rassam to Stanley, Jan. 10, 1867, ibid., 560.
47 Rassam to Merewether, Jan. 29, 1867, ibid., 582.
48 Rassam to Merewether, Jan. 29, 1867, ibid., 583.
49 Merewether to Stanley, Feb. 15, 1867, ibid., 556-59.
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war would be “a popular measure” in England, and, though the
operations would entail expensive outlays, the money would be
“spent in restoring easily, and at comparatively small cost, the
prestige of our name, which is reckoned lower than it should be.”50
The question of the workmen was now overshadowed by the prob-
ability of war. Merewether’s letter of March 4 recommended that
Talbot and his colleagues return to England. This proposal was
accepted by the foreign secretary on April 20, with the result that
the men sailed home on May 11; the presents were kept a further
three months in Massawa in the hope of an eleventh-hour settle-
ment. 51 By May 1, Merewether was urging the government to insist
on the emperor’s unconditional surrender.52
Theodore and Flad, neither of whom perhaps realized quite how
much the situation had deteriorated, were still contemplating the
possible arrival of the craftsmen. On June 11, Flad reported to
Merewether a conversation he had had two days earlier. Theodore
is supposed to have said: “Though the English are too proud to send
me workmen, God has given me, in Mr. Waldmeier and Saalmiiller,
workmen who can do every work for me; but I tell you if they don’t
come now and fight for their Mr. Rassam I shall keep him and force
them to give me what I want from them.” Apparently unaware that
Talbot and his assistants had been sent home, Flad had replied that
“the artisans and machinery are waiting his order at Massawah,
according to Her Majesty’s letter; and it would be a pity if those
clever men and useful machines would not come to Your Majesty’s
Court.” To this Theodore, who doubtless remembered that the
queen’s letter contained no reference to the workmen, cryptically
had replied, “well we must see the letter, if we can get it, perhaps
we can get them all.”53
The time for negotiation, of course, had passed, for neither side
was willing to talk. On September 9, the foreign secretary wrote to
Theodore that the queen had ordered a military force to enter his
dominions and that “the only means of preserving your country
50 Merewether to Stanley, March 4, 1867, ibid., 577-579.
51 Merewether to Stanley, May 11, 1867, ibid., 631; see also Stanley to
Theodore, April 16, 1867, ibid., 610.
52 Merewether to Stanley, May 1, 1867, ibid., 626.
53 Flad to Merewether, June 11, 1867, ibid., 717.
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from war, and your own power from overthrow, will be found in the
delivery to the Commander of the British invading army of all the
Europeans in your keeping.”54 Six weeks later, on October 21, the
British advance brigade landed on the coast, the British commander,
Sir Robert Napier, arriving there on January 3 of the following
year, 1868. Then followed the long trek to the emperor’s fortress at
Magdala; here, on April 10, the British won a decisive battle.
Realizing that he had lost in his long struggle with the British
government, Theodore made his first attempt at suicide on April 11.
Failing in this also, he ordered the release of the prisoners. The
situation was obviously so critical that all the Europeans elected to
go. Together with their families, they were 61 in number, with no
less than 187 Ethiopian servants and 323 animals. The foreigners
included the official British party, composed of Consul Cameron,
his secretary L. Kerans, and his servants or former servants D.
Pietro,
J.
Macraire, and R. McKelvie; Rassam and his aides, Lieu-
tenant Prideaux and Dr. Blanc; the group of missionaries not in
the emperor’s employ, made up of the H. A. Stern, H. E. Rosenthal
and his wife, W. Staiger, and F. Brandeis; the workmen’s mission and
a number of other craftsmen, including Waldmeier and his wife,
Saalmiiller, T. M. Flad and his wife, Bender and his wife, Zander
and his wife, Mayer, Mrs. Zieglen (the widow of a German artisan),
Moritz Hall and M. Bourgaud (two craftsmen who were not mis-
sionaries), and Ato Aligaz, the son of the Englishman John Bell; the
botanist Schimper, two German naturalists, T. Essler and K. Schiller,
and A. Bardel, a French artist and language teacher. There were
also numerous half-castes, including Ingida Schimper, the son of the
botanist, John Parkyns, the son of the traveler Mansfield Parkyns,
as well as four children of the craftsmen: Kassa Zander, Yaeqob
Moritz, Yohannes Mayer, and Gotthelf Bender.55
54 Stanley to Theodore, Sept. 9, 1867, ibid., 713.
55 Markham, History, 340 and n; A. J. Shepherd, The Campaign in Abyssinia
(Bombay, 1868), 251-252; Rassam, Narrative, II, 29; H. M. Hozier, The British
Expedition to Abyssinia (London, 1869), 219-220; H. M. Stanley, Coomassie
and Magdala (London, 1874), 436; Beke, British Captives, 204; Rassam to
Clarendon, April 18, 1866, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 467; T. Heughlin, Reise
nach Abessinien (Jena, 1868), 302-305, 339; E. A. de Cosson, The Cradle of
the Blue Nile (London, 1877), I, 119-120; II, 66; L. Fusella, “La Cronaca
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After handing over the foreigners, Theodore still thought it pos-
sible to obtain some artisans. In his last letter to the British envoy
on April 12, 1868—the day before his death by suicide—he wrote:
“Now that we are friends you must not leave me without artisans,
as I am a lover of the mechanical arts.”56
The question of the supply of foreign artisans, though by no
means the sole, or even the most important, cause of the dispute
with the British government, was thus in the emperor’s mind to the
end. In trying to import the possessors of skills virtually or com-
pletely unknown in his own country, Theodore was following the
path of Ras Wube, but he seems to have been the first to have
placed particular emphasis on the training of his own people.
Throughout this struggle—from the detention of Rassam in 1866 to
Theodore’s death in 1868—the issue of foreign artisans was a major
one. Theodore was able to induce the British government to aban-
don its attitude of indifference, to engage a group of artisans, and
to provide for the expense of equipping them and sending them to
Africa. Yet Theodore failed to reach his objective, a failure for which
he clearly bears a major responsibility. Partly this was because of
poor communications, partly because Theodore gave the impres-
sion, by imprisoning his captives, that concession would only lead
to a further turning of the screw. However, British negotiators were
slow to abandon the scheme and placed the artisans on the borders
of Ethiopia, to enter as soon as the prisoners were released. But that
minimal degree of confidence between parties which is necessary
for successful negotiation had been destroyed. Theodore resented
the imposition of conditions; the British government would not fur-
ther humble itself by concessions. Theodore’s unwillingness to move
may have stemmed from eccentricity and ignorance of the outside
world, but an adequate explanation would have to include also an
analysis of the political situation within Ethiopia. Domestic weak-
ness, to which Merewether alluded,57 made Theodore no less an-
xious about prestige than his British adversaries were. The im-
dell’ Imperatore Teodoro II di Etiopia,” Annali d’lstituto Universitario
Orientale di Napoli (1954-1955), 116.
56 Rassam, Narrative, II, 326; Shepherd, Campaign, 253.
57 Memo by Merewether, Sept. 25, 1866, Correspondence, 1848-1868, 508-
510.
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portant issue of foreign craftsmen, therefore, had to await the
achievement of more stable conditions within Ethiopia and between
Ethiopia and other states. The effective employment of foreigners
was not achieved until over a generation later, in the reign of
Menilek.
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The negotiation of the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 helped Great
Britain to settle its conflicts with France and Italy regarding Ethi-
opia, but the delimitation of Ethiopia’s southern border with
British East Africa had to be settled through direct negotiations
with Emperor Menilek. The history of this intricate border problem
illustrates Ethiopia’s consistent policy of border expansion: the
method was to infiltrate areas which the British government con-
sidered to be within the boundaries of British East Africa, but which
it was never able to control properly because of its own vacillating
policy. 1
1
By July 1890, the German government had recognized British
holdings as “coterminous with the territory reserved to the influence
of Italy in Gallaland and Abyssinia.”2 Less than a year later Britain
and Italy signed the protocol of March 24, 1891, which placed most
of northern and central Ethiopia within the Italian sphere of influ-
ence. The same protocol stipulated: “The line of demarcation in
East Africa, between the spheres of influence respectively reserved
to Italy and Great Britain follows, from leaving the sea, the thalweg
of the Juba River up to the 6th degree of north latitude . . . The line
follows, thereupon, the 6th degree parallel of north latitude to the
35th degree meridian east of Greenwich, which it will follow up
to the Blue Nile.”3 Had Great Britain been able to implement these
1 Archival materials used in this article were drawn from the microfilmed
collection of Professor Sven Rubenson of Haile Sellassie I University. From the
Foreign Office, the FO 1 file is composed of documents; the FO 401 and 403
files are made up of the Confidential Prints.
The author wishes to thank Jacoba van Schaik, Jeffrey Butler, and Susanne
Marcus for their assistance in the final preparation of this essay for publication.
2 Governo Italiano, Ministero degli Afferi Esteri, Trattati ( Rome, 1906), I,
263.
3 Ibid., 340. Thalweg is a term in international law which essentially means
j
the middle point of a river, or any moving stream of water.
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treaties, most of Sidamo-Borena, part of Gemmu Gofa, and a small
but strategically important area of the southeastern Harrarghe
Province would have been included in the British East African
protectorate.
In a circular letter of April 1891 to the European powers, Em-
peror Menilek claimed his southern border as “following the Sobat
River and including Arbore Gala . . . and extending to Lake
Samberu [Lake Rudolf]; to the east it includes Boran Galla, Arussi,
Ogaden, and stretches as far as the Somali border.”4 This line, as the
accompanying map shows, was to the south of that claimed by the
British. But, because of its agreement with Italy and its assumption
that Ethiopia would soon become an Italian colony, the British
government paid no heed to the emperor’s statement. Even after
Ethiopia’s victory at the Battle of Adwa, the region continued to
be regarded by Britain as an Italian sphere of influence. A Foreign
Office report of 1897 concluded that the southern frontier was
“distinctly defined” by the Anglo-German Treaties of 1886 and 1890
and by the Anglo-Italian protocols; 5 on this basis Rennell Rodd,
who headed the first British diplomatic mission to Menilek in 1897,
was instructed to leave the settlement of Ethiopia’s southwestern
and southern borders to Ethiopia and Italy. 6
Menilek refused to acknowledge the Anglo-German and Anglo-
Italian agreements. By the time Lieutenant-Colonel Wingate and
Captain Gleichen, the two intelligence officers with the Rodd
Mission, made their report, the emperor’s forces were said to be
within two hundred miles of Lado, within three hundred miles of
British posts in Bunyoro, and within two hundred and fifty miles
of the British protectorate of Buganda—“that is to say, effective
Abyssinian occupation now extends far into the British sphere of
influence as defined by the Anglo-German Agreement of the 1st
July, 1890 . . . There would appear to be little doubt that the greater
part of these countries [Boran Galla, Arussi as far as the Somali, and
4 For the English translation, see either April 1891, FO 403/155, or May
1897, FO 403/255. For the original Amharic version, see Menilek to Rodd,
May 13, 1897, FO 1/32.
5 Notes on Abyssinia, n.d., FO 403/255.
6 Rodd’s instructions, n.d., FO 1/32.
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the Ogaden] are now, more or less, effectively occupied by the
Abyssinians.”7
At this time, however, the British government was deeply in-
volved in other areas of Africa, and its prime concern in Ethiopia
was the delimitation of the Sudan border. Thus, it hoped that a
mission displaying the flag would be sufficient to reaffirm its claims
to the northern part of the British East African protectorate. But the
MacDonald Mission of 1899, designed in part for this purpose,
failed to check “Abyssinian advances south of the Anglo-Italian
delimitation frontier,”8 as Sir John Lane Harrington had hoped.
Menilek was not put off by such feeble measures; single-mindedly
he operated to fulfill his policy statement of 1891, and the opinion
of a recent author suggests that for him, as well as for other Ethi-
opian dignitaries, to regain the traditional Ethiopian territories was
a “sacred trust, which derived as much from racial pride as from
legends of the first Menelek.”9 From 1896 on, Menilek carried out
his southern expansion by every means at his disposal. Ras Walda
Giorgis conquered Kafa in October 1897, 10 and by March 1898,
accompanied by the Russian observer-cartographer, Bulatowitch,
he succeeded in placing an Ethiopian flag at the mouth of the Omo
on Lake Rudolf and in establishing several military posts on the
northern part of the lake. 11 At about the same time, Fitaurari Habte
Giorgis conquered the Boran Galla east of the Omo River. 12 This
southern expansion of Ethiopia was to continue until 1913. 13
7 Memo by Wingate and Gleichen, May 7, 1897, FO 403/255. Wingate later
became Sirdar of the Sudan.
8 Memo of Harrington, July 22, 1898, FO 1/34. Sir John Lane Harrington
was the first permanent British diplomatic official in Ethiopia. Before his as-
signment to Ethiopia, he had been an official in the government of India and
had also seen service in British Somaliland.
9 Czeslaw Jesman, The Russians in Ethiopia
,
an Essay in Futility (London,
1958), 69.
10 Docteur Merab, Impressions cTEthiopie (Paris, 1921), I, 31, and memo
by A. H. W. Beru, Dec. 3, 1897, FO 403/247.
11 Conrad Keller, Alfred llg: Sein Leben und Seine Werke (Frauenfeld and
Leipzig, 1918), 166.
12 Keller claims that Menilek believed the MacDonald expedition was sent
to occupy this territory and sent Habte Giorgis to forestall that possibility.
Keller, Ilg, 166.
13 British records are full of reports of bands of Ethiopians pushing south-
west and southeast. The following selection lists a few important ones:
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In an attempt to consolidate his hold over the newly conquered
southern areas, Menilek granted the so-called equatorial provinces
of Ethiopia14 to “the only Russian buccaneer in the grand style in
Africa at the end of the last century,”15 Dejjazmach Leontieff.
Leontieff explained that he had been chosen governor because
Menilek was impressed with the accomplishments in the Sudan of
the various Europeans employed by the Khedives of Egypt. Since
Menilek had previously done very well with Ethiopian officers, a
more likely explanation of his choice lies in the fact that Leontieff’s
expedition included a fairly large number of Russians and French-
men, including Prince Henri d’Orleans, and Menilek probably felt
that the British government, despite its fear that Leontieff, if suc-
cessful, would push the line of effective Ethiopian occupation
Report by Mohammed bin Agil, in Crawford to Salisbury, July 10, 1899, FO
403/284; Abyssinian raiding parties in southern Borena.
Hardinge to Salisbury, May 6, 1900, FO 403/298; Ethiopian troops have
occupied the following Borena settlements: Hego, Leim Arer, Dubullu, Egollej,
and Wajille.
Sir H. Johnston to Salisbury, May 26, 1900, FO 403/299; Ethiopians are
raiding east of Lake Rudolf “far into British East Africa.”
MacDougall to Sir C. Elliot, July 18, 1901, FO 403/313; Ethiopians have
bridged the Juba River south of Lug, and 400 soldiers are permanently sta-
tioned near Lug.
Baird to Lansdowne, Aug. 19, 1902, FO 403/323; Ethiopians in the regions
of lakes Rudolf and Marguerita are moving south to hunt for elephants.
Sub-Commissioner Hannyngton to Sir Charles Elliot, Nov. 3, 1903, FO 1/48;
Ethiopians have arrived at Gedu within ten hours of Wocher.
H. T. Kirkpatrick to Sir Charles Elliot, Dec. 18, 1903, ibid.; Ethiopians are
close to Wocher.
Sir D. Stuart to Lyttelton, Apr. 24, 1905, FO 401/8; 500 Ethiopians have
arrived at the Webi Shebelli.
Sadler to Earl of Elgin, Jan. 8, 1906, FO 401/9; Ethiopians are building
stations at Wocher, El Wak, and Madowa.
Hervey to Grey, Nov. 7, 1908, FO 401/11; elephant hunters in large num-
bers are crossing the frontiers.
Only a few of these incursions were official. Evidence indicates that Menilek’s
policy of southern expansion was aided by the historic southward population
movement which had already caused a shift in the Ethiopian power balance
from the north toward the central and southern part of the country.
14 Harrington to Cromer, June 24, 1899, FO 403/284.
15 Jesman, Russians in Ethiopia, 110; for the full story of Leontieff’s activities
in Ethiopia, see chap. 10.
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farther south, would not take any decisive action that might involve
it with France and Russia. 16
That British fears were justified is shown by Leontieff’s own
words
:
These provinces [the equatorial provinces] which extend between the
2nd and the 6th degree of north latitude17 were not under real control
except for the northern part; all the other territories of Equatoria, even
those within the sphere of influence claimed by Ethiopia, only nominally
recognized the authority of the Negus . . . The first thing to do then was
to occupy the country fully and to impose the authority of the Emperor
both where it only existed nominally, and where it was ignored. 18
Leontieff, however, did little actual damage to British pretentions
in southern Ethiopia, beyond planting a few Ethiopian flags in place
of British ones northeast of Lake Rudolf, 19 an act that Menilek
immediately disowned upon British protests.20
British officials in Ethiopia had suspected that Menilek would
use Leontieff as a catspaw and disavow him when necessary.21 But
Harrington, the British minister in Addis Ababa, was nonetheless
aware that the Ethiopians would continue their southward expan-
sion until they came into contact with British outposts. It was clear
to him that Menilek had every intention of occupying territory that
had no visible owner, even though he would probably halt if he
found signs of effective British occupation.22
16 Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 21, 1898, FO 403/274; see also Harrington to
Sanderson, June 1, 1900, FO 1/37. Sir Thomas Sanderson was then permanent
under-secretary of state in the Foreign Office.
17 Italics added.
18 Count Dejjazmach Leontieff, “Exploration des Provinces Equatoriales
d’Abyssinie,” La Geographie, Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie (Jan. 15,
1900), 105-118.
19 Gerolimato to Sadler, Nov. 7, 1899, FO 403/284. Gerolimato was the
British Consular Agent in Harrar.
20 Harrington to Salisbury, Dec. 26, 1899, FO 403/297.
21 Harrington to Sanderson, June 1, 1900, FO 1/37.
22 Memo by Harrington, Feb. 17, 1900, FO 403/287. Nonofficial British
observers also saw that only effective occupation of the disputed area would
halt Menilek’s southward expansion and preserve that part of the British sphere
in East Africa. Captain M. S. Wellby, who toured southern Ethiopia in 1896,
wrote that “in order to put a check on their [the Ethiopians’] raiding [the first
step in the process of expansion], there is in my opinion, one speedy and ef-
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In fact, important British officials such as Harrington and Cromer
were aware that effective British occupation was the only way to
stop Menilek. But, because of the tight-fisted policy of the British
Treasury, it was impossible for the British East African authorities
to make a start in that direction until 1910, and then the administra-
tion of the northern British East African border had to be of the
least expensive and least thorough type. “They [the various border
plans] all mean money and Chanc of the Exch. is not likely to let
us have any for the purpose.”23 Indeed, cost was one of the reasons
why the British turned down Menilek’s first proposals to settle the
southern border. Harrington personally felt that: “It is a pity to
allow Menelek to extend his frontiers at our expense but the cost of
the prevention of his doing so is, in my opinion, more than the value
of what we should save.”24
2
In late May 1899, after the western border had in principle been
settled,25 Menilek said to Harrington, “now let us settle the other
frontier.” He had marked his idea of Ethiopia’s frontier with
British East Africa on a map. The fine started at the Juba and, in-
cluding the Ishing, Arbore Galla, and Turkana countries, ran to the
southern shore of Lake Rudolf, placing that lake inside Ethiopia.
When asked the basis for his claims, the emperor said he stood on
his proclamation of 1891 and on the ground of effective occupation.
fective method, and that consists of fixing a frontier line around the Abyssinian
dominion ... I put forward this suggestion now, not from a political, but
simply from a commonsense point of view.” He stressed that the line must be
effectively controlled and occupied. Augustus Wylde, traveling in Ethiopia
during 1898 and 1899, told the British public that “if our rule ... on the
borders of Abyssinia is to be a success it . . . will necessitate small garrisons
and therefore a moderate military expenditure.” See M. S. Wellby, ’Twixt
Sirdar and Menelik (London and New York, 1901), 334; and Augustus B.
Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London, 1901), 75.
23 Memo by Sanderson, March 27, 1900, FO 1/44.
24 Harrington to Sanderson, Feb. 17, 1900, ibid.
25 For an account of the negotiations leading up to the settlement of the
western border, see Harold G. Marcus, “Ethio-British Negotiations Concerning
the Western Border with the Sudan,” Journal of African History, IV no 1
(1963), 81-94.
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Harrington told him, “it was impossible that my Government would
accept the proposed line.”26
Menilek had apparently used this extreme position to test British
reactions, because in early June 1899 he made a more serious
proposal, as Harrington reported to Cramer:
following tribal limits when actual delimitation takes place, the frontier
to start from the termination of the Soudan frontier, making a curve to
the mouth of the small river which enters Lake Rudolph on the north, and
west of the Omo River, the Turkana country to remain in the British
sphere . . . On the southern side, starting from the junction of the Dawa
River with the Kjuba River (Ganawa), the frontier being based on tribal
limits, the Marehan to be in the British sphere, the Gere, Gabra, Sakayu,
Sabo and Tertala tribes in the Ethiopian sphere. When the limits of the
Tertala tribe are marked, the frontier to be a line running from the Tertala
southern limits to Lake Rudolph, the Bur Kenedschi being in the British
sphere.
Harrington, who had no instructions concerning the matter, ac-
cepted this proposal in principle, with the understanding that his
action only bound him to support Menilek’s suggestions and was not
to be considered binding on the British government.27 Harrington
explained to higher officials that he had accepted Menilek’s second
proposal so quickly partly because, knowing how thoroughgoing
the emperor's effective occupation was, “I recognised that a pro-
posal on Menelek’s part would put a limit to Abyssinian expansion,
as he can scarcely now go beyond his proposed line, and partly
because I dreaded his making use of Leontieff to occupy territory
that we have not yet occupied.”28
The British government was, however, loath to accept Menilek’s
proposals, because they would have resulted in a serious loss of
territory for British East Africa. On the other hand, it was just as
reluctant to spend the money necessary to patrol the frontier. “Al-
though the proposal made by Menelek is not satisfactory, we have
no means at present of enforcing our claims by effective occupation
of the territory.”29 Lord Cromer recommended “that Harrington
should be authorised to state that further communication will be
26 Harrington to Cromer, May 26, 1899, FO 403/284.
27 Harrington to Cromer, June 3, 1899, ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Salisbury to Cromer, Oct. 18, 1899, FO 403/284.
A History of the Ethiopia-East Africa Border 247
made on the subject, while avoiding pledging himself to any par-
ticular. It is always to be apprehended that the Abyssinians will
continue to advance southwards, if nothing is said. If, however, he
can manage to bring Menelek to put forward fresh suggestions of a
more advantageous nature than those he made before, he might
take note of them and report them.” Salisbury agreed to this plan.30
So the man on the spot was overruled, and the British government
by its indecision continued to play Menilek’s game for him: while
the British government awaited better proposals from Menilek, he
was ensuring that no better proposals would be necessary. His
expansion could continue practically unhindered, and with official
and unofficial Ethiopian raiding parties nibbling at British East
Africa, the border he desired was ultimately attained.31
In early 1900, Harrington again reported that “the expansion of
[Menilek’s] Empire will continue . . . until country is reached where
there are visible signs of our authority.” For the British government
to push claims in areas where it could display none of these “visible
signs” would, Harrington continued, “incur a serious risk of war . . .
I think it possible [Menilek] may be forced by his Chiefs to fight
if we press him too much . . . The Abyssinian Chiefs who rule the
southern districts are so powerful that I doubt [Menilek’s] daring
to curtail their provinces beyond a certain point.”32 Caught in this
double dilemma, the British government was unable to act.
In June 1900, Menilek made new proposals: “Following tribal
limits . . . the line runs south to the Dawa River, then west to Lake
Stephanie, so that the Karayu and Wadditu tribes remain Abys-
sinian. The Tortola [Tertala], if they should prove to be a district
sub-tribe of the Boran-Galla, remain British, but, if they are in
reality a sub-tribe of the Karayu or Wadditu, they are Ethiopians.
West of Lake Rudolph the frontier will follow the River Maurizio
Sacchi.” Harrington told Salisbury: “I incline to the opinion that
these proposals represent the maximum that the Emperor will yield
30 Cromer to Salisbury, Oct. 20, 1899, and Salisbury to Cromer, Oct. 20,
1899; ibid (telegrams).
31 For example, in late 1899 the Ethiopians had not yet established an ef-
fective claim to the Sakuyu, Gara, Karayou, and Tertala countries, whereas by
1903 these areas were occupied. See memo by fenner, Nov. 1, 1899, FO 1/44.
32 Memo by Harrington, Feb. 18, 1900, FO 403/297.
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willingly, and I humbly venture to suggest that they are worthy of
serious consideration by your Lordship.” The longer the British
delay, “the more likely we are to find an extension of Abyssinian
influence.”33 But still nothing was done.
In 1901 there were numerous complaints about Ethiopian raiding
in British East Africa: “Until some sign of our authority, however
small, exists in the northern portion of our B. E. African Protec-
torate, it is hopeless trying to prevent Abyssinian raids and . . .
when a raid takes place it is a waste of breath complaining.”34 By
mid-July 1901, it was reported that the Ethiopians had bridged the
Juba south of Lug, an important communication and commercial
center, permanently stationed troops near that town, and “are
masters of the situation there at present, and the Boran country [is]
virtually annexed.”35
Finally, in 1902 the British government decided to act, but again
only in a half-hearted way. It enlisted a private citizen, W. Butter,
a sportsman and adventurer, to make a surveying trip to the south-
ern border at his own expense, and to “place his work at our disposal
without any conditions attached to it.”36 Butter was instructed as
follows : “The object of your expedition is to place in my hands suffi-
cient information to enable me to arrange with the Emperor
Menelek a frontier between Abyssinia and British East Africa.” He
was to recommend a line that followed natural features, did not
interfere with local tribes, and took into consideration Menilek’s
previous proposals as agreed to by Harrington. Furthermore, Butter
was to instruct Captain Maud, the official British surveyor accom-
panying the expedition, to map the location of Ethiopian outposts,
the extreme limits of Ethiopian occupation, and the area in which
Ethiopian raiding parties roamed: “Permanent occupation should
be carefully differentiated from raiding parties.”37 To obtain
Menilek’s permission for the Butter expedition, Harrington told the
emperor that, before renewing negotiations, the British government
needed a more thorough knowledge of the southern border area.38
33 Harrington to Salisbury, June 19, 1900, FO 403/299.
34 Harrington to Hill, Aug. 24, 1901, FO 1/45.
35 Commissioner MacDougall to Elliot, luly 18, 1901, FO 403/313.
36 Rodd to Sanderson, March 21, 1902, FO 1/46.
37 Butter’s instructions from Harrington, n.d., FO 403/323.
38 Harrington to Boyle, May 3, 1902, FO 1/46.
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Menilek, probably feeling that British findings could only lend
support to his claims, gave his consent to the expedition, which left
Addis Ababa for southern Ethiopia on November 6, 1902.
According to regular reports he was receiving from the expedi-
tion, Harrington could already report in March 1903, that ‘matters
in our so-called sphere of influence are even worse than I expected.
Abyssinian influence extends ... as far south as 3°30'N.”39 Shortly
afterward, knowing that word would get back to Harrington, Meni-
lek told the Italian minister that he had been “forced” to agree to
the western border, but that Great Britain “should find greater diffi-
culty in coming to an agreement about this border.” Furthermore,
he told Captain Ciccodicola that he had no intention of giving
Liban-Boren to England.40
Letters from the Butter expedition gave good evidence of Meni-
lek’s sizable claims. The expedition members were amazed by the
extent and effectiveness of Ethiopian occupation. The Galla popula-
tion evidently feared the Ethiopians and had been warned by
Menilek’s officers “that Abyssinia would not yield a foot of Borena
without fighting and that the Abyssinians were more than a match
for the British if it came to blows.” The expedition did find, how-
ever, that this control extended only as far as 3°3(XN, 38°48'E, and
that even raiding was rare below 3°30'N. “However, [the Ethio-
pians] look on the country as undoubtedly theirs and will continue
to do so until we occupy a line beyond which they may not pass.”41
“The border proposals made by the Butter expedition offered a clear
frontier defined for most of its length by physical features. It starts
with the River Dawa on the East . . . further west, the line follows
an escarpment, leaving the highlands to the Abyssinians and the
plains to us. At the base of the escarpment is a strip of unhealthy
neutral zone.”42 It was further suggested that the proposal was
based on the principles of dividing the high country from the low
and separating the Boran Galla from the non-Galla population.43
39 Harrington to Sanderson, March 3, 1903, FO 1/47.
40 Notes by Baird, Aug. 22, 1903, ibid. J. Baird was a British diplomatic
agent in Ethiopia during Harrington’s tenure in office as British plenipotentiary.
41 Precis of letters from Butter and Baird, n.d., ibid.; and Maud’s report on
the Butter expedition, Sept. 4, 1903, FO 403/334.
42 Elliot to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, FO 1/47.
43 Memo by Baird, n.d., ibid.
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Maud stated that his proposals were based on the principle of effec-
tive occupation and that “the country of which the Abyssinians may
be said to be in occupation goes to Ethiopia.” This included the
Boran of Liban, Dirri, Tertala, N.W. Golbo, Arbore, and the
Hummur Hills, and the peoples of Gubbra Migo and Gubbra Algan.
“Country in which the Abyssinians have only raided becomes
British East Africa,” including the following: Gurre, Murrehum-
Somali, Baludda, Idur, Sakuyu, Ajuran, Boran and Gabbra of Golbo
( That portion south of the escarp ) , Lolcob, Summander, Korro, and
Rendile. 44 Maud said, however, that he was “convinced that what-
ever frontier may be agreed upon with the Emperor Menelek, unless
it were held by our posts, it would not be respected by his very
independent officers who rule the Boran country.”45
In London the War Office Intelligence Division reported to the
Foreign Office that: “Captain Maud’s frontier involves the surrender
to the Abyssinians of all the country of which they may be said to be
in occupation at the present time. Should it be successful as a
barrier to prevent them from pressing further south, the sacrifice of
territory to which the British Government has claims would be
worth the advantage gained.”46 From Addis Ababa, George Clerk,
the British charge d’affaires, reported that, although Menilek had
given orders that no further southward movements should be made
until the frontier had been determined, “the southern chiefs are
aware that the Emperor is better pleased by their disobeying than
by their observing his orders.” While Menilek would disavow such
encroachments, “he feels that the more territory he can show to be
in actual Abyssinian occupation the stronger will his position be
when the frontier comes to be discussed here.”47
Meanwhile, having heard of the Butter expedition and anxious
to ensure its own interests in Ethiopia, the Italian government,
according to Rodd, asked that if
there should be ultimately a modification of the line laid down bv the
Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 24th March, 1891, that we [the British]
should, before actually negotiating the frontier with Menelek, refer to
44 Maud’s report, Sept. 4, 1903, FO 403/334.
45 Ibid.
46 Intelligence Division to FO, Dec. 8, 1903, FO 403/334.
47 Clerk to Lansdowne, Dec. 5, 1903, ibid.
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them . . . the proposed modifications and obtain pro forma their consent
to any changes in the line of the Protocol which may be contemplated.
For "the future might bring considerable changes in Ethiopia; cir-
cumstances might arise conceivably in which Abyssinia would have
to contract her borders, and Italy would wish to keep an open road
for expansion westwards north of the Juba.” The Italians, Rodd
continued, accordingly wanted the area between the Benadir Coast
and Abyssinia reserved for their possible occupation, and further-
more they wanted Great Britain to help them in their diplomatic
struggle for Lug.48 Harrington, who tended to view British imperial
policy only insofar as it related directly to Ethiopia, said bitterly:
"I cannot see [by] what right the Italians can claim to interfere with
any frontier we choose to make with Abyssinia . . . The sooner the
farce of regarding Abyssinia as an Italian sphere of influence is
knocked on the head, the better, as all agreements we have made
with Italy in this part of the world have considerably hampered our
negotiations with Abyssinia.”49 Lord Lansdowne, however, saw the
value of retaining Italian support for England in Ethiopia and in the
Middle East, and instructed Rodd to inform the Italian government:
"In negotiations for the settlement of this frontier. His Majesty’s
Government have every desire to work in accord with the Govern-
ment of Italy, and to make no arrangements that would be prejudi-
cial to Italian interests.” Also, before making any modifications in
the border, England would seek Italy’s concurrence.50
In December 1903, Lansdowne informed Harrington: “The line
appears to . .
.
[His Majesty’s Government] to form a reasonable
compromise between the claims of Great Britain and Abyssinia in
the regions in question, and they are prepared to enter into nego-
tiations with the Emperor Menelek on this basis.” Because the
Butter line left the area between the Rivers Ganale and Dawa free
from any claim by the British government, Lansdowne did not
48 Rodd to Lansdowne, Jan. 1, 1903, ibid. For a brief discussion of the de-
velopment of the Lug controversy, see Luca dei Sabelli, Storia di Abissinia
(Rome, 1938), III, 92ff.
49 Harrington to Sanderson, Jan. 17, 1903, FO 1/47. For a description of
the difficulties Great Britain had with Italy over the western border, see Marcus,
“Ethio-British Negotiations.”
50 Lansdowne to Rodd, Jan. 23, 1903, FO 403/334.
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foresee any difficulty with the Italians. 51 Nonetheless, the matter
needed their approval, and Harrington was instructed to' put the
matter before them on his way back to England. Giacomo Agnesa,
the head of the colonial department of the Italian Foreign Office,
Rennell Rodd, and John Harrington met in Rome in early Decem-
ber 1903, to discuss a wide range of issues regarding Ethiopia—it
rapidly became clear that Italy was seeking economic domination
in the Italian Somaliland hinterland. The British delegates promised
only freedom of trade on all routes crossing British East Africa from
the Boran country to Lug, and Agnesa, though not fully satisfied,
agreed to support the proposed border changes if Great Britain
would help Italy to obtain Lug.52
When Harrington returned to Addis Ababa, he carried with him
instructions to begin final negotiations about the southern border.
He was to base them on the Maud-Butter line, and he was to be
sure not to enter into any agreement “prejudicial to Italian interests
in those regions” or to agree to any alteration in the line of March
24, 1891, without first gaining the concurrence of the Italian gov-
ernment. 53
3
A year later Harrington reported that the border negotiations
were not progressing well. Menilek claimed that the Girrhi, previ-
ously considered British subjects, were in fact of Galla origin. More-
over, he was pressing for a border along a 2° N line.54 Meanwhile,
raiding continued unabated, although Harrington reported that it
was difficult to obtain accurate news of such raids, since local in-
formants were afraid to corroborate official reports. In June and
August 1905, he had received word from Uganda of raids in the
unadministered northern tracts of the protectorate. 55 In final des-
peration he recommended the employment of a traveling border
inspector who would, he felt, prevent serious raiding. 56 The Colonial
51 Lansdowne to Harrington, Dec. 7, 1903, FO 1/48.
52 Memo by Harrington and Rodd, n.d., memo by British delegates, n.d.,
declaration of Agnesa, Harrington, and Rodd, Dec. 19, 1903; FO 403/334.
53 Lansdowne to Harrington, April 1, 1904, FO 403/346.
54 Harrington to Lansdowne, April 1, 1905, FO 401/8.
55 Report of Fowler, June 1905, and report of Sadler, Aug. 1905; ibid.
56 Harrington to Lansdowne, Oct. 10, 1905, ibid.
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Office approved this plan and agreed to charge expenses for the
post, around £1200 per annum, to the British East African protec-
torate.57 In November 1905, Zaphiro, a Greek subject, was ap-
pointed by Harrington to travel as inspector along the southern
frontier, to patrol the Butter-Maud line, and to turn back Ethiopian
raiding parties from British territory.58
Although Zaphiro could never hinder the movements of indi-
viduals or of small groups, he was successful in stopping the south-
ward incursions of large groups of Ethiopians,59 thus finally stabiliz-
ing the border region.60 This meant the end of Ethiopia’s active
southern expansion, and on December 7, 1906, Menilek and Har-
rington agreed to a frontier line. 61 Harrington now left Ethiopia for
consultations in London, where he told the British government:
it has taken nearly eight years hard fighting to get this frontier, and no
time should be lost in sending Mr. Clerk telegraphic instructions to sign,
as any delay will probably mean we may not get the frontier settled for a
year or two more . . . The frontier is anything but acceptable to the
Abyssinian chiefs in the south, they have lost good raiding grounds, and
every influence has been brought to bear on Menelek to get him to hold
out for a frontier at El Wak and Wujjers ... In my opinion, we have
been a great deal luckier than I ever thought we should be over this
border.62
With reservations the Colonial Office approved the draft of the
agreement, and Clerk was authorized to sign it.63 But it took until
December before the Southern Border Agreement was finally com-
pleted and signed by all parties.64
The negotiations of the intervening eleven months are too intri-
cate and picayune to warrant discussion. Suffice it to say that, while
Menilek and his advisers wanted more territory, the British tried to
hold them to the Butter-Maud line or even to diminish the Ethio-
57 ibid.
58 clerk to Grey, May 20, 1907, FO 401/10.
59 See footnote 12 above.
60 Resume of Zaphiro’s reports, FO 401/10.
61 Clerk to Grey, Jan. 10, 1907, ibid.
62 Minute by Harrington, Jan. 18, 1907, ibid.
63 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, Jan. 21, 1907, and Grey to Clerk, Jan. 21,
1907; ibid.
64 Hohler to Grey, Dec. 24, 1907, ibid.
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pian holdings. After much wrangling, the British succeeded in keep-
ing the border at the line set by Harrington and Menilek in the
previous December.
The final agreement called for a line which,
starting from the junction of the River Dawa with the River Ganale, fol-
lows the thalweg of the River Dawa to Ursulli, and from that point fol-
lows the tribal limits between the Gurre and the Borana to Gebel Kuffole;
from Gebel Kuffole the line passes through Moyale, Burrole, El Dimtu,
Furroli, Dugga Kakulla, Burrchuma, Afur. From there the lines goes to
the creek at the south end of Lake Stefanie, thence due west to Lake
Rudolph, thence northwest across Lake Rudolph to the point of the
peninsula east of Sanderson Gulf, thence along the western shore of that
peninsula to the mouth, or marshes at the mouth, of the River Kibish
[River Sacchi], thence along the thalweg of the river to latitude 5°25'
north; from there due west to a point 30° 15' longitude east of Greenwich,
thence the line follows this degree of longitude to its intersection with
latitude 5°40' north and runs from there to the intersection of the 6°
north latitude with the 35° of longitude east of Greenwich.
Tribes on both sides of the line were given "the right to use the
grazing grounds on the other side as in the past,” and free access
to wells was guaranteed. The agreement further stipulated that
“both governments shall send commissioners, who shall by concert
delimit the exact line of the frontier.”65 Menilek told Thomas
Hohler, the British charge d'affaires, that he was content that “the
Agreement should remain in its present irregular form. He
[Menilek] wishes to put it in the ordinary form of a Treaty when
the Commissioners shall have finished their labours, and he ex-
pressed the desire that they might commence them with the least
possible delay.”66
As their chief commissioner the British assigned Major Gwynn,
who had already delimited the Sudan-Ethiopia border. 67 But Ethio-
pia assigned no one, since Menilek was incapacitated by illness and
the Council of Ministers was unwilling to take the responsibility. 68
65 Treaty of Dec. 6, 1907, FO 401/11.
66 Hohler to Grey, Jan. 1, 1908, ibid.
67 CO to FO, April 9, 1908, and Grey to Harrington, April 10, 1908; ibid.
68 Hervey to Grey, n.d., ibid. Menilek’s serious illness and ultimate
paralysis threw the Ethiopian government into a state of chaos, and govern-
ment officials became unwilling to make decisions regarding internal or foreign
policy, lest Menilek’s successor later accuse them of betraying their country.
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Since the delimitation expedition had to leave Addis Ababa in
October in order to finish its work before the beginning of the long
rains in late June, it was suggested that Major Gwynn should start
immediately and meet the Ethiopian commissioners at Dolo and
Ursulli in mid-December. The British government agreed to this
plan, 69 but Lord Hervey, the British charge d’affaires in Addis
Ababa, reported that the Ethiopian government seemed to be taking
no action. 70 Hervey interpreted this inaction to mean that Ethiopia
would be willing to abide by the British commissioners’ decisions. 71
In the meantime Hervey wrote: “Owing to the protracted illness
of the Emperor Menelek, and the consequent loosening of his grip
on the outlying portion of his domains, a state of lawlessness exists
on the southern frontier unparalleled in recent years.”72 He recom-
mended that, “Given the apathetic attitude of the Abyssinian au-
thorities, the only satisfactory solution of the question is the prompt
establishment of a force under our control sufficiently strong to
turn back any ordinary-sized bands found crossing the line.”73
Major Gwynn also realized that only effective patrolling would stop
the encroachment of Ethiopians into British East Africa, and there-
fore he suggested a number of border changes to make the frontier
more easily defensible by moving the previously arranged line
around Moyale slightly farther north. This arrangement would
provide Great Britain with the wells at Churre Moyale and Fort
Harrington, thus permitting continuous patrolling and communica-
tion along the border. 74 In compensation, the wells of Chillanko and
There followed a breakdown of order and government generally, extending to
the border areas and seriously taxing relations between Ethiopia and its neigh-
bors. For further information, see Harold G. Marcus, “The Last Years of the
Reign of the Emperor Menelik II, 1906-1913,” Journal of Semitic Studies
,
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no. 2 (1964), 229-234.
69 Hervey to Grey, n.d., and Grey to Hervey, Oct. 16, 1908; FO 401/11.
70 Hervey to Grey, Oct. 29, 1908, ibid.
71 Hervey to Grey, Dec. 5, 1908, ibid.
72 Hervey to Grey, Oct. 30, 1908, and Nov. 7, 1908, ibid.
73 Reports of Zaphiro, Aug. 23, 1908, and Oct. 2, 1908, ibid.
74 Gwynn explained that Zaphiro had, for administrative purposes, “latterly”
claimed a number of wells which the Agreement of 1907 had placed inside
Ethiopia. Local Ethiopian officers had not disputed this action. These were the
wells which Major Gwynn now placed inside Kenya, since they were “abso-
lutely necessary” for maintenance of administration: “The Treaty [agreement
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a large piece of territory in that area would be placed within the
Ethiopian boundary. 75 When reports of Gwynn’s alterations reached
him, Menilek “is said to have informed Fitaurari Habte Giorgis [the
minister of war] that he would not consent to them,”76 since the
loss of the wells around the border region would also mean the
surrender of a sizable taxable population of Borans, whom Menilek
had always considered Ethiopians. Furthermore, if Great Britain
needed the wells to control the border, Ethiopia needed them to
control its Boran population.77 In March 1909, the Council of
Ministers sent a German named Schubert as their border commis-
sioner and then, apparently not trusting him, an all-Ethiopian com-
mission. 78
Before Major Gwynn left Ethiopia in May 1909, he explained his
changes to Fitaurari Habte Giorgis and Naggadras Haile Giorgis,
the foreign minister, and said that any future border dispute would
be the fault of the Ethiopian government, which had not had its
commissioners ready in time. The two Ethiopians said only that they
would compare Gwynn’s border with the conclusions reached by
their own commission. 79 Meanwhile, Britain continued to occupy
Churre Moyale and Fort Harrington, and Hervey was instructed not
to enter into any discussion of the issue until Gwynn’s report and
maps were finished. If the Ethiopian government should complain,
of 1907] excluded almost all the permanent water supplies from British ter-
ritory. To the east of Churre Moyale there is no permanent water near the
frontier for about 100 miles, and to the west for about 130 miles. Accordingly
it was necessary either to regularise or abandon Mr. Zaphiro’s claims.” Gwynn
decided to “regularise” them and adopted the view that “The natural features
named in the Treaty were merely used for the identification of the line, and
not as hard and fast points to which it was necessary to adhere.” He felt that
he could balance concessions and was free, within reasonable limits, to intro-
duce modifications where necessary to secure a workable frontier; “a frontier
which could not be administered would have been unworkable.” Gwynn to
FO, July 27, 1909, FO 401/13.
75 Gwynn to Hervey, Jan. 27, 1909, FO 401/12.
76 Hervey to Grey, March 20, 1909, ibid.
77 Thesiger to Sir P. Girouard, Nov. 9, 1910, FO 403/320. Girouard was
governor of Kenya and Wilfred Thesiger was British minister after Harrington
had retired.
78 Hervey to Grey, April 17, 1909, FO 401/12.
79 Hervey to Grey, April 28, 1909, ibid.
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he was to reiterate that the fault was its own because it had not sent
commissioners to accompany Gwynn “in accordance with the recog-
nised arrangement.”80
The Ethiopian government continued to reject the Gwynn line;
but on January 31, 1910, Thesiger met with several high Ethiopian
officials, and they agreed that “until the question of Major Gwynn’s
line was settled matters should remain as they were”—Britain was
thus granted the de facto right to hold the appropriated wells pend-
ing final settlement. Plans were underway to create an administra-
tion for the northern frontier district of Kenya; “to make the frontier
into a practically independent district, with the boundaries already
mentioned [the Gwynn line] communicating directly both with
Nairobi and Adis Ababa”; and to garrison the border with one
hundred and twenty soldiers commanded by a British officer
assisted by Zaphiro. 81 After Thesiger had informed the Ethiopian
government of these plans, he reported that the Ethiopians were
uneasy about them, since they felt that the placement of British
regular troops along the border implied an intention of altering the
frontier by force. Thesiger wrote that he hoped he had lessened
these fears by explaining that Ethiopia would always be consulted
before Britain took any action affecting the border, and, “should
any debatable points arise, we should do our best to settle them
between us in a temporary and friendly manner pending the final
decision.”82
A month later Grey authorized Thesiger to reopen the frontier
negotiations at any time that appeared suitable; speed was no longer
a factor now that Britain was taking steps to protect its side of the
border. The negotiations were to be carried out on the basis of the
Gwynn line, which Grey regarded as fair to Ethiopia and “of ad-
ministrative necessity” to Great Britain. 83 Thus the British position
was fairly well established before the reopening of the discussions
on July 23 at a meeting of the ministers, chaired by Fitaurari Habte
Giorgis. If the British position appeared firm, the Ethiopian policy
was “intractable.” The ministers asked for removal of Gwynn’s
80 Grey to Hervey, July 22, 1909, FO 401/13.
81 Memo by Capt. Barret, n.d., FO 401/14.
82 Thesiger to Grey, Feb. 4, 1910, ibid.
83 Grey to Thesiger, March 8, 1910, ibid.
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border beacons, accused Britain of annexing a large portion of
territory without discussion, and demanded that a joint commission
delimit the border, as provided in the Agreement of 1907. “Under
these conditions all discussion was impossible, and the whole morn-
ing was wasted in attempting to show that the removal of the
beacons could not be allowed and that they themselves were
entirely to blame for not having sent their commission as agreed
upon.” Another meeting was set, at which time Thesiger hoped to
persuade the Ethiopian government to accept the Gwynn line, “at
least as a basis of discussion—a thing which they absolutely refuse
to do at present.”84
At the second meeting on August 1, the general tone was “more
reasonable, but still far from satisfactory.” The Ethiopian govern-
ment contended that the old Maud-Butter line had taken away a
large amount of territory from the Ethiopian Boran tribes, and it
had hoped that the delimitation would return this; instead, “they
found that the new line absorbed still more of their territory.”
Thesiger continued to insist that Gwynn’s line be used as a basis for
discussion, especially since he knew that the Ethiopian government
could not control the movement of hunters and soldiers near its
border. 85
The fact that the Abyssinian Government cannot control their frontier is
our strongest argument, and I have given them to understand that, although
I am anxious to settle this matter on a friendly basis, if they persist in
refusing their consent [to Gwynn’s line], and in raiding our territory,
there will be nothing left but to take strong measures, as a continuance of
the present state of affairs is bound sooner or later to cause serious com-
plications.86
During an interview between Thesiger and Habte Giorgis, the
latter surprisingly “acknowledged that they had practically no
control over the Lake Rudolph tribes, and that it was difficult to
keep the hunters in hand.” Thesiger took this opportunity to stress
the “absolute necessity” of accepting Gwynn’s line, since it would
create an easily controllable border, and again warned that con-
tinued raiding would ultimately tax the good relations between
84 Thesiger to Grey, July 28, 1910, FO 401/15.
85 Thesiger to Grey, Aug. 4, 1910, ibid.
86 Thesiger to Hope, Aug. 31, 1910, ibid.
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Great Britain and Ethiopia. 87 When in mid-October the Ethiopian
government still refused to discuss the Gwynn line, Thesiger sug-
gested that Britain, after the next raid, ought to occupy Gwynn’s
line completely so that patrolling could be made effective. The
Ethiopian government would be forced to take the matter more
seriously: “we must ... be prepared ... to take a strong line, and
I am convinced that to do so after due warning will enhance our
prestige here, and will not lead to any serious complications.”88
On November 26, 1910, the Council of Ministers again insisted
that they need not accept the Gwynn line because the delimitation
commission had not included an Ethiopian. Thesiger regarded this
view as totally negative and wrote: “It is impossible to discuss any
question with the present Government, each member of which is
intensely afraid of accepting any responsibility, and dares not give
any opinion lest he should be accused of betraying the interests of
his country.” He again suggested an “energetic policy” to show the
Ethiopian government how seriously His Majesty’s Government con-
sidered the problem. 89 He then reiterated his earlier position in a
letter to Ras Tasamma, the regent:
The events of the past four years have shown that the Abyssinian Govern-
ment cannot prevent their hunters, soldiers, and tribes from raiding our
territory, and it is therefore absolutely essential that the line should be so
altered as to give us certain wells which will enable us to patrol the
whole frontier, and, in conjunction with the Abyssinian frontier police, to
stop . . . raids, which must otherwise lead to disputes between the two
countries, which we should both regret.90
Tasamma answered, according to Thesiger, that he dared not
make any further concessions to the British, particularly since many
Ethiopians already considered the 1907 agreement to be unjust.
“He was not Menelik, and if as Regent he consented to give us what
we required, his position, which, as I must know, was at the present
moment not of the strongest, would be much weakened, and he
would certainly be accused of having sold his country.” The Ras
then suggested, Thesiger continued, that he would consider the
87 Thesiger to Grey, Sept. 1, 1910, ibid.
88 Thesiger to Grey, Oct. 18, 1910, ibid.
89 Thesiger to Grey, Nov. 27, 1910, ibid.
90 Thesiger to Ras Tasamma, Nov. 28, 1910, ibid.
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port of Zeila sufficient compensation for the necessary changes along
the southern border, and even for some along the western border.91
Although in 1909 and 1910 the Somali protectorate government had
made several serious moves to withdraw its administration from all
but the coastal areas,92 the Foreign Office refused to consider any
cession of land in the protectorate. On the other hand, Grey ad-
mitted: “There would appear to be little or no hope for Mr.
Thesiger being able to obtain the voluntary recognition by the
Abyssinian Government of Major Gwynn’s line as the true frontier,
Moreover, the internal political condition of the country is precari-
ous, and ... it would not be advisable to alienate the Shoan party
or other influential rulers in Southern Abyssinia by an aggressive
frontier policy.” Accordingly, Thesiger was instructed to let the
situation remain as it was, pending further negotiations and so long
as there was no serious raiding.93
In late February Thesiger informed the Council of Ministers that
His Majesty’s Government consented to postpone further discussion
of the southern frontier until the Ethiopian political situation had
eased, provided that there was no serious raiding; in the meantime
British frontier officials would continue to maintain their present
position. He wrote: “While relieved that further discussion on this
question was postponed, they expressed considerable indignation
that I should have declared that under any circumstance we should
occupy the line without their consent, which meant to say that if
they would not agree to the new frontier we should take it by force,
and that it was unjust to punish the country for the acts of a few
robbers whom they could not control.” Thesiger insisted that all
raiding was the Ethiopian government’s responsibility and that the
British government was tired of ineffectual steps. He felt this state-
ment had made a strong enough impression on the council: “for
some time to come the Abyssinian Government will prevent any
serious raids, and this period could be utilised to establish ourselves
firmly from the administrative and commercial point of view.”94
91 Thesiger to Grey, Dec. 9, 1910, ibid.
92 Thesiger to Grey, March 31, 1910, FO 401/14; FO to CO, May 5, 1910,
ibid; Manning to Earl of Crewe, lune 2, 1910, FO 401/15.
93 FO to CO, Ian. 12, 1911, FO 403/420.
94 Thesiger to Grey, March 3, 1911, ibid.
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4
The border problem was allowed to rest for a few months, but
in May 1911, the Ethiopian government, in an attempt to improve
its position, tried to lay claim by occupation to an area north of
Lake Rudolf which, according to the agreement of 1907, was to be
British. The governor of this frontier territory, Dejjaz Berru, stated
that all Turkana and Dodosi were Ethiopian “and had been held
and taxed by his predecessor . . . Therefore accusations of raiding
[in his area] fell to the ground, for the country mentioned was his.”
Thesiger replied that the territory was British and that the Dodosi
were ten days’ journey from the Ethiopian side of the border. The
Ethiopians held stubbornly to their view that they “had certainly
held both Turkhana and Dodosi;
. . . that no one knew where the
. . . line on the map was on the ground; that the country had never
been British; . . . that there were no British officers ever seen there;
and that Abyssinia could not give up country which she had held
without dispute for fifteen years.” The Ethiopians, wrote Doughty-
Wylie, hoped to legitimize their claim by requesting that “no taxes
be collected in the countries in question by the British pending an
agreement,”95 but Thesiger entirely rejected their claims: “I cannot
listen to any claim put forward by the Abyssinian Government to
administer even the smallest part of it or to tax any single native
living there.”96
In the summer of 1911, Thesiger, in London on home leave,
recommended that the authorities of the British East African pro-
tectorate should steadily patrol the country in the neighborhood
of the Gwynn line and arrest all raiders; if this could be done, he
felt that “the Abyssinians would, in all probability themselves ask
for a definite settlement of the frontier at no very distant date.”97
But even a request by the Colonial Office that the authorities in
Uganda survey the Ethiopia-Uganda border was refused, because
95 Doughty-Wylie to Grey, May 6, 1911, ibid. In this dispatch, Doughty-
Wylie, the second officer of the British legation during Thesiger’s tenure of
office, reports what happened at a recent meeting between the council and
Thesiger.
96 Thesiger to Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 5, 1911, ibid.
97 FO to CO, July 17, 1911, FO 403/421.
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the director of surveys in Entebbe could not spare a surveyor.98 For
some reason, however, the general position along the southern
border “greatly improved as the continual raids which took place at
such frequent intervals during the year 1910 . . . completely ceased.”
The Ethiopian government, moreover, continued its de facto recog-
nition of Moyale and Fort Harrington as British territory,99 a con-
cession that allowed the British government to carry out its plans
for the administration of the frontier district.
The situation remained relatively quiet until mid- 1913, when
Ethiopian troops crossed the border to follow a large number of
Boran Galla who had crossed to the British side. 100 The district
commissioner at Moyale felt that the situation would be alleviated
only if the Boran could be persuaded to return to Ethiopia; 101 but
the British government, apparently regarding the time ripe to make
a stand, instructed the governor of British East Africa to allow the
Boran to remain within his territory. Thesiger was instructed to be
firm in the face of any Ethiopian complaints and to protest loudly
if the raiding continued, as Grey thought likely. 102 The situation was
aggravated when Captain Aylmer, a British frontier inspector, was
killed by Ethiopian hunters about eighty miles east of Moyale. 103
Grey apparently hoped that these incidents would force the Ethi-
opian government to concede Gwynn’s border rectification. When
Thesiger met with the Council of Ministers in June 1913, he told
them that the British government now considered it
absolutely necessary, for the prevention of such incidents in the future,
that a rectification of the frontier should be made which would give . . .
[Great Britain] permanent water ... so that we could patrol our side of
the line effectively
. . . that it was only out of consideration for the weak-
ness of the Ethiopian Government that His Majesty’s had been so patient
in the face of continued provocation both on the western and southern
98 Memo by Allen, Sept. 15, 1911, ibid.
99 Annual Report on the situation in Abyssinia for the year 1911, by Thesiger,
April 22, 1912, FO 403/429.
100 Governor of East African Protectorate to Harcourt, May 21, 1913, FO
403/438.
101 D.C., Moyale to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, May 1, 1913, ibid.
102 Grey to Thesiger, July 3, 1913, FO 402/439.
103 Enquiry into death of Capt. Aylmer, n.d., ibid.
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frontiers, and that . . . they were now forced in self-defence to insist on
the acceptance of the above measures. 104
The Ethiopian government played for time and, when the situation
still did not improve, Thesiger asked for instructions to present the
Ethiopians with “a definite demand” for a frontier change, "giving
them [the Ministers] clearly to understand that a refusal to meet our
wishes will mean the breaking-off of relations between the two
countries with all the consequences which may ensue.”105 The
British government, however, drew back, cautioning: "If by break-
ing off relations you mean merely to remain at Adis Ababa but to
hold no official communications with the Abyssinian Government
until they agree to your terms, you may use this threat, but there
can be no question of your leaving Adis Ababa or of committing
His Majesty’s Government to any use of force such as a military
expedition.”106 Thesiger accordingly met with the Council of Min-
isters, presumably in a more conciliatory fashion. They continued
to equivocate, stating that "it was out of the question for the Coun-
cil, as it now stood, to give a definite answer on such an important
question,” and requesting postponement of the discussion until
after the rains in mid-October, when the council could meet under
the presidency of Lij Iyyasu, the crown prince. Thesiger pointed
out that only a small amount of territory was under discussion and
that the wells at Chillanko seemed adequate compensation. When
the council remained adamant,107 the British government moved to
reinforce the garrison at Moyale.108
In mid-November the Council of Ministers under Lij Iyyasu
finally discussed the southern border problem and concluded that
"the red line [of 1907] had been recognised by the Emperor
Menelek and could not be altered during his lifetime without his
consent.” It apparently made no difference that Menilek was totally
incapacitated, or that Lij Iyyasu and the Council of Ministers repre-
sented the only Ethiopian government. The one remaining solution
104 Thesiger to Grey, June 19, 1913, ibid.
105 Thesiger to Grey, June 27, 1913, ibid.
106 Grey to Thesiger, July 26, 1913, ibid.
107 Thesiger to Grey, July 31, 1913, ibid.
108 CO to FO, Oct. 8, 1913. ibid.
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to the problem now seemed to be to increase the strength of the
British frontier garrisons, 109 but the British government was loath
to use such force and the matter could not be settled.
Thus, in 1914, the southern border situation was at an impasse.
Britain held de facto control of several waterholes not included in
British territory by the agreement of 1907 and was continuing to
press the Ethiopian government to accept the Gwynn delimitation.
The Ethiopian government clung steadfastly to the “red line” of
1907 and was unwilling to surrender the strategic wells demanded
by the British. It is interesting to note that, despite the internal
problems which continued to beset Ethiopia after Menilek’s death
in 1913, its government remained strong enough, and determined
enough, to resist British pressure to recognize the border. And this
border has only recently been settled between Kenya and Ethiopia
by the cession to Ethiopia of the disputed strategic wells.
Ethiopia’s southern expansion can be better understood within
the context of the empire’s general growth, which was closely asso-
ciated with the accession of Menilek II to the throne of Shoa in
1865 and to the imperial crown in 1889. Generally speaking, Meni-
lek’s motives for his policy of territorial aggrandizement were to
strengthen and increase his internal political power; to regain those
areas which Ethiopian tradition suggested had been lost to Moslem
and Galla invaders during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;
and to keep the European imperialists away from the heartland of
Ethiopia. Although considerable expansion of Ethiopia’s borders
occurred before 1896, the Ethiopian victory over Italy at Adwa in
that year threw the various adjacent European powers off balance,
and provided Menilek with greater opportunities for expansion and
with a large, experienced, well-equipped army to carry out his
commands. Menilek’s expansionary policies prior to 1896 were
aimed primarily toward the ultimate goal of gaining the imperial
crown; after 1896 his intent was to enlarge his empire as much as
possible without provoking conflict with the adjacent European
colonies and protectorates.
This essay on the southern-border situation clearly illustrates the
109 Thesiger to Grey, Nov. 29, 1913, ibid.
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methods that the Ethiopian government used to increase its
domains. The basic philosophy was similar to the European idea of
“effective occupation.” The Ethiopians infiltrated areas, set up posts
and fortified villages, and proceeded systematically to subdue the
local population, often a violent process. The European govern-
ments with paper claims to the occupied areas were thus presented
with a series of faits accomplis to which they could protest only
ineffectually—they were not at all certain of what line of action to
take in the face of the strength and vitality of Menilek’s government.
The emperor consistently worked within the framework of his
declaration of 1891, implementing it to the best of his abilities. He
expanded the borders of his country to the geographical limits de-
scribed by the highlands and the key river systems, thus creating
the Ethiopian empire that exists today.

XThe Triumph of the Congo Reform
Movement, 1905-1908
by
WM. ROGER LOUIS
Assistant Professor of History,
Yale University

A sort of gale is at present blowing upon the Congo State. This gale has come
from England.
M. Woeste in the Belgian Parliament, 1906 1
I am convinced that when the whole story of the Congo has passed into
history the Belgian people will feel that the work of the Congo Reform As-
sociation was a work of friendship and enlightenment in their behalf.
Sir Roger Casement, 19132
The paramount issues in the “Congo controversy” of the early
twentieth century were constitutional government versus what
might be described euphemistically as benevolent despotism, and
colonial development for the benefit of the Congo versus exploita-
tion of the Congo for the benefit of Belgium. The crucial years of
this controversy were 1905-1908, between the time of the publica-
tion of the report of King Leopold’s Commission of Inquiry in
November 1905 and the annexation of the Congo in November 1908.
During this period, the movement for Congo reform in Great Britain
reached full strength and contributed greatly, if not decisively,
toward Belgium’s momentous annexation of the Congo. The ac-
ceptance of colonial responsibility was perhaps the most important
decision made by a Belgian government since the separation from
Holland in 1830. For the Congo, annexation was no less momentous;
it marked the passing of the Leopoldian regime.
The outstanding feature of Leopold’s rule in the Congo was an
anachronistic despotism. In an age of constitutional monarchs, his
critics frequently pointed out, the sovereign of the Congo State
could say with more justification than Louis XIV, Tetat, c’est moi.”3
1 Annales Parlementaires, Chambre, Feb. 27, 1906.
2 Casement to E. D. Morel, June 11, 1913, Morel Papers (MP), London
School of Economics. Quotations from the Morel Papers by permission of the
Librarian.
3 Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), 198; see also
F. Cattier, Etude sur la Situation de VEtat Independant du Congo (Brussels,
1906), 324-327; E. Vandervelde, Souvenirs d’un Militant Socialist (Paris, 1939),
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As criticism of his “Oeuvre Africaine” grew, along with his dividends,
as he acquired the epithet “le Roi batisseur” because of public works
built in Belgium with Congo funds, Leopold became less and less
patient with those who doubted his good faith, more and more
authoritarian, if not in his capacity as constitutional monarch of
Belgium, at least in his role as sovereign of the Congo State. As the
personification of Belgian patriotism, he intended to transform the
Congo into a Belgian colony; but as the revenues of the Congo
State increased he became less inclined to hand over his African
empire to Belgium. Why did he finally yield? In 1905-1908, the
Congo State was nearly wrecked on the shoals of public opinion.
Leopold, the navigator, saw that the greatest danger was Great
Britain. As E. D. Morel, the secretary of the Congo Reform As-
sociation, prophesied: “if the British Government stands firm—the
‘Congo Free State’ slave-ship will break in pieces, and disappear
beneath the waves of public execration.”4
The Congo reform movement (though it had its foreign counter-
parts ) was essentially a British movement. The anti-Congo campaign
was begun in the mid-1890s by the secretary of the Aborigines
Protection Society, H. R. Fox Bourne, at a time when Europe and
America were oblivious to what he called the “Civilization in Congo-
land”;
5
it was ended two decades later, in 1913, by Morel, five years
after the European powers and the United States began to regard
the Congo controversy as a dead issue. On the basis of missionary
reports and articles in the Belgian press, Fox Bourne and Morel
(then editor of the West African MailQ ) protested the system of
commercial monopolies and the alleged cruelty to Africans in the
Congo State—which in their eyes violated the two main premises
of the Berlin Act of 1885: free trade and welfare of the indigenous
population. The indignation at the “Congo atrocities” stirred up by
Fox Bourne and Morel had concrete results in March 1903, when
70-71; and Jean Stengers, Belgique et Congo: L’Elaboration de la Charte
Coloniale (Brussels, 1963), 27-29.
4 Official Organ of the Congo Reform Association, Aug. 1907.
5 This was the title of his book published in London in 1903.
6 For Morel’s background as journalist, see F. Seymour Cocks, E. D. Morel:
The Man and His Work (London, 1920), chap. 2.
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the House of Commons passed a resolution “to abate the evils” in
the Congo.7
In accordance with the resolution, the British government on
August 8, 1903, dispatched a circular on the alleged abuses in the
Congo to the powers signatory to the Berlin Act. 8 From June to
September of the same year the British consul in the Congo, Roger
Casement, traveled in the interior of the Congo State.9 The publica-
tion of his report in February 1904, 10 followed in March by the
founding of Morel’s Congo Reform Association (which in a few
months included as members ten peers and over forty members of
Parliament), marked an important point in the Congo reform cam-
paign. “No one reading this report,” commented the conservative
Morning Post
,
“can come to any other conclusion than that the sys-
tem in force in King Leopold’s kingdom rests on the enslavement of
the native population.”11
Casement’s report temporarily united the British public,12 but by
the end of 1904 the British agitation for Congo reform had subsided.
According to one of the stalwart defenders of the Congo State,
James J. Harrison (whom Casement once described as an “addle-
pated dwarf impresario”13 ), “public opinion has veered round and
begun to doubt the truth of all these countless atrocities.”14 One rea-
son for the temporary eclipse of the Congo reform movement was
7 Parliamentary Debates
,
CXXXII, May 20, 1903, 1304; on this debate, see
Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (Oxford, 1919),
131.
8 Africa no. 14 (1903), Accounts and Papers, LXII.
9 See Wm. Roger Louis, “Roger Casement and the Congo,” Journal of Afri-
can History, V (1964), 99-120.
10 Africa no. 1 (1904), Accounts and Papers, LXII.
11 Morning Post, Feb. 15, 1904. Quotations from newspapers are from lead
articles unless otherwise indicated.
12
“Nothing, indeed, is more remarkable in the movement for the reform of
the Congo administration than the absolute unanimity with which the demand
is advanced and supported by every section of public opinion in the country
. . . Government and people are at one in demanding that an end shall be put
to a state of things which recalls the worst days of the Spanish conquests in
the new world.” Ibid., June 10, 1904.
13 Casement to Morel, n.d. (May? 1905), MP.
14 Harrison to The Times, Oct. 1, 1904.
272 Wm. Roger Louis
the reply by the Congo government to Casement’s report. 15 The
strength of Casement’s inquiry—the reason it carried conviction
—
was his minute description of specific examples of maladministration,
such as the one of a Congolese boy named Epondo, whose right
hand, Casement reported, had been hacked off because of failure to
fulfill the rubber quota. The Epondo case was of singular importance
in Casement’s report because it was the only atrocity which Case-
ment had the opportunity to investigate personally. 16 When the
Congo authorities in their reply produced evidence certified by an
American missionary that Epondo had lied to Casement and that
Epondo’s hand had been bitten off by a wild boar, many English-
men began to doubt the validity of other parts of his account.
There were other reasons for the waning of the reform agitation
in late 1904. In December, Morel was temporarily discredited by an
unscrupulous Italian officer in the Congo State service named Bene-
detti, whose disclosures that the Congo Reform Association had tried
to bribe him gave the erroneous impression, according to the Morn-
ing Post, that Morel was “a suborner of witnesses and an atrocity
monger caught red-handed in . . . his trade.”17 At the same time, the
Federation for the Protection of Belgian Interests Abroad, supported
by such prominent Englishmen as Sir Alfred Jones and Sir Hugh
Gilzean Reid, increased its attacks against the anti-Congo move-
ment, alleging that the motives of King Leopold’s British critics
were, “if not the secret political ambitions of the British Govern-
ment, at least the thinly veiled covetousness of the merchants of
Liverpool, who look on the Congo as an easy prey.”18 Between the
accusations and counter-accusations of the association and the fed-
eration, even the most astute, impartial student of the Congo con-
troversy could not ascertain the truth; as The Times complained
in January 1905, “no one can have perused the voluminous cor-
15 Africa no. 7 (1904), Accounts and Papers
,
LXII.
16 See Casement to Famall, Feb. 20, 1904, FO 10/808 (Public Record Of-
fice, London), in which Casement elaborates circumstances concerning his re-
port and protests against the Foreign Office’s “editing.”
17 Morning Post, May 12, 1905; for a different interpretation of the Bene-
detti affair, see F. Masoin, Histoire de YEtat Independant du Congo, 2 vols.
(Namur, 1912), I, 143.
18 Morning Post, May 12, 1905.
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respondence on the subject . . . without a certain feeling of hope-
lessness as to the utterly contradictory nature of the evidence
given.”19
The founders of the Congo Reform Association, Casement and
Morel, were absolutely convinced of the justice of their cause.
Moved by an apocalyptic vision of evil in the Congo, they set out in
1904 to organize a crusade “with one clear, sole, determined end
—
namely to free the Congo people”: “They, poor beings, are being
treated in a way in which no other human race on this earth is
being treated—their case is a special one—their need an appalling
one.”20 Casement, as a civil servant, could not participate publicly
in the Congo reform movement. As the “sleeping partner” in the
Congo Reform Association,21 his role in the controversy after 1904
was restricted to advising Morel.
Morel was a man of marked intelligence and prodigious energy,
who once while organizing the association wrote four hundred let-
ters in ten days. He was an exceptionally gifted propagandist, able
to persuade rationally as well as to excite emotionally. His con-
tribution to the anti-Congo campaign was much more than rabble-
rousing and tub-thumping. While Fox Rourne attacked the atrocities
in the Congo, Morel attacked the system of administration that he
believed inevitably led to atrocities. Morel saw the root of the
Leopoldian system as the denial to Africans of their right to the
land and its produce. In the words of one of the prominent figures
of the reform movement, Sir Charles Dilke: “You showed us that
all depended upon the right of the original black inhabitants of the
soil to own their property and carry on trade.”22 As Morel wrote in
Red Rubber
,
his most famous and widely read work, the Congo
State’s administration was based on the principle that “the rubber
which grows in the forest does not belong to the native. It belongs
to King Leopold!”23 The Africans were compelled to pay taxes.
19 The Times, Ian. 25, 1905.
20 Casement to Fox Bourne, fan. 25, 1904, Aborigines Protection Society
Papers (APS), Rhodes House, Oxford.
21 Fox Bourne to Morel, March 10, 1904, MP.
22 Dilke to Morel, Feb. 6, 1908, Dilke Papers (DP), British Museum Add.
Mss. 43917.
23 E. D. Morel, Red Rubber (New York, 1906), 204.
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Since they had no means to pay, they were forced to work for the
state (or the concessionaire companies) and to collect for its bene-
fit the rubber and other forest produce as “taxes in kind.” “So he
[Leopold] claimed the labor of the people to bring him their wealth
which he has pirated.”24 The Congo government, as far as Morel
was concerned, was a mere commercial enterprise, whose slogan
might be expressed as, “No rubber, no profit; no compulsion, no
rubber.”25 The result, Morel wrote in 1906, was that “the ‘Congo
Free State’ has long ceased to exist.” “It has given place to a
political monster and international outlaw . . . The reek of its abom-
inations mounts to Heaven in fumes of shame. It pollutes the earth.
Its speedy disappearance is imperative for Africa, and for the
world.”26
In Belgium, Casement’s report and the denunciations of the
Congo State were received with almost universal skepticism. Leopold
was at the zenith of his power. With the exception of the radicals
and socialists, whose attacks he dismissed as contemptuously as he
did those by British humanitarians, the commercial prosperity of
the Congo State was admired throughout Belgium. The clerical gov-
ernment, devoting all its energies to prevent the advance of social-
ism, therefore allowed Leopold a free hand in the Congo. Belgium
was ruled by a triumvirate: Leopold; Woeste, the leader of the
ultraclerical, ultraconservative majority of the Belgian parliament;
and de Smet de Naeyer, the prime minister, through whose emi-
nent financial ability were administered the sovereign’s grandiose
public-works projects.
Outwardly Leopold’s position was impregnable; nevertheless, the
British anti-Congo campaign had a profound effect on his rule. His
response to the indictment of the Casement report was to appoint,
in July 1904, a commission of inquiry, the purpose of which, at least
in the opinion of the Congo reformers, was to placate the British
Foreign Office. Leopold feared that the British might succeed in
persuading the other powers to intervene in the Congo; the ap-
pointment of the Commission of Inquiry was a move to check this
possibility; in Casement’s view it was “not intended and never was
24 ibid.
25 Morning Post, March 23, 1904.
26 Morel, Red Rubber, 212-213.
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intended to find out anything detrimental to the Congo Govern-
ment’s interests.”27 In Belgium, however, the appointment of the
commission was interpreted as a genuine attempt by Leopold to
sift the facts and arrive at the truth—to stifle his British critics by
proving that their charges were false. Even those in the Congo gov-
ernment itself took the commission seriously: “They express such
confidence in the honesty of their commission,” Sir Constantine
Phipps, the British minister in Brussels, reported, “that I cannot be-
lieve any tricks will be played with the evidence.”28 The commis-
sioners, de Schumacher (Swiss), Janssens (Belgian), and Nisco
(Italian) were suspected in Britain for Congophile tendencies; but
they were accepted nevertheless as men of integrity who would try
to reach an impartial judgment. Only the Congo Reform Association
regarded the commission as an utter farce.29 Morel charged that its
purpose was merely to soothe public opinion, and it did have this
effect. The British Foreign Office, as well as most of the British press,
suspended judgment on Leopold’s Congo, pending the commis-
sion’s report.30
Leopold fully recognized the dangers of a censorious report from
his own commissioners.31 He attempted to diminish its impact in the
same way that he had tried futilely to suppress the Casement re-
port,32 by striking a bargain with the British Foreign Office. Leo-
pold’s agent in these negotiations was his consul for the Congo State
at Liverpool, Sir Alfred Jones.
Jones was the leading English opponent of the Congo reformers
—in Casement’s view a “poisonous serpent,”33 “a bold and original
27 Casement to Fox Bourne, private and confid., Oct. 15, 1904, APS (Case-*
ment’s emphasis).
28 Phipps to Campbell, private, Sept. 30, 1904, FO 10/811.
29 See, e.g., Morel’s letter to the Morning Post
,
March 21, 1905.
30 See, e.g., The Times, Nov. 6, 1905, and Official Organ, Nov. 1905.
31 See especially J. Stengers, “Le Role de la Commission d’Enquete de 1904-5
au Congo,” Annuaire de Vlnstitut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientates et
Slaves: Melanges Henri Gregoire, X (1950), 701-726.
32 See F. H. Villiers’ memos of Dec. 10, 1903, FO 10/806, and Dec. 21,
1903, FO 10/807; Casement to Fox Bourne, private and confid., Oct. 15, 1904,
APS; and Ruth Slade, English-Speaking Missions in the Congo Independent
State, 1878-1908 (Brussels, 1959), 287-288.
33 Casement to Morel, Dec. 14, 1904, MP.
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liar.”34 In the eyes of his critics he was the British equivalent of
Leopold on a lesser scale, a curious mixture of patriot, philanthropist,
and pirate. Even the Congophobe Morning Post admitted that Jones
was “a man respected in many walks of public life.”35 He was
president of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, as well as con-
sul for the Congo State; the latter position enabled him, in his own
words, “to promote the interests of civilization, good government,
sanitation, and development of British commercial interests [in the
Congo].”36 Jones’s African Steamship Company (a subsidiary of
the Elder-Dempster Company) enjoyed a monopoly of traffic be-
tween Belgium and the Congo under contract with the Congo gov-
ernment. The head of a prominent Liverpool trading concern, John
Holt (from whom the Congo Reform Association received much of
its financial backing37 ) charged that Jones’s “steamers are employed
in carrying the bloodstained rubber of the Congo to Antwerp.”
Jones, in brief, was accused widely, in the words of an anonymous
critic, of being the unprincipled agent of “an enterprise piratical
rather than commercial.”38 When goaded into public apology for
his association with the Congo State, he emphasized the difficulties
of introducing both trade and civilization into tropical Africa. The
London Star commented, with an acumen valid for other Congo-
philes
:
Sir Alfred feels his position acutely. It is not a nice position. It is, as he
says, a position of considerable odium ... he ventures to hope that nobody
who knows him would believe him to be callous or cruel, or capable of
indifference to human suffering. That is true. His fault is less valiant. It is
his moral patience which displeases his friends. It is his Christian tolerance
which vexes them. It is his power of extenuating the crimes of others
34 Lying “is his chief asset in the game of life.” Casement to Morel, Nov. 2,
1905, MP.
35 Morning Post, Dec. 17, 1904.
36 Jones’s statement to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, Oct. 29, 1907,
quoted in Official Organ, Nov. 1907.
37 See, e.g., Casement to Morel, May 12, 1905, MP. Full evidence of Holt’s
support of the Congo Reform Association may be found in numerous letters
from Holt to Morel in the Morel Papers. Holt himself had no financial interests
in the Congo State but had suffered heavy losses in the French Congo. See
E. D. Morel, The British Case in French Congo (London, 1903).
38 Viator to Morning Post, June 28, 1906.
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which saddens them. It is his ability to forgive wrongs done to others which
saddens them.39
Jones, like the British minister in Brussels, Phipps, believed that
the best way to achieve reform in the Congo was to cooperate with
the Congo government. “I [Jones] have preferred to work in the
way which seemed best to me for the maintenance of good relations
between Belgium and England, and for the reform of the Congo
administration, and I shall not rest satisfied until my efforts meet
with complete success. As to the consulship, I will not retain this
one day beyond the time when I discover that I cannot use it for
the good interests of humanity in that region/’40 There is no reason
to believe that Jones was insincere in his wish for Congo reform;
but, like Leopold himself, his financial connections with the Congo
government made it difficult for him to persuade others of the purity
of his motives, and left him vulnerable to charges of being represen-
tative of the “money-grubbing commercial spirit of the day.”41
Jones approached the Foreign Office in September 1905 with the
following proposal: that a British syndicate under his direction take
over the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company ( ABIR ) ,42 the con-
cessionaire company in the Congo most notorious for abuses. The
ABIR territories extended over 30,000 square miles in the Equator
district of the Congo State; the concession amounted to a monopoly
of the entire trade of the area and included the right to collect a tax
from Africans paid in rubber through forced labor. Jones’s proposal
was that the administration would be entirely in the hands of Eng-
lishmen; the only role of the Congo government would be to provide
an armed force for protection. In return, a yearly sum would be paid
to the Congo government and a share of the profits would be given
to the ABIR company until it was compensated for withdrawal of
its concession. Jones was willing to accept Leopold’s offer, if he had
the “approval of the Foreign Office.”43
39 Quoted in Official Organ, Nov. 1907.
40 lones’s statement to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce Oct. 29, 1907,
quoted in ibid.
41 Casement to Morel, April 25, 1905, MP.
42 The name is misleading. Although founded in part by British capital, con-
trol had passed into Belgian hands; the Congo State itself owned half the
shares.
43 F. H. Villiers’ memo of Sept. 8, 1905, FO 10/814. lones’s proposals on
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“This is a very puzzling question,” wrote Lord Lansdowne, the
foreign secretary. On the one hand, if the concession were rejected,
Britain would be criticized for failing to grasp an opportunity for
remedying abuses to which the British themselves had constantly
called attention. On the other hand, if a British syndicate were to
take over the concession with the approval of the Foreign Office,
the British government would incur definite responsibilities, “some
of which may be of a very inconvenient kind.”
It will not be possible for a syndicate formed in London to transform the
administration by a stroke of the pen. Many of the present local agents,
natives and Europeans, will have to be retained, and unless they “change
their spots” very rapidly, we shall have complaints of cruelty, exaction,
etc., for which we, and not the Belgian Government, will be held ac-
countable.44
Other officials in the Foreign Office agreed:
The Belgians would watch our proceedings with an exceedingly critical
eye, and exaggerate with joy any failures.45
Where a syndicate of Liverpool merchants have once tasted the sweets of
50 per cent, what prospect is there that they will voluntarily forgo these
for the sake of the Congo native?46
“I cannot help doubting,” Lansdowne said, “whether the offer is
not merely a clever move on the part of the Congo government in-
tended to discount the report of the Commission [of Inquiry], and
to place us in an embarrassing position.”47 The Foreign Office re-
fused to become entangled in Leopold’s concession scheme.48
Jones handled these negotiations with an agility, if not duplicity,
worthy of his royal patron. When he approached the Foreign Office
in September 1905, he was eager to accept Leopold’s proposal: it
was an attractive offer financially; apparently he was genuinely anx-
behalf of Leopold were made orally and are recorded in this memo. On Oct. 7,
the scheme was submitted to the Foreign Office in writing. See FO 10/815;
cf. Slade, English-Speaking Missions, 294-295.
44 Lansdowne’s minute of Sept. 10, 1905, FO 10/814.
45 Villiers’ minute of Sept. 8, 1905, ibid.
46 F. A. Campbell’s minute of Oct. 11, 1905, FO 10/815.
47 Lansdowne’s minute of Sept. 10, 1905, FO 10/814.
48 For this decision, see E. A. W. Clarke’s memo of Oct. 11, 1905, minuted
by F. A. Campbell and Lansdowne, FO 10/815.
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ious "to benefit the natives”; 49 and he could hardly afford to offend
Leopold, who might cancel his profitable steamer contract. A month
later, however, Jones had altered his views: “[he] is now equally
eager to obtain our assistance in backing out of it.”50 The British
syndicate scheme had been received hostilely in the British press; 51
and Jones had completely failed to gain the cooperation of the
British missionaries in the ABIR region.52 Steering between the
Scylla of Leopold and the Charybdis of the British public, Jones
had decided that Leopold s concessionaire company was not worth
the price of British condemnation. The Foreign Office’s refusal to
approve the scheme enabled him to save face with Leopold. The
British syndicate project foundered, along with Leopold’s attempt
to divert attention from the Commission of Inquiry report, which
was released in November 1905. 53
The Manchester Guardian interpreted the report as "a complete
vindication of those who have carried on a ceaseless agitation for
investigation and reform.”54 The Morning Post called it “one of the
most damning indictments levelled at any government in modern
times.”55 Yet on the surface the report was euphemistic, lavish in
praise of Leopold’s civilizing work in Africa, and quick in defense
of European officers of the Congo State accused of mutilating Afri-
49 Villiers’ minute of Sept. 8, 1905, FO 10/814.
50 Clarke’s memo of Oct. 11, 1905, FO 10/815.
51
“Doubtless King Leopold would have been prepared to admit a British
syndicate into the ABIR territories if he could thereby have secured the con-
tinuance of his system in the rest of the Congo State. We are not at all sure,
however, that the Sovereign of the Congo State will be pleased with Sir Alfred
lones’s candid avowal that the syndicate would enjoy the exclusive right to all
trade. Hitherto this has been disguised as the right of the state to the products
of the soil on vacant lands. Now monopoly in trade emerges naked and un-
ashamed.” Morning Post, Nov. 28, 1905.
52 See lones’s correspondence with Grattan Guinness of the Regions Beyond
Missionary Union in Morning Post, Nov. 28, 1905; Slade, English-Speaking
Missions, 294-296.
53 “The King was only waiting for Sir Alfred Jones’s answer to authorize
the issue of the report of the Commission of Inquiry.” Clarke’s minute of Oct.
11, 1905, FO 10/815. The report was published in Bulletin Ofjiciel de VEtat
Independant du Congo, 1905, 135-285.
54 Manchester Guardian, Nov. 7, 1905.
55 Morning Post, Dec. 13, 1905.
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cans. Casement himself, no doubt surprised that the report was less
of a whitewash than he had expected, described it as “a very queer
production ... I call it a series of half-truths each followed by its
qualifying whole untruth!”50 Casement’s own report had been de-
scriptive; it had not attempted to judge explicitly the good and bad
features of the administration. It had shown through specific ex-
amples merely that Africans in the Congo State were forced to work
hard, were often inadequately remunerated, and were frequently
treated cruelly. By contrast the Commission of Inquiry report was
a lengthy, analytical (though in some places naive57 ) exegesis on
good and bad colonial administration. The specific examples men-
tioned by the commissioners were given merely to substantiate their
theories, not to create an impression of maladministration. The com-
missioners argued that forced labor was necessary and justified, but
they objected to the brutal ways in which the Africans were com-
pelled to collect rubber—taking of hostages, detention of chiefs, and
the employment of sentries ( armed Africans employed as overseers )
.
They admitted as a “most legitimate” principle the state’s claim to
all “unoccupied and vacant lands”; but they concluded that “over-
restrictive interpretations and over-severe applications” of this prin-
ciple had resulted in the administration’s arrogating to itself nearly
all the land and monopolizing the “fruits of the soil.” This was the
point that Morel was so fond of making: “the root of the evil [will
remain] untouched . . . till the native of the Congo becomes once
more owner of his land and of the produce which it yields.”58
The Commission of Inquiry report proved conclusively to Belgians
and Englishmen alike that abuses existed in the Congo. It vindi-
cated the Congo reform movement, which gained strength not only
in Britain, but also on the continent: “the volume of disinterested
opinion ... all over western Europe is now rising in arms against
the atrocities of a monstrous regime.”59 In France the Congo State
56 Casement to Morel, Nov. 18, 1905, MP.
67 See Stengers, “Le Role de la Commission d’Enquete;” Cattier, Etude sur
la Situation, 15-17; and A. Stenmans, La Reprise du Congo par le Belgique
(Brussels, 1949), 297-306.
58 Morel’s interview in Morning Post, June 4, 1907. For his immediate reac-
tion to the Commission of Inquiry report, see Official Organ, Nov. 1905.
59 Manchester Guardian, Feb. 22, 1906.
The Triumph of the Congo Reform Movement 281
was denounced by Anatole France and Pierre Mille.60 In Italy the
Congo administration was discredited by disclosures that sums of
money were given to certain newspapers to publish “letters, articles
and news in favor of the Congo Free State,” and by adverse reports
from Italian officers in the Congo service.61 Most importantly, in
Belgium itself Professor Cattier published a book called Etude sur
la situation de Vetat independant du Congo, in which he cogently
argued as an acknowledged colonial expert that it was a “funda-
mental error” to admit that the finances of a colony should be de-
voted to anything other than its exclusive development. “Cattier’s
book is a great assistance to our cause,” Sir Charles Dilke wrote.62
The Belgian parliament debated Congo affairs in February and
March 1906. Emile Vandervelde, the leader of the socialist party,
called on the members of all parties as patriots and humanitarians
to reform the Congo administration. “I ask you to forget the links
which bind you . . . and to cling, above all, to that which your con-
science dictates to you. In presence of facts denounced by all mini-
sters of Christianity, Protestant and Catholic, you have no right to
remain impassive, and to wash your hands of the blood which has
been shed.”63 Vandervelde denounced the “reform commission” ap-
pointed by Leopold to consider the recommendations of the Com-
mission of Inquiry. The reform commission was composed of four-
teen members, seven of whom were officials of the Congo State,
and one an administrator of the ABIR company: “It is precisely as
though one called in a slave trader to a conference to abolish the
slave trade!”64 The attacks against the Congo State were vigorous,
the defense feeble. The debate was a decided victory in the cause of
Congo reform. 65
In June 1906, Leopold responded to the mounting pressure for
reform by decreeing “some more admirable laws.”66 Regardless of
60 See Pierre Mille, Le Congo Leopoldien (Paris, 1905).
61 See Morning Post, June 13, 1905.
62 Dilke to Lord Fitzmaurice (fragment), Feb. 16, 1906, DP.
63 Annales Parlementaires, Chambre, Feb. 20, 1906.
64 Ibid.
65 On this debate, see Stengers, Belgique et Congo, 69-72.
66 Fitzmaurice in the House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, CLIX, July 3,
1906, 1584. See also Bulletin Officiel, 1905, 226-286.
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whether the reforms were intended to be “illusory,”67 they were
overshadowed by the king’s haughty letter that accompanied them:
“My rights over the Congo are indivisible; they are the fruit of my
labors and my expenditure ... It is my duty to proclaim these rights
to the world, since Belgium possesses none in the Congo beyond
those which will come to her from me.”68 Leopold said, in effect,
that the Congo was entirely his own affair, which he would con-
duct as he saw fit. As to Belgian annexation, “at present I have noth-
ing to say.”69 Spurning international as well as Belgian opinion,
“King Leopold tries to treat the rest of the world as cavalierly as
Belgium.”70
Leopold’s Congo administration was debated in the House of
Lords a month later. Expressing the general mood of the debate,
Lord Lansdowne, then out of office, with uncharacteristic vehemence
emphasized that there was in the Congo “the existence of bondage
under the most barbarous and inhuman conditions, and maintained
for mercenary motives of the most selfish character.”71 As foreign
secretary, Lansdowne, though genuinely appalled at reports of atroc-
ities, had been hesitant and indecisive in prosecuting the anti-Congo
campaign. “Ghastly,” he once wrote about the Congo maladministra-
tion; “but I am afraid the Belgians will get hold of the stories as to
the way the natives have apparently been treated by men of our
race in Australia.”72 Relieved of his official responsibilities at the
time of the advent of the Liberal government in December 1905, he
became more bold: “Lansdowne in opposition can talk bravely
—
Lansdowne in office was a belated wayfarer seeking a harbor of
refuge to escape the pitiless gibes of Leopold and company!”73 By
contrast, Sir Edward Grey, Lansdowne’s successor, and Lord Fitz-
maurice, the new parliamentary under-secretary, were “as emphatic
as the most zealous of the reformers on the iniquity of the present
system and the necessity for its abolition.”74
67 The Times, June 18, 1906.
68 Bulletin Officiel, 1906, 289.
69 Ibid., 287-298.
70 Manchester Guardian, June 20, 1906.
71 Parliamentary Debates, CLIX, July 3, 1906, 1584.
72 Lansdowne’s minute on Mackie to Lansdowne, March 11, 1905, FO 10/
815.
73 Casement to Morel, private and confid.. July 4. 1905, MP.
74 Morning Post, Aug. 5, 1907.
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Grey was “absolutely convinced of the shame of the thing.”75
“The Sovereign of the Congo State,” he said in the House of Com-
mons in July 1906, “speaks less as a governor and more as if he were
the owner of private property ... It has become like a private pos-
session.”76 “My own personal feeling is that we are justified in any
measures which will result in taking the Congo out of the hands of
the King. He has forfeited every claim to it he ever had; and to take
the Congo away from him without compensation would be less than
justice, for it would leave him still with all the gains he has made
by his monstrous system.”77
The object of Grey’s Congo policy was the “Belgian solution”
—
in other words, Belgian annexation. Where did this idea originate,
and how did it become the grand design of the British anti-Congo
campaign? It did not start, it seems, in the British Foreign Office,
which probably would not have moved toward any solution had it
not been pressed by the strength of public sentiment. 78 It originated
in the interchange of ideas between Morel and Sir Harry Johnston.
Morel had a one-track mind. He saw the “Congo evil” as “special
and extraordinary.”79 Johnston, as an Africanist of many years’ ex-
perience in varied capacities ( and one of the early Congo explorers )
,
remembered that the early years of the Congo State’s administration
were “positively beneficent,”80 and that Britain’s own colonial record
was “very far from stainless.”81 Morel clung to his views tenaciously
and ferociously—as Casement remarked, like a “bulldog . . . very
dangerous and gripping and seeing red.”82 Johnston had trouble
75 Emmot to Morel, June 26, 1904, MP. See also Grey’s Twenty-Five Years,
2 vols. (New York, 1925), 190: “My own feeling was one of detestation of the
system and its crimes and of the character of the man who was responsible
for them.”
76 Parliamentary Debates, CLX, July 5, 1906, 319-322.
77 Grey to Hardinge, Feb. 28, 1908, in George M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallo-
don (London, 1937), 200. See also Parliamentary Debates, CLXXXIV, Feb. 26,
1908, 1870-1881.
78 See for example Harry Famall’s minute of April 3, on Fox Bourne to
Salisbury, March 27, 1902, FO 10/773: “Neither this country nor any other is
likely to take active steps in the matter unless more or less forced to do so by
public opinion.”
79 E. D. Morel’s unpublished history of the Congo Reform Association, MP.
80 Johnston to Morel, private and confid., July 4, 1907, MP.
81 Johnston’s introduction to Morel’s Red Rubber, chap. 7.
82 Casement to Morel, n.d. (May? 1905), MP.
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making up his mind whether to take a prominent part in the anti-
Congo campaign.83 Morel had a romantic vision of the pre-Leo-
poldian Congo, a prosperous Congo thriving in trade. Johnston
disagreed: “Oh do let us purge our minds of cant in these things/’
he wrote to Morel. “The pre-Bula Matari [pre-Congo State] trade
you mention so often as having been so flourishing in western Congo-
land. Well! I have seen that trade being carried on by much slavery,
much gin and rum drinking, and endless wearisome caprices and
tyranny, and I have come out of Congoland—like Grenfell [the
missionary]—in 1883 as much desirous of a European control (in the
best interests of the natives) as he did.”84 Johnston regarded Morel’s
ideas as sentimental and utopian. Morel, on the other hand, was
utterly baffled about why Johnston had “the slightest difficulty in
accepting the [Congo] gospel I preach as the ‘ultimate’ right thing
to do.”85 His efforts to proselytize Johnston were in vain: “do leave
me alone a little bit,” Johnston wrote. “I don’t think I shall ever be-
come a crusader!”86
Yet it was Johnston who shaped the strategy of the Congo reform
movement. “Johnston’s suggestion that Belgium should become na-
tionally responsible for the administration of Congo affairs,” Case-
ment wrote to Morel in May 1905, “would offer a practical line of
advance for all—it would unite the most convinced opponents of
Congo misrule with the lukewarm ones—for it is a suggestion cap-
able of being taken up even in Belgium.”87 This policy was accepted
hesitantly by the rank-and-file Congo reformers, who were generally
skeptical of Belgium’s ability to administer the Congo. “It was . . .
83 Compare the two following passages concerning a public meeting of the
Congo Reform Association in June 1905: “I took the chair, very unwillingly”
(Johnston’s introduction to Red Rubber
,
chap. 7); “I saw Johnston, who jumped
at it and will take the chair con amore” (Casement to Morel, May 4, 1905,
MP).
84 Johnston to Morel, private, Sept. 8, 1908, MP.
85 Morel to Johnston, Sept. 10, 1908, MP.
86 Johnston to Morel, Sept. 8, 1908; see also Johnston to Clarke, April 3,
1907, FO 367/68: “I am never at any time very keen on ‘crusaders’; they so
often cover either unreasonable sentimentalism or secondary and interested
motives. At the same time, I have felt for some time past that the situation
in the Congo was no ordinary case of African misgovernment.”
87 Casement to Morel, May 26, 1905, MP.
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with misgivings as deep as your own,” Dilke wrote to Morel, “that
the Aborigines Protection Society . . . and myself . . . accepted the
Belgian solution.”88 It was a solution to which some Congo reformers
never agreed. 89 It was a conditional solution, to be accepted only if
Belgium would promise to abolish the Leopoldian system and to
administer the Congo in the “spirit as well as the letter” of the Berlin
Act.90 It was, above all, an expedient, an excellent way to prove that
the Congo reform movement was not motivated by territorial or
commercial greed.
If the Congo reformers accepted the “Belgian solution” reluctantly,
the Foreign Office pursued it eagerly and dogmatically. The attitude
of the Foreign Office was of course determined by European as well
as African considerations. 91 As an anonymous correspondent wrote
to The Times:
Of late the historic position of Great Britain in Belgium has almost dis-
appeared. The Belgian people believe, rightly or wrongly, that England
has designs on the Congo State, and that the agitation fostered here by
88 Dilke to Morel, Feb. 6, 1908, DP. See also Roland Oliver, Sir Harry
Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London, 1959), 348.
89
“Can a solution be found through Belgium? No, it is impossible, and that
should be recognized from the outset. The Belgians have been given their
chance. They have had nearly twenty-five years of undisturbed possession, and
they have made it a hell upon earth. They cannot disassociate themselves from
this work or pretend that it was done by a separate State. It was done by a
Belgian King, Belgian soldiers, Belgian financiers, Belgian lawyers, Belgian
capital, and was endorsed and defended by Belgian governments. It is out of
the question that Belgium should remain in the Congo.” A. Conan Doyle, The
Crime of the Congo (New York, 1909), 123. Cf. Casement to Morel, Nov. 8,
1909, MP: “I hold with Doyle that the Belgians are really unfit to govern a
subject and defenceless race. But you cannot say that—and failing getting rid
of the Belgians altogether, which I fear is out of the question for many years
yet, the next best thing is to try and bind them fast and sure and not leave
‘reforms’ to be of their goodwill and fancy.”
90 Technically it could not be proved that the Congo State had violated the
Berlin Act; legally ( according to the interpretations by the Law Officers of the
Crown of the Anglo-Congolese treaties) Britain had no basis for intervention
and could only remonstrate that the Congo government had not fulfilled the
spirit of the Berlin Act.
91
“For Belgium might have been driven into the arms of Germany.”
Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, 196. For international complications, see also
Casement to Morel, Nov. 2, 1905, MP.
certain interests has the tacit support of the government. And so Belgium
is looking to her continental neighbours for support . . . Her trade . . .
with Germany has grown rapidly.92
The Congo was an irritant in Anglo-Belgian relations. It was also an
issue that could reopen the scramble for Africa. “Some are inclined
to think,” Morel wrote to Grey, “that His Majesty’s Government are
bent upon . . . securing a right of way through Congo State ter-
ritory for the Cape to Cairo railway.”93 This argument was used ef-
fectively by the Congo government in convincing the Belgian public
of the sinister motives of Britain. According to Leopold himself:
Good relations with England are of great importance to Belgium; but
England, in pursuance of her Cape to Cairo policy, is bent upon the dis-
memberment of the Congo Free State, as she was bent on the destruction
of the Boer republics. She sets up humanitarian pretexts in the one case,
as she did the wrongs of the outlanders and natives in the other; and, if
the Free State became a Belgian colony tomorrow, she would still com-
plain of its misgovernment until she had secured her slice.94
Only by the “Belgian solution” could the Foreign Office disclaim
territorial ambitions in central Africa.95
The “Belgian solution” meant more than simple annexation of the
Congo by Belgium. It signified the introduction of a humane native
policy and the end of commercial monopolies; in the words of
Morel, it meant “reform, drastic reform—that is . . . the system under
which the Congo natives are robbed and murdered, rooted up, and
. . . the basin of the Congo thrown open to commerce.” During the
summer and fall of 1906, it was by no means clear that this sort of
radical reform would occur, or even that Belgium would annex the
Congo. Leopold’s June letter was interpreted in Belgium as well as
in Britain as a declaration of absolutism; so was his didactic letter
to Grey, which Leopold wrote after having been provoked by the
British parliamentary debates in July 1906; 96 so also was his famous
92 The Times, Jan. 10, 1905.
93 Morel to Grey, private and confid., Dec. 28, 1906, FO 367/68.
94 As recounted in Hardinge to Grey, Africa no. 99, very confid., Oct. 20,
1906, FO 367/33.
95 See text pertaining to footnotes 131, 132, and 134 below.
96
“If my views and dealings are not well known in England, the real state
of things in the Congo is still less well known. Certain persons seem only to be
occupied in finding or inventing faults and crimes. The natives’ well-known
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interview published in the New York American on December 10 of
the same year, which, The Times wrote, in its “affectation of artless
and engaging candor, is one of the most characteristic specimens
of Congo tactics the world has seen.”97 When asked during this
interview whether it was true that atrocious conditions existed in
the Congo, Leopold replied: “Of course not, as a system of govern-
ment.” This remark was pregnant with meaning. It indicated to
Leopold’s critics that he believed that atrocities in the Congo were
only sporadic and occasional, and that they resulted merely from
individual officials who abused their powers, not from the system
of exploitation on which the administration was based. Leopold be-
lieved that reform was possible within the system he had created.
He believed, above all, that the Congo was entirely his own busi-
ness, that, as Stengers has stated, he “owned the Congo just as
Rockefeller owned Standard Oil.”98 Stung by criticisms, he publicly
propensity for lying greatly facilitates their task . . . The government of a
state must be unique; it is alone qualified in its independence to insure the
administration of the public interests of the state. Any other situation would
give rise to a state of anarchy, of which the natives would take advantage to
perpetuate their laziness and barbarous customs. As far as I am concerned I
have always clearly and publicly defined my aspirations. When I entered the
international field I have always said, and I repeat it, that I devoted my efforts
to civilization, and to the free expansion of trade. I still hold to the same flag.
You may, perhaps, find my letter too long and too outspoken. I belong to an
independent country, the institutions of which are the most liberal in existence.
I have served this country in public office for fifty-five years without interrup-
tion. I have devoted my attention to central Africa for twenty-six years, also
uninterruptedly, animated with that Belgian sentiment which is neither blood-
thirsty, despotic, nor unenlightened.” King Leopold to Grey, July 17, 1906, FO
367/32.
97 The Times, Dec. 17, 1906. Leopold had said in his interview: “Financially
speaking ... I am a poorer man, not a richer, because of the Congo . . . They
see me as a boa-constrictor squeezing the life out of the blacks to put gold into
my purse. Why should I do such a thing? ... I have sufficient money for my
wants. I do not wish any more. I am not a business man.” Cf. Hardinge to Grey,
Africa no. 153, confid., Dec. 14, 1906, FO 367/33: “The astounding assertion
that his philanthropic efforts in Africa had seriously impoverished His Majesty
had been
. . . really and deliberately made to this newspaper correspondent by
the King.”
98
J. Stengers, “La Place de Leopold II dans l’Histoire de la Colonisation,”
La Nouvelle Clio (1949-1950), 527.
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professed, sometimes arrogantly, sometimes disingenuously, his faith
in the regime as well as in his absolute rights.
Leopold’s extravagant utterances consolidated his opponents,
though this was less true in Belgium than abroad. The June letter
was generally considered a “royal blunder,” but Leopold’s de-
fenders in Belgium pointed out that the letter had to be read in the
context of the violent attacks that had provoked it; that it was not a
declaration of absolutism, but a “solemn recommendation”; and
that Leopold should be admired for taking such a bold stand. Owing
to the hostile reception in Britain of his June proclamation, Leopold
was able to point forcefully to reasons for his continued rule in the
Congo. “The best way to keep Belgium out of international complica-
tions resulting from England’s African ambitions,” he said, “is to
put off the annexation of the Congo, with all its attendant financial
problems, as long as possible, and let the King-Sovereign alone bear
the brunt of the British attack.”99 Contemptuous of parliamentary
politics, Leopold did not want the Congo to be administered under
parliamentary control. Staggered by the vast financial operations
in the Congo, and hesitant to accept so complicated and onerous
an inheritance, the Belgian parliament procrastinated. Although
shocked by the disclosures of the Commission of Inquiry’s report,
the leaders of the clerical and liberal parties were unwilling to
antagonize their king, not so much on grounds of principle as be-
cause of Leopold’s personal authority and their own timidity. Never-
theless in late 1906, on the eve of the great parliamentary debate on
the Congo, public pressure in Belgium for annexation was rapidly
mounting; but this was not the immediate reason for Leopold’s de-
cision in favor of annexation. 100
In November 1906, Edward Grey stated to a delegation of Congo
reformers that “it will be impossible for us to continue to recognize
indefinitely the present state of things.”101 As The Times commented,
“That is the plainest warning yet addressed to King Leopold and it
99 Quoted in Hardinge to Grey, Africa no. 99, very confid., Oct. 20, 1906,
FO 367/33.
100 On this question see J. Stengers, “Quand Leopold II s’est-il Rallie a
1’Annexion du Congo par la Belgique?” Bulletin de ITnstitut Royal Colonial
Beige
,
XXIII (1952), 783-824.
101 The Times
,
Nov. 21, 1906.
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is one which he will do well to heed.”102 A few days later, news
reached Europe that the American government had joined the anti-
Congo campaign. Deluged by public petitions, and guided by a re-
port from the American consul in the Congo that the Congo govern-
ment was “nothing but a vast enterprise for exploitation,”103 Elihu
Root, the secretary of state, instructed the American representative
in London to cooperate with Grey to bring about “amelioration of
conditions in the Congo.”104 On December 10, Senator Lodge intro-
duced a resolution to the effect that the president would have the
Senate’s “warm support” in whatever action might be necessary to
achieve reform in the Congo State. 105 These rapid developments,
especially those in the United States, came as a tremendous shock to
King Leopold, who feared that the anti-Congo campaign was gain-
ing such momentum that it would spread to still other countries. He
yielded, mainly because of the stand taken by the British and Amer-
ican governments. In December 1906, King Leopold decided that
Belgium should annex the Congo. 106
The historic debate in the Belgian parliament during the winter
of 1906 was followed with avid interest throughout Europe and
America. Seen from abroad, the main issues were the welfare of
Africans and commercial freedom in the Congo. In Belgium, how-
ever, the point of paramount interest was not maladministration ( as
had been the case in previous debates), but the legal and con-
stitutional implications of the June letter, which had imposed arbi-
102 ibid.
103 Slocum to Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1906, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1907.
104 Root to Carter, Dec. 10, 1906, ibid.
105 Originally the resolution was worded “that the native inhabitants of the
Congo Free State have been subjected to inhuman treatment”; but it was
amended to read “the native inhabitants of the Congo basin.” The result of this
ingenious revision was to change a censure of Leopold into “an insult to our-
selves Britain and France and Germany.” (Clarke’s minute of March 4, 1907,
FO 367/68.) “It appears that Senator Spooner, of Wisconsin, intended to draw
the attention of the Senate to this change, but was dissuaded from doing so
by the Belgian Minister, and that the majority of the Senators voted for the
resolution without appreciating the real meaning of the change.” Howard to
Grey, Africa no. 32, confid., Feb. 19, 1907, FO 367/68.
106 See Stengers, “Quand Leopold.”
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trary conditions on the transfer of the Congo State. 107 Attacking
these conditions, Paul Hymans, the liberal leader, asked de Smet de
Naeyer whether annexation would occur by a unilateral act of the
Belgian parliament or by a bilateral convention between Belgium
and the Congo State. In other words, would the Belgian parliament
be free to deal as it pleased with the future administration of the
Congo, or would its freedom be fettered by obligations contracted
with the king? De Smet de Naeyer conceded finally that the law
establishing the future government of the Congo should be the work
of the Belgian parliament alone, thus throwing Leopold’s autocratic
June letter to the winds. 108
Leopold, though having decided that it was in his best interests
for Belgium to annex his African empire, by no means had intended
to give up his sovereign rights as ruler of the independent state of
the Congo. He was annoyed at de Smet de Naeyer for having sur-
rendered so much. Throughout 1907 and part of 1908, Leopold
struggled to have his own terms accepted. Even after annexation,
he was determined to influence, if not control, Congo affairs; and
he intended that revenues from the Congo should continue to be
allocated for public works in Belgium.
During this period the British Congo reformers assumed the re-
sponsibility of enlightening the Belgians about the nature of the
heavy burden they were about to acquire. “Bearing no enmity to
the Belgian people,” Morel wrote in May 1907, “we should deplore
that the Belgian [s] . . . find themselves committed to annexation of
the Congo without being in a position to judge the issues.”109 The
issues that the Congo Reform Association tried to place before the
107
“In assuming the sovereignty of the Congo, with all property, rights, and
advantages attaching to it, my legatee will, as is just and necessary, undertake
to respect all engagements of the ceded state with respect to third parties, as
well as the acts by means of which I have . .
.
provided for the indorsement of
. . . the foundation of the Domaine de la Couronne, the establishment of the
Domaine National. My legatee will also respect the obligation not to diminish
in any way the integrity of the revenues of these institutions without granting
them equivalent to the loss of revenue involved.” Bulletin Officiel, 1906, 297-
298. On the question of the “domains,” see J. Stengers, Combien le Congo
a-t-il Coute a la Belgique? (Brussels, 1957), chap. 3.
108 Cf. Masoin, Histoire, I, 206-207; Stenmans, La Reprise
,
346-369.
109 Official Organ
,
May 1907.
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Belgian public were both political and economic. Politically the
Congo reformers, who by 1907 included most of the British press110
—an important point, since the press was the main medium of com-
munication with the Belgian public—feared that annexation on
Leopold’s terms would mean merely a perpetuation of the Leo-
poldian regime. The fall of de Smet de Naeyer’s ministry in April
1907 ( ostensibly on a matter of domestic politics, but really because
of de Smet de Naeyer’s inability to agree with Leopold on the Congo
issue) was interpreted in Britain as a victory for Leopold in his
efforts to maintain his authority in Congo affairs.
De Trooz, the new prime minister, The Times observed, was an
“unqualified ‘King’s friend’; with M. Renkin, the new minister of
justice [who in 1908 became the first Belgian colonial minister] and
M. Delbeke, who has been appointed minister of public works, he
stands without concealment for the old regime, for absolutist gov-
ernment in the Congo, and opposition to all reform.” Further, “They
are understood to be there because they will do what is pleasing to
the King, and everyone knows that what the King desires as regards
the Congo is the perpetuation of the old system, the stifling of in-
quiry, and the annexation of the Free State only on such terms as
will leave His Majesty in full possession of the absolutism he now
enjoys.”111 It is obvious, said the Morning Post
,
that the annexation
of the Congo by Belgium “can only be satisfactory if it is complete
and unrestricted, if it gives the Belgian nation a free hand to carry
out necessary reforms.”112 “It is certain that public opinion in this
country will not recognize any scheme of transfer that does not
seem to provide for real and radical reforms.”113 In the words of
Edward Grey, annexation must be “a reality and not a sham.”114 As
seen by The Times, the crucial question involved in making the
Congo transfer a reality was “whether, if Belgium annexes the
Congo, annexation can take place on terms that will make it a re-
110 With the principal exceptions of the Catholic Herald, the Catholic Times,
and the Daily Graphic.
111 The Times, May 4, 1907; cf. Carton de Wiart, Leopold 11 (Brussels,
1944), 159-164; Stenmans, La Reprise, 369-376.
112 Morning Post, April 10, 1908.
113 Ibid., June 4, 1908.
114 Quoted in The Times, Feb. 28, 1908.
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formed colony, or whether it may not have the sinister result of
extending King Leopold s absolutism over a hitherto constitutional
country.”115
“Absolutism” was one of the powerful shibboleths of the British
anti-Congo campaign. Yet it was an extraordinarily imprecise battle-
cry. Even admitting that Leopold was “the absolute ruler of the
Congo,” how he might remain so after annexation was at best a
matter of speculation. However justified the fear of absolutism might
have been, the concrete issues in the Congo controversy after the
Belgian parliamentary debate of December 1906 were more eco-
nomic than political.
The real plague spots in the Congo were the regions handed over
to the chartered companies. The Congo State, by investing in the
companies which administered and exploited its territories, was the
apotheosis of the chartered-company system of empire building.
“The body which was set up to govern was a body existing for
private profit, and bent primarily on making the work of govern-
ment pay dividends. It has no responsibility to the governed, nor to
anyone else except the financial promoters, whose main interest it
is that the governed shall be fleeced.”116 “It cannot be too fre-
quently asserted,” commented the Morning Post, “that the anomaly
that differentiates the Congo Free State from all other African com-
munities is the fact that its vast territories are administered not in
the interest of the inhabitants, but of a group of persons in Europe
who for courtesy’s sake are styled the Congo Government.”117 The
rankest “excresence”118 of this system of exploitation was unques-
tionably the Domaine de la Couronne, the private preserve of King
Leopold. Lying west of Lake Leopold II, the Domaine de la
Couronne was a territory twice the size of England. No other region
in the Congo was more notorious for cruelty to Africans, and no other
was richer in rubber. It was the best slice of the Congo cake. 119
115 The Times, May 4, 1907. See also Official Organ, Oct. 1907: “The bill
proposed by the Belgian Government for the administration of the Congo is
the very negation of national responsibility, the very incarnation of unfettered
absolutism.”
116 Manchester Guardian, Feb. 22, 1906.
117 Morning Post, Aug. 28, 1906.
118 The Times, June 18, 1906.
119 See especially Cattier, Etude sur la Situation, 211-245.
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According to Cattier in 1906, the Domaine de la Couronne had
already yielded profits in rubber of nearly 3 million pounds sterling,
a large proportion of which (as de Smet de Naeyer admitted) had
been invested in real estate in the vicinity of Brussels and Ostende.
The Domaine de la Couronne became the burning issue in the trans-
fer of the Congo State to Belgium.
Leopold’s June letter in 1906 had declared that the revenue from
the Domaine de la Couronne after annexation must continue to be
devoted to the construction and upkeep in Belgium of projects such
as the ones described by The Times as "gorgeous palaces of art and
pompous public buildings/’120 This was a condition he would not
yield. According to the draft treaty of cession published in Decem-
ber 1907, the Belgian government acquiesced in his demand. The
revenues of the Domaine de la Couronne, however, could be main-
tained only under the Leopoldian system of forced labor, with all
its attendant abuses. Without severely exacted forced labor, the
colonial budget would show a deficit. If there were a deficit, could
expenditures from Congo revenues be justified for architectural and
other sumptuary purposes in Belgium? As far as both the Congo
Reform Association and the British Foreign Office were concerned,
the Belgian government’s concession to Leopold on the issue of the
Domaine de la Couronne was tantamount to admitting that Belgium
had no intention of making a real break with the past.
The tendency of the British Foreign Office in regard to the Congo,
as Roger Casement once observed, was to “hope—hope for this,
hope for that—never to resolutely think out what could be accom-
120 The Times, Dec. 21, 1907. For the conditions of the June letter, see note
7 above. In the mind of one British diplomat, Sir Arthur Hardinge, the issue
of exploitation for the benefit of the metropole was the fundamental difference
between the British and Congolese systems of administration. “Our system was
that the revenues of a dependency were to be devoted to its development, to its
defence, and to the welfare of its population, and that any surplus was to be
expended in it either on remunerative works of public utility, on paying debts,
or on directly relieving the burden of taxation. The system of the Congo Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, seemed to be to extract as much revenue as pos-
sible from its African territories for the purpose of public works, improvements,
etc., in Belgium, which however admirable in themselves, were of no benefit
to the subject populations.” Hardinge to Grey, Africa no. 129, Sept. 25, 1907,
FO 367/69.
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plished and then set to work to bring it about.”121 Until 1907, there
was a good deal of truth in this statement, though perhaps there
was more in the comment by a Foreign Office official that the British
policy was “to avoid pin pricks while saving ourselves for a grand
assault.”122 In any case, in 1907 there was a hardening of thought
about Belgium and the Congo.
The two people who contributed most to the Foreign Office dis-
cussion were Sir Arthur Flardinge and E. A. W. Clarke. Hardinge
was the British minister in Brussels (who had replaced Phipps in
early 1906), a scholar as well as a diplomat who, while a fellow of
All Souls, Oxford, had chosen diplomacy as a career. Clarke was the
head of the African department of the Foreign Office, an exuberant
twentieth-century version of his predecessor, Sir Percy Anderson.
An incorrigible conservative, Hardinge thought that the Foreign
Office under the Liberal government was too susceptible to the
“sentimentalism of the Exeter Hall type.”123 By contrast, Clarke was
closer in temperament to the Congo reformers. He was deeply dis-
turbed by the reports of atrocities. “We have supped full of Congo
horrors,” he once wrote, “but I really don’t think we have ever had
anything in its way more horrible than that instance of ill-treatment
of the child Katuma.” According to the British consul in the Congo,
Katuma was a Congolese boy of seven years who had been carried
off by his parents to attend one of the Congo State’s schools. “No
attempt whatever is made to teach him his letters but he is instead
made to carry stones and because the wretched creature is unable
to execute his tasks to the satisfaction of his masters he is not only
put in chains but he is kept in them night and day for three
months.”124 Clarke, with Edward Grey’s approval, instructed Hard-
inge to ask the Congo authorities about Katuma.
The results of this one incident reveal a good deal about Foreign
Office attitudes toward Congo reform. Hardinge asked the Foreign
Office to reconsider his instructions, not only on grounds that there
was no way of ascertaining the facts in the case, but also because
there would be no practical results from a complaint to the Congo
121 Casement to Morel, Aug. 16, 1909, MP.
122 Clarke’s minute of Dec. 3, 1906, FO 367/5.
123 Hardinge, Diplomatist in Europe, 194.
124 Clarke’s minute of Dec. 3, 1906, FO 367/5.
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officials. Would the British government, he asked, protest a similar
case if it had happened “in Algeria or in a German African col-
ony?”125 Clarke retorted angrily: “If no reform was ever begun until
the reformer was absolutely sure his fiery speeches would have effect
the world’s history would be very different.”126 Further, “Of course
we should not say anything about a similar case in Algeria or Ger-
man East Africa: in the first place because au fond the French and
Germans are boys too big to interfere with. It may be quite possible
and one’s duty to prevent a big boy bullying a small but it is quite
another matter to stop a strong man beating a little.”127
In some respects the behavior of Britain toward Belgium over the
Congo did ( to straighten out Clarke’s analogy ) resemble a big boy
bullying a small one. According to the law officers of the Crown, the
Congo State was an independent and sovereign state, which Belgium
could annex without the consent of the other powers. Legally Britain
had no more right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo
State than in those of France or Germany. 128 Yet Grey planned to
“regard the Congo as a territory without a government and equally
open to every one,” unless Belgium annexed it. “I know there may
be some technical difficulties in the way of the course I propose,” he
wrote. “But public opinion here will make light of technical dif-
ficulties and I consider that the state of slavery [there] ... is such as
to transcend technical difficulties and the letter of treaties.”129
As far as legality was concerned, France had pre-emptive rights
over Congo territory through the Franco-Congolese agreements of
1884 and 1895. Grey foresaw that the state of affairs in the Congo
could become so intolerable that France might have to exercise this
right; to prevent international rivalry, he went so far as to suggest
to the French ambassador in London that France might easily come
to an agreement with Germany to partition the Congo State between
125 Hardinge to Barrington, private, Dec. 16, 1906, FO 367/5.
126 Clarke’s minute of Dec. 21, 1906, FO 367/5.
127 Ibid.
128 See; e.g., W. E. Davidson’s minute of May 16, 1900, FO 10/754:
“Beyond strong remonstrance we have no further remedy short of the employ-
ment of actual force.”
129 Grey to Hardinge, Feb. 28, 1908, in Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, 198-
200. Cf. Grey’s statement in Twenty-Five Years
,
I, 192: “We hoped we were
making him [Leopoldl uncomfortable; it was all we could do.”
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them. 130 This was, in any case, a proposal filled with uncertainties.
In the minds of his colleagues, Grey, by disclaiming British ter-
ritorial ambitions while encouraging those of France and Germany,
had jeopardized Britain’s strategic position in Africa. The British
ambassador in Paris wrote:
I believe that the ambition and ultimate aim of Germany is to extend her
African possessions from sea to sea, viz. from the Indian Ocean to the
south Atlantic ... If we begin by disclaiming all territorial desires we
leave the cake to be cut up between France and Germany, and if later on
we make objection to a prospective allotment between those two powers
France would have reason to say you told me that so long as the natives
were secured in their rights and the Berlin Act trade arrangements were
observed you had no desires. What have you to complain of?131
The result of such a policy might be to give Germany the opportunity of
making with France a bargain which would bring Germany in still further
contiguity than now with British interest in Africa. 132
Clarke recognized this as a “suicidal course.”133 Grey, modifying his
stand, wrote: “I am not anxious personally to see us assume the
responsibility for more territory in tropical Africa, but if France
proceeds to make an [Parrangement] with Germany about the Congo
we should have to consider how our frontiers would be affected and
put in our word according to what our interests seemed to re-
quire.”134 Britain would resist, in Clarke’s words, “anything which
would enable Germany to bar the way definitely between our pos-
sessions in the South and Egypt and the Sudan.”135
iso Grey to Bertie, Africa no. 17, confid., April 19, 1907, FO 367/68. Cf.
Clarke’s memo of Dec. 13, 1906, FO 367/68: “We should not object, failing
all else, to cutting the Congo up.”
131 Bertie’s memo of Nov. 25, 1907, private, with minutes by Clarke,
Charles Hardinge, and Grey, FO 367/74.
132 Bertie to Tyrrell, private, Oct. 31, 1907, FO 367/70. Also Johnston to
Clarke, April 3, 1907, FO 367/68: “I believe myself that behind Leopold and
all the Congo trouble stands Germany . . . Germany is not at present in a
position to stretch out her hand over the Congo Free State, so that it serves
her purpose better that Leopold shall remain in possession of it.” See also
Hardinge to Grey, Africa no. 162, confid., Dec. 21, 1906, FO 367/33.
133 Clarke’s minute of Dec. 2, 1907, on Bertie’s memo of Nov. 25, 1907,
FO 367/74.
134 Grey’s minute on Bertie’s memo of Nov. 25, 1907, ibid.
135 Clarke’s minute of Dec. 2, 1907.
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These considerations about French and German territorial designs
in Africa were largely academic. British policy was based on the
assumption that Belgium would annex the Congo, but that Belgium
herself could not be trusted to “lay the foundations of the economic
and moral regeneration of the native.”136 The British public de-
manded guarantees. To secure them, Clarke proposed a reconvoca-
tion of the Berlin conference: “Personally I rather share Mr. Morel’s
views that no great good is likely to result from the annexation of
the Congo by Belgium, even if that annexation takes place ... A
conference is certainly our best, if not our only, chance of seeing
our wishes in regard to affairs in the Congo given effect to.”137
Hardinge pointed out that the logical prelude to a conference
—
which should be a last resort—would be a policy of nonrecognition
:
Before recognizing as a signatory of the Berlin Act the validity of the
transfer we must ask for explicit and positive guarantees . . . our formal
refusal to recognize the cession without the guarantees insisted on by the
Congo Reform Association would satisfy the latter that we were acting
energetically on the lines constantly urged by them, and were applying
that impressive moral leverage in which they profess such touching faith
. . . there might be no immediate cessation of all the grave abuses on the
Congo; but this latter result can in no case be looked for unless Belgium
at once voluntarily undertakes the work of reform.138
Arthur Hardinge, the scholarly diplomat who despised humani-
tarians, was responsible more than any other Foreign Office official
for the perpetuation of the anti-Congo campaign until 1913. It was
Hardinge who shaped the British policy of nonrecognition. 139
In January 1908, Hardinge, along with the American minister,
Henry Lane Wilson, called at the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs. Hardinge said that Britain would reserve the right of recog-
nition of the transfer if the Congo were not administered “in the
spirit of the Berlin Act.” The Foreign Office demanded three specific
reforms
:
1) Relief of the natives from excessive taxation.
2) The grant to the natives of sufficient land to ensure their ability to
136 Official Organ, Nov. 1907.
137 Clarke’s minute of Jan. 21, 1907, FO 403/374.
138 Arthur Hardinge to Charles Hardinge, private, Dec. 20, 1907, FO
367/70.
139 See Wellesley’s dissenting memo, n.d. (Dec. ? 1907), with minutes by
Clarke, Langley, Charles Hardinge, and Grey, FO 367/70.
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obtain not only the food they require, but also sufficient produce of the
soil to enable them to buy and sell as in other European colonies.
3) The possibility for traders whatever their nationality may be to
acquire plots of land of reasonable dimensions in any part of the Congo
for the erection of factories so as to enable them to establish direct trade
relations with the natives.140
Once committed to making British recognition contingent on specific
reforms, Foreign Office policy became inflexible. And by choosing
to measure the “spirit of the Berlin Act” by the yardstick of land
and tax legislation, the Foreign Office denied itself the chance to
appraise the Congo situation by events of incalculable importance
—
such as King Leopold’s cession of the Domaine de la Couronne
(under the new name of the Fondation de la Couronne) in March
1908. 141
The cession of the Fondation de la Couronne signified that Bel-
gium had at last, to use Hardinge’s phrase, succeeded in “buying
out” King Leopold. The Belgian government agreed to subsidize
King Leopold’s public-work projects; but the funds were to come
from the Belgian treasury. It was thus officially recognized that
parks, museums, palaces, hippodromes, triumphal arches, and “bath-
ing cities unique in Europe” should not be built by funds raised in
the Congo. It was a substantial triumph of the principle that the
Congo should not be exploited for the benefit of Belgium.
The other major issue in the Congo controversy, absolutism, for
all practical purposes had been killed by the Belgian parliamentary
debate of December 1906, which repudiated Leopold’s autocratic
June letter. Yet the issue lingered on, even through the annexation
debates of the spring of 1908 and the actual enactment of annexa-
tion by the Chamber and Senate during August and September of
the same year. Suspicion of the King’s sinister influence died only
with Leopold himself. His death in December 1909 profoundly
affected Congo affairs, of course. From the Belgian point of view, the
colonial administrators were left free to promote reforms and to
govern the colony as they themselves were inclined; for the British,
there was considerably less ground for suspicion that reforms were
intended to be superficial and sporadic. But the Belgian administra-
140 Africa no. 3 (1908), Accounts and Papers
,
LXII.
141 On this point, see Stengers, Belgique et Congo, chap. 4.
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tors were unable to revolutionize the Leopoldian system immedi-
ately, and the British Foreign Office could not ignore reports from
their consuls in the Congo that there was little administrative im-
provement to be seen there. As Hardinge explained to King Albert,
Leopold’s successor, in July 1910: “The confidence felt in England
in His Majesty’s good intentions and high ideals had largely allayed
the old feelings of distrust, but . . . the extreme Congo reformers,
who were slower to convince, demanded positive evidence of im-
provement . . . our consular reports had, unfortunately, so far not
justified the hopes of those among us who believed in and wished
well to the Belgian solution.”142
The Foreign Office, while wishing to heal the wound in Anglo-
Belgian relations, could not, owing to agitation against Congo abuses
in Parliament and from the humanitarians, acknowledge the transfer
as legitimate until there was evidence that the abuses had been
abolished. The Belgian government, for its part, while wishing
genuinely to introduce adequate reforms, was unable to rectify
quickly the evils of a system over two decades old. This placed the
Belgian government in an extremely embarrassing position: “The
Belgians are a proud little people, very sensitive to the opinion of
other countries, and the implied suggestion that they are not living
up to civilized standards in the Congo is one which they feel some-
what acutely. Their papers may now and then say ‘we don’t care’
. . . but the present situation is certainly galling to their national
self-esteem.”143 As Casement wrote to Morel in 1910, “the Belgian
State cannot dispense with the goodwill of mankind as the one-man
machine of King Leopold could do.”144
The continued agitation from Congo reformers was based on their
conviction that Belgium had “no intention of reversing the . . .
Leopoldian system.”145 It could not be denied, Morel wrote in 1912,
that Africans were still not permitted to own their own land. In
theory, most of the land in the Congo still belonged to the state.
Renkin, the Belgian colonial minister, tried to handle this bitter is-
sue by avoiding theoretical discussions of sovereign rights and con-
142 Hardinge to Grey, Africa no. 133, confid., July 22, 1910, FO 367/213.
143 Hardinge to Grey, Africa no. 101, confid., June 10, 1910, ibid.
144 Casement to Morel, July 12, 1910, MP.
145 Morning Post, Dec. 23, 1907.
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centrating on practical measures of reform. As far as he was con-
cerned, colonial rule should not be judged by controversial standards
of property ownership, but by the way in which Africans were
treated. By 1913, the British government was obliged to accept this
view; recognition could not be withheld from a benevolently ruled
Congo in which freedom of trade had been restored. According to
Morels biographer: “By May 1913 very little was left to be done.
The entire Leopoldian policy had been completely abandoned. The
atrocities had ceased. The concessionaire companies had either
vanished or had been reduced to impotence, and with their disap-
pearance the swarms of irregular levies which had terrorized the
countryside had also gone. A responsible government had replaced
an irresponsible despotism.”146 Morel said in 1913 that “the Associa-
tion has failed in securing one only of its objects ... a specific act
of the Belgian Parliament recognizing the native tenure in land.”147
The happy ending to the drama of Congo reform was the general
recognition of E. D. Morel as the hero of the day. “That damned
old scoundrel in Brussels must hate you with a pretty vigorous
hatred,” Casement wrote him in 1907. “The King of Beasts to be
beaten by a poor, lowly, unknown man! The pen in your case, in
the hand of a very honest, very brave, and very unceasing human
being has beaten the Principalities of Powers of Darkness out of
their domains—Leopold has nothing, absolutely nothing, but his
gold left.”148 It was Morel who caused the name of King Leopold
to reek “in the nostrils of the civilized world,”149 who convinced the
world that the real atrocity of the Congo was that “the native owns
nothing,”150 and who could claim, only half in jest, that the Congo
exposures “had permeated wherever civilization extended, and even
beyond the pale of civilization—into the palace of the Sovereign of
the Congo State.”151 Within a year of his vindication by the Com-
mission of Inquiry report, Morel had risen from the obscurity of a
free-lance journalist to the national prominence of a latter-day
146 Cocks, Morel, 161.
147 Quoted in The Times, June 17, 1913.
148 Casement to Morel, Oct. 16, 1907, MP.
149 Official Organ, Aug. 1907.
150 Manchester Guardian, April 20, 1907.
151 Morning Post, Feb. 22, 1908.
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Wilberforce. He was not universally admired, even in Britain or
even in the councils of the Congo Reform Association itself. Harry
Johnston regarded him as “a visionary and next door to a lunatic.”152
He was a quixotic figure, a knight-errant in search of controversy
as well as justice. He did overplay his emotional appeals to pity
and imagination, as when he once described the plight of the Congo
people at a public meeting: “In the vast crown domain, two and
one half times the size of England, the natives wandering distractedly
through the gloomy forest, exposed to the attacks of wild beasts,
to the inclemencies of the weather, to the hardships of all kinds,
far from home and wife and child, shelterless, hopeless, searching
for rubber, rubber, rubber, to minister to the disordered ambitions
of Leopold II, his courtiers and his mistresses.”153 But if he exag-
gerated, he did so in the conviction that he was justified by his
Christian mission to turn “the biggest pagan in Christendom out of
his misused kingdom.”154 He was sincere and, despite the “dirty
mud-slinging”155 of the Leopoldian press, he emerged with his char-
acter untarnished. His honesty made him, in the eyes of his disciples,
“the conscience of humanity, especially British humanity.”156
Morel had been able to precipitate the “tidal wave”157 of British
opinion against the Congo State. The sources of his strength were
not the diplomatic machinations of the British Foreign Office or the
commercial ambitions of the Liverpool merchants. Nor was the
Congo reform movement essentially either political or religious.
At bottom, the secret to Morel’s success was the shared belief of the
British public that the Congo reform movement was the last great
crusade against slavery. In the words of the Bishop of Exeter: “The
natives were living in the Congo in what was virtually a state of
slavery, and such as was utterly unparalleled in the history of slavery
in any civilized or almost any uncivilized, state, ancient or mod-
ern.”158 At the dissolution of the Congo Reform Association in June
152 Morel surmised this from Johnston’s letter to him of Sept. 8, 1908; the
quotation is from Morel to Johnston, Sept. 10, 1908, MP.
153 Official Organ
,
Nov. 1907.
154 Casement to Morel, n.d. (1909), MP.
155 Casement to Morel, n.d., MP.
156 The Times
,
June 17, 1913.
157 Official Organ
,
May 1907.
158 ibid.
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1913, the Bishop of Winchester said that Britain owed to Morel its
success in “freeing the natives of the Congo.”159
Whatever the truth of this assertion, and whatever credit should
be given Morel in general, there can be little doubt that the Congo
reform movement was a powerful force to be reckoned with by the
British government. Morel did not exaggerate when he wrote that
it was “a movement which Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord
Lansdowne, Sir Harry Johnston and other eminent personages have,
in varied language, described as the most remarkable British popular
movement in the last half century.”160
159 The Times, June 17, 1913.
160 Unpublished history of the Congo Reform Association, MP.
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In the current wave of academic interest in Africa, Liberia has
received a good deal less than its fair share of attention. There ap-
pears to be a feeling that, like North Africa and the Republic of
South Africa, Liberia presents a special case, with a history and
development somehow atypical of the continent as a whole. In a
certain sense, obviously, this is true: Liberia was never subjected
to the political control of a European power; its economic develop-
ment lagged because there were none of the infusions of capital
received by the colonial areas; and its connection with the United
States set it apart from other parts of Africa.
Yet, from another point of view, it makes little sense to argue that
Liberia is somehow un-African because it is ruled by a group whose
background sets it apart from the new rulers of other areas of the
continent. It is hard to see how the so-called American-Liberian
elite, born and for the most part educated in Africa, with ancestors
who have governed the republic for more than a century, is less
African than the leaders of other countries, whose attitudes and
ideologies were shaped at the Sorbonne, the London School of Eco-
nomics, or Lincoln University. Indeed, it may be argued that Liberia
deserves especially careful study because certain patterns estab-
lished in that country a century ago now seem to be emerging
among its neighbors: the one-party state, the vast gulf between the
standards of living and education of rulers and ruled, a certain
extravagant emphasis on politics as the preferred career of the
educated minority. Even the forced labor whose existence in Liberia
so exercised the United States and the League of Nations in the
1930s—and which led to the crisis discussed in this essay—is found
in Africa today, under such euphonious names as “human invest-
ments.” Perhaps these patterns are not the result of the introduction
of a foreign ruling group—the original Liberian settlers saw them-
selves as returning sons of Africa—but rather of the confrontation
of under-developed economies with Western political ideas and
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institutions. Investigation of Liberia’s history and problems may
well provide us with some idea of the future course of Africa.
This essay, though only a modest contribution to the diplomatic
history of a small country, may point to two important facts. In the
first place, it should be possible to do work in African history strictly
with the tools of the historian, using sources easily available even to
the less fortunately placed investigator. Much of the history of
Africa will, of course, have to be recovered by anthropologists and
archaeologists. But historians may be able to make their contribu-
tion most effectively by staying within their own field, however
frustrating that may be in the case of Africa, and exploiting such
documentary materials as do exist. Clearly this does not mean that
we should not use the findings of other disciplines. Yet one may
doubt that the history of Africa will be served best by historians
who become amateur anthropologists and archaeologists.
Second, and more specifically, this account of the major crisis of
Liberian independence in this century points to the continued
vitality of imperialist attitudes in Europe and the United States in
the 1920s. A myth seems to be creeping into some general accounts
of African history, to the effect that after 1919 European powers
renounced imperialism and began to prepare their colonial peoples
for independence. Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia is frequently cited as
the exception to this rule, owing to the Fascist ideology of Italy’s
rulers. Liberia’s independence, however, was not threatened by
Fascist aggressors—rumors in the 1930s of German designs on the
republic were baseless—but by the very League of Nations that
opposed Italy’s proceedings a few years later, and even to some
extent by Liberia’s stepmother and occasional protectress, the
United States. Some of the problems touched upon here, such as the
conflict between needs of economic development and those of
national independence, and the question to what degree an inter-
national body may interfere in the domestic affairs of one of its
members in order to make it live up to standards set by that body,
may have relevance for understanding the problems of Africa as a
whole.
1
On June 5, 1929, the American Department of State transmitted
to the Republic of Liberia a note brusquely accusing that govern-
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ment of tolerating conditions “hardly distinguishable from orga-
nized slave trade,”1 and demanding that prompt steps be taken to
abolish such abuses. This note marked the beginning of an extended
crisis for Liberia; the independence of which the United States had
been the chief guardian was threatened by that same country, in
concert with the European colonial powers.
Several writers who have dealt with the subject, notably Robert
E. Anderson and Nnamdi Azikiwe, have yielded to the temptation
of seeing in this episode nothing more than a last flagrant mani-
festation of Dollar Diplomacy, and have painted a simplified
moralistic picture of an innocent small country under attack by
greedy imperialists. Such an interpretation, however, tends to over-
look that American interest in Liberia, in spite of the powerful
factor which the Firestone rubber interests had become in that
republic since 1926, continued to be strongest in philanthropic and
Negro groups. Their concern had been behind the century-old
American protective attitude toward Liberia, and they could cer-
tainly not be willing now to applaud the end of the country’s inde-
pendence. Secretary of State Henry Stimson, moreover, who had
been in charge of America’s foreign relations for only a few weeks
when the slavery note was sent, was just beginning the job of liqui-
dating the United States’s economic protectorates in the Caribbean
area. That he should have worked for the establishment of a new
colony in faraway Africa would have been inconsistent in the
extreme. Finally, such well-meaning enemies of imperialism as
Anderson and Azikiwe tend to overlook the scandalous social condi-
tions in Liberia, the government’s toleration of an almost grotesque
degree of corruption among its officials, and, perhaps most impor-
tant, the lack of evidence, at least in the beginning stages of the
crisis, of other than humanitarian motives for America’s diplomatic
intervention. Only when the European colonial powers, especially
Great Britain, began to clamor for reforms in Liberia did the United
States take the lead in demanding foreign intervention to improve
social and economic conditions. We shall see that this demand was
at least partly calculated to forestall unilateral action by the Euro-
pean powers, a motive easy to understand in view of the consider-
1 Stimson to Francis, June 25, 1929, telegram, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States ( FR ), 1929 (Washington, 1945), III, 274-275.
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able American interest in the country, both philanthropic and
financial.
Both Azikiwe2 and Anderson3 have attempted to prove that eco-
nomic imperialism was at the bottom of that note of June 1929. No
basis can be found, however, for their implications that Firestone
believed that the shipment of laborers abroad would tend to
diminish the labor supply available to his rubber plantations and
that this concern motivated him to prompt the State Department to
make representations. The plantations’ need for labor at the time,
before tapping operations began, was quite small,4 and Firestone,
far from experiencing difficulties in finding workers, was quite
optimistic about their availability.5
An equally weak explanation, on the other hand, is that the State
Department’s note, which after all amounted to unusual interference
in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, reflected a sudden
public interest in Liberian conditions, aroused by the publication
of several books and articles by apologists for imperialism and by
disappointed Liberian politicians. 6 Of the books usually mentioned,
only Reeve’s The Black Republic7 appeared before June 1929. It is
difficult to see why this work, which deals with Liberian conditions
only up to 1922, should suddenly be the cause for diplomatic inter-
vention seven years later. Buell’s volume, The Native Problem in
Africa
,
8 although published in 1928, was not designed, in view of its
sympathetic attitude toward Liberia, to arouse the ire of the State
Department. Lady Simon’s Slavery
,
9 in which she calls for the ad-
ministration of the West African republic by “some capable and
warm-hearted white administrators,”10 was not published until
November 1929 and makes reference to the American note. And
2 Nnamdi Azikiwe, Liberia in World Politics (London, 1934), 184-187, 207.
3 Robert E. Anderson, Liberia, America’s African Friend (Chapel Hill,
1952), 96-103.
4 League of Nations, Official Journal, July 1932, 364.
5 Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (New York, 1928),
833.
6 Anderson, Liberia, 185; Azikiwe, Liberia, 184.
7 Henry Fenwick Reeve, The Black Republic (London, 1923).
8 Buell, Native Problem, passim.
9 Lady Kathleen Simon, Slavery (London, 1929).
10 Ibid., 83.
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Faulkner, the defeated presidential candidate of Liberia’s
People’s Party, did not give his first interview to the American press
until July 20, 1929, 11 significantly to a Negro newspaper, the Balti-
more Afro-American. In the note itself, reference is made only to the
“confidential report submitted by Dr. Patton [the American bishop
of the Liberian Episcopal Church] to the Presiding Bishop of the
Episcopal Church and your [the American minister in Monrovia]
confidential telegram to Mr. Castle of April 20.”12 That the State
Department should take action merely upon these reports is more
easily explained when we bear in mind that charges of slavery had
been made against Liberia for some years, especially before the
League of Nations Committee which in 1925 drew up the Anti-
slavery Convention. 13
Liberia’s reply to the accusation made against it was prompt and
decisive. A note of June 13 categorically denied the charges and
suggested an investigation by a competent, impartial commission. 14
The United States, accepting the suggestion, proposed that such
a commission be composed of one Liberian, one American, and one
member appointed by the League of Nations; 15 Liberia immediately
acceded. 16 Throughout the negotiations leading to the eventual ap-
pointment of the commission ( here referred to as the Christy Com-
mission) and to the drafting of its terms of reference, the United
States kept Liberia under constant pressure. In several communica-
tions the minister in Monrovia emphasized the necessity for such
prodding and reported that the Liberian government was desper-
ately trying to find a way out of the situation created by President
King’s call for the investigation, which the State Department was
inclined to consider a bluff. 17
Meanwhile, one of the practices complained against in the
11 Stimson to Wharton, July 23, 1929, tel., FR, 1929, III, 288.
12 Stimson to Francis, June 25, 1929, tel., ibid., 274. William R. Castle, Jr.,
was U.S. under-secretary of state.
13 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Existence
of Slavery and Forced Labor in Liberia (Christy Report) (Washington, 1931),
3-4.
14 Francis to Stimson, June 13, 1929, tel., FR, 1929, III, 279.
15 Stimson to Francis, June 22, 1929, tel., ibid., 283.
16 Wharton to Stimson, July 4, 1929, tel., ibid., 286.
17 Wharton to Stimson, July 26, 1929, tel., ibid., 292.
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American note continued: the forced shipment of laborers to the
Spanish island of Fernando Po. 18 Thus it smacks of an international
double standard that the State Department on July 19, 1929, in-
structed its minister in Madrid to inform the Spanish government
that “this Government has no thought of suggesting that the
Spanish Government or the Spanish authorities in Fernando Po had
any knowledge of the conditions in Liberia which have been made
the subject of this correspondence.”19 At the same time, Liberia was
admonished to effect a “material alteration or radical change in
interpretation of the present agreement with Spain.”20
The terms of reference for the international commission, as finally
agreed upon in September, empowered it to ascertain
(a) whether slavery as defined in the anti-slavery convention [which
Liberia ratified on November 13, 1929] exists in the Republic;
( b ) whether this system is participated in or encouraged by the Govern-
ment of the Republic;
(c) whether and what leading citizens of the country participate
therein;
and also to inquire into the extent and conditions under which
forced labor was used in the republic, “whether for public or private
purposes,” and how it was recruited; into conditions of recruitment
and shipment of labor to Fernando Po and other foreign territories;
and into charges that the Liberian Frontier Force, the country’s
combined army and gendarmerie, had been used in the forcible
recruitment of labor.21 A further clause was inserted, possibly as a
delaying tactic at the insistence of the Liberian government,22
requiring the commission to ascertain “whether the labor employed
for private purposes on privately owned and leased [the original
Liberian draft reads “the Firestone”23 ] plantations is recruited by
voluntary enlistments or is forcibly impressed for this service by the
Liberian Government or by its authority.”24
The choice of a League member for the proposed international
18 Cotton to Wharton, Aug. 3, 1929, tel., ibid., 293.
19 Clark to Hammond, June 19, 1929, ibid., 282.
20 Stimson to Francis, June 5, 1929, tel., ibid., 274.
21 Christy Report, 7.
22 Wharton to Stimson, Aug. 1, 1929, tel., FR, 1929, III, 293.
23 Wharton to Stimson, July 24, 1929, tel., ibid., 289.
24 Ibid.
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commission was obviously an important and difficult decision. The
American minister in Switzerland was realistic enough to question
the wisdom of appointing a citizen of a country with colonial pos-
sessions,25 although the State Department had “no national prefer-
ence except that the League nominee should not be a national of a
country likely to import labor from Liberia.” The person finally
chosen, Sigvald Meek of Norway, seemed eminently qualified by
either criterion. But he rejected his appointment in January 1930
on the grounds that there would not be sufficient time to do field
work between the commission’s arrival in Liberia in March and the
onset of the rainy season in May.26 Meek’s place was hurriedly
filled by Cuthbert Christy, who was not well qualified on either
count. Christy was a medical expert who had also had administra-
tive experience in many parts of the British Empire. His colleagues
on the commission were Charles S. Johnson of Fisk University, a
well-known Negro sociologist, and ex-President Arthur Barclay of
Liberia. An impartial observer would have to concede that the
commission’s members were technically qualified to make the
inquiry.27 The fact that its findings and recommendations were
arrived at unanimously would tend to contradict the argument that
they were the result of nationalist bias.
In spite of the constant fears of the American representative in
Monrovia that the Liberian government, “seriously alarmed over the
possible outcome and effect of investigation would gladly seize upon
any pretext to prolong discussion to the point where investigation
might fail of its purpose,”28 the Liberians continued their policy of
full cooperation. The delay in constituting the commission had
largely been due to slow League action in naming its representative.
As soon as the American and League members arrived in Monrovia
in March 1930, the International Commission of Inquiry was
formally constituted by President Charles D. B. King. It began its
work in early April, holding hearings in various parts of the coun-
try.29 The American charge d’affaires in Monrovia was instructed
to avoid scrupulously any appearance of influencing the work of the
25 Wilson to Stimson, Aug. 17, 1929, tel., ibid., 300.
26 Carter to Stimson, Ian. 30, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 339.
27 Cf. the contrary view in Azikiwe, Liberia, 190.
28 Carter to Stimson, Ian. 30, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 338.
29 Christy Report, 5.
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international group, and particularly to abstain from participating
in any of its hearings.30
The report of the International Commission, handed to the
Liberian president on September 8, included in its preliminary
remarks two significant admissions : it contained “a good deal which
might be considered an unwarranted extension of the Commission’s
limits of inquiry” and, further, “the Commission has found difficulty
in disentangling evidence of fundamental economic and social
conditions from an extravagant emphasis upon politics in the
Republic, an emphasis accentuated by the nearness of the presi-
dential election, with numerous factions active.”31 This is clearly a
reference to the activities of Faulkner’s People’s Party, which used
the commission’s hearings to further its political aims by intention-
ally discrediting the Liberian administration and stirring up the
natives with rumors that they need no longer obey the local officials,
since the White Man had come to take over the country.32
Much of the commission’s report did not deal with slavery in any
sense, but with the maladministration of native affairs by Liberian
officials, which, coupled with the naivete of the natives, produced
some shocking cases of extortion and tended to make a farce of any
principle of justice. Yet this had little to do with the commission’s
terms of reference, except insofar as the systematic extortion prac-
ticed by some local officials tended to force the chiefs to supply
laborers, for whom they received a certain sum as head money to
pay illegal “fines.” These laborers were then shipped to the Spanish
and French possessions in West Africa by recruiting firms from
which many high government officials, including the vice-president
of the republic, derived considerable profit. The commission pointed
out that by this system the actual burden of using force to provide
contract labor was thrown upon the local chiefs.33 Vice-President
Yancy, however, was also accused of having occasionally used the
Frontier Force for slave-raiding expeditions.
The commission’s report went on to state that the compulsory
labor system had serious flaws; it had been established in Liberia’s
30 Cotton to Carter, April 3, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 344.
31 Christy Report, 10.
32 Carter to Stimson, April 3, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 344.
33 Christy Report, 37.
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earliest days, and under it roads and other public works were built
by natives who worked for a given length of time in lieu of taxes.
Such labor was “wastefully recruited and used frequently under
conditions involving systematic intimidation and ill-treatment on the
part of government officials, messengers and Frontier Force sol-
diers.” Some of the laborers had also been diverted to nonpublic
work. Liberia was absolved of the charge that “classic slavery,” in
the sense of slave markets and systematic buying and selling of
human beings, existed in the country. Domestic slavery was found
to exist among the natives, despite the antislavery clause of the
Liberian constitution, although it was discouraged by the govern-
ment, whose courts had occasionally granted writs of habeas corpus
to free slaves who had been badly treated. The system of pawning
human beings, common along Africa’s west coast,34 also was found to
flourish in Liberia, and some leading citizens supposedly partici-
pated in it under the guise of taking native “apprentices.” The Fire-
stone plantations were given a clean bill of health. The investigators
found “no evidence that the Firestone Plantations Company con-
sciously employs any but voluntary labor on its leased rubber plan-
tation,” and that “all the company’s laborers are free to terminate
their employment at will.”35
The commission’s “suggestions and recommendations” undoubt-
edly went far beyond the agreed terms of reference in an effort to
strike at the roots of the revealed evils. They called for an end to the
“closed door” policy that the Liberian government had long fol-
lowed with respect to the hinterland—even Liberian citizens from
the coastal area were forbidden to enter the inland districts without
special permission—and advocated the systematic opening of the
interior to trade and civilization. The government’s attention was
called to the task of providing an adequate system of education36
and to the necessity of changing its suppressive native policy by
taking steps to restore the power of the chiefs over their tribes. With
notable inconsistency, the commission also advocated, almost in the
34 Buell, Native Problem, 750ff.
35 Christy Report, 33-35.
36 See Buell, Native Problem, 757; Liberia already had spent a larger
proportion of its budget on education than had the neighboring British colony
of Sierra Leone.
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same breath, measures to end the division of natives and civilized
persons. Pawning and domestic slavery were to be made definitely
illegal. The shipment of laborers to Fernando Po was to be discon-
tinued, considering the unsatisfactory working conditions on that
island and the abuses to which recruitment of contract labor had
led; the Frontier Force was to be reformed, especially with a view to
establishing better discipline; and the immigration of Negroes from
the United States was to be encouraged. The report also advocated,
somewhat inconsistently in view of its recommendation of opening
up the hinterland, the curtailing of the road program and of the
labor levies required for it.
To accomplish these reforms, the commission thought it necessary
to reorganize the country's administrative divisions and to appoint
European or American officials to supervise them. Any hope of
improving conditions without such outside help was categorically
declared futile. The commission added the somewhat baffling sen-
tence: "Mere advance to greater honesty and efficiency will not be
sufficient.” The report marked the beginning of an insistence on
assuming Liberia's reform program that characterized American
and European relations with that country for several years.37
2
The commission's findings made a considerable impression every-
where. President King expressed his mortification and promised
prompt action along the suggested lines.38 Domestic servitude and
pawning were declared illegal by presidential proclamation.39 The
American representative in Monrovia felt that King was ready to
introduce reforms; however, such efforts would be met with "tre-
mendous opposition from almost all other political factions,” and
Secretary of State Edwin Barclay was thought especially likely to
create trouble.40
King was indeed treading on thin ice. A newly formed citizens'
league, as well as Faulkner’s adherents, demanded his resignation
and total reform of the government. The league was, however,
37 Christy Report, 137-146.
33 Reber to Stimson, Sept. 11, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 350-351.
39 Reber to Stimson, Oct. 3, 1930, tel., ibid., 356.
40 Reber to Stimson, Sept. 21, 1930, tel., ibid., 51.
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opposed to the introduction of new white officials in addition to the
ones already in the country under the Firestone loan agreement of
1926, and felt that the “punishing of the leading offenders who are
named in the report and the establishing of a new government will
prove the Liberian people's good faith.”41 President King was
alarmed at the possibility of rioting, and a British war vessel kept
up steam in Freetown to intervene, if necessary, for the safety of
foreigners.42
King’s precarious position was not made easier by Secretary of
State Stimson, who on November 3, 1930, addressed a note to
Liberia declaring himself “profoundly shocked” at the commission's
findings and demanding “nothing short of complete reforms, sin-
cerely achieved” to “satisfy world-wide demand for positive action.”
On November 17, after receiving reports from Liberia (later proved
to be without foundation) which charged that the government had
taken reprisals against natives who had testified before the Interna-
tional Commission, Stimson waxed even sharper—he threatened the
“final alienation of the friendly feelings which the American Gov-
ernment and people have entertained for Liberia since its establish-
ment nearly a century ago.”43
Stimson undoubtedly expressed American opinion at the time.
It is remarkable that the Negro press was particularly vocal in de-
nouncing Liberian conditions and in demanding reforms.44 Most
magazines and newspapers echoed the New York Telegram
,
which
felt that Stimson “had earned the lasting gratitude of all civilized
peoples and of the black slaves of Africa by his ultimatum to the
American Protectorate of Liberia.” Still a few, such as the Norfolk
Virginian
,
were thoughtful enough to point out that Liberia was not
the only country guilty of maltreating its natives: “Great Britain,
France, Belgium and the Netherlands are not to be addrest with
scathing notes. Liberia, being, so to speak, a protege of ours, and
insignificant to boot, can be upbraided without serious embarrass-
ment.”45
41 Reber to Stimson, Oct. 13, 1930, tel., ibid., 361.
42 Reber to Stimson, Oct. 20, 1930, tel., ibid., 363.
43 Dept, of State to Liberian Consulate General, Baltimore, ibid., 371.
44 Azikiwe, Liberia, 207-208.
45 Both quotations are from “Liberia Warned to Clean Up Slavery,” Literary
Digest, CVIII (Jan. 24, 1931), 11.
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Feeling that King had gone too far in committing himself to
acceptance of the International Commission’s recommendations, the
Liberian legislature requested that he resign, threatening to im-
peach him if he refused. The legislature wanted to introduce re-
forms, without accepting any new white officials.40 On December 3,
1930, both King and Vice-President Yancy resigned, and the Secre-
tary of State, Barclay, according to the provisions of the Liberian
constitution, succeeded to the presidency. At the same time, a num-
ber of members of the legislature and other high officials, including
the present chief executive of Liberia, W. V. S. Tubman, were re-
moved from office for their part in the irregularities uncovered by
the Christy Commission. 47
The American government, once informed by its charge in Mon-
rovia, Samuel R. Reber, that Barclay was “openly anti-white and
opposed to the International Commission’s recommendations,”48
declined to recognize his administration, informing him that “the
United States Government would be more disposed to acceptance
of the present situation were it promptly to receive a declaration to
the effect that President King’s successor accepted the International
Commission’s report, intended to carry it out in full, and forthwith
would create the necessary machinery to execute it.”49 This impor-
tant note was sent after the Liberian government had called the
State Department’s attention to its own reform scheme, which in-
cluded provision for two white commissioners to reform the hinter-
land administration and had pointed out that steps had already
been taken to punish delinquent officials.50 The American position
was an absolute refusal even to consider partial compliance with the
Christy Commission’s report. Even when Liberia requested Amer-
ican aid (which had been offered in the note of November 17) to
carry out her own reforms, the State Department refused to ac-
knowledge the communication.51
46 Reber to Stimson, Nov. 29, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 376-377.
47 Azikiwe, Liberia, 204.
48 Reber to Stimson, Dec. 30, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 379.
49 Stimson to Reber, Dec. 5, 1930, tel., ibid., 381.
50 Coleman to Reber, Dec. 5, 1930, ibid., 382; Reber to Stimson, Dec. 13,
1930, tel, ibid., 386.
51 Stimson to Reber, Dec. 20, 1930, tel, Reber to Stimson, Dec. 22, 1930,
tel, Coleman to Reber, Dec. 23, 1930; ibid., 388-390.
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The United States’s view of the Liberian problem was clearly
expressed in a State Department memorandum dated December 27,
1930. It took cognizance of the possibility “that the American Gov-
ernment may be faced with a strong demand of certain racial
groups, philanthropic organizations and others in favor of positive
action [italics added]” and called for the “substitution of external
for Liberian control.”52 It did not, however, advocate that the
United States act alone in establishing such control, lest this arouse
suspicions of imperialism in Europe and South America, and “no
compensating gain, in profit or in prestige would accrue to the
United States if it took over Liberia.” Instead the United States
ought to “consider the Liberian situation as an international ques-
tion, and if necessary to cooperate, but not to accept exclusive re-
sponsibility, in its solution.” The memorandum then suggested
American participation in an international control body formed on
the basis of the 1926 League of Nations antislavery convention, of
which the United States was a signatory.
The “others” referred to in the memorandum as likely to demand
foreign intervention in Liberia were, of course, the Firestone inter-
ests. In a conversation with Secretary Stimson on December 10,
1930,53 Harvey Firestone expressed his belief that “the Liberian peo-
ple were unable to handle their own affairs; that they must be
controlled; that they were sinking down and down and there was
nothing but anarchy ahead of them. He said the responsibility was
always recognized to be ours and the time would probably come
when Barkley [sic] would make a proposal of compromise and he
hoped we would not accept it.” But Stimson told the industrialist
that he “saw no likelihood of the American Government willing to
assume responsibility in Liberia across the Atlantic; that I [Stimson]
thought that it would have to be eventually handled by the League
of Nations with such advice or help as we can give them, whatever
that may be.”
It is just possible that Firestone’s sudden concern for the welfare
of Liberians was occasioned by the impact that the world depres-
sion was beginning to have on Liberia, and by the consequent diffi-
52 Memo by E. O. Briggs, Dec. 27, 1930, ibid., 391-392.
53 Stimson, Memoranda of Conversations, Stimson Papers (SP), part XV,
misc. no. 2, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.
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culty in making interest payments on the loan that Firestone had
extended to the country in 1926. In April 1930, even before the
slavery problem had been brought into the open by the Christy
Commission, the charge in Monrovia had suggested to the State
Department “the advisability of a temporary friendly intervention”
for just that reason. 54 From late 1930 on, Firestone continued to
press for unilateral American action; yet the government’s policy
was one of international cooperation in the solution of the problem.
It is probably reasonable to criticize this policy on the grounds that
it refused to admit the possibility that conditions in Liberia could
be bettered by the Liberians themselves, with friendly assistance
from (but not domination by) the United States. Still this cannot
be called imperialistic in the usual sense of the word: the United
States government very definitely was not trying to extend its eco-
nomic or political power at the expense of the small West African
republic.
3
Reference has already been made to the influence of European
powers in shaping American policy toward Liberia. The British
government in particular had for some time manifested considerable
interest in Liberian developments. In October 1930, its ambassador
in Washington queried the State Department about the American
attitude toward international control over Liberia. 55 In a conversa-
tion between him and Secretary Stimson on January 6, 1931, both
agreed that such control, exercised by the signatories of the 1926
antislavery convention, would be desirable. They did not expect
force to be required for the imposition of this control.56 As a result
of the positive American reaction to these overtures, the British
representative in Monrovia was instructed to notify the Liberian
government that “in the circumstances, the only thing for Liberia
to do was to request the League for an international Commission
of Control to take over the country and that if Liberia were unwill-
ing to do this, Great Britain would view it with grave concern and
54 Carter to Stimson, April 25, 1930, tel., FR, 1930, III, 395.
55 Memo by Briggs, Dec. 27, 1930, ibid., 393.
56 Memo by Marriner of a conversation between Stimson and Lindsay,
Jan. 6, 1931, FR, 1931, II, 653.
The U.S. and Liberian Independence 319
it would imperil the friendly relations existing between the two
countries [italics added]/’57
Under the shadow of these clouds gathering over its indepen-
dence, Liberia on January 6, 1931, accepted, in principle, the recom-
mendations of the Commission of Inquiry.58 The United States,
however, considered this declaration unsatisfactory and requested
the other powers represented in Monrovia to join in putting pressure
on the Liberian government.59 Accordingly “strong representations”
were made jointly by the British, German, and American envoys,
with the objective of getting Liberia to make a “voluntary request”
for League of Nations assistance. 60 President Barclay, faced by this
imposing display of diplomatic power, promised to do so, but he
refused to compromise Liberia’s independence:
In respect to the suggestion that the Government of Liberia should be
committed for a time to an international governing commission, the Presi-
dent of Liberia is compelled to observe that the acceptance thereof would
not only be in violation of the constitution of the Republic, but would also
be tantamount to surrender of its sovereignty and autonomy. This course
of action the President and Government of the Republic are without
authority to take and it is not believed that the traditional friends of
Liberia, the powers to whom this note is addressed, would intentionally
insist upon it. 61
Barclay had taken a clear position: from now on he never deviated
from it, and Liberia’s representatives at the League of Nations de-
fended it, not without dignity.
Liberia, as a result of foreign pressure, thus asked the League for
assistance in the solution of its difficulties. The great powers con-
tinued to insist on an international protectorate, using the Liberian
request for assistance as a pretext. This design was betrayed by
Under-Secretary of State Castle, when in a conversation with the
French counselor of embassy he “made Mr. Henry understand that
we knew just as well as the French Government knew that any
pressure brought on Liberia must appear to be as a result of the
57 Memo by Marriner of conversation with Lindsay, Jan. 14, 1931, ibid., 658.
58 Reber to Stimson, Jan. 6, 1931, tel., ibid., 653.
59 Stimson to Reber, Jan. 16, 1931, tel., ibid., 659-660.
60 Reber to Stimson, Jan. 21, 1931, tel., ibid., 661.
61 Reber to Stimson, Jan. 23, 1931, tel., ibid., 667.
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request of the Liberian Government for assistance.”62 In spite of
this, however, the motives for establishing control over Liberia, at
least as openly professed, were still humanitarian. The familiar
formula, “protection of foreign property,” was conspicuously lacking
in the diplomatic communications between the United States and
the European powers.
On January 24, 1931, the League Council decided to deal with
the Liberian request through a committee consisting of representa-
tives from France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Poland,
Venezuela, and Liberia. The United States was invited to partici-
pate in its work, and Samuel Reber, the bitterly anti-Liberian charge
d’affaires in Monrovia, was sent to Geneva as America’s representa-
tive. 63 The composition of the committee, of which Christy was
named chairman, boded ill for Liberia. Of the powers represented,
five had African interests, if we include Germany, which during
those years had the lion’s share of Liberia’s trade; the American
representative could be counted upon to support any plan that
would curtail the republic’s independence, in view of his govern-
ment’s declaration that it felt that in international control “lies the
only hope for Liberia’s future.”64 Liberian arguments that the re-
quest for advice and assistance did not express a desire for foreign
control were supported only by Venezuela and later by Panama,
both countries having had firsthand experience of the blessings of
such control. After 1932 the new government of Spain made the
most of its representative’s opportunity to lambaste capitalism and
imperialism. 65
The committee, instead of proceeding on the basis of the Christy
report, decided to send a new investigating group to Liberia to
ascertain what measures should be taken, a step not overly pleasing
to the United States, which wanted quick action.66 The composition
of the subcommittee reflected the majority of the parent body. The
62 Memo by Castle of conversation between Stimson and Henry, Feb. 24,
1931, ibid., 674.
63 Gilbert to Stimson, Jan. 24, 1931, tel., ibid., 668; Stimson to Reber, Jan.
26, 1931, tel., ibid., 669; Wilson to Stimson, Jan. 31, 1931, tel., ibid., 669-670;
Stimson to Wilson, Feb. 2, 1931, tel., ibid., 671.
64 Stimson to Wall, Feb. 20, 1931, tel., ibid., 673.
65 Gilbert to Stimson, Feb. 6, 1932, tel., FR, 1932, II, 700.
66 Stimson to Dawes, Feb. 28, 1931, tel., FR, 1931, II, 678.
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Frenchman Charles Brunot, a former governor of the Chad Terri-
tory, was named chairman. The committee’s financial expert was a
Dutchman, Theodorus Ligthart and its medical specialist, Melville
McKenzie, came from Britain. One is tempted to suspect that their
professional backgrounds in the colonial service of European states
made it difficult for them to be sympathetic or even wholly objective
in their report, which formed the basis of the League’s plan of
assistance.
Meanwhile, on May 6, 1932, Edwin Barclay had been returned as
president of Liberia in an election described as comparatively
orderly and honest for that country. The United States, while con-
tinuing its official refusal to recognize him, for no other reason than
that he refused to cooperate in putting his country into the hands
of foreign administrators, had sent a new Negro minister, Charles
E. Mitchell, to Liberia, and his attitude stood in sharp contrast to
that of his white predecessor, Reber. In his first report Mitchell
stressed Barclay’s determination to introduce reforms and the prog-
ress that had already been made, especially in the field of sanitation.
He advocated recognition of Barclay, and his remark that “Liberia
deserves pity rather than censure”67 was a clear reproach to the
State Department’s intransigent policy.
The Brunot Committee spent only a little over a month in Liberia
(June 16-July 24). The question comes to mind whether such a
period was indeed sufficient to make a thorough study of the coun-
try’s needs, or whether the committee’s members were content with
finding some supporting evidence for their preconceived ideas.
Many of the findings and recommendations followed those of the
Christy Report, especially the sections dealing with interior admin-
istration and native policy. The principle of indirect administration
through freely elected paramount chiefs was recommended for
adoption, and the authority of the white administrators called for
in the Christy Report was now to be extended to the sea coast as
well, thus bringing the entire country under their control. The finan-
cial position of the country was termed “tragic,” owing to the world
depression and reduced employment in the Firestone plantations,
67 Mitchell to Stimson, May 6, 1931, tel., ibid., 684.
68 League of Nations, Official Journal, July 1932, 1386-1397.
69 Belden to Dennis and McCaskey, June 3, 1932, FR, 1932, II, 735.
322 Wolfe W. Schmokel
the country’s only major enterprise. Government officials were no
longer paid. Since under the terms of the 1926 agreement Liberia
was forbidden to contract any new debts,68 a renegotiation of that
agreement was considered necessary so that money could be made
available on better terms and, further, so that Liberia could obtain
the second installment of the five-million-dollar loan of 1926, whose
payment Firestone made dependent upon conditions which the
committee considered “impossible.” It was also pointed out that no
interest or sinking-fund payments could be made for 1931. To im-
prove the government’s fiscal position, the introduction of export
duties on coffee and rubber was recommended by the experts, who
apparently were oblivious to the prohibition of duties on rubber
under the Firestone agreement. Through such measures the commit-
tee hoped to increase Liberia’s revenues, which in 1931 amounted
to only $482,000 (against expenditures of $702,000),69 to $650,000.
Its reform plan would cost $398,000 a year, with the larger part of
this sum to be spent for salaries for twenty foreign officials. This
was termed “practical assistance,” which, unlike mere advice, could
best help Liberia! 70
It is not surprising, in view of such proposals, that Liberia made
another attempt to settle its difficulties through a bilateral agree-
ment with the United States and to obtain help from that source. 71
Again the request was rebuffed, to the apparent distress of the
American minister in Monrovia,72 who continued in the unusual
position of having to deal with a government that his country offi-
cially refused to recognize.
4
The latter half of 1931 brought no new developments in the
Liberian crisis. The full Liberian Committee of the League, which
was to consider the report of the Brunot group and recommend
action, did not meet until the following January. Mitchell reported
from Monrovia that Barclay was ready to make any effort “as far as
practicable” to meet the international desire for reform so that his
70 League of Nations, Official Journal
,
1932, 1364-1368.
Mitchell to Stimson, Oct. 3, 1931, tel., FR, 1931, II, 693.
72 Mitchell to Stimson, Oct. 31, 1931, ibid., 695.
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country might receive some international aid. 73 The slavery and
related charges receded into the background, and new accusations
against Barclay of systematic suppression of the natives, particularly
on the Kru coast, in retaliation for their testimony before the Christy
and Brunot commissions, 74 proved largely groundless; 75 hence the
economic side of the American concern with Liberia became the
dominant factor in the relations between the two countries. The
Department of State persisted in its inflexible position of wishing to
impose an international protectorate upon the republic, motivated
by the typically colonialist attitude that efficiency and progress are
unquestionably to be valued more highly than national indepen-
dence. At the same time, the Hoover administration was definitely
not prepared to give real material assistance. Again, however, we
must note the cooperation of the United States with the League of
Nations and the rejection of all suggestions, continually brought
forward by the Firestone interests, to act unilaterally. This refusal
to repeat the mistakes of Dollar Diplomacy was gradually to lead
to open conflict between the State Department and the rubber
baron, who in view of the peculiar nature of his agreements with the
Liberian government was able to negotiate on the Liberian question
almost like a sovereign power, independent of the American govern-
ment’s policy.
At the January 1932 meeting of the Liberian Committee in
Geneva, the Firestone interests were represented by their own dele-
gate, a Mr. Howe of the Finance Company of America. Their reform
plan went much further in its provisions for actual foreign control
over Liberian affairs than the Brunot Committee’s had. The State
Department favored it: “In view of experience with advisorships in
the past, the Department is in entire sympathy [with the Firestone
plan] and feels moreover, that unless complete executive and ad-
ministrative control is granted for a period of ten years, no genuine
reforms or rehabilitation could be achieved.”76 At the same time,
however, the State Department was trying to dissuade Firestone
73 Mitchell to Stimson, Nov. 24, 1931, ibid., 696.
74 Mitchell to Stimson, Dec. 9, 1931, tel., ibid., 696.
75 Mitchell to Stimson, March 9, 1932, tel., FR, 1932, II, 712; memo by
Reber, Jan. 30, 1932, ibid., 705-707.
76 Stimson to Gilbert, Jan. 3, 1932, tel., ibid., 687.
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from demanding that the commissioner general, who under his plan
would assume virtually dictatorial powers over Liberia, be an Amer-
ican citizen. 77 This question, as we shall see, developed into a major
controversy some time later.
If Firestone considered the Brunot proposals too easy on Liberia,
that country thought them excessively harsh. President Barclay de-
clared that the report exceeded the committee’s powers and that its
recommendations could not be squared with the Liberian constitu-
tion. The American representative in Geneva, on the other hand,
complained that many committee members “felt and expressed the
opinion privately that if Liberia did not wish to accept the League’s
plan when concluded, there would be no method of compelling it
to do so,” and added that in his opinion nothing but force could gain
Liberia’s acceptance. 78 The committee eventually deferred action on
the Brunot plan to allow Liberia time to present its counter-
proposals.
Reference has already been made several times to charges that
the Barclay administration was guilty of the cruel suppression of its
natives, particularly on the Kru coast. The League committee pro-
tested such alleged abuses, which the Liberian government denied
with the explicit assurance that no action would be taken against
the Kru tribes as long as they refrained from attacks upon other
tribes and from threats against foreign interests. 79 Investigations
undertaken by the British consul in Monrovia, Douglas G. Rydings,
under joint British-American sponsorship, and concurrently by a
Liberian government commission headed by Winthrop A. Travell,
an American loan official, exonerated the Liberian authorities of
the charges, stating that such reports had been produced by propa-
gandists living in Monrovia. The tribes had been incited to rebellion
by 4 propaganda stirred up by Americo-Liberians and natives to the
effect that the whites were coming to take over the country.”
Rydings’ report also took notice “of the fact that some of the natives
77 Stimson to Gilbert, Jan. 20, 1932, tel., ibid., 693.
78 Reber to Stimson, Feb. 8, 1932, ibid., 703.
79 British Embassy to Dept, of State, aide memoire, Feb. 19, 1932, ibid.,
707; Stimson to Lindsay, March 2, 1932, Stimson to Mitchell, March 4, 1932,
tel.; ibid., 708-712.
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were [apparent omission] in their acclaim for British rule.”80 Later
that summer the League of Nations sent Dr. McKenzie to adjust the
difficulties between the Krus and the government in Monrovia. His
report supported the findings of Travell and Rydings in pointing to
antigovernment propaganda and close connections “between the
dissident Krus in Liberia and those in adjacent colonies” as causes
for the disorder. It absolved the government of charges of retaliation
against witnesses before the previous League inquiries. Also, per-
haps unintentionally, it defended Liberian native policy:
The only possible means of governing these tribes, if few Government
Commissioners are available, is by supporting a strong Paramount Chief
over several tribes and holding him responsible for the maintenence of
order, at the same time giving him such government assistance as he may
require, making it clear to the dissident tribes that the government forces
are ready to support the Paramount Chief.81
Previously Monrovia had been condemned for exactly this policy of
indirect pressure and for supporting “unpopular” paramount chiefs.
McKenzie made peace on the Kru coast by taking from the sup-
posedly peaceful and unarmed victims of government suppression
over five hundred firearms. At the same time, the Frontier Force was
severely limited in its freedom of action. McKenzie, who had arrived
in Liberia aboard a British cruiser, a manner hardly designed to
underline his friendly intentions, nevertheless had occasion to thank
the Liberian government for its “excellent cooperation.”82
The Liberian government had already forwarded its reform plan
to Geneva on May 12, 1932.83 It laid particular stress on the devel-
opment of education in the country, a field largely neglected by the
Brunot plan since few funds would have been available for it after
paying the expenses of hiring a large number of foreign administra-
tors. It also stressed that Liberia did not want the second installment
of the Firestone loan unless the Finance Corporation of America,
the Firestone subsidiary through which the loan was administered,
agreed to improve its terms.
80 Mitchell to Castle, April 20, 1932, tel., ibid., 714.
81 League of Nations, Official Journal, Dec. 1932, 2040.
82 Ibid., 2037-2041.
83 Gilbert to Castle, May 2, 1932, tel., FR, 1932, II, 716-717.
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The League committee now worked out a compromise plan that
cut the cost of administrative assistance to $200,000 per year; but it
did not go far enough for the American State Department, which
suggested further reduction of this sum and insisted upon tighter
controls over the Liberian government. In a note of May 8 it de-
clared that "arguments about ‘sovereignty’ and ‘constitutionality’
should not be permitted to stand in the way of foreign authority in
Liberia”84—surely a remarkable statement for a country that refused
to join the League for many of the same reasons. From this point of
view, Reber, now in Geneva, considered the draft plan of assistance,
as adopted by the League committee on May 17, “thoroughly un-
workable and impractical.” The Liberian government, however, still
thought that the plan went too far in undermining local authority;
on May 26 it again appealed to the United States for aid in carrying
out its own reform scheme. 85 Its request was not even acknowl-
edged.
At the same time, however, the State Department also declined to
use its influence to get Liberia to accept the League’s plan,86 which
it considered too expensive and unsatisfactory in the amount of
authority it gave to foreign officials. It continued to advocate an
“administration under one man’s leadership with a very flexible
scope of work.” This plan, amounting to a temporary dictatorship
under a white official, was forwarded to the minister in Monrovia
on June 18,87 with instructions to communicate it to Barclay. That
the American government was well aware of how its plan would be
regarded by public opinion in America and abroad is shown by its
warning to the minister that “no memorandum or other record
should be left by you. If your Secretary has any knowledge of this
message, you should warn him that he must say nothing about it to
anyone.” Barclay was apparently convinced at last that the United
States was not willing to offer his country conditions for cooperation
which would be more tolerable than those of the League. Conse-
quently he offered a counterproposal, which consisted of the
League’s plan supplemented by an American chief adviser, in the
84 Phillips to Castle, May 8, 1932, tel., ibid., 723.
85 Mitchell to Stimson, May 27, 1932, tel., ibid., 732.
86 Memo by Boal, June 16, 1932, ibid., 737.
87 Stimson to Mitchell, June 18, 1932, tel., ibid., 739.
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framework of the Liberian governmental structure, as minister with-
out portfolio. 88 A joint resolution of the Liberian legislature ap-
proved this plan; but it was rejected by the United States on the
grounds that it still did not make provision for sufficient foreign
controls. 89
To emphasize its insistence on more authority for the foreign
officials, the State Department advised the Firestone interests not
to send a representative to the September meeting of the League
committee. Firestone himself was only too happy to follow this
advice, which accorded with his own inclinations, and he declined
the invitation.90 The League committee on Liberia proved not un-
willing to accept the American demand for a chief adviser with
broad powers, but it definitely objected to a United States citizen
in that position: “To place an American at the head of the plan of
reform would be to give him the power of arbiter between an Amer-
ican concern and the Liberian government and would amount to the
practical administration of the country being centered in American
hands.”91 The State Department’s position on the question was none
too clear. In an exchange of letters between Lord Cecil for the
League, Lord Simon for Britain, and Secretary Stimson for the
United States, the latter declared that his government would not
make an issue of the nationality of the chief adviser but thought
that the decision was up to Firestone, “the only major center of
civilization in an undisciplined region, which tends without outside
pressure to revert to chaos.”92
Thus when the League’s revised plan of assistance was adopted
by the League committee and by Liberia on September 27, 1932,
everything hinged on Firestone’s willingness to give up his demand
for an American chief adviser and to make concessions in rewriting
the loan agreement of 1926. The State Department urged him to do
so on October 5,93 but Firestone, claiming that the powers of the
adviser were insufficient and insisting upon an American citizen for
88 Mitchell to Stimson, lune 24, 1932, tel., ibid., 742-743.
89 Dept, of State to British Embassy, memo, Aug. 27, 1932, ibid., 749.
90 B. M. Robinson to Stimson, Sept. 2, 1932, ibid., 752.
91 Wilson to Stimson, Sept. 22, 1932, tel., ibid., 757.
92 Stimson to Gibson, Sept. 25, 1932, tel., ibid., 758-759.
93 Stimson to Gilbert, Oct. 7, 1932, tel., ibid., 768.
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that post, again rejected the plan. His strenuous insistence on his
views finally created a rift with the Department, which on October
11 “informed Mr. Firestone that the decision rested with him, but
that in the event he persisted in his decision the responsibility there-
fore to public opinion both in this country and abroad must likewise
be assumed by Mr. Firestone.”94 Washington refused to transmit the
Finance Corporations letter of October 8 to the international com-
mittee in Geneva and informed Firestone that, if this letter repre-
sented his final position, the League would simply be informed that
he refused to negotiate.95
Now understanding that the government would not back him
indefinitely in his extravagant demands, Firestone went to Wash-
ington, and in a conference with the State Department declared his
willingness to send a representative to Geneva to work out an
arrangement for fitting his loan agreement with the Liberians into
the framework of the League’s plan of assistance.96 The committee
was advised of this decision, and the Liberian secretary of the
treasury stayed in Geneva to be on hand for the negotiations with
the corporation. Firestone, however, apparently had undergone
another change of mind. Instead of cooperating with the League,
he sent a representative to Monrovia to deal directly with the Libe-
rian government.97 Obviously he felt that his corporation’s position
would be weakened if the League came in to control the country,
and he now made an attempt to work out an arrangement more
favorable to his interests.
Again the State Department backed Firestone, whose excuse that
certain details would first have to be worked out with the Liberians
before negotiations with the committee could be fruitful was flimsy
at best; there was no reason why these preliminary talks could not
have been held in Geneva. The deferential attitude of the outgoing
Hoover administration toward Big Business is clearly recognizable
in a State Department official’s reply to representations of the Brit-
ish ambassador, who suggested that the American government
94 Stimson, memo, “Liberia,” 19, SP (filed with various memoranda on
“Western Europe,” uncatalogued).
95 Castle to Harvey Firestone, Oct. 10, 1932, FR, 1932, II, 773.
96 Stimson to Gilbert, Oct. 11, 1932, tel., ibid., 773.
97 Belden to Castle, Oct. 26, 1932, ibid., 776.
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should put pressure on the Firestone interests to hurry their nego-
tiations. Pierrepont Moffat, the chief of the Division of Western
European Affairs, answered that he felt “we could hardly do this as,
with the amount of money that they had legitimately put into this
project the matter of whether or not they were satisfied that the
plan would protect them in advancing more money and rewriting
the contracts they now had, was a matter which they alone could
decide.”98 At the same time the State Department had to inform
Reber, who complained about the bad impression of Firestone’s
intransigence upon the League committee, that “the Company has
recently shown a marked reluctance in all matters pertaining to their
co-operation with the International Committee in connection with
the ‘General Principles’ adopted by the Committee and subse-
quently endorsed to the company by the Department as a basis for
direct negotiation.”99
Firestone’s representative in Monrovia, L. T. Lyle, was meanwhile
informed by the Liberian government that it preferred to work
through the League.100 On the same day that Lyle was received by
Barclay, December 17, 1932, the Liberian legislature passed a joint
resolution calling for the suspension of all payments on the Fire-
stone loan until such time as the country’s revenues were to reach
$700,000 a year. This step, as the Brunot Committee had already
indicated,101 was a real necessity forced on Liberia by economic
conditions. Nevertheless, and in spite of his feeling that “the respon-
sibility for permitting this opportunity to arise rests partly on the
Firestone interests,”102 Stimson protested sharply in notes dated
December 23 and January 23. The latter communication, which
threatened that the United States might “hold Liberia responsible
for the effects of those acts,”103 was not accepted on the fully legiti-
mate grounds that, since America still refused to recognize its gov-
ernment, Liberia had no choice but to refuse diplomatic inter-
course.104
98 Memo by Moffat, Nov. 10, 1932, ibid., 777.
99 Stimson to Reber, Nov. 23, 1932, ibid., 782.
100 Stimson, Memo “Liberia,” 19, SP.
101 League of Nations, Official Journal, July 1932, 1365, 1383.
102 Stimson, memo, “Liberia,” 19, SP.
103 Stimson to Gilbert, Jan. 23, 1933, tel., FR, 1933, II, 884.
104 Stimson to Gilbert, Jan. 28, 1933, tel., ibid., 887.
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5
With the loan moratorium, the Liberian crisis entered a new
stage. Firestone now made the repeal of the Liberian resolution an
absolute condition for further negotiations with either Liberia or
the League committee. 105 The State Department accordingly re-
quested the League to put pressure on Liberia to revoke the Decem-
ber 17 measure. In replying, Lord Cecil pointed out to Stimson that
Firestone had treated the League
with grave discourtesy and [has] left it entirely in the dark as to what is
[his] real attitude towards the League attempt to come to the assistance
of Liberia and prevent the recurrence of the terrible scandals which existed
under the administration of ex-President King, who is, I understand, now
one of the advisors of the Firestone Corporation. Several members of
the Committee have arrived at the conclusion that the object of the
Firestone Corporation was, by insisting on the rigid execution of what
was, after all, a very onerous agreement, to drive the Liberian Govern-
ment into such straits that they would be at the mercy of the corpo-
ration.106
The committee felt that some concessions in return for Liberia’s
repeal of the moratorium resolution should be made by Firestone,107
thus agreeing at least to some extent with that country’s demand
for a solution “appropriate to the social facts and not merely upon
theoretic rights.”108
Stimson was in the difficult position of having to defend the in-
terests of an American corporation despite his belief that Firestone
had “not in fact been playing ball’ with the League committee,
whose interests in [his] behalf [he was] only too ready to enlist.”109
The State Department finally persuaded the Finance Corporation to
promise definitely to send a representative to Geneva as soon as the
December 17 resolution was repealed by Liberia, and further to
allow a two months’ de facto moratorium while negotiations were
in progress. After Firestone had made these concessions, the League
105 Stimson to Gilbert, Jan. 17, 1933, tel., ibid., 879.
106 Mellon to Stimson, Jan. 25, 1933, tel., ibid., 884-885.
107 Gilbert to Stimson, Jan. 25, 1933, tel., ibid., 885.
108 Edge to Stimson, Jan. 20, 1933, tel., ibid., 881.
109 Memo by Moffat of conversation between Stimson and Sanders, Jan.
26, 1933, ibid., 886.
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committee on January 31, 1933, requested Liberia to withdraw her
moratorium measure; this displeased Stimson, who felt that such a
step should be demanded as a juridical right.110 Liberia did not act
upon the League’s request, and the result was a deadlock in which
neither Firestone nor Monrovia would budge.
To work out a new approach to the whole problem, the State
Department on February 27 dispatched General Blanton Winship
and Ellis O. Briggs of the Department on a mission to Monrovia.
Shortly thereafter the new secretary of state, Cordell Hull, per-
suaded the Firestone interests to enter into direct negotiations with
the Liberian government under General Winship’s supervision.
Under the agreement finally reached, the interest rate on the loan
was decreased from 7 to 5 percent, with overdue interest payments
to be met out of the proceeds from newly issued bonds.111
Upon conclusion of the agreement Firestone was coaxed, with
great difficulty, into sending a representative to Geneva to partici-
pate in the drafting of a final plan of assistance. During the sessions
of the League committee, which were moved from Geneva to Lon-
don where they lasted until the end of June, the question of the
nationality of the chief adviser remained the major stumbling block,
since both Firestone and the American Colonization Society (also
represented during the discussions) insisted on an American. The
matter was finally left open in the plan of assistance that the League
Council adopted and forwarded to Liberia,112 with the clear warn-
ing that if it did not accept the plan as a whole, without further
procrastination, it would be left to its own devices. The American
representative in London, General Winship, from the beginning did
not expect that the Liberians would find the plan acceptable, and
110 Gilbert to Stimson, Jan. 31, 1933, tel., Stimson to Gilbert, Feb. 1, 1933,
tel.; ibid., 893-895.
111 Winship to Hull, April 8, 1933, tel., ibid., 905; Hull to Winship, April 11,
1933, tel., ibid., 906; Hull to Winship, April 20, 1933, tel., ibid., 907; memo by
Moffat, April 29, 1933, ibid., 909-910; Hull to Winship, April 29, 1933, tel.,
ibid., 911; Winship to Hull, May 7, 1933, tel., ibid., 911-912; Winship to
Hull, May 10, 1933, tel., ibid., 912.
112 Winship to Phillips, June 9, 1933, ibid., 915-917; Bingham to Phillips,
June 24, 1933, tel., ibid., 918; Bingham to Phillips, June 28, 1933, tel., ibid.,
919.
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he placed greater hopes in an amended loan agreement independent
of it.
In the meantime American public opinion had undergone a shift.
When it became evident that it was no longer social reform but the
position of the Firestone interests that was the real issue in Liberia,
the liberal press began to criticize American and League policy. In
an article in The Crisis
,
Howard W. Oxley, former educational ad-
viser to the Liberian government, accused this policy of being “bent
on industrial enslavement upon a larger scale then ever before,”113
and called for sympathetic cooperation with Liberia instead of
harassment. In a later issue, The Crisis appealed to the sense of
justice and decency in the United States to stop the efforts that were
being made “to wipe this poor little country from the list of inde-
pendent Negro governments.”114 In reporting a visit to the State
Department by Mordecai W. Johnson of Howard University, W.
E. B. Du Bois, editor of The Crisis and a former minister to Liberia,
and Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, for the purpose of pleading the cause of Liberian
independence, The Nation called upon the public to “prevent this
new imperialist grab.”115 The State Department eventually had to
take cognizance of this current of public opinion, which was also
supported by the Foreign Policy Association. In a letter to Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Phillips, the new under-secretary of state, referred to
changing popular opinion but recommended* continued cooperation
with the League.116 The president agreed, but with “the clear under-
standing that we are not guaranteeing monies due the Firestones or
making our continued interest depend on Firestone’s financial inter-
est. At all times we should remember that Firestone went into
Liberia at his own financial risk and it is not the business of the
State Department to pull his financial chestnuts out of the fire ex-
cept as a friend of the Liberian people.”117 This statement, of course,
113 Howard W. Oxley, “The Crisis in Liberia,” The Crisis, XXXIX, Dec.
1932.
The Crisis, XL (Oct. 1933), 468.
115 Mauritz W. Hallgren, “Liberia in Shackles,” The Nation, Aug. 16, 1933,
188.
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indicated a complete change in American policy and opened the
way for the final adjustment of the difficulties with Liberia.
As General Winship had anticipated, the republic insisted on
modifications in the plan of assistance, encouraged, as Winship
reported from Monrovia where he had returned in August, by the
French and by certain groups in the United States, as well as by
the assumption "that in the absence of some overt act against Amer-
icans here, our actions will be confined to remonstrances and note
sending.”118 Monrovia’s objections to the League plan centered on
four main points: the excessive authority the plan allowed foreign
officials; the possibility that an American might be appointed chief
adviser (on this point Barclay had changed his mind, probably as
the result of the American government’s close cooperation with
Firestone); the increase of the Firestone debt that the plan would
entail; and the high cost of the plan, particularly the expenditures
for foreign officials. Winship felt that it would be wiser for America
and the League to make concessions to these Liberian criticisms
than to withdraw the entire assistance scheme, leaving the country
on its own and vulnerable to British and French machinations
against its independence. 119
Secretary Hull agreed to the extent of recommending concessions
to reduce the cost of the plan, and he was finally able to prevail on
Firestone to drop his demand for an American chief adviser.120 At
the October 1933 meeting of the Liberian Committee of the League,
the Firestone representative made a further concession in liberal-
izing certain provisions dealing with the Liberian budget, which
was tightly controlled under the 1926 agreement. The League’s final
"Draft Protocol establishing a Plan of Assistance for Liberia”121
incorporated these changes and was urgently endorsed to the Libe-
rian government as the last effort the League would make on its
behalf; the plan was to be accepted in full or not at all.
The hope that Liberia would accept it was small from the outset,
in view of its representative’s protest after the defeat of an amend-
ment stipulating that neither the chief adviser nor the other foreign
118 Werlich to Hull, Sept. 8, 1933, tel., ibid., 931.
119 Ibid., 931-933; Hull to Roosevelt, Sept. 21, 1933, ibid., 933-934.
120 Harvey Firestone, Jr., to Hull, Sept. 22, 1933, ibid., 935.
121 Ibid., 945-959.
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officials should have powers that would undercut those of Liberia’s
officials under the country’s constitution:
To the mind of an unsophisticated African, such as I am, the rejection of
that amendment was not only contrary to the Covenant of the League and
the aforementioned commitments of the Council, but when taken together
with the preamble to the Protocol now before the Council [which de-
clared the plan of assistance to be an effort to preserve Liberia’s inde-
pendence! is in patent contradiction to the purpose for which the assistance
is to be granted, a violation of the most elementary principles of logic. 122
The European powers, moreover, had lost interest, and France and
Germany in particular would no longer cooperate in putting pres-
sure on the Liberian government to accept the virtual League pro-
tectorate. The American charge in Monrovia cabled the State
Department on December 12, 1933, that the Europeans obviously
desired “the onus of persuasion on Liberia to accept the plan to fall
on the United States.”123
The Liberian government reacted to the League demand with
further delaying tactics. It decided to send a commission to the
United States to solicit the financial and moral support, especially
from American Negroes, which would enable it to avoid the League
protectorate. The commission was also empowered to settle the re-
maining differences with Firestone. On January 12, 1934, the Libe-
rian legislature accepted the League plan with twelve reservations
that entirely changed its character. 124 Geneva refused to consider
these, and on May 14, 1934, the Council of the League of Nations
officially withdrew the plan of assistance, 125 with accompanying
British suggestions to expel Liberia from the League.126
Continuing British interest in having something done about
Liberia was manifested in a note of June 12, which urged the United
States, now that the League’s intervention had failed, to take some
kind of action on its own, with which Britain was willing to co-
operate. Accordingly, the State Department sent out to Monrovia
Harry McBride, special assistant to the secretary and former finan-
122 League of Nations, Official Journal, Dec. 1933, 1639.
123 Wedich to Phillips, Dec. 12, 1933, tel., FR, 1933, II, 964.
124 FR, 1934, II, 788-789.
125 League of Nations, Official Journal, June 1934, 509-513.
126 Lindsay to Phillips, May 14, 1934, FR, 1934, II, 796.
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cial adviser to Liberia under the 1912 international loan arrange-
ment, to make a survey of the entire situation and to ascertain
whether the country desired American or joint French-British-
American aid or whether it wished the United States to stay out
completely. It is remarkable that this seems to be the first instance
in which the Liberians were asked what they wanted.
McBrides report127 brought about a complete change in Ameri-
can policy. It applauded Barclay, who had held together the gov-
ernment of his country in an extremely trying period, and the plan
of reform developed by the Liberians themselves, which included
provisions for white advisers in the fields of general administration,
native affairs, and the constabulary. Financial control, taken over
by the Liberians as a result of the 1932 moratorium, would be re-
turned to the American fiscal advisers provided for under the Fire-
stone loan agreement. Considerable efforts had already been made
in building roads and other public works, improving sanitation and
education, and introducing administrative reforms that embodied
the principle of indirect rule.
McBride expressed his belief in the good faith of the Liberian
officials and the possibility of an economic revival in the country.
Revenues were already beginning to climb as a more efficient sys-
tem of tax collection went into effect, and the start of tapping opera-
tions in the Firestone rubber plantations would bring about greater
employment and, through royalties, directly increase the govern-
ment’s income. The opening of the hinterland by new roads would
lead to even greater wealth.
Stressing “that when the moratorium action was taken, the finan-
cial stress [upon the government] was practically unbearable,”128
McBride recommended a compromise of the remaining points at
issue between Firestone and Liberia. He particularly suggested re-
adjustment of the loan with a reduction of the interest rate and of
the number of foreign officials, as well as a change in the priority
provisions for the application of current revenue, which would put
ordinary government expenditures before the loan service charges.
McBride also spoke of the great progress Liberia had made since
he had been in the country in 1919, and he stressed the obvious, but
127 Report by McBride, Oct. 3, 1934, ibid., 806-825.
128 Ibid., 811.
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often forgotten, unfairness of comparing that country with the neigh-
boring colonies, which had the advantage of being developed by
financially strong countries. Since he considered the government of
Liberia to be “functioning in a fairly creditable and serious man-
ner,” McBride suggested that the United States finally recognize
Barclay and aid his government in carrying out its reform plan,
especially by furnishing capable officials.
Acting on these recommendations, Hull informed the British
ambassador on October 17, 1934, that “this Government is prepared
to cooperate with President Barclay in whatever way may be pos-
sible to carry out his proposals.”129 The United States would of-
ficially recognize the Liberian administration as soon as it was
convinced of the seriousness of the plans for reform and recom-
mended that Britain do likewise. Firestone also declared himself
willing to revise the loan agreement along the lines suggested by
McBride130 and to cooperate in other ways, such as sending a medi-
cal officer to Liberia to care for his native employees. 131
On December 13, 1934, the Liberian legislature enacted President
Barclay’s three-year plan. The United States thereupon accorded
recognition. A visit of Harvey Firestone, Jr., to Monrovia paved the
way for a revision of the loan agreement that met most of the
Liberian wishes. 132 By the beginning of 1935 Liberia had weathered
the storm that had threatened its national existence.
The official American attitude toward Liberia during the inde-
pendence crisis was influenced by various factors and underwent
several changes. Originally United States concern was largely hu-
manitarian. With the coming of the great depression, Firestone’s
financial troubles in Liberia had led him to demand American
intervention to protect his investments. Although the conduct of
none of the parties to this diplomatic conflict, Liberia not excepted,
was wholly creditable, it must be acknowledged that Secretary
Stimson, while sympathetic to Firestone’s demands, never com-
pletely surrendered American policy to the interests of the rubber
129 Hull to Lindsay, Oct. 17, 1934, ibid., 826.
130 Phillips to MacVeagh, Nov. 9, 1934, ibid., 827.
131 Hull to Hibbard, Nov. 19, 1934, ibid., 829.
132 Hull to Hibbard, Dec. 21, 1934, tel., ibid., 835.
The U.S. and Liberian Independence 337
corporation; he sought to arrive at an international settlement in
concert with the League of Nations and the major European powers,
especially Britain, which had always manifested considerable in-
terest in Liberian affairs. With the failure of the League’s plan of
assistance—which did have the earmarks of a new international
kind of colonialism—and with the coming into power in the United
States of a new administration less bound to business interests than
Hoover’s, the problem of Liberia was finally solved in a spirit of
friendly cooperation. Skillful Liberian diplomacy, as manifested in
the use of delaying tactics, must not be overlooked as a factor in
enabling that country to retain its position as the only independent
republic in Africa.
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